

405
032 (AMERICAN 17)
JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

Founded by B. L. GILDERSLEEVE

CUL-1703285-17-P014934

Edited by

HAROLD CHERNISS

KEMP MALONE, BENJAMIN D. MERITT, DAVID M. ROBINSON

(VOLUME LXI)

1940

BALTIMORE: THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

LONDON: ARTHUR F. BIRD

PARIS: ALBERT FONTEMOING

LEIPZIG: F. A. BROCKHAUS

1940

P16939

1

CONTENTS OF VOLUME LXI.

No. 241.

	PAGE
Pythagoreans and Greek Mathematics. By W. A. HEIDEL, -	1
Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle. By ERICH FRANK, -	34
Meaning of ἐκτῆμος. By KURT VON FEITZ, -	54
On the Apocryphal Oath of the Athenians at Plataea. By DONALD W. PRAKKEN, -	62
blimites. By EMIL GOLDMANN, -	66
cretius V, 1442. By G. CLEMENT WHITTICK, -	69
Gens Porcia and Monte Porzio Catone. By GEORGE MCCracken, -	73
On Aristophanes. By MILTON GIFFLER, -	77
On Aristotle, 'Aθ. Πολ., 54. By BENJAMIN D. MERRITT, -	78
Emended Oracle. By H. W. PARKE, -	78
Note on Isidore. By ARTHUR STANLEY PEASE, -	80
VIEWS: -	81

The Cambridge Ancient History, XII; Volume of Plates, V (HUGH LAST).—*Altheim's* A History of Roman Religion Translated by *Harold Mattingly* (ARTHUR DARBY NOCK).—*Ros'* Die Μεταβολή (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides (JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.).—*Robinson and Clement's* Excavations at Olynthus, Part IX (ALFRED R. BELLINGER).—*Cumont's* L'Égypte des Astrologues (H. C. YOUTIE).—*Stuart's* The Portraiture of Claudius (PAUL A. CLEMENT).—*Schadewaldt's* Homer und die homerische Frage (HAROLD CHERNISS).—*Reinhardt's* Das Parisurteil (HAROLD CHERNISS).—*Riefstahl's* Der Roman des Apuleius (HENRY W. PRESCOTT).—*Molt's* Ad Apulei Madamensis Metamorphoseon Librum Commentarius Exegeticus (HENRY W. PRESCOTT).—*De Cola's* Callimaco e Ovidio (WM. STUART MESSER).—*Visser's* Götter und Kulte im ptolemäischen Alexandrien (IVAN M. LINFORTH).—*Austin's* The Stoicheion Style in Greek Inscriptions (STERLING DOW).—*Tarn's* The Greeks in Bactria and India (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).—*Thomas' Recherches* sur le développement du préverbe latin *ad-* (WALTER PETERSEN).—*Simpson's* M. Minucii Felici Octavius (CHARLES UPSON CLARK).

No. 242.

The Background of the Social War of 220-217 B. C. By JOHN V. A. FINE, -	PAC 15
The Fundamental Opposition of Plato and Aristotle (concluded). By ERICH FRANK, -	16
The Composition of the Tribes Antigonis and Demetrias. By W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT, -	18
The Athenian Cleruchy on Samos. By EUGENE SCHWEIGERT, -	19
O. Mich. I, 24. By HERBERT C. YOUTIE, -	19
Valerius Maximus in Certain Excerpts of the Twelfth Century. By DOROTHY M. SCHULLIAN, -	20
A Note on the New Inscription from Samothrace. By M. ROSTOVITZKY, -	20
Addendum. By C. B. WELLES, -	20
Another Literary Papyrus in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge. By F. M. HENCKELHEIM, -	20
REVIEWS: -	21

Roberts' Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester, III. (W. A. OLDFATHER).—*Pohlens' Hippokrates und die Begründung der wissenschaftlichen Medizin* (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN).—*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. XLIX (WHITNEY J. OATES).—*Robinson and Graham's Excavations at Olynthus, VIII: The Hellenic House* (AXEL BOETHIUS).—*Bonner and Smith's The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, II* (HARRY M. HUBBELL).—*Perry's Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop* (ELINOR M. HUSSELMAN).—*Zmigryder-Konopka's Le Guerrier de Capestrano* (J. WHATMOUGH).—*Scharf's Studien zur Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Rheinlande auf epigraphischer Grundlage* (NORMAN J. DEWITT).—*Hatch's The Principal Uncial Manuscripts of the New Testament* (H. A. SANDERS).—*Bender's Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides* (JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.).—*Dörrie's Passio SS. Machabaeorum. Die antike lateinische Übersetzung des IV Makkabäerbuches* (ARTHUR DABBY NOCK).—*Pfeiffer's Die Netzflücher des Aischylos und der Inachos des Sophokles* (ALFRED CARY SCHLESINGER).—*Olemen's Lukians Schrift über die syrische Göttin* (ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH).—*Delcourt's Stérilités mystérieuses et naissances maléfiques dans l'antiquité classique* (ERNST RIESS).—*Nestle's Der Friedensgedanke in der antiken Welt* (AUBREY DILLER).

CONTENTS.

v

No. 243.

	PAGE
The Divine Entourage in Homer. By GEORGE M. CALHOUN,	257
The Mind of Lucretius. By CYRIL BAILEY, - - - - -	278
On "Twofold Statements." By ADOLFO LEVI, - - - - -	292
Observations on Chronology in Sound-Changes in the Italic Dialects. By A. C. MOORHOUSE, - - - - -	307
Fragments of a Latin Grammar from Egypt. By JAMES E. DUNLAP, - - - - -	330
New Datings for Some Attic Honorary Decrees. By ELEANOR WESTON, - - - - -	345
<i>Pimare</i> in Isidore. By LEO SPITZER, - - - - -	357
The Athenian Secretary Phaidros of Cholleidai. By EUGENE SCHWEIGERT, - - - - -	358
REVIEWS: - - - - -	359

Cameron's The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of Recollection (HAROLD CHEYNISS).—*Raeder's* Platons Epinomis (BENEDIKT EINARSON).—*Zeller-Mondolfo's* La Filosofia dei Greci nel suo Sviluppo Storico. Parte I: I Presocratici, Vol. II: Ionici e Pitagorici (ALISTER CAMERON).—*Kern's* Die Religion der Griechen. Dritter Band: Von Platon bis Kaiser Julian (IVAN M. LINFORTH).—*Schmekel's* Die Positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Erster Band: Forschungen zur Philosophie des Hellenismus (PHILLIP HOWARD DE LACY).—*Beede's* Vergil and Aratus, a Study in the Art of Translation (EUGENE O'NEILL, JR.).—*Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor's* The Athenian Tribute Lists, Volume I (JAMES H. OLIVER).—*Laidlaw's* The Prosody of Terence, a Relational Study (ALICE F. BRAUNLICH).

BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	383
---------------------------	-----

No. 244.

Sophocles on his own Development. By C. M. BOWRA, - - -	385
Alexander's Plans. By C. A. ROBINSON, JR., - - - - -	402
Corinth and the Argive Coalition. By H. D. WESTLAKE, - - -	413
Euripides and Eustathius. By HAROLD W. MILLER, - - -	422
Apollo and the Sun-God in Ovid. By JOSEPH E. FONTENROSE, -	429
Livy as Scripture. By MOSES HADAS, - - - - -	445
Drusus Caesar's Tribunician Power. By ROBERT SAMUEL ROGERS,	457
Ptolemais and the Archon Sortition Cycles. By WILLIAM BELL DINSMOOR, - - - - -	460
The Term of Office of Attic Strategoi. By W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT,	469

	PAGE
A New Fragment of A. T. L., D8. By ANTON E. RAUBITSCHKE,	475
P. Aberdeen 18. By H. C. YOUTIE,	480
REVIEWS:	483
<i>Jaeger's</i> Diokles von Karystos. Die griechische Medizin und die Schule des Aristoteles (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN).— <i>Bignone's</i> Studi sul Pensiero Antico (FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN).— <i>Severyns's</i> Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus, Première Partie: Le Codex 239 de Photius, Tomes I et II (FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK).— <i>Paratore's</i> Introduzione alle Georgiche (JAMES HUTTON).— <i>Ehrenberg's</i> Alexander and the Greeks (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).— <i>Glötz, Roussel, and Cohen's</i> Histoire Grecque, IV, Part I: Alexandre et le Démembrement de son Empire (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.).— <i>Becker-Freyseng's</i> Die Vorgeschichte des philosophischen Terminus 'contingens' (K. v. FRITZ).— <i>Le Blond's</i> Eulogos et l'argument de convenance chez Aristote (WILLIAM C. GREENE).— <i>Mugler's</i> L'Évolution des subordonnées relatives complexes en Grec (JAMES W. POULTNEY).— <i>Westington's</i> Atrocities in Roman Warfare to 133 B. C. (WILLIAM G. FLETCHER).— <i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i> , XV (AGNES KIRSOPP LAKE).— <i>Müller's</i> Claudians Festgedicht auf das sechste Konsulat des Kaisers Honorius (LESTER K. BORN).— <i>Rolfe's</i> Ammianus Marcellinus, II and III (CHARLES UPSON CLARK).— <i>Walde-Hofmann's</i> Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 3. Auflage, Lief. 10, 11 (ROLAND G. KENT).— <i>Sage and Schlesinger's</i> Livy, XII (Books XL-XLII) (NORMAN W. DEWITT).	
BOOKS RECEIVED,	514
INDEX TO VOLUME LXI,	516

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXI, 1

WHOLE No. 241

THE PYTHAGOREANS AND GREEK MATHEMATICS.

Historians are not agreed regarding the relevancy of the history of mathematics to the general history of science and philosophy. While Zeller treated it as negligible, except as mathematical concepts entered expressly into a system, some recent historians have regarded it as far more important, some going so far as to assign to it a leading rôle in the story. A story, of course, requires a hero, and Pythagoras would naturally play that part, were it not for the critical examination of the tradition that began, say, with the publication of Zeller's monumental work. In default of so imposing a figure, historians now tend to fall back upon the "Pythagoreans," as one might tell the story of a nation as that of a reigning dynasty; for the Pythagoreans are conceived as the mathematicians *par excellence* of Greece down to the middle of the fourth century, B. C.

Obviously this view has certain formal advantages, which it is not necessary to emphasize. Moreover, the candid student will gladly acknowledge that the concentration on mathematics that favors and accompanies this point of view has been fruitful in many ways. To be sure it is no uncommon observation that the positive contribution of any discussion is apt to be incidental and nearly or quite independent of the preconceived notion as to the angle from which the subject should be approached. It is important, therefore, to determine with what right and in what measure the critical historian may single out the Pythagoreans as especially worthy of playing the leading rôle, even if one grants the preëminent importance of mathematics.

Though our present concern is with the Pythagoreans as mathematicians, one cannot altogether ignore certain data on

which historians rely as evidence of scientific achievements on the part of Pythagoras himself. In this regard contemporary evidence, which we should value highly, is negligible when closely examined. Xenophanes alluded to his belief in the transmigration of souls, significant in reference to his religious views, but of philosophic importance only on certain assumptions that we have no right to make for Pythagoras himself. Much is made of a statement of Diogenes Laërtius¹ that Xenophanes denied that God breathes, it being assumed that he was rejecting the Pythagorean doctrine, attested by Aristotle,² that the cosmos inhales time and empty space from the surrounding infinite. If one adopts this view one does so in spite of several important considerations. For, first of all, the authority of Diogenes is not in itself great, and the passage in which the statement occurs is confused and in part certainly inaccurate, since it asserts that Xenophanes held the doctrine of the four elements. This alone, without other considerations, suffices to show that we have to do with a source on which one may not well rely. However, assuming that Xenophanes really said that God does not breathe, it is not necessary to suppose that he had a philosophical statement to the contrary in mind. He presumably had in mind rather the popular anthropomorphism; for he said that God in no wise resembles man, either in body or in mind—He is all sight, all hearing, all thought.³ That implies that God has neither eyes nor ears. Why should He have lungs? The reference to Pythagoras presupposes that Xenophanes identified God with the cosmos, an assumption that rests on a dubious interpretation of a statement by Aristotle;⁴ but even if one accepts that interpretation as true, there is as good reason to think that he was criticizing Anaximenes as Pythagoras.

Heraclitus also referred to Pythagoras, but in ways that do not warrant one in supposing that he thought of him as in any

¹ IX, 19.

² *Phys.* 213 b 22 ff., *frag.* 201 Rose.

³ The text of Diogenes apparently presupposes this context, for it continues *σύνπαντά τε εἶναι τοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ δίδων*.

⁴ *Metaph.* 986 b 24, *eis. τὸν δλον οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν εἶναι φησι τὸν θεόν*. Aside from the fact that the Laurentian omits *τὸν θεόν*, the word *ἀποβλέψας* raises questions. It is natural to suppose that here, as at 991 a 23, it means "looking at a model," the usual meaning in Plato.

sort concerned with science or mathematics. "Learning of many things," he says,⁵ "teacheth not understanding, else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus." Another fragment,⁶ of doubtful authenticity, asserts that Pythagoras practised inquiry more than all other men, and constructed for himself a wisdom that was only a knowledge of many things and an imposture. One suggestion of the text, as it has come down to us, is that Pythagoras culled his wisdom from many books. That might indeed be true, but what we otherwise have grounds for believing regarding him would hardly suggest it. The only real clue to the meaning of Heraclitus is the company in which he places the sage; and one will hardly contend that it suggests scientific inquiry in the sense in which it was practised by Pythagoreans in later times. Certainly it is difficult to associate the imposture charged to him with mathematics or mathematical theories.

On the other hand, Epicharmus at a somewhat later date is seriously invoked as a witness to the mathematical interest of Pythagoras or his Order; for a fragment of his refers to odd and even numbers.⁷ Whether the text is genuine or not, it seems to me incredible that one should think of these terms or of the practice of counting with pebbles as originating with Pythagoras. No doubt odd and even numbers, square and oblong figures were almost as old in his day as they are in ours. To make plausible a reference to a particular thinker it does not suffice to point out something that was presumably the common property of many, if not most men; what one has a right to require is something distinctive, for example, in the connection of ideas.

When one comes to Alcmaeon the case is not quite so simple. There is no doubt that he was a physician of Croton, where according to tradition Pythagoras first established his Order. Of the date at which the medical school⁸ of Croton originated we have no definite knowledge, though certainly it existed before the arrival of Pythagoras; neither is it certain whether it had a

⁵ *Frag.* 40 Diels, tr. Burnet.

⁶ 129.

⁷ *Frag.* 2 Diels.

⁸ This term, commonly used, is apt to prove misleading. We must not think of an organized society in the sixth century. Wherever there were physicians who taught their art to their sons or to others whom they approved, there was a "school."

filiation to any other school, though a relation to the Cnidian is not improbable. As a physician Alcmaeon would most naturally derive whatever medical or physiological presuppositions he made from the school to which he belonged, and there is the best of evidence for the belief that in his time as well as later a physician was generally interested in such scientific researches as were being pressed, as the employment of Democedes and Ctesias by the Kings of Persia well illustrates. Alcmaeon dedicated his treatise to three men reported to have been Pythagoreans, but about whose attainments and achievements we know little or nothing. We may assume, therefore, that he was at least on intimate terms with members of the Order, as would be natural in any case since all concerned presumably belonged to the intellectually more conspicuous group of citizens. This association need not of course imply any formal relation to the Pythagorean Order, nor does it afford any grounds for attributing to it any special interest or direction of research considered as a whole. Later tradition, to be sure, regarded Alcmaeon as a Pythagorean, and that view is still generally accepted. So far as one can see, this assumption can be justified only by a statement in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which, however, proves upon examination to be at least very dubious. After speaking of certain Pythagoreans who set up a table of ten pairs of contraries—limited and unlimited, odd and even, etc.—he proceeds,⁹ "In this way Alcmaeon of Croton seems to have conceived the matter, and either he got the view from them or they got it from him; for he expressed himself similarly to them. For he says most human affairs go in pairs, meaning not definite contrarieties such as the Pythagoreans speak of, but any chance contrarieties, e. g. white and black, sweet and bitter, good and bad, great and small. He threw out indefinite suggestions about the other contrarieties, but the Pythagoreans declared both how many and which their contrarieties are."

In justice to those who regard Alcmaeon as a Pythagorean it must be added that this version of Aristotle's statement omits a clause asserting that he was <young> in the old age of Pythagoras, which is found in some good manuscripts but wanting in the best. I fully agree with Ross in bracketing it, not only because

⁹ *Metaph.* 986 a 26 ff., tr. Ross.

it is omitted by the Laurentian and is quite ignored by Alexander and is besides otherwise contrary to the usage of Aristotle, but because the text of the MSS that contain the clause is imperfect, since it does not give the inevitable word "young" (νέος). This seems to me strongly to suggest that we have here a marginal note carelessly embodied in the text. One may even conjecture with some confidence the source of the marginal note; for it may well be derived from Porphyry's *Life of Pythagoras* (c. 104), where a long and ill-assorted list is given of the most ancient Pythagoreans who were contemporaries or pupils of Pythagoras, young in his old age (συγχρονίσαντες καὶ μαθητεύσαντες τῷ Πυθαγόρᾳ πρεσβύτῃ νέοι), including Alcmaeon. If that were true, one readily understands why Alexander could not take account of it.

Now, if we consider the matter more in detail the data regarding Alcmaeon fail to give us much real information. Aristotle, on this view, affords no indication of his date, and Porphyry is as always, except where we can certainly make out his authorities, quite untrustworthy. In this instance he groups as contemporaries and personal pupils of Pythagoras, along with Alcmaeon, such men as Philolaus and his pupil Eurytus as well as Lysis, the teacher of Epaminondas, who must be dated near the turn of the fifth and fourth centuries. Furthermore it is natural to infer that Aristotle had no knowledge whether Alcmaeon was actually a member of the Pythagorean Order; and the way he speaks of the possible relation of their respective doctrines is quite non-committal. To this one must add that from Zeller onward the consensus of scholars has strongly tended to regard the table of ten contrarities as a relatively late creation of certain Pythagoreans. It is clear, then, that Alcmaeon affords no criterion for determining what is early and late in Pythagoreanism.

What he had in common with certain Pythagoreans of unknown date is, according to Aristotle, a tendency to look upon things as characterized by contraries. Just why Aristotle should have thought it necessary to ask whether such a natural point of view had been borrowed by either from the other remains a profound mystery, because he himself had emphasized the rôle of certain contrarities in the thought of the Ionians, especially Anaximander. Not to mention the common Greek

practice of setting one state in contrast to its opposite,¹⁰ it was inevitable that Alcmaeon as a physician should concern himself with such phenomena as heat and cold, the opposite effects of summer and winter on his patients. If there was anything distinctive of either Alcmaeon or Pythagoreans in this respect we have no knowledge of it. Burnet, to be sure, in his notes on Plato, *Phaedo* 86b f., would have us believe that the doctrine was Pythagorean, though the special form of it there set forth must have been influenced by Empedocles and the Sicilian School. What one may infer from Aristotle's statement is perhaps only that he was aware that Alcmaeon was sometimes regarded as a Pythagorean or, because of the dedication of his book, in close touch with the Order, but that he was not prepared to commit himself on the question of their relations. That, at least, appears to have been his general attitude toward the Pythagorean tradition as we see it reflected in the works of his maturity.

Our present concern being with the history of Greek mathematics and the rôle played by the Pythagoreans in it, it is clear that so far what we know about Alcmaeon throws no light on the subject. It is true that in the Pythagorean table of contrarieties there are several pairs of mathematical concepts; but none of these is attested for Alcmaeon, and the uncertainty respecting his date and that of the table deprives the question of all possible evidential value. The same is obviously true of the only other datum that may be thought to have a bearing on Pythagorean science. Aëtius states¹¹ that certain *μαθηματικοί*, presumably Pythagoreans, held that the planets moved in a sense contrary to that of the fixed stars, i. e. from west to east, and that Alcmaeon agreed with them. While this would not directly throw light on Pythagorean mathematics, if accepted and interpreted as implying that the theory of the *μαθηματικοί* was at least as old as Alcmaeon, it would confirm one's belief in the scientific interest of Pythagoreans at a date presumably before the middle of the fifth century. The character of the

¹⁰ See Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*,² p. 8. Heraclitus only emphasizes what was a common Greek point of view. His merit lies in his attempt to reconcile the oppositions which everyone felt.

¹¹ II, 16, 2-3. The other astronomical views attributed to Alcmaeon are, as Burnet, *B. G. P.*³, p. 110, n. 1, truly says, extremely crude.

text of Aëtius, however, is such as hardly to warrant one in accepting the statement as a fact or in so interpreting it, if it were true; for Aëtius is lavish of statements about Pythagoras that sober criticism must reject, and perhaps the earliest dependable evidence regarding the date of Alcmaeon comes from Greek medical writers of the "Hippocratic" and Sicilian schools in the latter half of the fifth century. The earliest of the "planets" (excluding sun and moon) mentioned are the morning and evening stars, the discovery of their identity being attributed to Parmenides or to Pythagoras. Disregarding the latter, it is possible that the former actually referred to their identity. As for the supposed retrograde motion of the planets, including sun and moon, we know that Plato in the *Laws* still thought it worth while to declare that it was false. We are told that Anaxagoras and Democritus held that all the stars moved from east to west. On the other hand Plato in the *Timaeus* and the myth of Er in the *Republic* represented the planets as moving from west to east. It may very well be true, therefore, that the notion was originated or at least held by Pythagoreans.

It is certain that Plato and his school owed much to the Pythagoreans, and that Socrates had among his associates men who were somehow affiliated with them. It was, however, a revived Pythagoreanism in both cases, and many questions that cannot be confidently answered arise in connection with it. On the surface it would appear that the associates of Socrates were chiefly concerned with religious and moral problems, while Plato and his school debated mathematical questions with Pythagoreans. This appearance may be deceptive. In any case, as we shall presently see, it is difficult if not impossible for the most part to distinguish between what is Platonic and what is Pythagorean. Above all, we obtain from Plato no certain criteria by which one could differentiate between the fifth and the fourth centuries in Pythagorean thought. Since the revived Pythagoreanism died out at the end of the fourth century one turns expectantly to Aristotle and his pupils for information, the more hopefully because Aristotle and his school diligently studied the earlier history of the several sciences. There were, however, marked differences among them, and unfortunately Aristoxenus of Tarentum, who was most deeply interested in Pythagoreanism,


appears in general to deserve little confidence. It seems probable that he was responsible for a good deal that is reported by later writers.

To begin with Aristotle, there are those who confidently cite a statement made by Apollonius, a writer not earlier than the second century B. C., in his *Historias Mirabiles*, 6: "After these (*sc.* Epimenides, Aristeeas, Hermotimus, Abaris, Pherecydes) came Pythagoras the son of Mnesarchus. At first he busied himself with mathematics, i. e. with numbers,¹² but after a time he did not refrain from the miracle-working of Pherecydes." It will be noted that at best we have here witness to concern about numbers on the part of Pythagoras, entirely credible in itself, but giving no real information, because we are left in the dark regarding the way he was supposed to deal with numbers. So much might probably have been said of any man at the time. The circumstance that makes it worth while to cite the remark is that it is supposed to be derived from Aristotle, who would presumably mean that Pythagoras already began the speculations about numbers mentioned as characteristic of Pythagoreans in his extant treatises. There is, however, no reason whatever to think that the statement derives from Aristotle,¹³ who is expressly cited only as authority for several statements in the sequel. It is interesting, however, to note that from the context it would seem to follow that Pythagoras took up Miracle-working after the fashion of Pherecydes after arriving at Metapontum, whereas his occupation with numbers would thus have begun (and ended?) in Ionia.¹⁴ This would be poor evidence for Pythagoras and his Order as the prime movers in the study of mathematics among the Greeks. We may confidently dismiss this datum as of no significance. Elsewhere Aristotle attributed not a single scientific achievement to Pythagoras. Apollonius is known to have quoted as genuine works admitted to be falsely

¹² *καί* is here, as often, defining.

¹³ Rose includes it in Aristotle, *frag.* 191.

¹⁴ The supposed connection of Pythagoras with Pherecydes is referred by some to his earlier, by others to his later years. Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.*, 184, represents Pythagoras as returning from Italy to attend him in his last illness. This is very improbable. Whether this statement derives from Aristoxenus, who said that he buried Pherecydes in Delos (Diog. Laërt., I, 118), is not certain, though not improbable.



attributed to Aristotle, and in the present case, where no authority is actually cited, it is more likely that he derived the notion from Heraclides of Pontus or a similar source. It is characteristic of a certain kind of the search for sources that this particular statement should be attributed to Aristotle simply because it precedes several others expressly referred to him. There is no doubt that he had written a special treatise about the Pythagorean doctrines,¹⁵ but there remain some difficult questions regarding its scope.

Perhaps the most precise statement regarding the date of the Pythagoreans known to Aristotle occurs in the *Metaphysics*:¹⁶ "Contemporary with these philosophers and before them the Pythagoreans, so-called, devoted themselves to mathematics; they were the first to advance this study, and having been brought up in it they thought its principles were the principles of all things." Of the nature of this study we shall speak presently; for the moment we are concerned chiefly with the temporal relation of the Pythagoreans. It seems clear that the philosophers to whom they were to be compared as to date were Leucippus and Democritus, who had just been mentioned, not the entire series of thinkers previously enumerated. Unfortunately the statement leaves much to be desired, because it is very vague. Assuming that Aristotle meant that the Pythagoreans were contemporaries of both Leucippus and Democritus and in part earlier than either of them, the time indicated might extend from a date before the middle of the fifth century far into the fourth. That is doubtless true as to the later period, and it may have been the case so far as the earlier date is concerned; but it is not certain that Aristotle meant to say just that. It is quite possible that he meant that the first ones were contemporary with Leucippus and earlier than Democritus, for his expression is singularly wanting in precision. What does he imply in saying that they were the first to advance the study of mathematics? Conceivably he might have meant that the study long antedated them and that their merit lay in notably advancing it; but if so, one learns nothing from him that one could not safely infer from a general knowledge of Greek civilization, which had already attained a high degree of advancement. Again, the state-

¹⁵ *Metaph.* 986 a 12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* 985 b 23 ff.

ment that they had been brought up in the study implies either that it existed as such before they took it up, or that those who advanced it were not the earliest Pythagoreans. At all events careful attention to Aristotle's statement actually assures us that in the latter part of the fifth century Greek mathematics had attained considerable development, which the Pythagoreans were credited with promoting. The precise date would then depend on that of Leucippus, which is unknown.

Another statement similarly vague also occurs in the same work. "Socrates," we are told,¹⁷ "occupied himself with the excellences of character, and in connection with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definitions—for in the realm of physics the problem was only touched on by Democritus, who defined, after a fashion, the hot and the cold;¹⁸ while the Pythagoreans had before then treated of a few things, whose definitions¹⁹ they connected with numbers—e. g. opportunity, justice, or marriage." We may ignore the reference to definitions by predecessors of Socrates, as they were not definitions at all in the logical sense; but it is worth noting that Aristotle at least affords no comfort to those who attribute definitions of geometrical terms to Pythagoreans before the time of Zeno. What interests us here is that Socrates is dated after Democritus and the Pythagoreans are set down before the latter. If this order is accepted as historically true, the occupation of Socrates with universal definitions must be referred to his last years, and the Pythagoreans who proposed the identification of concepts like justice or marriage need not have been earlier than the last third of the fifth century.

In many passages Aristotle either expressly couples Pythagoreans with Plato or Platonists or else makes statements that

¹⁷ *Ibid.* 1078 b 17 ff., tr. Ross.

¹⁸ Aristotle apparently refers to such things as the description of the fire atoms as little spheres.

¹⁹ Cf. *Metaph.* 985 b 29, 987 a 19 ff. It is curious that Aristotle should regard such identifications as definitions. One should expect him somewhere to refer to the definition of mathematical terms, e. g. such as are required in geometry, but he never does so. At best the statement, *Eth. Nic.* 1132 b 21 ff. *ὁρίζοντο γὰρ ἀπλῶς τὸ δίκαιον τὸ ἀντικειμενὸς ἄλλῳ* might be compared with attempts of interlocutors in Platonic dialogues. See in general, *De Part. An.* 642 a 24 ff.

may sometimes apply to both and sometimes distinguish between them. Doubtless in his lectures he would make it clear to whom he specifically referred; we cannot always distinguish, and even his ancient commentators were often at a loss. What this means is at once obvious. For Aristotle the Pythagoreans were generally of interest chiefly because of their relation to the teachings of the school of Plato in which he was brought up. The subjects of prime importance to him were those debated in the Academy, while he belonged to it, and between him and the leading Platonists, after he had set up his own school. As has already been said, we are frequently unable to assign the various views to their advocates, just because those who heard his lectures were presumably themselves engaged in the debates and hardly needed to be told whose views were being criticized. Though we cannot hope to go far in solving the historical and personal questions involved in these discussions, a general presumption does seem to be created by this state of the record. Whatever may have gone before (the very point that chiefly concerns us at the moment) it is difficult to accept the view, now tacitly assumed by some scholars, that the debates in the Academy, during Aristotle's connection with it, were chiefly concerned with Pythagorean theories and definitions proposed a century or more earlier. When in search of teachings that might seem to foreshadow his own doctrine Aristotle was often compelled to re-interpret the record, not only in regard to the four kinds of causation, but also in regard to other matters. One might easily point out instances where a rather primitive doctrine is set into a very different light because the point of view had radically changed. Unless one bears this in mind one is likely to misconceive entirely the historical development or, at least to build a structure of unverifiable and improbable hypotheses.

So far as concerns the chronology of Pythagorean mathematics it seems to be clear that Aristotle does not warrant us in going beyond the middle of the fifth century. Of course one may conjecturally go much farther back, and many have done so and doubtless will continue to do so. That is a privilege any scholar has, provided he is himself aware, and keeps his readers aware, of the basis of his statements. We have therefore to consider the view of the Pythagorean mathematics as Aristotle

saw it. It is surprising how little positive information he gives us on this head, and some of his definite, and repeated, statements are open to the justifiable suspicion of actual misrepresentation.

His most general statement²⁰ tells us that the Pythagoreans were the first to advance the study of mathematics. He does not say what he means by the term, but it is natural from the context to infer that he was thinking principally of their pre-occupation with *numbers*. They thought numbers, as the first principles of mathematics, were the principles of all things. Because they saw in numbers resemblances to things about them, and because the attributes and ratios of the musical scales could be expressed in numbers, and all other things were modeled after numbers, they thought the elements of numbers were the elements of all things and that the whole heaven was a musical scale and a number. As for the elements of number he elsewhere²¹ tells us that they were the odd and the even, or the limited and the unlimited. The examples he gives of the way in which they noted resemblances in numbers to parts of the heavens and how they identified numbers with certain abstract concepts do not add to our knowledge of mathematics, but rather suggest that their method was fantastic and futile, as were the "definitions" he mentions. If these were the best they could offer, they required little serious attention, and there would be no reason to suspect that their geometry afforded examples of terms properly defined. The same may be said of his report regarding the nature of the One and of the Infinite.²² We are repeatedly

²⁰ *Metaph.* 985 b 22 ff.

²¹ *Ibid.* 986 a 18.

²² Aristotle repeatedly says that the Pythagoreans, like Plato, regarded the One ($\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\nu$) and the Infinite ($\tau\omicron\ \alpha\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$) as substance and not as attribute, and yet divided the latter (*Phys.* 203, a 4-6; 204 a 20-34; cf. *Metaph.* 987 a 134; 1001 a 3 ff.; 1053 b 9-16). One wonders what basis there was for his statements so far as the Pythagoreans were concerned. Possibly he was transferring Platonic expressions to them. One suspects that he had only the expressions $\tau\omicron\ \epsilon\nu$ and $\tau\omicron\ \alpha\epsilon\iota\rho\omicron\nu$ to go on, and interpreted these as implying the substantial existence of the One and the Infinite apart from any entity of which they might be predicated. This interpretation might well be captious; for, when he professes to cite an actual opinion of theirs, he says (*Metaph.* 1091 a 13 ff., tr. Ross), "There need be no doubt whether the Pythagoreans attribute generation to them (i.e. things) or not; for they obviously say that when the One had been constructed (whether out of planes or of surface or of seed or of elements which they cannot express [rather

told that they knew only one kind of number, the "mathematical" or abstract, but that it also had magnitude, or was spatial. Aristotle is apparently puzzled by this contradiction, and it is difficult to believe that any one consciously held these contradictory views regarding the same thing. One is tempted to think that Aristotle combined two classes of expressions, (1) those relating to mathematics and (2) those used in their cosmology. In their reckonings and in their theory of numbers the numerals they employed were naturally those used by everyone else, whether or not they were expressly characterized as abstract. The difficulty, real or factitious, arose from their use of numbers in cosmology. Here the different ways in which Aristotle represents their views raises the question whether he does them justice, for it is hardly possible to regard as synonymous the statements that the concrete things are made of numbers and that they display resemblances to or are imitations of numbers. There are, of course, ways in which one may explain the different statements without impugning Aristotle's veracity or the fairness of his interpretation; but, when all is said, there remains a reasonable doubt as to the actual views of the Pythagoreans that is not removed by referring to the figurate representation of numbers or to the practice of Eurytus. It is more to the point to note that in any case this practice of Eurytus makes it impossible to distinguish between early and late conceptions of numbers among Pythagoreans. To say, as is sometimes said, that Eurytus "still" used the primitive method merely begs the question. We know that, as the pupil of Philolaus, he was approximately contemporary with Plato.

about which they don't know what to say]), immediately the nearest part of the Infinite began to be constrained [rather, reading *εισελκετο*, "inhaled"] and limited by the limit." Whatever their *language* might imply, it is fair to assume that they thought of the Infinite, not as a substance, but as an attribute of something that could be inhaled, say breath, or air. Cf. Diels, *Vorsokr.*⁵, I, p. 460, 4 ff. The passage above enclosed in parentheses is explained by *Metaph.* 1080 b 20, *ὅπως δὲ τὸ πρῶτον ἐν συνόρτῃ ἔχον μέγεθος, ἀπορεῖν ἐόικασιν*. In any case, whatever basis he had for the supposition that the One and the Infinite were substances seems to have referred to cosmology, and so had reference to mathematics only on the assumption that *the cosmos was actually constituted of numbers*. In so far as the Pythagoreans meant that to be taken quite literally, his argument would of course hold good; but it throws no light on their mathematical conceptions.

In all this we discover little that goes beyond the concern of the Pythagoreans about numbers. The table of ten contrarieties contains several mathematical terms, but they may all relate to numbers rather than to geometry. The same is true of the musical intervals and concords and of the harmony of the spheres. As for Pythagorean geometry proper, in which historians of mathematics are naturally most interested, there is, so far as I can see, no certain reference to it in Aristotle. One naturally thinks of the proposition that the square on the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, which no one, probably, doubts that we owe to the Pythagoreans; but, in the first place, though Aristotle alludes to it,²³ he does not say that it was Pythagorean, and secondly he states the matter as concerned with numbers, using it as an example of demonstration by a *reductio ad absurdum*: the proof that the diagonal is incommensurable results from the fact that odd must be equal to even numbers. He speaks of Pythagoreans as earlier than Plato, but he provides no criterion by which to distinguish later from earlier or to determine the age of a single achievement.

When we come to his pupil Eudemus, who wrote the history of the mathematical sciences, we naturally have great expectations. Unfortunately little remains of his work, and that little has in part to be reconstructed from late sources. In the reconstruction, moreover, due care has not always been taken to avoid unjustifiable assumptions; for it does not follow from the fact that the later tradition dealing with the history of mathematics ultimately depends on Eudemus that it did not suffer additions as well as losses. The situation here seems to be quite parallel to that of the doxographic tradition which ultimately derives from Theophrastus, for it is plain in the latter case that the phase represented by Aëtius was strongly influenced by the school of Posidonius, who followed the Stoic practice of "accommodation" or assimilation of earlier to later doctrines. We know, for example, that Posidonius thought that Parmenides knew the geographical zones.²⁴ When it is reported²⁵ that Py-

²³ *Anal. Pr.* 41 a 26.

²⁴ Strabo, I, 94, repeated by Aëtius, III, 11, 4. Aëtius, II, 12, 1 says that Pythagoras and his followers knew the five celestial zones. This

thagoras and Parmenides regarded the earth as spherical, it is obvious that these views go together. Since every other indication points definitely to the conclusion that the sphericity of the earth was first proposed about the end of the fifth century, one has good reason to suspect that we have in these statements an example of the historical method of Posidonius, of which Galen gives us a good illustration. He says ²⁶ that Posidonius ascribed the doctrine of the tripartite soul to Pythagoras, "inferring it from what some of his disciples have written; though no treatise of Pythagoras himself has survived to our time." There being no evidence of Pythagorean writings before the time of Philolaus,²⁷ who lived at most a generation before Plato, the Pythagoreans on whom he relied dated presumably from the fourth century or later, and it is not even necessarily implied that these attributed the doctrine in question to Pythagoras. Probably Posidonius merely found the doctrine stated by some Pythagorean and from its source inferred that Pythagoras himself had held it, because, as he thought, his followers religiously adhered to his views.

It is obvious to any critical student that the reports of Aëtius regarding Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans are so compounded of earlier and later data that they are for historical purposes entirely useless except as they can be checked by reference to others that inspire greater confidence. This does not, of course, mean that Posidonius himself is to be credited with every statement about Pythagoras and Pythagoreans in Aëtius. It is enough for our purposes to know that his method has infected the mass. It is important to bear this in mind in dealing with the history of mathematics, which, as has just been said, derives

looks like another inference to Pythagoras from (late) Pythagoreans, such as we might expect Posidonius to make. Aëtius, II, 24, 9 even attributes the notion of zones to Xenophanes.

²⁶ Diog. Laërt., VIII, 48; IX, 21. From the former passage it seems clear that Theophrastus merely said that Parmenides (first?) used the term *στρογγύλη* as describing the form of the earth. Though it *may* mean spherical, it need not be so interpreted, because it is used in the description of the earth by Diogenes of Apollonia, who thought it a circular disk. Favorinus was the authority of Diog. Laërtius.

²⁷ *De Hippocr. et Platone*, p. 478.

²⁸ Demetrius Magnes, *ap.* Diog. Laërt., VIII, 85.

ultimately from Eudemus, as the doxographic tradition derives from Theophrastus. There is good reason to suspect that the former was subjected to the same influences as the latter. Tannery made out a strong case for the thesis that the summary account of the development of Greek mathematics given by Proclus was directly or indirectly derived from Geminus, and we chance to know that Geminus wrote a commentary on Posidonius. These facts suffice to cast suspicion on the statement of Proclus regarding the mathematical achievements of Pythagoras, which owe their supposed authority to the presumption that they derive from Eudemus. While there are many historians who hold that view, it has been rejected of late by several leading scholars. That it may be questioned is enough for our present purpose. I may add, however, that in my opinion it is certainly not derived from Eudemus. There is, in fact, no satisfactory evidence that Aristotle, Eudemus, or Theophrastus attributed a single scientific achievement to Pythagoras himself: such things they always referred to "Pythagoreans." If other members of Aristotle's school represented Pythagoras as the originator of the interests that marked the scientific pursuits of his Order, it becomes a pertinent question why they did so. We should be especially grateful if we could be quite sure that it was really Dicaearchus, one of the best pupils of Aristotle, who said²⁸ of Pythagoras, "What discourses he held with his associates, no one can affirm, for they observed exceptional silence. Nevertheless what is best attested by all is, first, that he said that the soul is immortal; next, that it migrates into other species of living beings; and in addition, that according to certain periods the things that once were come about again, and nothing is absolutely new; and that all beings that have souls must be considered akin. For it seems that Pythagoras was the first to introduce these beliefs into Greece."

Proclus, then, after saying that Thales first went to Egypt and thence introduced geometry into Greece, himself discovering many propositions and preparing the way for his successors to discover the principles of many others, approaching some solu-

²⁸ Porphyry, *Vit. Pyth.*, 19. Diels (*Vorsokr.*⁵, I, p. 100, 36 ff.) holds, with most scholars, that this statement is part of the text which Porphyry refers to Dicaearchus (c. 18).

tions in a more general (i. e. abstract), others in a more visual manner, and saying that Mamercus, the brother of the poet Stesichorus was mentioned²⁹ as having interested himself in geometry, he proceeds:³⁰ "Following these Pythagoras converted geometrical philosophy³¹ into the form of a liberal education, contemplating its principles deductively and investigating its theorems in an immaterial and rational way. It was he who discovered the theory of proportions (?) and the construction of the (five) regular solids." As I have already said, I cannot believe that this truly represents Eudemus, however much in detail may have been ultimately derived from him. Judging by what we otherwise know of him we may be sure that he did not so speak of Pythagoras; but he may have characterized the method of the *Pythagoreans* in some such terms, which seem to reflect the ideals of Plato as set forth in the *Republic*. Even so, however, the method of (Pythagoras or) the Pythagoreans, as here described, does not differ essentially from that attributed to Thales. We know, to be sure, that Eudemus did credit Thales with the knowledge of certain fundamental propositions of geometry;³² but it is plain that his knowledge of them was inferred from feats with which tradition credited him. The question naturally arises, since we have here no verbatim quotations from Eudemus, whether he attributed these discoveries to Thales unconditionally or merely said that he must have known the propositions *if the traditions were true*. Either view is, of course, possible. In any case, however, the statement of Proclus and the known inferences of Eudemus make it certain that the mathematical tradition did not regard Pythagoras as the *founder* of the science in Greek lands. One must add that the statement that Pythagoras discovered the construction of the cosmic (Platonic) solids is certainly not true. The labored efforts of certain scholars to find some justification for it are based on the indefensible view that we are here dealing with Eudemus rather than with Proclus. If the latter's immediate source was Geminus we

²⁹ This expression suggests Proclus' dependence on general literature rather than on a serious history of mathematics.

³⁰ In *Eucl.*, p. 65, 11, ed. Friedlein.

³¹ Eudemus would hardly have used this expression.

³² Diels, *Vorsokr.*, I, p. 79, 8 ff.

may really have to thank Posidonius for the view generally accepted by historians of Greek mathematics.

We are fully justified, then, in disregarding the supposed testimony of Eudemus to the mathematical achievements of Pythagoras; but of course that does not eliminate the Pythagoreans. If we take the statements of Proclus as applying to them, we have essentially the same view as we obtain from Aristotle. But Eudemus, fortunately, compensates us for the loss of spurious data regarding the founder by giving precious information about specific achievements of those who called themselves Pythagoreans. It is not necessary for our present purpose to review and evaluate the precious data of Eudemus as reported by Proclus in his *Commentary on the Elements of Euclid*. That may safely be left to more competent mathematicians. It is only necessary to emphasize the need of guarding against the same temptation to which Eudemus may have succumbed—the temptation to infer too much from what we may safely accept as fully attested. If that precaution is fully observed we arrive at a body of propositions and demonstrations at least as early as Eudemus and presumably earlier. One wishes that one might add that all this body may be certainly referred to the time before Hippocrates of Chios,²³ who is said to have written the first *Elements of Geometry*; for then we should have an approximate *terminus ante quem*. Obviously this cannot be done, because there were Pythagoreans who lived contemporary with and after him, and we know almost nothing about the contents of his treatise.

To sum up the situation, we may say that from Aristotle and Eudemus we learn that from the middle of the fifth century onward there were Pythagoreans busily and fruitfully occupied with mathematics, especially with the theory of numbers and geometry. Between the middle of the fifth century and Aristotle there are a few data of considerable importance; but about the part played by Pythagoreans (excepting the specific achievements mentioned by Eudemus, all without dates or names of

²³ There exists no evidence for his date, which is commonly put about 450 B. C. This seems to me too early; on the other hand Erich Frank, *Plato und die sogen. Pythagoreer*, p. 227, probably goes too far in the opposite direction in saying that he lived scarcely before 400.

individual geometers) we have no satisfactory evidence. It is one of the most singular facts in the history of Greek thought that individual Pythagoreans are rarely mentioned except by later writers whom one has every reason to suspect. Aristotle, indeed, mentions among others Hippasus, but only to say³⁴ that he, like Heraclitus, made fire the material cause. Whether he wrote a book or not we do not know, but we incline to doubt it because it is expressly stated that he did not³⁵ and that Philolaus was the first Pythagorean to do so. Even if he did, however, we should infer from Aristotle's reference that his book did not deal with mathematics. In later times he became the Judas of the Order, who betrayed the master's secrets and was deservedly destroyed by the gods. He obviously cannot afford firm footing for a reconstruction of the development of Greek mathematics. Aristotle's other references to individual Pythagoreans—to Paron, Xuthus, Eurytus—tell us nothing of importance.³⁶ Philolaus is cited in the *Eudemian Ethics*,³⁷ but not for mathematics. The contention of some scholars that Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*³⁸ refers to a statement of his is more than dubious. While I believe that Erich Frank has tried to prove too much, I fully agree with Burnet in regarding the so-called fragments of Philolaus as spurious, or at least as pseudepigraphic. What we may safely say about his views depends on Plato, Eudemus,³⁹ and Menon, and that throws no light on his mathematics. Even if one accepts the "fragments," however, there is little gain in this respect, unless they are interpreted and combined with texts

³⁴ *Metaph.* 984 a 7. Theophrastus (*Dials. Vorsokr.*⁵, I, p. 109, 6 ff.) repeats this with amplification probably based only on Aristotle's statement that Hippasus and Heraclitus made fire their *ἀρχή*.

³⁵ *Diog. Laërt.*, VIII, 84, citing Demetrius Magnes as his authority. Cf. n. 27.

³⁶ *Diog. Laërt.*, VIII, 46 mentions as the last of the Pythagoreans, whom Aristoxenus knew, Xenophilus, Phanto, Echebrates, Diocles, and Polymnastus, pupils of Philolaus and Eurytus. None of these, so far as we know, contributed anything to mathematics. Ecphantus appears as an astronomer who combined opinions of Democritus and Anaxagoras. Perhaps he was only an imaginary person, playing a rôle in a dialogue of Heraclides Ponticus. We know nothing about his mathematics.

³⁷ 1225 a 33.

³⁸ 1080 b 6: cf. Philolaus, *frag.* 8 Diels.

³⁹ That is, provided the *Eudemian Ethics* was written by him (300 B. C.?).

dating from later centuries. What remains for the would-be historian are inferences. Besides Aristotle and Eudemus, Plato and the Platonists contemporary with Aristotle inevitably demand consideration; but here, as has already been stated, the information is in general rather vague and subject to different interpretations. Above all, it affords no definite chronological data and no assured references to individuals. Even about Archytas we know too little to be of much service. In fine, we may be said to have positive knowledge only of a considerable body of mathematics in which Pythagoreans were certainly concerned; and some of these Pythagoreans were earlier than Plato; how much older, we do not know, and one is strongly inclined to infer from the polemical tone of many references, that the questions at issue were, at least for the most part, the subjects of debate in the schools of Plato and of Aristotle and therefore presumably not dating back a century or more.

Though this state of our actual knowledge is rarely, if ever, frankly confessed, it has evidently troubled the more conscientious historians. That is why so much stress is laid on the connection of the Eleatics with the Pythagoreans. Burnet⁴⁰ confesses that the only means of distinguishing between what is earlier and what is later in Pythagoreanism is furnished by the Eleatics. This assumes, what one has tried to prove, that there are in the doctrines and arguments of the Eleatics adequate proofs of the existence of Pythagorean doctrines. If that can be shown, the student does indeed have a sure foundation for his reconstruction of the history of Greek mathematics, though even so it must remain in good part conjectural. Much as this is to be desired, we must not permit our wishes to influence our judgment as to what we may infer from the evidence at our command. On the other hand we may not lightly regard the theses of such eminent scholars as Tannery, Bäumker, and those who have accepted their conclusion. If we cannot agree with them, we may derive a little comfort from the fact that they often confess that their accounts are largely conjectural.

There is much to be said for the view that the Eleatics had relations more or less intimate with Pythagoreans. This need not be disputed, though there remain certain difficulties

⁴⁰ *Greek Philos. Thales to Plato*, pp. 43 f.

that may not be ignored. By way of illustration one may cite Parmenides. One statement⁴¹ has it that he was "converted to peace" not by Xenophanes but by the Pythagorean Ameinias, to whom he erected an heroön after his death. This implies that Parmenides was converted to Pythagoreanism, and one would naturally think of this occurring in his youth. If there is any basis for this statement, the evidence for it, one would suppose, was the monument to Ameinias and the inscription it bore. Alongside this datum, however, we must place another. In the proëm of his work Parmenides himself tells of being conducted by the Sun-maidens from Darkness into Light, even to a goddess who reveals to him the unshakable heart of Truth. If this means anything, it must symbolize another conversion, again presumably in his youth.⁴² This conversion is taken to be a renunciation of Pythagorean dualism. He thus appears to be (rather strangely for a "stabilizer") as volatile as Schelling and an apostate from the faith of the Order. Though this cannot be regarded as in any way conclusive, it inevitably suggests caution regarding a person and a situation about which unfortunately we know far less than we could wish. We need not dwell upon Parmenides, however, because the only aspect of his teaching that even remotely concerns mathematics is that dealing with the One and the Many, which is the theme of Zeno's arguments.

It is really in Zeno that we have to look for reference to Pythagorean mathematics, if it is to be found in the Eleatics. Now it must appear strange, in view of the assurance of many modern scholars, that there is not, so far as I know, a single hint in our sources that the Greeks themselves were aware of the purpose of Zeno to criticize the fundamental doctrines of the Pythagoreans. Of course our historians have a ready answer to this objection to their thesis. Are we not told⁴³ that Zeno wrote *Against the Philosophers* and that he meant to pay off with

⁴¹ Diog. Laërt., IX, 21.

⁴² I should not insist, as Burnet did, on the fact that the goddess addresses him as *κοῦρος*, for that is hardly decisive. But the tone of the poem is so uncompromising that I can think of it only as the work of a young man fond of paradoxes; its crude form also suggests a first attempt. If this view is right it has obvious bearings on the question of Parmenides' relation, for example, to Heraclitus.

⁴³ Suidas, s. v. *Ζήνων* (after Hesychius), and Plato, *Parm.* 128 c.

014736

interest those who ridiculed or travestied the view of his master, Parmenides, that All is One? As for the title of Zeno's book, may one confidently assume that it was not given by the Alexandrians but by Zeno himself? The latter supposition is extremely improbable if we date the work *ca.* 465 B. C. With that assumption falls also the presumption that it was specifically directed against the Pythagoreans as the only "philosophers" at the time prominent in Italy. But why should one think especially of "philosophers?" The paradoxical doctrine of Parmenides that All is One and that motion is impossible must have made him the butt of many a ribald remark. Philoponus says,⁴⁴ "Those who introduce plurality are confident of it because of its self-evidence, for there is a horse and a man, etc." Surely Parmenides, as a man, was not a horse? One imagines that Antisthenes the Cynic was not the first to answer the arguments against motion by getting up and walking away.⁴⁵ That is still the way the man of the world answers philosophers and professors. Indeed, if we are to depend on the titles of books attributed to Zeno, why should we not rather think of Empedocles, on whose work he is reported to have written a commentary? Assuming that the Pythagoreans were the profound philosophers we are given to understand, we should hardly think of them as indulging in the kind of ridicule that Plato's statement implies.

It is clear that nothing reported about the purpose of Zeno's book affords the least presumption in favor of the view that it was directed against the Pythagoreans. If there is any evidence pointing to such a conclusion it must therefore be discovered in the arguments themselves. It would be tedious and useless to review the arguments in detail. They are familiar to every student of Greek thought and their subtlety still exercises the students of logic and mathematics. We need only to direct attention to their general assumptions and the form in which the arguments have been handed down to us. Regarding the latter it is important to observe that we have at most three statements⁴⁶ that can be plausibly regarded as preserving the

⁴⁴ *Phys.* 42, 18, ed. Vitelli.

⁴⁵ Diels, *Vorsokr.*⁵, I, p. 251, 20 ff.

⁴⁶ Diels, *ibid.*, p. 255, 14 prints *ei μὴ ἔχου μέγεθος τὸ δὲ, οὐδ' ἂν εἴη* as *ipsissima verba* of Zeno. This is in itself improbable and is further

actual words of Zeno, whereas the variant versions of his arguments themselves prove that we have for the most part to deal with paraphrases dating from later times, from which we can at best infer only the drift of the argument. If this is obvious at first glance, it is emphasized also by Aristotle's reference⁴⁷ to those who urge the antinomies of Zeno and by the certainty that at times he is thinking quite as much of Plato as of the Pythagoreans.⁴⁸

It is sometimes urged that Zeno was attacking an hypothesis. But there is really no reason whatever to single out the Pythagoreans as the proponents of the fundamental hypothesis of all his arguments, to wit, that things are a plurality. Whatever specious considerations may be offered in favor of the supposition that Zeno had Pythagoreans in mind are all due to incidental statements in later authors, who are manifestly *interpreting* and not reporting what he said. So far as we know Zeno did not mention the word "number" at all, though he does *imply* a reference to numbers.⁴⁹ In doing so, moreover, he implies no special conception of number but only such as anyone must have who enumerates objects of any sort. Most of the difficulties he raises are connected with the notion of infinity. What we actually know about the Pythagorean notion of infinity, in relation to number, is *nil*. Taking infinity in the strict sense,⁵⁰ Zeno evidently regards a realized or realizable infinite, that is, a numerable infinite, as a *contradictio in adjecto*. Either things are just as many as they are, in which case they are

indicated as not true by comparing with *προδείξας* the passages p. 257, lines 3 and 6 introduced by *προδείξας* and *δεικνύς*. Except when it is expressly stated that a passage is given *verbatim* it is rarely possible to distinguish between a quotation and a paraphrase, which may be quite free and is in fact very often entirely misleading.

⁴⁷ *Phys.* 263 a 5 ff. It is obvious that no inferences can safely be drawn regarding the original intention of an argument from later applications of it.

⁴⁸ E. g. *Metaph.* 1001 a 29-b 13.

⁴⁹ E. g. *frag.* 3, Diels.

⁵⁰ Zeno is the true Parmenidean in doing so; for much of the significance of Parmenides arises just from the insistence on a single and strict sense in the use of the terms *τὸ ἓν* and *τὸ ὅν*. It was this tendency, especially emphasized by the Eleatics, that created and promoted dialectic by requiring the distinction and definition of terms.

finite in number, or if they are not, they are not numerable at all, and plurality has no meaning. Parmenides had said that what is is One and at least distinctly implied that it is extended. That statement would naturally provoke criticism; for what has extension must have limits that do not coincide and consequently presuppose an interval between them. This criticism is so obvious that it requires no great mathematician to make it. Zeno recognizes the difficulty⁵¹ and, as Plato says, pays the critic off with interest. We may imagine him retorting, Yes, there is a difficulty here, but is your assumption of plurality any less obnoxious to objection? You insist that the extended is divisible. Well and good: supposing it to be divisible, it must be divisible *ad infinitum*, for so long as it is extended (and parts of the extended must themselves be extended) there is no limit to division. The only alternative is that the parts shall not have extension, in which case they will be nothing, and no multiplication of them can produce an extended body. The horns of the dilemma are equally fatal, and once one takes the conception of infinity seriously the dilemma must be obvious to any man of intelligence. The difficulty thus posed is logical rather than mathematical, and I, for one, cannot see why we need to look beyond Zeno for the author of the alternatives. If one says he must have been attacking someone who held that reality is composed of indivisible entities, why should one think of contemporary Pythagoreans, rather than of Democritus, Plato, and Xenocrates? If the latter could accept, after the dilemma had been stated, the latter horn, why may not Pythagoreans of a

⁵¹ This is certainly implied in the statement Plato represents Zeno as making (*Parm.* 128 d) that the hypothesis that there is a plurality leads to *still more ludicrous consequences* than the Parmenidean hypothesis that the One only exists. Similarly Plato frankly admitted difficulties in his theory of ideal forms. I think it is unwarranted to say, as is often said, that Zeno's arguments¹ against an indivisible unit (*ἕν*) do not touch the One of Parmenides, but apply only to an atomic unit, supposed to be Pythagorean; for the One of Parmenides, if extended, as is clearly implied in describing it as continuous, is obnoxious to the same objections as the atom. I cannot otherwise understand the statement attributed to Zeno by Eudemus (Diels, *Vorsokr.*², I, p. 251, 25) *ἐλ τις αὐτῷ τὸ ἕν ἀποδοῖν τι ποτὲ ἔστιν, ἔχει τὰ ὅντα λέγειν*, for here τὸ ἕν must refer to the Parmenidean One. The only way of escape would lie in regarding the One as incorporeal; but neither Parmenides nor Zeno took that way.

later age have done the same? The burden of proof rests with those who contend that Pythagoreans, Zeno's predecessors or contemporaries, held that view. His argument cannot take the place of such proof.

As has already been said, the supposed reference to the Pythagoreans finds its only documentary support from later writers. There we find such terms as *monad*, *henad*, *point*, etc., but not in Zeno's own statements. He doubtless spoke, as did Parmenides, of the *one* (ἐν); *monad*⁵² and *henad*, which are not known to occur before Plato's time, are obviously abstract terms, suited to a conception of number directly opposed to the view attributed to the Pythagoreans by Aristotle, who insists that their numbers had magnitude. He does, to be sure, say that they were mathematical, but apparently only because they used numbers in ordinary calculations, as one does in every mathematical operation. Moreover he expressly declares that their numbers were not *monadic*. That, it would seem, should dispose of the supposition that they used the term *monad*.⁵³ As for the contention that Zeno was attacking a view that identified the monad with the point, it is clear that there is really no evidence to support it. Simplicius does indeed twice⁵⁴ quote Eudemus on

⁵²Theo Smyrnaeus, p. 20, 19 says 'Ἀρχύτας δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος διαφέρει τὸ ἐν καὶ μονάδα καλοῦσι, καὶ τὴν μονάδα ἐν. One can well believe this statement, for that brings us down to Plato's time; but why should it be made, if Zeno had already used the terms interchangeably?

⁵³*Metaph.* 1080 b 18 τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν, πλὴν οὐ μοναδικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνουσιν ἔχειν μέγεθος. From any point of view this statement is curious. I take it that Aristotle in the last clause was falling into current terminology, which consequently signifies nothing. (Alexander, *In Metaph.*, p. 746, 1, ed. Hayd. says μοναδικὸν τὸ ἀμερὲς καὶ δρώματον ἐνταῦθα δηλοῖ.) I think, however, that he could not have said that the Pythagoreans' numbers were *not monadic* if he had evidence of their using *monads* for ἐν. Cf. *De Caelo* 300 a 14 ff. In *Phys.* 227 a 27 ff. he speaks of those who describe point and monad as separate (κεχωρισμένας), and says that on this view monad and point cannot be identical. If these were Pythagoreans, we have no means of dating them; more probably they were Platonists. Cf. n. 56.

⁵⁴*Phys.*, p. 97, 13 ff.; p. 138, 32. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1001 b 7 ff. had given a similar interpretation. If Eudemus had found in Zeno anything to justify the identification he would hardly have contented himself with conjecture. Tannery, *Pour l'histoire de la science hellène*, p. 252, says that Eudemus did not know Zeno's arguments except through tradition. This supposition is difficult to credit, since Simplicius still had the

this matter, but when it is stated that Zeno identified the point with 0 this is expressly given as a conjecture (*ὡς εἰκοι*); in other words, it is an *interpretation* Eudemus offers of Zeno's argument. That an interpretation in terms of mathematics was called for would seem to be strong evidence that Zeno's statement was couched in *logical* terms. After the manner of the commentators Simplicius⁵⁸ gives as a fact what Eudemus conscientiously stated as a conjecture.

Much is made of the supposed identification by the Pythagoreans of the unit (monad), point, and atom. That Pythagoreans at some time may have made this identification need not be denied, though the evidence has not been produced. Those who see criticism of Pythagoreans here regard them as maintaining the contradictory positions (a) that space (body) is extended and therefore divisible, and (b) that division may be halted at a given point, leaving discrete ultimate units, which however are equivalent to geometrical points. It is important to observe, however, that Zeno does not say, or imply, that anyone took both these positions, but regards them as *alternative* possibilities under the general hypothesis of a plurality conceived as parts of an extended whole. The conception of non-extended units (points) is itself an alternative under the head of ultimate units. The argument purports to show that each of the conceived possibilities leads to absurd consequences. How difficult it is to determine the special target of these arguments, suppos-

original text at hand. As the historian of mathematics Eudemus would, it seems, certainly have consulted and carefully read the book, had he believed it dealt specifically with the fundamental concepts of mathematics. Tannery there calls attention to another significant fact—that Eudemus, so far as we know, did not mention Zeno in his history of mathematics, but only in his *Physics*. I can account for this only on the supposition that he, like Aristotle, regarded the Eleatic arguments as essentially logical and as concerned with the fundamental concepts of the physical sciences generally rather than with the particular question of number or geometry.

⁵⁸ *Phys.*, p. 99, 7 ff. Burnet, *B. G. P.*², p. 315, n. 3 quotes part of this statement as if this were actually a quotation from Eudemus. That is hardly fair dealing. Similarly, *ibid.*, p. 314, he says "Plato (*Parm.* 128 c f.) tells us that the premises of Zeno's arguments were the beliefs of the adversaries of Parmenides." The only premise stated is that *things are many*. That premise was certainly not peculiar to Pythagoreans!

ing that there was one, is shown by the fact that they apply perfectly to the Atomists, whom Aristotle (*De Gen. et Corr.* 324 b 25 ff.) represents as trying to meet the Eleatic logic. Similarly *Phys.* 187 a ff. might well be taken as referring to the Atomists; the ancient commentators, however, thought of Plato and Xenocrates, and Ross, *Metaphysics*, I, p. XC, thinks there is an evident reference to Plato's *Sophist*. The equation of the monad and the point having position is attested only by a quite late writer.⁵⁶ Now it is obvious that Zeno did consider, only to reject, the indivisible unit, most pointedly, perhaps, in the "Arrow," where time and space are each conceived as composed of indivisible units. Why one should think this was Pythagorean doctrine I am unable to discover. To make the supposition plausible one must produce evidence that Pythagoreans, and Pythagoreans of Zeno's time, held such a view of time, space, and motion. In the "Stadium" also we have the same elements, only even more sharply defined; for there space, time, and motion are conceived as composed of indivisible units, each precisely corresponding to each. The refinement of the argument is truly wonderful; but what grounds have we for thinking that Pythagoreans expressly held such a view? If Zeno constructed his subtle argument on the sole basis of an extended (spatial) unit, such as Aristotle supposes their numbers to have been, he was presumably capable of conceiving without help from anyone else a *continuum of any sort* as composed of discrete units, which would be a natural way of regarding plurality. Plato makes Zeno say that his arguments were intended to show that the hypothesis of plurality led to even more absurd conclusions than monism *if one adequately followed it out*. I take it, it was Zeno himself ^{56a} who analyzed the assumption of plurality into its ele-

⁵⁶ Proclus, *In Eucl.*, p. 95, 20. If Aristotle, *Phys.* 227 a 27 ff. and *Metaph.* 1002 a 36 ff. represent Pythagorean doctrine, rather than an interpretation of it by Platonists (cf. Plato, *Parm.* 148 d ff.), there is no way of dating the notion that the point and the monad may be identified. Cf. n. 54. In any case we should have to assume, from the usage of Parmenides and Zeno, that the Pythagoreans of the first half of the fifth century spoke of τὸ εἶν and not of the *monad*.

^{56a} When Plato, *Phaedrus* 261 d, called Zeno the Eleatic Palamedes he obviously had in mind the *inventiveness* of Palamedes celebrated in several dramas. Clearly Diogenes Laërtius, IX, 25, or his source, so understood the matter, for it is coupled with the statement of Aristotle

ments, purely as a logical problem,⁵⁷ presenting the alternatives under which it could be made. I would not deny that one or the other of the possibilities he considers had already been stated by others, for it is of course possible: if one holds it to be a fact, one must produce the evidence for thinking so.

Lest the position of this survey be mistaken, it should be clearly stated that we have no satisfactory evidence for the view that Zeno was attacking a particular theory, that is to say, the Pythagorean. There is no pretense, on the other hand, that there is clear evidence that he was not doing so. It suffices for our purpose to point out that the arguments he advanced were, as Plato implies, the result of a thorough canvass of the implications of plurality considered as referred to a world having the property of extension that Parmenides admitted. There is no express reference to number, or if there is, certainly none to a particular conception of number; for, though the arguments are applicable to number, the analysis seems to have been conducted as a dialectical exercise, noting and drawing the necessary conclusions from the alternative forms the primary assumption of plurality may take. If one contends that there were stated hypotheses of schools opposed to Parmenides, it is fair to ask whether one is to assume that every hypothesis of Plato's

that Zeno was the inventor of dialectic, as Empedocles was of rhetoric. The acknowledged originality of Zeno and the fact that no ancient authority suggests that he was criticizing views of the Pythagoreans create a strong presumption that he alone is responsible for both the form and the presuppositions of his arguments.

⁵⁷ It seems clear that Aristotle so regarded the Eleatic method: *De Gen. et Corr.* 325 a 13 ὑπερβάλλει τὴν αἰσθησίν· καὶ παρίδοντες αὐτὴν ὡς τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν ἀκολουθεῖν, cf. *De Caelo*, 298 b 20-23. On the other hand, in his Δόξα Parmenides, according to Aristotle, *Metaph.* 986 b 31 ff., set up two causes and principles, ἀναγκαζόμενος ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινόμενοις, καὶ τὸ ἐν μὲν κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πλεῖον δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησίν ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι. The dialectic of Plato's *Parmenides* clearly presupposes the same purely logical approach. Where numbers are mentioned, e.g. 143 a ff., 149 b, this is done incidentally, and in no way suggests that the subject was of special importance. If it be true, as some contend, that the *Parmenides* is partly a criticism of the atomism of Democritus, it is such only by implication, the logical problem of the 'one' being the essential point. If, as it would appear, Theophrastus did not discuss Zeno in his *Φυσικῶν δόξαι*, he also presumably took the position that the arguments were purely logical.

Parmenides is likewise to be so considered. Is it not possible, indeed highly probable, that in that dialogue Plato was imitating the method of Zeno? If so, is it not fairly arguable that the latter also was himself setting up the hypotheses in order to point out their necessary implications?

It is clear that Zeno or others who repeated and applied his arguments might have used them against the theories of Anaxagoras and the Atomists; for they fit their theories as perfectly as the supposed Pythagorean doctrine of numbers. These philosophies did in fact accept the horns of Zeno's dilemma, Anaxagoras adopting the view that matter may be infinitely divisible without therefore being reduced to 0; Leucippus and Democritus, that matter is ultimately constituted of discrete indestructible particles;⁵⁸ and we must assume that both schools applied their principles to mathematics. We need not now inquire how they met the inevitable problems of continuity and infinity. Both these problems continued to exercise the schools of the fourth century; and it is more than likely that Pythagoreans engaged in the debates. Unfortunately we have no satisfactory evidence for them, more especially about the middle of the fifth century.

One readily understands the motives of those who press the claims of Pythagoreanism and seek by all means to reconstruct its doctrines during the obscure period between the times of

⁵⁸ Aristotle pointed out (*De Caelo*, 303 a 8) that the atoms were quasi-numbers, and he represented the theory of the Atomists as an answer to the Eleatic logic (*De Gen. et Corr.* 324 b 25 ff.). It is notable that the dependence of Atomists on the Pythagoreans, which must be evident if the reconstruction of Burnet is sound, was apparently never thought of (Aristotle, *De An.* 404 a 1 ff., 16 ff. really has no significance, even if the text be sound, which, like Diels, I doubt), just as no one hinted at the supposed Pythagorean doctrine as the target of Zeno's devastating arguments. In fact Burnet, *B. G. P.*³, p. vi, insists that "the vital point" of his argument is his contention that Atomism was derived from Eleaticism. That one ignored even the Atomists, again shows how preoccupied one was with the debates in Platonic circles. On the other hand, if one takes Aristotle's view that the Pythagorean numbers had magnitude, one finds it difficult to understand how it could be asserted (cf. Aëtius, I, 3, 9) of Ecphantus (who, if an historical person, must have lived in the fourth century), *τὰς Πυθαγορικὰς μονάδας οὗτος πρῶτος ἀνεφάνετο σωματικὰς*, thus making the (numerical) unit virtually an atom.

Parmenides and Plato. We know that there were members of the school who busied themselves with mathematics and contributed much to the advancement of the science, but except for specific discoveries and their necessary implications we actually know little more; above all, we have no chronological data except the fact that a good deal had been achieved before the time of Aristotle and Eudemos. Even respecting the necessary implications of the specific achievements with which Eudemos credits the Pythagoreans we can confidently affirm no more than that they must have been known to them; for it by no means follows that they *discovered* them.

We are thus brought to a point that has been strangely ignored in the reconstruction of Greek mathematics. We have seen that we have no dependable evidence of mathematical achievements of Pythagoras himself, and we know that in later times one inferred his teachings from opinions held by those who were known as Pythagoreans. The best informed Greeks did not regard him or his followers as the creators of Greek mathematics, but thought of them as being active in promoting the science. Eudemos credited Thales with a knowledge of some fundamental geometrical problems: since he did so, as we gather from one instance, by inference from practical achievements traditionally attributed to the sage of Miletus, we may refuse to accept his conclusion; but it is not without significance that the first general historian of mathematics found no difficulty in assuming such knowledge on the part of an Ionian earlier than Pythagoras. We know, moreover, that Anaximander also framed a picture of the cosmos that was essentially geometrical and in principle not unlike that involved in the later Pythagorean theory of the "harmony of the spheres." Indeed, the engineering feat of Eupalinus in constructing the tunnel of Samos implies certain definite geometrical propositions. We thus know that mathematics was cultivated in Ionia before the time of Pythagoras, who left his native Samos about the time the tunnel was built. One readily surmises that Pythagoras had learned some of its rudiments before he went to Italy, whether he and his earliest associates did or did not devote themselves to the study.

There is, in fact, much to be said for the view that mathematics was intensively cultivated by the Ionians from the sixth

century onward. Aside from the geometrical pattern of the cosmos, Anaximander and his successor Hecataeus evidently applied similar principles in the construction of their maps of the earth, and later Ionians applied the same methods in laying out cities. Plato evidently had these schemes in mind, perhaps consciously combining them with cosmological patterns, in describing the capital city of the Atlantians. This aspect of Ionian research should not in the least surprise us when we reflect that almost all the pre-Socratic thinkers, who laid the foundations of Greek science in all fields, were Ionians. But we are not restricted to general considerations and probabilities. Whereas we cannot name a single Pythagorean before Archytas who made a notable contribution to mathematics, we have considerable evidence regarding others whom it will repay one to consider briefly, without attempting to appraise their several merits.

We have referred to Thales, Anaximander, Hecataeus, and Hippodamus of Miletus. Agatharchus of Samos is mentioned⁵⁹ as a scene-painter for Aeschylus in a way to suggest that he was interested in the problem of perspective, which was taken up and advanced by Anaxagoras of Clazomenae and Democritus of Abdera. We have every reason to think that the latter two contributed principles of fundamental importance to the solution of geometrical problems. Oenopides, the astronomer, and Hippocrates; the author of the earliest known hand-book of geometry, were natives of Chios, and Leodamas of Thasos is mentioned as a contemporary of Plato and Archytas among those who contributed to the improvement of geometry.⁶⁰ One notes with interest that all these were Ionians. One cannot pass over Hippias of Elis, who not only concerned himself with astronomy, but attempted the solution of difficult geometrical problems and touched on the history of mathematics. Though he was presumably not an Ionian (we know nothing of his antecedents), he shared all the interests of the Ionians and in character resembled them rather than the Pythagoreans. Meton was an Athenian, as was Theaetetus. The latter, as a pupil of Theodorus of Cyrene,

⁵⁹ Vitruvius, *Præf.* 7.

⁶⁰ Proclus, *In Eucl.*, prol. II, p. 66, 14, ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ (i. e. Plato's) καὶ Λεωδάμας ὁ Θάσιος ἦν καὶ Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντίνος καὶ Θεαίτητος ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, παρ' ὧν ἐπηυξήθη τὰ θεωρήματα καὶ προήλθεν εἰς ἐπιστημονικωτέραν σύστασιν.

has of course been thought to belong to the Pythagorean line, though we have no good reason to think of Theodorus as connected with the school. Iamblichus, in his list of Pythagoreans,⁶¹ mentions a Theodorus of Tarentum, but he may quite well have been a different person. In his commentary on Euclid's *Elements* Proclus⁶² gives a list of precursors of Euclid in the composition of geometrical hand-books, each surpassing his predecessor in the number of propositions and the excellence of the demonstrations. Going backward from Euclid he names Hermotimus of Colophon, Theudius of Magnesia, Leon the pupil of Neoclides, and Hippocrates of Chios. Again, where we know anything about the men he names, we are faced with a group of Ionians.

This is certainly a remarkable showing, which it is difficult to understand except on the supposition of a continuous tradition of strong interest in geometry among the Ionians from early times. As against this indisputable evidence it appears reckless to suggest that we owe the entire development of mathematics to the Pythagoreans and to assume that all the necessary implications of the specific achievements credited to Pythagoreans by Eudemus constitute "Pythagorean geometry." Even Iamblichus, who was inclined to claim nearly everything for that school, lends no support to such pretensions, for he says⁶³ that when the mathematical secrets of the Order had been divulged by Hippasus, two men, Theodorus of Cyrene and Hippocrates of Chios did most to advance the science. If we disregard the discredited story of Hippasus and the secret teachings of Pythago-

⁶¹ *Vit. Pyth.*, 265.

⁶² P. 67, ed. Friedlein.

⁶³ Diels, *Vorsokr.*⁵, I, p. 108, 10 ff. Aristotle, *Meteor.* 342 b 29 ff., compares and contrasts the views of certain "Italians" (Pythagoreans) and Hippocrates of Chios regarding the comet. The passage decides nothing about the question of their relations. Erich Frank, *Plato und die sogen. Pythagoreer*, p. 233, holds that Aristotle meant to set Hippocrates apart from the Pythagoreans; Loria, *Scienze Esatte*, p. 74, thinks he classed them together. Such instances of partial agreement, with differences in detail, seem to me natural where there is a common interest in a problem. In order to decide whether one thinker depended on the other we should have to know more than we do, especially regarding their chronology. By the end of the fifth century, it seems, many minds were contributing to a more or less common stock of knowledge and opinion.

ras, we have here a confession that neither of these celebrated men belonged to the Order.

If one is to believe that the Ionians above mentioned learned their mathematics from the Pythagoreans one must make some extremely improbable assumptions; for the connection of the individual philosophers and scientists with Pythagoreanism, though often asserted, cannot generally be accepted as based on anything better than the same wishful thinking that inspires some historians of the present day. Iamblichus, to be sure, furnished a long list of "Pythagoreans" assigned to various cities, including Ionian Paros, Cyzicus, and Samos, but Melissus is the only person otherwise known, and he could be connected with Pythagoreanism only through the apostate Parmenides. We do not even know when the Order, originally at home in Italy, was scattered. Zeller thought it could not have been before the middle of the fifth century; and what dependable sources tell us of such representatives as Lysis, Philolaus, and the Pythagoreans who associated with Socrates rather suggests that their interests lay in other directions.

The conclusion to which we are driven by our study is that it is impossible to reconstruct the history of Greek mathematics, as one may to a certain extent tell the story of the development of Greek scientific thought in general, by focusing attention upon individual men or groups. Regarding our knowledge of details and also with respect to the necessary inferences from known facts nothing is changed; but the rôle of the Pythagoreans must appear to have been much exaggerated. If we are to exercise our imagination in order to supplement our knowledge it would seem that we must reckon with the probability of a continuous mathematical tradition in Ionian lands from an early date. Supposing that to be true, the question arises how the achievements of individuals and groups were communicated, so that it became possible from time to time to sum up and integrate the whole. To that question, which arises in other fields of Greek thought also, there is no satisfactory answer.

W. A. HEIDEL.

WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY.

THE FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

The subject proposed in this paper is itself disputable, for the Platonic and Aristotelian studies of the last two decades have made it questionable whether there is, in fact, such an irreconcilable contrast between Plato and Aristotle as at first appears to everybody who reads Aristotle's violent criticism of Plato's doctrine of ideas. Must the Aristotelian philosophy not rather be understood as a necessary and logical development of Plato's basic conceptions, especially those of his later period, and is not Aristotle's subtler and more distinct formulation of the ontological problems even more appropriate to the essential intentions of Plato?

Even in antiquity both opinions had found representatives. While most of the Neo-Platonists tried to harmonize the two philosophers with each other and even saw their own particular merit in the reconciliation of the two schools,¹ others, like Syrianus, did not deny the difference between the two and passionately tried to defend Plato against the attacks of Aristotle.²

The fundamental principle of the Aristotelian criticism of Plato being generally known needs to be outlined here but briefly. Aristotle rejects the transcendence, the *chorismos*, of the ideas, i. e. Plato's conviction that the true existence, the idea, is absolutely separated from the objects of this world; in their finite, particular, and perishable existence these objects reflect only in an image, as it were, the eternal and universal subsistence of an unique idea; they "imitate it" and "partake of it" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 987 b 10), without ever being able to reproduce it themselves. For Plato, therefore, the idea has a form of existence entirely different from that of the particulars, of which nevertheless the idea is predicated. Between idea and particular there is the same relation—to use Aristotle's own example concerning this Platonic conception—as there is between the real Callias and his wooden portrait. The two are entirely

¹ Cf. Ammonius Saccas, Plotinus, Origen in Photius, *Bibl.*, p. 461 a 24; Iamblichus *apud* Elias, in *Categ.*, p. 123, 2 (Busse).

² Marinus, *Vita Procli*, 13.

different from each other, the one Callias is real, a living being ($\xi\varphi\omicron\nu$), the other is a dead piece of wood which reproduces only the shape ($\epsilon\iota\delta\omicron\varsigma$) of the living Callias, a mere image, though also called $\xi\varphi\omicron\nu$ in Greek; but it is the name $\xi\varphi\omicron\nu$ alone which the two have in common. Thus for Plato the word "existence" ($\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$) which refers to the idea as well as to the particular things is only "homonymous" (*Parmenides* 133 D; *Phaedrus* 266 A, etc.), since in reality it has different connotations.³

It is this Platonic principle of the *chorismos* which Aristotle attacks most ardently. The existence of the idea, as Aristotle formulates it in the general notion ($\kappa\alpha\theta\acute{o}\lambda\omicron\nu$), the definition ($\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$), is separated only in thought from the particulars whose real character it expresses, whereas in reality it is immanent in the particulars. For Aristotle, then, the expression "existence" means the same here and there, it is "synonymous," not merely "homonymous," as it was for Plato.

These somewhat abstract formulations represent at bottom a fundamental philosophical opposition which has at all times incited philosophical passion for and against each one of these philosophers. The question is whether the true being, God, is beyond this world and therefore also beyond the being of the philosopher himself or whether it is within himself, adequately intelligible to his own thought and intuition. It is the same opposition which separates Kant from Hegel or, to-day, the philosophy of existence from every dogmatic conception of metaphysics and ontology, an opposition, however, which is irreconcilable only from the point of view of one side, in our case of Plato, because the other side denies that such a contradiction exists at all. To this group, therefore, the antithesis Plato-Aristotle must seem "superficial" (Hegel), and the historical progress from Plato to Aristotle must appear as a necessary "procession of thought." Under the influence of this philosophical conception many philologists to-day are inclined again to deny that the opposition between the two philosophers is final. They see in the Platonic dialogues of the later period a transition to the Aristotelian conception of the idea, just as, on the other hand, they see in the fragments of the early Aristotelian works a point of view closely related to that of Plato, with the result

³ Arist., *Categ.* 1 a 1; *Metaphysics* 990 b 22-991 a 8; cf. Syrianus, *Metaphysics*, p. 162, 15 Kroll.

that there appears a continuous development from Plato to Aristotle.

This problem of interpretation could definitely be solved only if, apart from the dialogues, we had an authentic writing of Plato in his last period from which it could be concluded with certainty whether his principle notion of the idea and the way in which it is known really changed in the direction of Aristotle's ontology. Now it seems as though we actually had such a document of Plato's, namely the *Seventh Epistle*. Since it can hardly be assumed that anybody except Plato himself should have attained such philosophical profundity as is to be found there, this letter is now generally supposed to be authentic. It is particularly the advocates of a continuous development from Plato to Aristotle who hold this point of view (Stenzel, Jaeger, *et al.*); but even if one believes that the authenticity of the *Seventh Epistle* has not yet been sufficiently proved, the document could be ascribed only to an author who was intimately acquainted with the manner of Plato's thinking during his last years. In either case the *Seventh Epistle* is an invaluable source of Plato's late philosophy. It seems appropriate, therefore, to start an investigation of the relationship of Platonic and Aristotelian thought with an analysis of the *Seventh Epistle* and to compare its philosophical content with that of the Aristotelian writings.

1. Plato's *Seventh Epistle* and Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

Plato presumably wrote this letter in the year 352/1, only two or three years before his death. It is his philosophical will, as it were, addressed to the followers and heirs of his friend Dion in Sicily. The purpose of the letter is to contrast Plato's true philosophical conviction, by which his thoughts and actions had been guided from early youth, with all the calumnies and misleading misinterpretations brought forward against him. It is in this connection that he speaks also of the complete misunderstanding (*παράνομα* 340 B) of his philosophical doctrines. Such misrepresentations had for a long time been spread at the court of the tyrant Dionysius in Syracuse by certain philosophers who pretended to have heard of the Platonic ideas, either directly or indirectly through Plato's pupils. At present these slanders

had been revived by pamphlets which claimed to contain the ultimate and highest principles (τι τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἀκρῶν καὶ πρώτων 344 D) of Plato's philosophy (341 B).

The mention of these so-called systematic outlines of his philosophy causes a passionate outburst against their authors: "But so much I have to say about all those who have written about these things and will write about them and who claim to know what I am really striving for (σπουδάζω), whether they heard it from me myself or through others, or whether they pretend to have found it by themselves, all these, I am convinced, cannot understand a word of the subject itself (πρᾶγμα). At least there exists no treatise of mine thereon, and there shall never be any, for there is no way of expressing these things like other *mathemata*, but only by repeated communication with the subject itself and by living in close contact with it it suddenly flares up in the soul like a light kindled from a leaping fire and henceforth itself nourishes itself" (*Ep.* VII, 341 B-C).⁴

In order to show how all such written presentations of his philosophy miss his real point in the very fact of formulation, Plato feels compelled in the following philosophical digression to explain his true opinion about philosophy in general. If from any source, we should be able therefore to learn from this one which philosophical point of view was prevalent during the last years of his life. The leading thought of this whole argument is the following: the true being, that which we are accustomed to call "the idea," cannot be comprehended adequately through any expressionable term (λόγος) at all within the

⁴ There is one conclusion that we can draw with certainty from this passage: at that time there must already have existed writings referring to the doctrines brought forward by Plato in his lectures. And we know by chance that a pupil of Plato's named Hermodorus carried on a flourishing trade in such Platonic *logoi* in Sicily itself, the country of the addressee of the *Seventh Epistle*. But we know also that Aristotle himself wrote such a treatise which claimed to reproduce the "enigmatic" opinions taught by Plato in his lecture *Περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* about the "one" and the "indefinite dyad" as the ultimate principles of the idea (Fr. 27 ff. Rose³). Whether it is these treatises that Plato has in mind in the *Seventh Epistle* can be decided the less since here he makes a very general attack on all such written presentations of his philosophy (similar to *Phaedrus* 276 A ff.), and it is just because of this generalization that his attack is so effective.

medium of human understanding, not even in its highest perfection, the thinking of the *νοῦς*; understanding therefore in all its phases, from the lowest to the highest, remains always something other (*ἕτερον*) than the being itself which it claims to understand; for, in the perception of the senses as well as in the intellectual concept, the true being (*τὸ ὄν*) does not represent itself to the soul as itself, but as something that is only qualified like itself, as a *ποῖόν τι*. As long as we search either through daily experience or through science for this true being, we are satisfied with the appearance in which it is accessible to us and rightly hold our understanding for certain. But as soon as we ask for that true being itself which is the basis of all appearance, every answer, whether given by conception or perception, proves to be dialectical and "easy to refute," and in this case the opponent in the discussion always prevails. The empirical appearance of a geometrical circle—this mathematical example is used to explain this important consideration—merely looks like a circle, but is none. This empirical circle is not absolutely round, as the mathematical definition demands, but is at the same time the contrary also, namely straight. Thus every empirical reality transgresses its own being, i. e. that which it really tends to represent, and turns into its opposite.⁶ Nor is the concept of circle in its specific existence, as this audible expression, namely "logos," that which it aims at being, true circularity. And finally, even the pure thought, as it rises and vanishes within the soul, unspoken and unheard, is not the circle itself but only a temporary determination, made by the soul (cf. also *Symposium* 208 A).

What the soul sought to know, however, is not that which is only like a circle, but the thing itself, the idea. Instead of that idea, intellection has presented to the soul what it was not seeking at all, only the thought of the object. Thus every thought is necessarily dialectical. The thinking is unable to preserve the transcendent existence as thought; it must annihilate the thought in order to reach the thing itself. For Plato, therefore, the true philosophical method is this form of dialectic, higher than

⁶ This is the phase of dialectic which Zeno discovered and which Plato therefore makes him explain in his dialogue, the *Parmenides*; cf. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, IIIa⁴, pp. 629 ff.

the primitive Eleatic dialectic which Socrates postulates for the intuition of the idea and of its existence.⁶ It is this alternation of question and answer which questions every answer to the question about the "what is it" in that in the answer given it distinguishes (*διαπερν*) again knowledge from ignorance, being from non-being, and in general the absolute, divine, from the finite, human. Every perception, every concept, every thought of a thing is thus again refuted and in "rubbing" (*Ep.* VII, 344 B) these phases of knowing against one another and against the true being of the idea itself, their finitude and untruth become manifest.

And yet the result of dialectic is for Plato not, as for the Sophists, merely negative. The truth which is attained through it is no longer a merely theoretical one, but is that of the *agathon*, of that supreme idea in the proper sense, which is the ultimate origin of every truth, of the intellection as well as of the existence of the various ideas (cf. *Republic* 508 E-509 B; Aristotle, *De Anima* 404 b 19). This truth is, therefore, the truth which one himself *becomes*, the truth of the existence of the philosopher himself. Man's essential and real existence, according to the Platonic Socrates, consists in searching, asking, longing for the true existence which, being hidden from him by the delusion of supposed knowledge, is not revealed to him unless he is struggling for self-knowledge, to be accomplished by that dialectical knowledge of one's own ignorance.⁷ The famous words of the *Symposium* are meant to express the true Platonic sense of the word "philosophia": "None of the gods philosophizes or wants to become wise, for he is wise, nor does anybody else philosophize who is wise. On the other hand, nobody philosophizes who is entirely ignorant For he who does not feel needy does not want that of which he is not in need. But those who do philosophize are just in between the two, between the knowing and the ignorant" (*Symposium* 203 E ff.). Thus according to the *Seventh Epistle* also, man does not attain his true and essential existence except through philosophical self-knowledge as accomplished by dialectic. Not until the philosopher, who, it

⁶ Cf. *Sophist* 251 A ff.; *Philebus* 15 A; *Parmenides* 129 B, etc.

⁷ Cf. G. Krüger, *Einsicht und Leidenschaft, Das Wesen der platonischen Philosophie* (Frankfurt, 1939), pp. 220 ff.

is supposed, has the necessary mental faculty by birth, has purified himself through dialectic from the false conceit of having already attained true existence and not until the practical form of his life has been transformed into true existence, which in itself is related to the true existence of the idea if not identical with it,—not until he has gone through this process of *ὁμοίωσις θεῷ* (*Theaetetus* 176 B) can he understand anything about the true existence of the idea. If the phases of knowing (i. e. perception, concept, thought, etc., *ἐπιστημονικὰ θεωρήματα*) are “rubbed” against one another and refuted by arguments friendly to the opponent, through the use of question and answer, free from jealousy, then *phronesis* and *νοῦς* flare up in the soul about every subject for him who makes as much effort as is humanly possible (*Ep.* VII, 344 B; cf. 341 C and 340 B).

There exists, then, for Plato an intellection of the ultimate idea, but it always remains within the mere possibility of human existence. And the most important point: the indispensable presupposition for the intellection of the idea is that the life of the man himself who tries to know be essentially true, that between him and the idea there be an inner relationship which he can attain only through his life (*πρᾶγμα* cf. *Ep.* VII, 340 B ff.). For man has to become true and similar to God before he will be able to know the truth of the divine; “if the eye were not sunlike it would never be able to perceive the sun.” Thus only the boniform is able to know the idea of the *agathon* (*Republic* 509 A). It is, therefore, not a knowledge which is accessible alike to everybody who has but the requisite intelligence and diligence. Nobody can attain philosophy merely by learning its *logoi* and then, by reason of such hearsay, pretend before himself and others to know “the whole.” Such people are really the true non-philosophers (*οἱ ὄντως μὴ φιλόσοφοι*). They are tinged by the doctrines only from outside, like those whose skin only is tanned by the sun. The genuine philosopher, however, is he in whose soul has flared up, kindled by the sun of the *agathon*, a light related to it (*Ep.* VII, 341 B ff.). Since the life, this *πρᾶγμα*, of the philosopher himself, is the presupposition for the knowledge of truth, Plato also calls this knowledge “*phronesis*,” a term which expresses incomparably well the fact that practical, moral understanding is inseparable from theoretical knowledge.

All these features indicate a sharp contrast to Aristotle. For Aristotle in Book IV of the *Metaphysics* begins the exposition of his metaphysical doctrine with a sentence that sounds exactly like the antithesis of this thesis: "There is a science (*ἐπιστήμη*) which contemplates (*θεωρεῖ*) being *qua* being and its essential attributes" (*Metaphysics* 1003 a 21). For Aristotle the possibility of knowing the idea is never determined by the existence of the philosopher in itself. The truth is a truth for everybody, similar to the truth of physics, just metaphysics, as his "first philosophy" is usually called.⁸

This principal contrast between Plato and Aristotle manifests itself also in the form in which each of them expresses his thought. Plato had to give his philosophy the strange form of Socratic dialogues. Neither before nor after him did any philosopher spontaneously adopt such a method of conveying his doctrines, a method which at first sight seems so unfit for the merely logical and objective chain of reasoning; but, if the Platonic philosophy implies that the real life of the man who philosophizes is the essential presupposition for his recognition of the truth, then there is no more perfect way of expressing this theory than by making evident the ideal of such a philosophical existence through the concrete example of a philosopher like Socrates. With him, every word is really true since it refers to the historical situation of one particular moment and to the friendly or hostile contact with other people.

In the *Seventh Epistle*, however, Plato expresses in his own name the same conception of philosophy which in the dialogues is represented by Socrates, even with clear reminiscences of thoughts which already in his earliest dialogues are put into the mouth of Socrates. Here again in the *Seventh Epistle* every philosophy culminates for Plato in the understanding of the *arete* (344 A). And the picture which we get of him as a teacher of philosophy strikingly resembles, even in externals, the picture drawn of Socrates in the dialogues.⁹ There is not a word that would

⁸ For this fundamental conception of his it is significant that with him the expression "phronesis" is limited again, as it was before Plato, to practical insight and prudence, whereas the highest theoretical knowledge is called "sophia."

⁹ In the *Seventh Epistle* exactly as in the early dialogues, especially in the *Republic* (504 C; 521 C ff.), the longer way, *μετὰ πολλόν*, toward the

force us to the conclusion that Plato ever used a merely theoretical method of teaching, corresponding to Aristotle's lectures, and that it is such theoretical lectures that formed the basis of the preserved Aristotelian writings. What Plato intends here in the *Seventh Epistle* is "to show to the others through *logoi* what seems to him to be best for men and to give them *advice* how to realize that in life" (327 A). So even here the idea of the *agathon* is the underlying principle and explains at the same time the somewhat complicated structure of the whole letter: it has always been this same advice which he gave to the young Dion as early as 388, then to the tyrant Dionysius in 367, and now for the third time, in 352, to the addressee of his letter. In the principal attitude of his philosophy, then, which he takes pains to make clear here, nothing has been changed since the time when he first acquired it in his early days. This philosophical "advice" is meant to show "what is at present and shall be in the future the divine and human good and just" (*Ep.* VII, 334 D). And, exactly as in the *Gorgias*, the *Phaedo*, and the *Republic*, this philosophical protrepticus ends with a reference to the "olden and holy words" about the immortality of the soul and its punishment in Hades.

2. The Eleatic dialogues of Plato and the Aristotelian criticism of the ideas

If so much is correct, it cannot be without bearing on the better understanding of the dialogues whether it is Socrates himself or other philosophers who express the thoughts and methods there discussed. It is obvious that Plato had to put his Pythagorean philosophy of nature into the mouth of a Pythagorean like Timaeus and could not have it explained by Socrates who in the *Phaedo* appears far superior to all such speculations (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 987 b 1); and the fact that in those dialogues the subject of which is the Eleatic dialectic it is Parmenides himself or Zeno or the stranger from Elea who leads the discussion apparently has the same meaning.

In the *Republic* (509 A ff.) Socrates tries to explain by a very significant simile that his idea, the *agathon*, lies beyond

recognition of the idea leads through the propaedeutics of the mathematical sciences and of dialectic (*Ep.* VII, 340 C).

being and the knowledge of being. He compares it with the sun: as in the sensible world the sun through its light gives to things not only the power (*δύναμις*) of being seen by us but also makes them come into being, grow, nourish themselves, in short, exist, although the sun itself is not a process but an unchangeable being, a "visible god" (*Timaeus* 40 D), so the ideas in general whose existence we apprehend by our *νοῦς* owe to the *agathon* not only this power of being apprehended but also their objective existence in the light of truth, although the *agathon* itself is not simply existence but beyond existence, surpassing it in rank and power. Here existence and its ontological correlate, knowledge, *νοῦς*, are not as with the Eleatics the ultimate principle of philosophy. Therefore Eleatic dialectic is not sufficient for the higher stage, the Socratic idea. Zeno dissolves the hypothesis of the truth of sense-perception—its multiple existence—by pointing out the logical contradiction contained in it, in order to prove that Parmenides' conception of one-Being, which is apprehensible only by thought, is the higher truth. Socrates applies the same method to the ultimate axioms of thought¹⁰ and uses it in

¹⁰ To be sure, the young Socrates, still inexperienced in dialectic, has to be warned by its master Parmenides into what difficulties, unforeseen by him, the dialectic of the ideas so understood may entangle the still unpracticed. Therefore Socrates asks Parmenides to give him an example of such dialectic. And although Socrates here only listens in silence, at the end of his life, in his discussion with the young Theaetetus (*Theaetetus* 183 E), he still recalls this meeting and speaks with reverence of Parmenides' noble profundity which it is not so easy for everyone to understand. Thereby he probably means to say that it was even then that in the dialectic of Parmenides he realized the whole profundity of his own idea, of the *agathon* (cf. p. 39 *supra*, *Ep.* VII, 344 B, *Symposium* 211 D). The relation between the old Parmenides and the young Socrates in the *Parmenides* is similar to that in the *Theaetetus* between Socrates himself and the young Theaetetus who bears such a striking resemblance to him. And as there Parmenides wants to give Socrates a propaedeutic exercise in his dialectic which will enable him rightly to determine the true relation between idea and reality, as he has it in mind, so here Socrates wants to lead the young Theaetetus from the propaedeutic sciences of mathematics as postulated in the *Republic* (531 D ff.) through dialectic first to the understanding of the term *ἐπιστήμη* which they have all in common, and then to the very idea of the *agathon* which is behind it as their ultimate basis (*Theaetetus* 176 A ff.). Although as a subject of discussion the idea of the *agathon* is not mentioned either here or in the *Parmenides*, yet it is always

order to ascend to the *agathon*, which as the very origin of the universe is the only *ἀνπόθετον* on which everything else depends.¹¹

Although for Plato this dialectic is the "key-stone" (*θρυγκός*, *Republic* 534 E) above all the single sciences, still it is to be interpreted only as a discursive way toward the intuition of the *agathon*, not as the intuition itself. In the *Phaedo* (99 C ff.) Socrates states this quite clearly: "In regard to this last, all-embracing cause of the *agathon*, I should very much like to have become the pupil of anyone. Now, since I was deprived of this cause and was in no position either to find it by myself or to learn it from someone else, I ascertained the second best journey toward the search for this cause." This second best journey is dialectic, that way *διὰ τῶν λόγων*, which "in every case assumes as an hypothesis whichever *logos* seems to be the strongest and which sets up the other as true or false, according as it is in contradiction or agreement with it." That is decisive for the comprehension of Platonic dialectic; here even the strongest *logos* is valid as hypothesis only, but, since the sun of the *agathon* is too blinding for us, we have no other refuge than the *logoi* and must investigate the ideas in them as in reflections of a mirror. Although Socrates hesitates to take the *logoi* as mere images (*ὡς εἰκόνας*, *Republic* 510 B; E) of the true existence of the idea in the same sense as the objects of the sensible world, still it is obvious that here as in the *Republic* and in the *Seventh Epistle* it is not yet the true existence of the *agathon* itself which is adequately apprehensible through these *logoi*.

But dialectic—"the way through *logoi*" to the *agathon*—not the idea of the *agathon* itself is the subject of the Eleatic dialogues, especially of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*. That Socrates in these dialogues, just as in the *Timaeus*, remains in the background quietly listening to the Eleatic dialectic without interfering with the discussion has rightly been understood

present in the philosophical existence of Socrates and distinctly announces itself to him also in the nature of the young Theaetetus, so similar to his own (*Theaetetus* 143 E; 144 D). The conversation with Theaetetus is later continued in the Eleatic dialogues, the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*.

¹¹ *Republic* 510 B ff. Concerning the ascent to the *agathon* cf. G. Krüger, *op. cit.*, pp. 200 ff.

as very significant.¹² This silence means, so we may understand it, that this philosophical method of the Eleatic certainly has to be taken very seriously and, according to Plato's conviction, represents the most profound dialectic of the idea as taught to his pupils by Plato himself in the Academy yet does not reach that highest level of philosophy which for Plato always can be represented by Socrates alone. Thus in these dialogues we have to deal only with a prelude (*Parmenides* 135 C ff.) to the genuine Socratic idea of the *agathon* to which all dialectic shall lead. It is true, these Eleatics also abandon Parmenides' limited conception and approach Plato's point of view (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1089 a 2). They show that dialectic, if properly applied, makes it necessary to assume besides the "one," the "unmoved," the "identical being" of Parmenides also the "many," the "different," the "moved," the "non-being." Yet even this argument is based on the *logoi* and the identity of thinking and being. The Eleatics renounce, therefore, the comprehension of absolute non-being which lies beyond every *logos* and all *dianoia* (*Sophist* 238 C, 258 E) as well as of its opposite, the idea of the *agathon*.¹³

¹² P. Friedländer, *Platon*, II (1930), pp. 505 ff.

¹³ In the *Sophist* (248 E, cf. *Philebus*, especially 30 A) the "absolute being" (*παρτελὼς ὄν*) of the Eleatic which embodies "movement," "soul," "thinking," "life," and is therefore a *ζῶον νοητόν*, is not identical with the idea of the *agathon*, but with that of the world; this is also the conception of Parmenides himself in whose terms Plato even in the *Timaeus* defines the world (cf. e.g. *Timaeus* 29 D; 31 D; 62 E with Parmenides, Fr. 8, 4, 44, 50, 60). It is certainly not by chance that by this *παρτελὼς ὄν* one is reminded of the *παρτελὼς ζῶον* in the *Timaeus* (31 B), where the world appears as an image of this *παρτελὼς ζῶον*. In the *Republic* (509 ff.) the many *εἰδη νοητά* of the world of ideas in the light of the *ἀλήθεια* integrated into the unity of "being" and *νοῦς* are compared in the simile of the sun with the many individual things of the material world which is enclosed by the one celestial globe. For Plato this world is a *ζῶον ἐμψυχον ἑνόν*; the individuals are included in the unity of the world-soul and supported by it, just as the single parts of an organism are included in its soul. Similarly, according to the *Sophist* the different opposing ideas lose their absolute independence within the *ζῶον* of the *παρτελὼς ὄν* and interlace with one another, an entanglement to be unraveled only by the *diacresis* of the dialectician. We must not fall into the error of the Neoplatonists who understood as "true *logos*" what by Plato was meant as mythical allegory; for him the *logos* can be apprehended only by dialectic and its *logoi*. But what

It has been assumed that Plato here in his late period gives up his former conviction of the transcendence of the idea in favor of a conception of immanent being closer to the Aristotelian point of view.¹⁴ Plato certainly is no longer satisfied with that conception of transcendence to be found in the more popular and protreptical dialogues in which he contrasted the idea, the "one," "identical," "eternal" with the objects, the "many," the "different," the continuous becoming and movement. He shows, on the contrary, that such a naïve conception of transcendence must lead to agnosticism (*Parmenides* 137 A ff., *Sophist* 248 A ff.) and must provoke all the eristic objections such as are incessantly brought forward by Aristotle in his criticism of the Platonic concept of the idea. Plato furthermore proves that all the opposites which formerly separated ideas and reality must rather be contained in the idea itself.¹⁵ For the antitheses themselves are *logoi*; yet everything which the *logos* recognizes as true according to the Socratic assumption must be considered as an idea or rather as the hypothesis of an idea. And it is this interlacing with one another which in these later dialogues dialectic through its diaeresis has to dissolve like an organic body (*σῶμα*) into its parts and to combine again into its original unity (*Sophist* 251 A, *Philebus* 14 D, *Parmenides* 129 B, cf. *Phaedrus* 266 B). Since the Eleatic identification of thinking and being is closely related, however, to the Aristotelian conception of being, it is not astonishing that these particular dialogues come

in the allegorical myth of the *Timaeus* appears as *παρτελῶς ἕψον* obviously is identical with what in the dialectic of the *Sophist* is understood as *παρτελῶς ὅν*, i. e. the idea of this world. Shorey (*The Unity of Plato's Thought* [1903], p. 37; n. 256; *Class. Phil.*, XXIII [1928], p. 344; cf. also Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* [1937], pp. 40 ff.) objects to this generally accepted interpretation. He contends that such a conclusion does not necessarily follow, since in the *Timaeus* no more is said than that the world, being both a living being and an image of the idea, must be a perfect living creature; that, however, must not imply that all ideas, the world of ideas as a whole, are also one. This objection certainly is logically correct, but the standard of exact logic cannot be applied to the myth. Furthermore, the *Sophist* proves in conclusive dialectical procedure that the idea of the "perfect being" is considered to be a living being.

¹⁴ Cf. J. Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles* (Breslau, 1917), e. g. p. 58.

¹⁵ Cf. p. 52 *infra*.

often very near to the Aristotelian train of thought. Besides the fact that in these dialogues the idea of the *agathon* is kept entirely in the background, so that they are of an abstract-theoretical character, noticeable also in the language and the form of the dialogues, they even contain arguments used by Aristotle himself in his criticism of the Platonic doctrine of ideas, such as in the *Parmenides*, for instance, the objection of the so-called *τῶτος ἀνθρώπος* which occurs in the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*.¹⁶

At any rate, so much can be shown from the *Parmenides*, that Plato did not feel obliged to change in the least his original conception of ideas on account of the discussion taking place among his younger pupils. This dialogue is so effective just by reason of the superiority which Plato shows in himself proposing all the possible objections and by the inability of the young people to meet his arguments, which inability is attributed to their lack of training in higher dialectic. From these late dialogues, then, it cannot be concluded that Plato, near the end of his life, gave up his doctrine of ideas and developed toward the Aristotelian point of view of the immanence of the idea.

¹⁶ *Parmenides* 132 A ff., cf. *Republic* 598 A; *Metaphysics* 990 b 17; 1079 a 13. This passage of the *Metaphysics*, however, as we learn from Syrianus, *ad loc.* (pp. 120, 34; 195, 1 Kr.; cf. also Karpp, *Hermes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 386), is nothing but an epitome of the Aristotelian special treatise "On the (Platonic) ideas"; that explains at the same time why it is that the same sentences are inserted into the *Metaphysics* at two different places (I and XIII). If Jaeger is right in saying that the first book of the *Metaphysics* was written shortly after Plato's death, it would follow that this treatise on the Platonic ideas must have been written while Plato was still alive, so that he may well have been familiar with its arguments (cf. Fr. 8 Rose² and Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, II b⁴, pp. 88 ff.; Natorp, *Plato's Ideenlehre* [1903], p. 284, cf. p. 218). Since the *Parmenides*, on the other hand, as is generally assumed to-day, was written after the *Theaetetus*, certainly after 369/8, the year when Aristotle, according to ancient tradition, entered the Academy, it would be easy to conjecture that the *Parmenides* is meant to be an answer to the criticism of the Platonic ideas brought forward by Aristotle, or at least by the circle of Plato's pupils whom Aristotle seems to represent in his treatise. This opinion is supported also by Natorp's correct observation (*op. cit.*, p. 218) that Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic doctrine of ideas obviously does not refer to the *Parmenides* at all. The question has always been raised whether it is mere chance that the youngest participant of this dialogue whom Parmenides addresses in presenting his masterly dialectic is also called Aristotle; but this cannot be decided with certainty.

This is evident also from the *Timaeus*; in this dialogue which was written at about the same time as the *Sophist* or rather somewhat later¹⁷ it is just the transcendence of the idea which is particularly emphasized (27 D). If that were not true, then Aristotle's whole criticism of Plato in the *Metaphysics* would be senseless.¹⁸

3. The Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of mathematics

Aristotle's attacks are directed with still greater ardor, however, against another decisive point of Plato's doctrine, namely his "Pythagorean" conception of mathematics. To Aristotle this seems so completely to determine the whole Platonic philosophy that he claims "in most parts it simply follows the Pythagoreans," although he admits that it has "a few characteristics of its own" (*Metaphysics* 987 a 30-31).

Ever since mathematics as a science came into the world, which was the accomplishment mainly of the Pythagoreans,¹⁹ the question whether its objects are real and existent has remained a fundamental philosophical problem. For the existence of these objects as recognized by this science with more exactness and certainty than any other science has attained up to the present day is of an entirely different nature from the existence of all the other objects of this world; numbers, dimensions, geometrical figures, as conceived by the mathematician, are not given in any phenomenal perception outside himself and are existent only in his thinking, in other words they are ideas, *ἰδέαι*.²⁰


For the Pythagorean mathematician, therefore, there is no doubt about the existence of ideas; it is proved to him by the

¹⁷ There are many features which both dialogues have in common. Cf. *Sophist* 265 ff., but also the other late dialogues, *Philebus* 30 A, *Phaedrus* 245 ff., 270 D ff.

¹⁸ Aristotle is well acquainted with the content of the late Platonic dialogues; cf. the passages about the *Sophist* in O. Apelt's edition, pp. 32 ff. and the passages about the other dialogues in Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, s. v. Plato, pp. 598 ff.

¹⁹ According to Aristotle's testimony, *Metaphysics* 985 b 23 ff.; cf. Plato, *Republic* 530 D ff.

²⁰ Such they were probably called even before Plato: *Republic* 510 D 6; cf. J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy Thales to Plato*, § 120 ff. and A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, pp. 258 ff.



knowledge of his science itself,²¹ and the Pythagorean philosophy is based upon this new conception of existence as upon an entirely new foundation (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 987 a 20, 1078 a 21) which remains the basis of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy as well. In the sixth and seventh books of Plato's *Republic* Socrates expresses his conviction that the knowledge of mathematics is the necessary presupposition of the true understanding of his ideas. Only he who has recognized the peculiarity of the mathematical objects which exist merely in thought has an open eye for the world of ideas (*Republic* 527 E; 533 A, D). To Socrates, therefore, the study of mathematics, by which the mind is trained to turn from the perception of the senses to the objects that exist in thought alone, is the indispensable introduction for the young philosopher. So far Socrates, as he himself emphasizes (*Republic* 530 D), is in perfect agreement with the Pythagoreans. But whereas for them there are no other *εἶδη* except just these mathematical objects, for Socrates the realm of the true ideas and of the *agathon* begins only beyond this boundary; thus the mathematical objects have an intermediate position between the ideas themselves and the perceptible things.²² Plato, then, took over the whole Pythagorean theory and ontology of mathematics into his thinking,²³ the only difference being that to him those principles (like "the odd" and "the even") which the Pythagoreans recognized as ultimate *ἀρχαί* are merely *προθέσεις* (*Republic* 510 C ff., cf. 523 C) and that the mathematical objects, especially the numbers, are not immanent in the empirical objects (*Republic* 530 A ff., 531 A) but exist rather as transcendent substances (*Republic* 524 E, *αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοί*), i. e. as individual objects of thinking,²⁴ as "ideal" numbers.

²¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 990 b 12, 987 a 27, 1090 a 27; cf. Plato, *Parmenides* 132 B, *Republic* 476 E, and Syrianus, *Metaphysics*, p. 177, 27 (*τεκμήριον ἰκανόν*).

²² Cf. *Republic* 509-535 and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 987 b 14; 995 b 17; 1002 b 13 ff.; 1028 b 20; 1042 a 12; 1059 b 6. A more detailed study of the mathematical problems involved will be given in an article dealing with the development of Greek mathematics in its relation to Greek philosophy which is to be published in Neugebauer's new American Journal for the History of Mathematics.

²³ Cf. *Philebus* 16-31, especially 23 C ff.; *Gorgias* 507 E; *Protagoras* 356 ff.; *Meno* 81 ff. and above all the *Timaeus*.

²⁴ Aristotle, *Physics* 203 a 6; *De Caelo* 300 a 15; *Metaphysics* 987 b 27;

Whatever the historical Socrates may have thought, for the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues the mathematical idea of the Pythagoreans is the inductive premise which guarantees to the human mind the truth of the idea in general and of the *agathon*, although in reality it is rather this idea which is itself the ultimate unconditioned premise for the truth of the mathematical objects and their comprehension.²⁵ To be sure, the idea of the *agathon* flares up immediately in the moral existence of Socrates as the true origin of his whole being and thinking to be perfected and even to be found only beyond this finite world; this idea Socrates realizes with his life and by his death bears witness to it (*Phaedo*, especially 64 A ff.). Yet theoretically the essential character of ideas in general cannot be proved except by way of mathematics: It is only by "analogy" (*Republic* 534 A) with the objects of Pythagorean mathematics that Socrates can explain the ontological character of his idea and of the *agathon*. As the mathematical ideas, apprehensible in the thinking of the *dianoia*, stand to the perceptibles, so the ideas and the *agathon* intuited by the *noûs* stand to the mathematical objects. And as for the Pythagoreans the perception of the senses provides nothing but images of mathematical ideas (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 985 b 27; 987 b 11) so for Socrates the mathematical objects themselves are in turn nothing but images of the true idea.

In sharp opposition to this opinion of Plato's Aristotle simply denies the objective reality of the mathematical objects. To him numbers and geometrical concepts are not beings (*οὐσίαι*) but mere abstractions of thought; real objective existence he ascribes only to the phenomenal sensibles with their perceptible continuum. While the Pythagoreans and Plato did not recognize the continuum (*συνεχές*) as a mathematically exact concept and therefore did not accept it among their definitions (*Metaphysics* 1036 b 9), Aristotle tried to reduce the mathematical concepts, especially that of the infinite, to the concept of the continuum which, as a mathematical concept, is still unknown to Plato and which Aristotle himself may have been the first to introduce into

990 a 15, b 21; 996 a 5; 1001 a 9; 1080 b 16; 1083 b 8-19; 1090 a 20-31. Cf. p. 51 *infra*.

²⁵ Cf. *Republic*, books VI and VII. Plato seems to have dealt with this problem more extensively in his lectures *Περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, cf. Aristotle *apud* Aristoxenus, *Harmonics* II, 30 (Marq.); cf. p. 37 *supra*.

mathematical discussion. According to Aristotle it is only the thinking of the mathematician which in the continuous reality of phenomenal perception draws the sharp limits of his concepts; in this exact sense, therefore, the object of these concepts exists only *in abstracto*, not in reality (cf. *Metaphysics* 1051 a 22; *De Anima* 431 b 12, etc.). Thus the concept of the infinite, the *ἄπειρον*, especially has not for him the character of a real mathematical existence, as it has for Plato and the Pythagoreans, but is reduced to the possible repetition of certain subjective processes of thought as its basic phenomenon (cf. especially *Physics* III, 4 ff.).²⁰

4. The contrast between Plato's and Aristotle's ontological conception of the ideas

If thus in mathematics and consequently also in metaphysics Aristotle recognizes the phenomenal perception alone as the ultimate criterion of truth, he tries, on the other hand, to maintain with Plato the general truth of the idea and of the thought which comprehends it in opposition to mere sensual perception. But, once he has undermined the idea in the sphere of mathematics, the means of understanding the idea is for him reduced to the *logos* alone, the universal concept which, he holds, defines the universal essence of the particular thing. What, then, is the being of the ideas, and where can man find them? Whereas for Plato the true being of things was the *ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλά*, the idea which exists beyond and above them, Aristotle conceives it only as the *ἐν κατὰ (ἐπὶ) πολλῶν* (*Anal. Post.* 77 a 5), i. e. as the "universal" (*καθόλου*, a term first coined by him) which belongs to several things, but which in reality does not exist as we think

²⁰ M. Dehn ("Espace, temps et nombre chez Aristote," *Scientia*, Juillet-Août 1936, pp. 7 and 35) interprets very well: "les 'mouvements de la raison' . . . qui conduisent à compter sont discontinus (Aristote, *Physics* 204 b 23, *De Lin. Insect.* 969 a 33) . . . tout ce qui représente nous paraît être continu; c'est un désaccord fondamental entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur, car l'expression par la parole (*λογισμός*, *συλλογισμός*) est discontinue. Ce désaccord entre la structure discontinue de l'âme et celle en apparence continue du monde extérieur est la 'cause cachée de toutes les apories et paradoxes'." Plato, on the contrary, points out that *τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσονται πρεσβύτερα* and *λογισμοί* . . . *πρότερα μήκους* . . . *καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους*, . . . *εἴτερ καὶ ψυχῇ σώματος* (*Lawos* 896 C-D).

it *in abstracto*, in the *logos* (*Metaphysics* 1077 b 1; 990 b 7 ff.; 1040 b 28). Substance (*οὐσία*) means to him first that of which, as underlying subject (*ὑποκείμενον*), all else is predicated (*Metaphysics* 1017 b 13; 1028 b 36; 1029 a 8; 1038 b 15; *Categ.* 2 a 11). This, however, can be only the particular in which the idea as the universal merely inheres (*De Anima* 432 a 3). So definitely is Aristotle's thinking determined by this conception of being that he cannot imagine the Platonic idea to be anything except a particular object or a universal concept (*Metaphysics* XIII, 10),²⁷ although it is neither the one nor the other, as Syrianus properly objects (*Metaphysics*, p. 193, 9 Kr.). The dialogue *Parmenides* is meant to show specifically in what kind of dialectic one becomes entangled if one takes the idea to be a particular object (131-136).

With his conception of *οὐσία* as particular substance Aristotle returns in fact to the pre-Socratic conception of the phenomenal thing, in overcoming which conception lay the epoch-making accomplishment of the generation before Aristotle (cf. *Metaphysics*, I, 5). On the other hand, Aristotle has to admit that all knowledge is essentially directed to the universal, not to the particular (*Metaphysics* 1087 a 7). Considering himself as the mediator between the opposite directions of thought he therefore takes the idea, which is intelligible and defined in the *logos*—the substantial “form”—, as another (second) *οὐσία* (*Categ.* 2 b 7),²⁸ although, as he himself admits, he is unable to decide with certainty which of the two substances represents true and real being (*Metaphysics* III, 4 and 6; XIII, 10). Lastly he sees true *οὐσία* just in the “combination” (*σύνολον*) of these two aspects of being, i. e. in that dynamic process of entelechy in which the substantial form of the idea manifests itself in the particular as the actualization of that thing's mere potentiality. Thus for him this being is to be understood only as this “combination,” only as the correlative relation of the two factors to each other, as their *analogon*, i. e. as “*analogia entis*” (*Metaphysics* 1048 a 37; 1043 a 5).

For Aristotle, then, the idea (the general character of the particular which is comprehended by the definition of the *logos*) has its real being within the particular itself as its formal cause.

²⁷ Cf. Appendix (to be published in the April number of this Journal).

²⁸ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 45, n. 1.

But the species does not exist in abstract thinking alone as a logical formula of classification, but has its being in the procreative process itself as the life of the genus, its flesh and bones as it were (*Metaphysics* 1034 a 6). The universal is in the seed itself, in that "potency" of the living being to create other individuals of its own species. Thus for Aristotle the sentence "a man begets a man" becomes the formula for the real essence of the idea within the cycle of becoming (*Metaphysics* 1073 a 1; 1092 a 16).²⁰ By declaring the static transcendence of the Platonic idea to be a mere abstraction of logical thinking and by transferring its true reality into the dynamic process of nature in which are developed all the seeds of life Aristotle obtains a magnificent image of the creative and productive *physis*, so decisive for his observation and description of phenomena, especially in the field of biology of which he is the acknowledged master.

The truth inherent in this concept cannot but impress everybody. Its underlying principle, that the eternal idea finds its earthly realization in the temporal process of perpetual regeneration and procreation (*ἀγενεσία*) through which the old is constantly replaced by something new, was already anticipated by Plato in the famous passage of his *Symposium* (206 C-208 B). But for Plato the organic form, as identically preserved in the process of reproduction and regeneration, is only a faint and far removed image of the idea; and whereas for him this procreative and productive instinct of the living being (i. e. the *eros* of the mortal nature for the unattainable eternity of the idea) is *daemonic*, for Aristotle it is divine, the direct expression of the divine *νοῦς* and its ideas in this world: ἐν πᾶσι . . . τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν, i. e. θεοί (*De Part. Anim.* 645 a 16). These ideas, Aristotle believes, we understand adequately through our universal concepts. Thus the free self-mastery of nature, the spontaneity of life (*ψυχή*) which according to Plato implies the very abyss of the *daemonic* is firmly fettered by the logical concept which is meant to define the truly creative power of the particulars themselves.

ERICH FRANK.

(To be Continued)

²⁰ Cf. E. Frank, *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* (1927), pp. 610 ff.

THE MEANING OF 'ΕΚΤΗΜΟΡΟΣ.

W. J. Woodhouse in his extremely brilliant book on the Solonian reforms¹ incidentally discusses the question of whether the *ἐκτῆμοροι*, mentioned by Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 2, and by some other authors, had to make over one-sixth of the produce of their farms to their creditors or whether they retained that portion for the maintenance of themselves and of their families. He arrives at the conclusion that the second answer to the question is correct; and, as far as I can see, his reviewers have accepted his interpretation up to the present date. Yet it seems to me that he can be proved to be wrong in regard to this special point; and the question is perhaps all the more worthy of reconsideration since his solution of this special problem is not an integral part of his analysis, so that its reversal does not detract from the value of his excellent work as a whole.

Since Woodhouse frequently warns against attacking the question on the basis of *a priori* considerations let us first turn to the ancient sources. Leaving aside Aristotle for the moment, there are two passages in ancient authors which state clearly that the hectemores paid, not retained, one-sixth of the produce of their farms; 1) Plut., *Sol.*, 13: ἐγεώργουν ἕκτα τῶν γινομένων τελοῦντες; 2) Hesych., *s. v.* ἐπίμορτος: ἐκτῆμοροι οἱ τὸ ἕκτον τελοῦντες. There are two passages which are ambiguous: 1) Hesych., *s. v.* ἐκτῆμοροι: οἱ ἕκτῳ μέρει τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦντες; 2) Photios, *s. v.* πελάται: ἐκτῆμοροι ἐπεὶ δὲ ἕκτῳ μέρει τῶν καρπῶν εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν. There is one passage which states equally clearly that the hectemores received one-sixth of the produce: Eustath. in Hom. *Od.*, T, 28: ἔθνικῃ δὲ λέξει καὶ ἡ μόρτη, τὸ ἕκτον, φασί, μέρος τῶν καρπῶν, ἣ ἐδίδοτο τοῖς ἐκτῆμοροῖς (sic) ὡς ἐν ἀωνύμῳ κεῖται λεξικῶ ῥητορικῶ. Thus far then, since Eustathius seems not particularly well informed, ancient tradition is decidedly in favor of the first interpretation quoted above.

But what is the opinion of Aristotle, by far the most important of the ancient authorities on the question? The passage in the *Ath. Pol.* runs as follows: καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτῆμοροι. κατὰ ταύτην γὰρ τὴν μίσθωσιν ἡργάζοντο τῶν πλουσίων τοὺς ἀγροῦς.

¹ *Solon, the Liberator* (Oxford University Press, 1938).

ἡ δὲ πᾶσα γῆ δι' ὀλίγων ἦν, καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδίδοιεν, ἀγώγμοι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ παῖδες ἐγίγνοντο. As Woodhouse himself points out, *μισθώσεις* means either rent, or lease, or the property which is leased, or the contract of lease, but never hire or wages.² Consequently he translates the first statement made by Aristotle quite correctly as follows: "The hectemores were so called because it was at this rent that they cultivated the land of the rich." But he plainly contradicts himself when he goes on to say (p. 44): "But the question still remains—at what rent, or on what terms exactly? In which direction did the rent pass?" Since according to his own very convincing theory the creditor became the owner of the farm on which the former proprietor stayed as a life tenant with the option of redemption, the *rent* obviously had to be paid to the creditor as to the owner; and, if there should be any uncertainty still left, it is eliminated by the following sentence: καὶ εἰ μὴ τὰς μισθώσεις ἀποδίδοιεν, ἀγώγμοι . . . ἐγίγνοντο. Here the men who pay the rent are plainly the debtors. Nor can the plural *μισθώσεις* in the second sentence be construed as meaning five-sixths in contrast to *μισθώσεις* which means one-sixth. No reasonable man would call a rent of five-sixths of the produce rents while calling a rent of one-sixth rent; and the difference between the singular in the first and the plural in the second sentence is fully accounted for by the fact that Aristotle speaks first of the rent in the abstract, while he later refers to the specific rents which the debtors, each individually, had to pay. If, therefore, the *μισθώσεις* in the first sentence, is a rent of one-sixth, as Woodhouse correctly interprets it, the *μισθώσεις* in the second sentence must be the same. Aristotle's statement is not ambiguous at all, but agrees fully with that of Plutarch—at least as far as the term *ἐκτῆμορος* is concerned.

Woodhouse, however, bases his opinion not so much on an interpretation of Aristotle, whose statement he considers ambiguous and obscure, as on an analysis of the word *ἐκτῆμορος* itself. He says (p. 47): "How a word meaning 'sixth-partner' should in its Greek form signify payment or surrender rather than reception or retention of one-sixth is not quite clear"; and in confirmation of this view he mentions the use of *ισόμορος* in Hom., *Il.*, O, 209 in the sense of "having an equal share."

² Cf. the evidence collected by Woodhouse on pp. 65-66.

But neither of these arguments is conclusive. For even if words of this type ordinarily meant "having a certain part"—which, as we shall see, is not true—one would still have to take into consideration the facts that *ἐκτῆμορος* is a technical term which originated in comparatively late times and in application to a peculiar historical situation and that terms of this kind do not always follow the general semantic laws of a language. The testimony of a man like Aristotle who is likely to have had some factual knowledge, therefore, would still weigh heavily even against otherwise incontestable linguistic or semantic analogies. But in fact there does not exist any law according to which the meaning of *ἐκτῆμορος* must be analogous to that of *ισόμορος* in the *Iliad*. On the contrary, adjectives and nouns of this type are *very* frequently used in two different senses. *δεκατεντής*, for instance, in Greek and *decumanus* in Latin are perhaps not quite analogous to *ἐκτῆμορος* inasmuch as they are derived from the verbs *δεκατεύειν* and *decumare*. Yet it is significant that both words can mean one who pays as well as one who collects the tithe, that is, they can refer to the same action in opposite directions. This, by the way, is very common with other adjectives too. So *αἰδοῖος*, for instance, means one who feels *αἰδώς* and acts accordingly as well as one who is an object of *αἰδώς*. Furthermore, the Greek and Latin words *δεκατεντής* and *decumanus* have exact equivalents in the English word "tither" and the German word "Zehntner," both of which have the same double meaning; and both these modern languages through the words "tithe-farmer" and "Zehntmann" provide us with perfect analogies to *ἐκτῆμορος* in the sense required by Aristotle and Plutarch.

This makes it quite clear that the form of the word as such does not give us a cue to its exact meaning as a technical term used in a special historical situation. Ancient tradition, on the other hand,—apart from Eustathius whom nobody will consider as an authority in such a matter—is unanimous in supporting the interpretation which Woodhouse rejects.

Let us then turn to an analysis of the historical situation. Woodhouse is absolutely right in rejecting arguments based on a comparison with modern conditions. What is a comparatively light burden in one period may be a very heavy burden at another time and under different economic conditions. If we want to arrive at a well-founded conclusion, we have to consider the

special situation prevailing at the time in question; and though we know comparatively little about pre-Solonian times there are some points that may help us to arrive at a definite conclusion.

1. Woodhouse himself has shown quite conclusively that the hectemores were not wage-earning laborers who worked on an estate during the season but that they lived on and from the farms on which they worked. One may therefore contend that, while one-sixth of the harvest might be a possible or even a reasonable wage for seasonal laborers, a rent of five-sixths of the produce of a farm which was the exclusive means of subsistence for a family would be almost incredible. But since we do not know the economic situation of the period and the degree of the oppression of the poor this argument may perhaps be too general.

2. The fact that the state of bondage which the name of *ἐκτήμερος* implies was so widespread at the time of Solon and that it always resulted from debts shows that very many people had to incur debts in order to keep their farms going. From this one can infer that under the economic conditions of the time it was extremely difficult to live on the produce of a farm of moderate size even when it was free from debts. How can we suppose that these farmers were able to live on their farms at all when they had to make over five-sixths of the produce to their creditors?

3. This second argument gains in weight if one considers that—as Woodhouse himself has pointed out (p. 46)—it was the bondage in which they were kept even more than the amount of the rent which caused the grievance and became the cause of an impending revolution.³ If the hectemores had been compelled to hand over five-sixths of the produce of their farms, they would have been in such a state of starvation that probably nothing else would have interested them.

4. If the hectemores had been able to hand over anything like five-sixths of the produce of their farms to their creditors, it is difficult to see how any creditor could have been so foolish as to sell his hectemores as slaves when they were unable to pay the whole amount of the rent. In order to get any revenue out of the farm he would have had to buy other slaves or to hire free

³ Cf. Aristotle, *loc. cit.*: χαλεπώτατον μὲν οὖν καὶ πικρότατον τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ δουλεύειν. Cf. also *infra*.

laborers, whom he would have had to feed or to pay; and it is scarcely credible that in this way he would have been able to get still more out of the farm than five-sixths of the value of the gross produce or an approximate amount.

5. That in fact a rent or tax, not of one-sixth, but of one-tenth of the produce, was considered a rather heavy burden even under the better economic conditions of the time of Pisistratus is proved by the story told by Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 16: Ἰδὼν γάρ τινα . . . ἐργαζόμενον, τὸν παῖδα ἐκέλευεν ἐρέσθαι τί περιγίγνεται ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου. ὁ δ' 'ὅσα κακὰ καὶ ὀδύνας,' ἔφη, 'καὶ τούτων τῶν κακῶν καὶ ὀδυνῶν Πεισίστρατος δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν δεκάτην.' . . . ὁ δὲ Πεισίστρατος . . . ἀτελῇ ἀπάντων ἐποίησεν αὐτόν. The significant fact here is not so much the complaint of the peasant, since taxpayers are always complaining, but the fact that Pisistratus relieves him from the tax and so implicitly acknowledges that the complaint was justified.

6. The most conclusive argument, however, derives from the way in which the status of an hectemore originated. According to Woodhouse, who advances very good arguments for this part of his theory, the free peasant, when he was compelled to take up a loan, had to sell his farm to the creditor with option of redemption, but stayed on it as a tenant and henceforth had to make over a certain portion of the produce to the new owner. That the fraction of one-sixth plays a special part in these transactions is explained by the system of coinage and measures prevailing at Athens at the time: one Attic medimnos containing six hecteis and one Attic drachma being equal to six obols.

All this is very convincing; but it is, of course, quite impossible that the debtor, immediately after having contracted the loan, should have had to pay an interest equal to five-sixths of the produce of the whole farm, that is, of his only productive property of which up to that moment he had been the free owner. Even Woodhouse admits this (p. 157). But in order to make his interpretation of the word ἐκτήμορος fit in with the rest of his theory he constructs a development from the status of a simple debtor who has sold his property to the creditor to the status of a real hectemore, and since nothing of this kind is mentioned in ancient tradition he accuses Aristotle and Plutarch of having neglected to distinguish between the different stages of this development.

But let us look a little more closely at Woodhouse's theory. He thinks that the debtor at first had to pay only one-sixth of the produce of his farm to the new owner but that he frequently would not have been able to pay this rent in full. In this case the arrears would again be funded as a loan on which an interest of one-sixth (of the arrears or of the produce of the farm?) would have to be paid. These arrears would soon pile up beyond all hope of clearance; and, when this stage was reached, the tenant, in Woodhouse's opinion, would *either* be haled into debt slavery *or* alternatively (*sic*) be reduced to hectemore status, that is to the status of a man who had to pay *five-sixths* of the produce of his farm.

This explanation is altogether incredible, quite apart from the fact that it has not the slightest foundation in ancient tradition, for if the creditor had the right to sell the debtor as a slave this right must have been dependent upon the debtor's inability to pay the interest or rent and not upon his inability to pay an excessive rent. Why then should the landlord have waited until the debt had grown beyond all measure instead of liquidating it by selling the debtor as soon as possible, for, if the status of a hectemore originated in the way in which Woodhouse suggests, it must have been clear long before that stage was reached that the debtor would never be able to pay one-half or one-third of the produce as rent, much less five-sixths, and what, in this case, would have been the advantage of making a man a hectemore anyway, since nobody could ever have fulfilled the obligations connected with that status?

Furthermore, if Woodhouse's explanation is correct, there must have been many people who paid one-sixth, or two-sixths, or three-sixths, and so on. How then are we to believe that they were not called hectemores until they had come down to keeping only one-sixth for themselves and handing over the rest to their creditors—especially since in Woodhouse's own opinion real hectemores, that is people who actually were able to pay five-sixths of the produce, never existed, but only legal hectemores, that is men who were under legal obligation to pay that amount but were never able to do so?

All this makes it perfectly clear that this part of Woodhouse's theory is based exclusively on the belief that the word *ἐκτήμερος* must be interpreted on the analogy of *ισόμορος* in the *Iliad*. This

belief, however, as has been proved above, is erroneous. The theory itself then becomes altogether untenable.

This does not at all detract from the value of Woodhouse's work as a whole. On the contrary: since the theory of a rent of five-sixths of the produce is less reconcilable with his own explanation of the origin and nature of the hectemore status than with that of any other scholar, its reversal makes the rest of his work all the more convincing and consistent.

We find, then, furthermore, that none of the statements made by Aristotle is erroneous, as far as we can check them, though his account is so brief and concentrated that it requires careful interpretation in the light of information gained from other sources.

In the first sentence: ἦν γὰρ τότε ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ὀλιγαρχικῇ πᾶσι καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐδούλευον οἱ πένητες τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες, καὶ ἐκαλοῦντο πελάται καὶ ἐκτῆμοροι the word ἐδούλευον cannot mean that the hectemores were actual slaves, since otherwise there would be no difference between their status at the time when they paid the rent and at the time when they had become unable to do so and consequently—but only then and not before as Aristotle himself tells us in the next sentence (cf. *supra*)—became ἀγώγμοι together with their wives and children. But it is a well known fact that, while the noun δούλος applies only to real slaves, the verb δουλεύειν is used very freely, for instance, in order to characterize the relation of the citizens of a city to a tyrant or of barbarians to their king, etc., where there is no question of real slavery. What the word means in the passage quoted becomes clear in the sentence: καὶ γὰρ δεδεμένοι τοῖς δανείσασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν μέχρι Σόλωνος. This refers partly to the preceding sentence in which Aristotle has stated that the hectemores became ἀγώγμοι if they were unable to pay the rent. The difficulty arising from the fact that Aristotle in one sentence speaks of a loan and in the other of a rent has been solved most admirably through Woodhouse's theory that the loan was really the price for the farm which was sold with option of redemption so that the interest on the loan and the rent for the farm on which the former owner stayed as a tenant were actually identical. Still, in what did the δουλεύειν consist at the time when the tenant was still able to pay the rent and hence was not yet ἀγώγμος? This can be answered

without too great difficulty. δεδεμένοι τοῖς δανείσασιν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν must imply more than the fact that the tenant could be sold into slavery if and when he was unable to pay the interest. Otherwise he could have avoided this consequence by handing over one-sixth or whatever portion of the produce was required—immediately after the harvest he must always have been able to do that—and leaving the farm. Obviously this was not possible since there is no indication that it ever happened, and that is what δεδεμένοι ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι and δουλεύειν means. When a peasant had sold his farm with option of redemption he and his family were kept in bondage and had to stay on it either until they were able to buy it back—which may have occurred rarely—or until they were unable to meet their obligations and so, at the will of their creditor and landlord, could be sold as slaves. This also explains perfectly why χαλεπώτατον μὲν οὖν καὶ πικρότατον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν τὸ δουλεύειν.

No further explanation is necessary, for Woodhouse's objection to Aristotle's statement that *οἱ πένητες* were hectemores is scarcely worth mentioning, since any such statement would naturally have to be taken *cum grano salis*, and, if, as Woodhouse himself has pointed out, originally all Athenian citizens owned a lot on which they lived or could live with their families and if poverty consequently consisted mainly in the necessity of contracting debts, Aristotle's statement was probably largely true.

KURT VON FRITZ.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

NOTE ON THE APOCRYPHAL OATH OF THE ATHENIANS AT PLATAEA.

In a recent publication¹ Louis Robert has discussed an inscription containing both the oath taken by the Athenian ephebi as well as that to which the Athenians were presumed to have subscribed before the battle of Plataea. These two documents were inscribed in a stoichedon manner upon the same stele, which was originally set up in the sanctuary of Ares and Athena Areia in the deme of Acharnae. As this note concerns only the latter portion of the oath at Plataea, the body of the text is not incorporated here.²

As the documents stands, it presents a curious mixture of at least two different things: 1) lines 21-35 concerning an oath pertaining to some alliance which included Athens, Sparta, and Plataea; and 2) lines 36-38 which certainly hark back to conditions of warfare imposed by the Amphictyonic league.³ Lines 39-46 are devoted to an enumeration of the curses which were to befall the unfortunate city whose citizen did not abide by his oath. It is this last section which presents peculiar difficulties. Robert has transcribed it as follows:

Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐμπεδορκοῖν τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁ-
40 ρκῳ γεγραμμένα, ἢ πόλις ἢ μὴ ἄνσος εἶ-
η, εἰ δὲ μὴ, νοσοῖη· καὶ πόλις ἢ μὴ ἀπόρθητ-
ος εἶη, εἰ δὲ μὴ, πόρθοιτο· καὶ φέροι ἢ μὴ,⁴ ε-
ἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄφορος εἶη· καὶ γυναῖκες τίκτοι-
εν ἑοικότα γονεῦσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τέρατα· κα-
45 ἰ βροσκήματα τίκτοι ἑοικότα βροσκήμασ-
ι, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τέρατα.

¹ *Études Épigraphiques et Philologiques* (Bibl. de l'École des Hautes Études, Fasc. 272 [Paris, 1938]), pp. 296-316.

² For reference purposes it should be noted that on pp. 307-8 there are two mistakes in Robert's transcription. In line 28 he has unintentionally omitted the main verb *ποθήσω*, although he takes cognizance of it in his discussion on pp. 310-11. In line 49 he has *δωμωμένων* instead of *δωμομένων*.

³ Cf. Aeschines, II, 115.

⁴ Cf. Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 313 and the examples cited there; also the statement on p. 314: "... il fallait écrire, après *πόρθοιτο*· καὶ ἢ γῆ καρποὺς φέροι ἢ μὴ. εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἄφορος εἶη.

Robert has nowhere commented upon the triple occurrence of $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta$ in lines 40, 41, and 42, which words require explanation. An examination of the photograph which accompanies his publication reveals that the letters are certainly HMMH. He has written them as the particle $\tilde{\eta}$ and the dubious factor $\mu\eta$. At first glance one would assume that this form was the regular negative used in an optative clause, but a translation of the oath reveals in this instance a decided incongruity: "And if I abide by those things which are prescribed in the oath, may the city *not* be without plague; if I do not (keep my oath), may it be plagued, etc."

If on the other hand one assumes that Robert understands the form $\mu\eta$ to be a variant of $\mu\eta\nu$, one has difficulty in finding parallels. In strong protestations or oaths $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta\nu$ is very common⁵ with the meaning of "yea, verily," but it is practically unknown in the form $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta$. Furthermore, if it is an intensive expression, why does it occur in only the first three, and not also in the last two, parts of the oath to make them all uniform?

We have seen in translating the document that a negative cannot be construed to give the meaning required by the sense of the argumentum. The substitution of $\mu\eta$ for $\mu\eta\nu$ is so unusual that other possibilities should be carefully weighed. Because of its triple occurrence, the chances for a stone-cutter's error are at a minimum, and this possibility should likewise be discarded in favor of any plausible philological explanation.

The most probable substitution for $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta$ is $\tilde{\eta}'\mu\eta$, the form resulting from aphaeresis of the possessive pronoun after the article. With this change the reading would give the proper sense: if I abide by the oath, may my city be free from plague, may my city be preserved from destruction, may my land be fertile, may the women, etc. It was pointed out by Robert that this part of the oath closely resembled in some details the Amphictyonic oath which is quoted in part by Aeschines.⁶ Representatives were chosen from the different cities and sent to the Amphictyonic council. Would it be too great an assumption to suppose that

⁵ Cf. Liddell and Scott, and the *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae*, s. v. $\tilde{\eta}$, $\mu\eta\nu$. See also J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1934), pp. 350-1. These works at least do not suggest that the final ν was ever dropped in the phrase $\tilde{\eta} \mu\eta\nu$.

⁶ II, 115.

each man subscribed to the oath individually as the representative of his city, and that his oath was considered as binding upon the entire city? If this were the case, he would very logically have said: "And if I abide by those things which are prescribed in the oath, may *my* city be without plague, etc."

Is such a form as ἡ'μῆ warranted by usage? For metrical reasons aphaeresis in general is more peculiar to poetry than to prose. The particular form ἡ'μῆ occurs as such in Sophocles⁷ and in an epigram of the second century B. C.⁸ Examples of crasis in prose between the article and the possessive pronoun or other words beginning with epsilon are available in Meisterhans-Schwyzler,⁹ even if the particular form (nominative singular feminine) does not happen to be represented. The nearest approximation is the crasis of ἡ ἐρέα to ἡρέα, both forms existing side by side in the epigraphical language of the middle of the fourth century B. C. This is the period to which Robert assigns this inscription.

Meisterhans-Schwyzler conclude with the generalization that the less official the document, the more common is crasis. It is rarely found in official decrees, but it occurs more frequently in honorary inscriptions. It should be pointed out that this is not an official decree, but one which was erected at his own behest by Dion, son of Dion, an Acharnian and priest of Ares and Athena Areia. In all probability the language and system of orthography employed by this country priest might have differed somewhat from the language of official decrees and the careful work of an official engraver under supervision. In line 8 στείχω is given for στοιχώ, and in line 9 ὁκ, for οὐκ. The optative verb in line 50¹⁰ terminates in ῃν instead of εῖν, where the sense obviously requires the third person plural rather than

⁷ *Oed. Rex*, 1483; *Electra*, 97. ἡ'μῆ is given in Bailly, *Dictionnaire Gréco-Français*, but not in either the old or new edition of Liddell and Scott. Practically all of the editors of Sophocles keep the manuscript reading, although in *Oed. Rex*, 1483 Schneidewin, Neue, and Wunder have made other conjectures.

⁸ U. Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka*, II (Leipzig, 1899), no. 1148, line 7; cf. Ed. Mayser, *Grammatik der Griechischen Papyri*, I (Berlin, 1923), on aphaeresis, pp. 143-5; on crasis, pp. 158-60.

⁹ *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*, 3rd ed. (1900), pp. 70-3.

¹⁰ In giving the reading of the stone for this word on page 308, Robert erroneously assigns it to line 51, instead of line 50.

the first person singular. This latter, however, is a stone-cutter's error as is the omission of ἡ γῆ καρπύς in line 42.

These other peculiarities would lend credence to the theory that such a form as ἡ'μή did exist in the spoken language of the time, and that it is to be read in lines 40, 41, and 42, in preference to ἡ μή. Is it not mere chance, after all, that we have preserved for us in literature many instances of crasis between the article and the possessive pronoun in other genders and cases, while aphaeresis between the feminine singular article and the corresponding possessive pronoun is exceedingly rare?

In conclusion the altered text of the inscription is presented:

- Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐμπεδορκοίην τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁ-
 40 ρκωι γεγραμμένα, ἡ πόλις ἡ'μὴ ἄνοσος εἴ-
 η, εἰ δὲ μή, νοσοίη· Καὶ πόλις ἡ'μὴ ἀπόρθητ-
 ος εἴη, εἰ δὲ μή, πόρθοιτο· καὶ <καρπύς> φέροι <γῆ> ἡ'μή, ε-
 ἰ δὲ μή, ἄφορος εἴη· καὶ γυναῖκες τίκτοι-
 εν ἐοικότα γονεῦσιν, εἰ δὲ μή, τέρατα· κα
 45 ἰ βοσκήματα τίκτοι ἐοικότα βοσκήμασ-
 ι, εἰ δὲ μή, τέρατα.

DONALD W. PRAKKE.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

SUBLIMITER.

The significance of *sublimiter*, a word used only by Cato, *Agr.*, 70, 71, has not yet been determined; it is here suggested that the clue to the meaning is to be found in evidence discovered by the study of the history of religion. Cato, in speaking of the treatment of a sick cow (*loc. cit.*), advises the owner to collect salt, leaves of laurel, grains of incense, leeks, and beans and then says (70): *haec omnia sublimiter legi, teri darique oportet; ieiunus siet qui dabit* and (71): *sublimiter terat et vaso ligneo det, bosque ipso et qui dabit sublimiter stet, ieiunus ieiuno bovi dato*.

The common interpretation is that cow and owner are to stand upright.¹ On the other hand, T. Birt supposes² that the remedy is to be collected and infused on a high mountain, not below in the valley where men live and work: "Je höher, je einsamer und unbeobachteter geschieht die Handlung." His point of departure is the usual significance of *sublimis(-us)*: "high in the air, between heaven and earth" (cf. Haffter, *Glotta*, XXIII, p. 252). Neither opinion is acceptable, however. As to the first, while it is conceivable that owner and cow should be required to stand upright while the mixture is being administered, there is no conceivable reason why one should stand upright while collecting and grinding the ingredients;³ and, besides, those who hold this opinion, have to maintain an unusual meaning for the word *sublimis* to begin with (cf. Haffter, *loc. cit.*). For the second interpretation, it is highly improbable that the Roman living in the plain of the Campagna should have been advised to take his sick cow up a distant mountain there to collect, prepare, and administer the remedy.

The clue to the correct interpretation is to be found, I believe, in A. D. Nock's essay on the relief of the basilica discovered

¹ Forcellini, s. v. "*sublimiter*": hoc est celso et erecto corpore; K. Meister, *Die Haussohwelle* (*Sitzungsab. der Heidelberger Akad. der Wiss.*, 1924-25, Abh. 3), pp. 33 f.; Jacobsohn, *Glotta*, XVI, p. 59 (at the suggestion of Lommatszsch).

² *Rheinisches Museum*, LXXVII (1928), pp. 210 f.

³ This point was seen by Jacobsohn, *loc. cit.*

in 1917 near the Porta Maggiore in Rome.⁴ The relief represents Jason in the act of securing the fleece with Medea's assistance. Medea is shown to the left of the tree on which the fleece is suspended and about which is the guardian serpent. To the right, Jason kneels on a table to secure the fleece. Under this table is a smaller table or stool on which rests an oblong object, "probably Medea's casket of magical herbs." Nock suggests that the explanation of the relief "may well be sought in magical ideas," and he believes that Jason is the subordinate figure, Medea playing the chief part. "If we turn to the *Demotic Magical Papyrus* translated by Drs. Griffith and Thompson, we read in the account of divination performed with a child as assistant (col. III. 5, p. 33): 'You take seven new bricks, before they have been moved so as to turn them to the other face; you take them, you being pure, without touching them against anything on earth. . . . You arrange them about the child, without touching any part of him on the ground,' and in later passages again the young medium and objects used are set on bricks, as also in the Paris Greek magical papyrus l. 911. Clearly there is in magic a kind of insulation: occult power can be lost by contact with earth, as, for instance, herbs may lose their freshness and the vigour of their hidden force (cf. Eitrem, *Pap. Osl.*, i, 93, 114 f., and for abundant illustrations of 'insulation' J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*⁵, x, 2 f., iii, 110, 180, 241, xi, 51 . . .)." Nock points out that this belief exists in spite of the opposite one that magical rites are aided by contact with the earth: since earth is a storehouse of *δύναμις*, as it is powerful to aid it is not without danger;⁵ and he suggests that Jason as the assistant in a magical act "is, in accordance with a widespread superstition insulated from earth by this table." Kroll (*Glotta*, XXV, pp. 157f.) has, it is true, doubted this interpretation and has supposed that the table is the artist's infelicitous substitute for the mound on which Jason customarily

⁴ *J. H. S.*, XLVI (1926), pp. 48-50, cf. fig. 1, p. 49.

⁵ Cf. Heckenbach, *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, IX, 3, pp. 44 f.; R. R. Marett, *The Threshold of Religion*², pp. 73 ff. To these titles given by Nock add E. Goldmann, "Cartam levare," *Mitt. des Inst. für oest. Geschichtsforschung*, XXXV (1914), pp. 31-59; E. Fehrle, "Erde" in *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, II, pp. 895 f.

kneels in sarcophagous reliefs; but this is improbable not only because it presumes that the artist bungled but also because a table is in itself an object of magical power according to primitive thought⁶ and specifically an object suitable for averting the magical power of earth.⁷

Nock's interpretation of the relief, then, would indicate the meaning of *sublimis* in the magical prescription given by Cato. The procedure would take place on a layer of stones or bricks or on a wooden stand,⁸ so that owner and cow were standing between heaven and earth,—the usual significance of the word *sublimis*. That the prescription is in fact of a magical character is proved by the requisite, "ieiunus ieiuno;" an empty stomach often is the *conditio sine qua non* for success in magical ritual.⁹ It is further proved by the fact that the ingredients used in the remedy are articles of the druggist's shop, used from the remotest times by sorcerers.

EMIL GOLDMANN.

VIENNA.

⁶ Cf. Haberlandt, "Tisch" in *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*; E. Goldmann, *Die Einführung der deutschen Herzogsgeschlechter Kärntens in den slovenischen Stammesverband*, 1903, pp. 70 f.

⁷ Cf. an example of this power in Haberlandt, *op. cit.*, p. 966.

⁸ Cf. the wooden stand used against the power of gypsies, H. Lewy, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XXX (1933), p. 207; for kettles used in similar situations, cf. Fehrle, *op. cit.*, p. 904.

⁹ Cf. Zepf, *Handwörterbuch des deutschen Aberglaubens*, s. v. "nüchtern," who quotes Horace, *Ep.*, V, 23; Varro, *de Re Rust.*, I, 2, 27; Pliny, *Hist. Nat.*, XXVI, 60, XXIV, 118 and 63, XXVI, 58, XXVIII, 22, XXX, 23.

LUCRETIUS V, 1442.

tum mare velivolis florebat †propter odores†.

Professor Tenney Frank has recently (*A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], pp. 225-6) discussed afresh the reading *propter odores* preserved in the above line by O and Q. His argument is as follows. Lucretius used some such word as *pinibus*, rather than *navibus* or *puppibus* which various modern editors have accepted, as the noun with which *velivolis* agrees, and the original line may have been *tum mare velivolis florebat pinibus atque*, or perhaps *fl. pinibu' tumque*. This use of *pinibus* later caused some glossator "to explain the figure contained in *florebat* as one suggesting agreeable odors rather than the more usual pictorial one," and his gloss *propter odores* subsequently displaced the last two words of the line.

While accepting as a gloss the last two words now preserved by O and Q, I have always suspected that the gloss itself has become slightly corrupt in transmission, and that what the glossator originally wrote was simply *propter colores* as a comment on *florebat*. This was misread as *propter odores*, which happened to scan (unlike *propter tria promuntoria*, the gloss on *triquetris* preserved by O at I, 717, which Prof. Frank quotes as a harmless parallel) and was later fitted on without difficulty to the end of the line. Knowledge of the similar but far-distant ending of II, 417 referred to by most editors (where however *propter* is adverbial) may or may not have contributed to this process. But the theory¹ that *propter odores* was actually transferred thence (*miro errore translata*, Diels *ad loc.*) now becomes unnecessary even if defensible. The somewhat unusual course of emending a generally accepted gloss seems to me essential in order to clear the way for establishment of the text. Acceptance of *propter colores* absolves us from the necessity of attributing to the glossator a comment which is extremely difficult to explain ("inexplicable . . . une glose absurde de *florebat*," Ernout-Robin) unless we are prepared to believe (to quote one example of this view) that the glossator *fortasse naves turibus et unguentis*

¹ Defended by A. E. Housman in *Journ. of Phil.*, XXV (1897), pp. 243-4.

*oneratas comparavit cum floribus in prato suavem odorem exhalantibus.*² Such an explanation is to my mind fantastic and improbable; and *propter odores* is equally unnatural and mistaken (as Prof. Frank admits)³ even if we accept the suggestion of a reading such as *pinibus* in place of *navibus*. The gloss *propter colores*, on the other hand, is a natural, if at first sight somewhat naïve, comment on *florebat* and the picture of the sea becoming "gay with the flying sails of ships" (Bailey), an image sufficiently striking for Servius to recall it in commenting on Virg., *Aen.*, VII, 804 (*florentes aere catervas*) where he remarks *Ennius et Lucretius florere dicunt omne quod nitidum est. Lucretius florebat navibus pontus*. Whether the last three words are actually a quotation or not, the main point is the use of *florere*, and this is entirely apt. *florere* does signify brightness, especially of flashing colours, and Cato (*ap. Charis.*, II, p. 185; Keil, *Gramm. Lat.*, I, p. 207) used the phrase *mare velis florere*⁴ with exactly the Lucretian picture in mind, though Lucretius improves on it by following Ennius' use of *velivolus* to describe the ships (*Ann.*, 387, *Sc.*, 79 Vahl.⁵; cf. *Sc.*, 65 *velivolantibus navibus*). Lucretius seems to have been peculiarly sensitive to this kind of picture—cf. his *daedala tellus summittit flores* (I, 7, 8) and the description of shells on a sandy beach (II, 374-5 *concharum genus . . . videmus / pingere telluris gremium*)—and we may recall that in II, 777, in another connexion, he has described the sea itself as normally (i. e., in stormless weather, when sailing would be possible) lacking variety in colour, so that the patches of colour provided by the sails and hulls would be highly attractive to his eye.

But *florere* in this context seems to me to have a fuller meaning. Lucretius has completed his account of man's progress on land, and man next turns his attention to the other element, the sea, which now also blossoms forth, a "crop" different indeed but no less colourful than the scenes pictured on land in 1370 ff. (see especially 1373-4, 1376-8). The juxtaposition of *colabatur tellus* in 1441 (in two lines which briefly sum up the story

² Brackman, *Mnem.*, XLVIII (1920), p. 259.

³ Lucretius does not use *florere* of "scent" or "bouquet," though *flos* itself bears this meaning (*fl. nardi* II, 848; *fl. Baccchi* III, 221).

⁴ *inde omnem classem ventus auster lenis fert: mare velis florere videres.*

of the growth of cities and of the art of cultivation on land which was divided up as communities grew) and *tum mare florebat* in 1442 seems too striking to be accidental,⁵ and the glossator, if he wrote *propter colores* as I suggest, was not so naïve as at first appears.

Further, I am inclined to think that these considerations may give us the clue to restoration of the end of the verse. In 1442-5 men extend their activities and pass beyond the former limits; they now embark upon the sea which has hitherto separated land from land, and thus establish new connexions by the new method of communication, an advance which, Lucretius says, had already led to treaties and alliances when poets first sang of man's story. In such a context the sea is regarded from a point of view which is typical of Lucretius and indeed of Latin poetry in general. *mare quod late terrarum distinet oras* (V, 203) is Lucretius' description of it: it is essentially *dissociabile*, a barrier between man and man, between land and land, and he has no illusions about the fate likely to come to those attempting to surmount this barrier (II, 552 ff.). To the sea as viewed in this way from the comparative safety of land Lucretius regularly applies the stock epithet *magnum*: cf. the familiar opening of Book II and the description even of the Hellespont as *magnum* when he refers to Xerxes' daring crossing (III, 1029).⁶ I consider therefore that 1442 should be completed thus:

tum mare velivolis florebat navibu' magnum:

For the elision of final *s* before *magnus* cf. I, 412 (*e fontibu' magnis*); elsewhere before *m* I, 591, II, 830. The removal of *propter odores* leaves us without restriction in restoring the verse-ending, since the gloss can no longer suggest that "the text current about the fifth century did not contain such words as *navibus* or *puppibus*" (Frank, *loc. cit.*), and the numerous suggestions based merely on resemblance to *propter odores* can be excluded. *navibus* is well attested by the Ennian examples

⁵ Cf. the frequent use of *arare, sulcare* (*mare, aequor*)—"to plough the sea."

⁶ Cf. the verse epitaph from Brundisium (*O. I. L.*, IX, 60, ll. 2-3):

*navibus velivolis magnum mare saepe cucurri,
accessi terras omplures . . .*

(quoted by Merrill, *O. R.*, XVI [1902], p. 169, in support of the retention of *navibus*).

and by its appearance in Servius, nor have we any instance of *velivolus* as a substantive. Some editors have regarded Servius' *pontus* as an actual quotation, and Housman therefore suggested ' *tum mari' velivolis florebat navibu' pontus*, supporting this by reference to Virg., *Aen.*, X, 377 and Prop., III, 5, 11. But in both of these the interpretation is doubtful, and comparison with Homer's πόντος ἄλος is slight cause for assuming Servius' accuracy on this occasion in spite of his frequent misquotations and for introducing an elided final *s* in a rare position⁸ for which there is only one parallel in the poem, at I, 978. More recently Martin (ed. Teubner 1933) has printed *t. mare v. fl. navibu' ponti*, an unconvincing attempt⁹ to combine Servius and the MSS which is not favoured by his comparison of II, 772 and 781, since in both these passages *aequor(a) ponti* is not merely pleonastic but has essential reference to the smooth surface of the sea (cf. I, 8 *tibi rident aequora ponti* and the phrases *aequor saxi* III, 892, *a. speculorum* IV, 107, etc.). *pontus* in fact is difficult to defend. Nor can Diels' *tumque* (supported as an alternative by Prof. Frank) be right. *tumque* never occurs in the poem, nor does Lucretius ever allow *tum* to stand in the sixth foot of the line unless it is put there for very special temporal emphasis, which only happens four, or perhaps five, times in 107 uses of the word.¹⁰ As a mere connective particle it has no claim whatever to this position. On the whole it seems preferable to complete 1442 as a unit rather than by a word which introduces 1443, and *mare . . . magnum*, far from being out of place as Merrill alleged,¹¹ seems to be a familiar Lucretian usage which gives precisely the sense required, while the emphasis which the Lucretian adjective derives by being placed at the end of the line at some distance from its noun is quite in keeping with the context.

G. CLEMENT WHITTICK.

KING'S COLLEGE, NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.

⁸ *Loc. cit.*

⁹ Cf. *O. Q.*, XII (1918), p. 106.

¹⁰ " . . . un deciso peggioramento della proposta dello Housman . . . fondata precisamente su Serv. *Aen.* VII. 804" (L. Castiglioni, *Gnomon*, XIII, [1937], p. 563).

¹¹ III, 840, IV, 957, VI, 402, 1063. I am not convinced of the genuineness of the text in VI, 288.

¹² *C. R.*, XVI (1902), p. 169.

THE GENS PORCIA AND MONTE PORZIO CATONE.

In June, 1931, I saw in the Cantina Bonasera, Via Mentana, Frascati, an altar of white marble, badly stained, bearing an inscription that has remained hitherto unpublished. The cippus measured 0.82 m. x 0.33 m. x 0.25 m., the inscribed space being 0.24 m. x 0.43 m. The letters, 0.039 m. high, were of good quality and should probably be dated in the latter part of the first century A. D.

	N e P T V N O	
	R E D V C I	
urceus	L · PORCIVS	patera
	SEVERINVS	
	V · S · L · M	

The letters were all undamaged except the second and the text presents no difficulties of interpretation: *N[e]ptuno Reduci L. Porcius Severinus v(otum) s(olvit) l(ibens) m(erito)*. While the epithet *Redux* is not applied to Neptune in any inscription which I have found,¹ I may cite its use with the name of Fortuna in an inscription from Cumae,² in which the name is given in both the genitive and dative. L. Porcius Severinus evidently made a vow to Neptune while on a voyage and erected this altar as a fulfillment of his vow. We may cite a parallel inscription: *Neptuno sacrum* [several words lost including name of dedicant] *votum in Siculo fretu* [sic] *susceptum solvit*.³ It is unfortunate

¹ No mention of Neptunus Redux appears in G. Wissowa, *Religion und Kultus der Römer*² (Munich, 1912), pp. 225-229; Roscher's *Lexikon s. v.* "Neptunus"; or S. Weinstock, *R.-E.*, s. v. "Neptunus." I have been able to find none in the indices to *C. I. L.*, IX, X, or XIV.

² *C. I. L.*, X, 8375 (bis), possibly also in an inscription from Praeneste (*C. I. L.*, XIV, 2903) where the reading is as follows: *Veneri [et] Fortun[ae] Genetrici R[educi?]*, etc.

³ *C. I. L.*, 3813 = 3585. Other altars dedicated to Neptune were erected in fulfillment of vows: *C. I. L.*, IX, 4675 (Reate); X, 8157; XIV, 3558 (Tibur). In the last the dedication is to Neptunus Adiutor. In this and IX, 4675, the word *Sacrum* is inserted between the name of the divinity and the dedicant. From Tibur comes another altar dedicated to Jupiter Custos by the same dedicant as the other Tiburtine titulus (*C. I. L.*, XIV, 3557).

that L. Porcius Severinus did not include the place where he made the vow.

The altar is also of significance in that it is the first Tusculan inscription to be discovered which mentions the name of any member of the *gens Porcia*.⁴ That no others have been found is, indeed, surprising, since we know that Cato the censor was born at Tusculum.⁵ While epigraphical remains dating from his lifetime are scarce, we should certainly have expected some mention of the *gens* in inscriptions from the time of Cato Uticensis, since, as Grossi-Gondi maintains,⁶ there is some likelihood that he had a Tusculan villa. Only seven other inscriptions naming members of the *gens* have been included in *C. I. L.* XIV. (Latium outside of Rome): 1294 (Ostia); 1565 (*ibid.*); 2366 (*Ager Albanus*); 2611 (Tibur); 3906 (Lunghezza); 3922 (Monticelli between Tibur and Nomentum); and 4010 (Ficulea). This is a small harvest indeed, but we should not forget that, though Cicero himself was probably the most prominent resident of Tusculum in antiquity, there has never been found a single scrap of epigraphical evidence that would permit identification of his famous villa.⁷ It is therefore interesting to be able to show on the basis of this altar that a member of the *gens Porcia* actually did own property in the *ager Tusculanus* as late as the first century A. D., however remotely connected with M. Porcius Cato our L. Porcius Severinus might be. To maintain, however, that the site of the discovery was the homestead of

⁴ I agree with Dessau that *C. I. L.*, XIV, 214-215* should be rejected as false. It was first printed by D. B. Mattei, *Memorie Istoriche dell' antico Tuscolo oggi Frascati* (Rome, 1711), p. 132, and copied from him by Muratori, Volpi, and Marocco. Mattei's testimony is so suspect that unless his statements can be confirmed by trustworthy sources, they must be rejected. Moreover, the stone, if genuine, should be included with those found in Rome (*C. I. L.*, VI, 3428*).

⁵ Cicero, *De Rep.*, I, 1; *Schol. Bobiens. Pro P. Sylla*, 23, and *Pro Plancio*, 19; Nepos, *Cato*, 1; perhaps also A. Gellius, XIII, 24.

⁶ F. Grossi-Gondi, *Il Tuscolano nell'Età Classica* (Rome, 1908), pp. 185-187. We can hardly follow him in his assertion that the younger Cato's villa was that at le Cappelletta near Frascati.

⁷ The brickstamp (*C. I. L.*, XV, 2277: M·TVLI) is no evidence for Cicero's ownership of the site where it was found. See p. 272 of my article, "Cicero's Tusculan Villa," *Classical Journal*, XXX (1935), pp. 261-277.

Porcii Catones would, of course, be pressing the evidence too far, but it is clear that the *gens* was not extinct at Tusculum when Cato Uticensis died.

The altar was found, according to my informant, at Grotte di Colle Pisano, the name given to a locality north of Frascati, between Prata Porci on the west and Fontana Candida on the east.⁸ The site lies a short distance north of the line of the older Rome-Naples railroad, and the discovery was made, I believe, in the course of some partial excavations of an ancient villa which were carried on, apparently by the owner of the land, in the year 1928. In my opinion, the altar gives us the name of one of the ancient owners of this villa,⁹ which was of moderate size but was well supplied with water from two, or possibly four, reservoirs which lie to the south and to the east.

The presence in this region of a villa belonging to a Porcius seems to me strong confirmation of the view that Prata Porci, a crater lying to the northwest of Colle Pisano, is really a reminiscence of the same name. On the southeast rim of Prata Porci lies the modern farmhouse, Casa Bruni (già Boldetti), which occupied the site of an ancient villa. According to Winckelmann,¹⁰ some inscriptions belonging to the *gens* were actually found here, but they have not been included in the *C. I. L.*, XIV or otherwise published, so far as I know. Ashby was therefore inclined to doubt whether the attribution was correct,¹¹ but since the discovery of the altar, I believe his skepticism unnecessary. One could wish, however, that Winckelmann had given the text of the inscriptions.

⁸ For these localities see the maps appended to Grossi-Gondi, *op. cit.*, and to T. Ashby, "The Classical Topography of the Roman Campagna," *Papers of the British School at Rome*, I (1902), map v, and IV (1907), map ii; and also the large map of the *ager Tusculanus* in my book, *A History of Ancient Tusculum*, Washington, American Documentation Institute (1939), fig. 47. All of these maps are based on the topographical maps of the *Istituto Geografico Militare*.

⁹ What was to be seen before 1910 is described by Ashby, *op. cit.*, V (1910), p. 324. The later excavations are described as villa 13 in my book mentioned above.

¹⁰ J. J. Winckelmann, *Werke* (Donaußschingen, 1825), II, p. 97; V, p. 199; VIII, p. 307 = Carlo Fea's translation as *Storia dell'Arte* (Rome, 1784), III, p. 253 = Fea, *Miscellanea Filologica e Antiquaria* (Rome, 1790), I, p. 184.

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 323 f.

Furthermore, the stone also confirms a similar belief in regard to the name of the village, Monte Porzio Catone, which lies on an isolated peak northeast of Frascati, 451 m. above sea level, about two and one-half kilometers southeast of Grotte di Colle Pisano. It is possible that the first occurrence of the name is to be found in the Register of Gregory II (715-731), but the reading of the manuscript is uncertain.¹² We can, however, be sure that the name was applied to the hill as early as the middle of the eleventh century when Gregory, Count of Tusculum and Roman Consul, offered to the monastery of Monte Cassino the *ecclesiam sancti Antonini in Monte Porculo*.¹³ The Catone part of the name was added in 1872 to distinguish the town from another of the same name in the Marches,¹⁴ and to satisfy the desire of the local antiquarians to connect the name with the *gens Porcia*. That the resemblance, though striking, was of any significance was denied by Gregorovius¹⁵ who believed that Porzio comes from the root meaning swine, and more recently the same view has been held by Bagnani.¹⁶ On the other hand, we are now provided with definite evidence favoring the derivation from the name of the *gens*.

The site of Monte Porzio Catone seems eminently suited for an ancient village, since it could be easily fortified and defended, but we know of no ancient town which could have been here. No ancient ruins belonging either to a town or a villa have ever been found on the hill *in situ*, though careful search has been made by several topographers. The modern pavements and buildings are not so extensive that they can be thought to hide completely any ancient remains, as do the edifices of modern Frascati, almost completely concealing from view extensive re-

¹² G. Tomassetti, *La Via Latina nel Medio Evo* (Rome, 1886), p. 261, reprinted from the *Archivio della R. Società Patria*, VIII (1885), pp. 1-59, 399-509; IX (1886), pp. 40-128, 372-432.

¹³ Chronicon Casinense, cited by Tomassetti, *loc. cit.* The anonymous note in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, XXIII, pp. 750 f., dates this event in 1078.

¹⁴ *Guida del Touring Club Italiano* (Milan, 1924), *Italia Centrale*: I, p. 339, map p. 128.

¹⁵ F. Gregorovius, *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, tr. by Annie Hamilton (London, 1905), IV, p. 8.

¹⁶ G. Bagnani, *The Roman Campagna and its Treasures* (London, 1929), p. 127.

mains of the ancient imperial villa of Nero, Vespasian, and Domitian. What antiquities have been seen on the hill were all of a type easily transported from other sites.¹⁷

OTTERBEIN COLLEGE.

GEORGE McCracken.

NOTE ON ARISTOPHANES.

The owl and the χύτρα.

In the *Birds* Peisthetairos and Euelpides are about to be attacked by the chorus which furnishes the title of the comedy:

Πει. πῶς γὰρ ἂν τούτους δοκεῖς
ἐκφυγεῖν; Εὐ. οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἄν. Πει. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τοί σοι λέγω
ὅτι μένοντε δεῖ μάχεσθαι λαμβάνειν τε τῶν χυτῶν.
Εὐ. τί δὲ χύτρα νῶ γ' ὠφελήσει; Πει. γλαῦξ μὲν οὐ πρόσεισι νῶν
(355-358).

Χό. ἔλκε τίλλε παῖε δαῖρε, κόπτε πρώτην τὴν χύτραν (365).

The relationship between owl and χύτρα is one of the much disputed minor points in Aristophanes. I have no intention of parading the many tentative suggestions of Aristophanic scholars, but Rogers says (*ad loc.*): "Why should the owl, in particular, be kept at bay by the χύτρα? This is a question which cannot be answered with confidence: but perhaps the most probable explanation is that of Dobree, that the pot contained lighted fire which the bird of night would shun."

I. G., I², 4, ll. 4-5 contain general provisions for the Hecatompedon. The sense of this passage has been certainly restored:

. : *λοι ε[νδο]ν ηιε[ρ]οργῶντ*
[*es* : μὲ ἔαν : *ηιστ*]άναι [:] χύτραν :

We know, then, that Athena's temple considered the χύτρα distasteful. May not the humor of this passage in the *Birds* lie in Aristophanes' attribution to Athena's bird of the dislike for the χύτρα felt at Athena's temple? From l. 365 it would appear that the χύτρα was more scorned than feared.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

MILTON GIFFLER.

¹⁷ Tomassetti, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

NOTE ON ARISTOTLE, 'ΑΘ. ΠΟΛ., 54.

In his book *Les Secrétaires Athéniens*, Brillant has shown (pp. 97-108) that the secretary whom Aristotle calls ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους and who sat with the Council ('ΑΘ. ΠΟΛ., 54, 4) held the same office as the secretary known from epigraphical sources as ἐπὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα.¹ The inscriptions known to Brillant which named the secretary ἐπὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα were *I.G.*, II², 223 (343/2) and *I.G.*, II², 1700 (335/4); to these may now be added the document published by Dow as *Hesperia*, Suppl. I, no. 1 (327/6).²

Inasmuch as the official title seems to have been changed from ἐπὶ τὰ ψηφίσματα, employed down through 327/6, to ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους, presumably in use when Aristotle composed this portion of the 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία, the awkward confusion of assuming now one designation and now the other may be avoided by claiming for the composition of 'ΑΘ. ΠΟΛ., 54 a date in 326/5 or later.

This view is in part confirmed by the discovery of a new fragment in the Athenian Agora (to be published soon in *Hesperia*) which names the secretary ἐπὶ τοὺς νό[μους] in 324/3.

BENJAMIN D. MERITT.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

AN EMENDED ORACLE.

Choeroboscus, Scholia to the *Canones* of Theodosius of Alexandria (ed. Helgard, Lipsiae, 1889, vol. I, p. 163):

τὸ γὰρ κύριον ὄνομα τὸ Πέρσης εἰς Ἡ ἔχει τὴν κλητικὴν, οἷον ὃ Πέρση, ὡς παρ' Ἡσιόδῳ [*Opp.*, 27]:

ὃ Πέρση, ὃν δὲ ταῦτα τεῶ ἐνικάτθεο θυμῷ.

σημειούμεθα παρ' Ἡρακλείδῃ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ χρησμῶν ὅτι περ καὶ λέγουσι τινες πεπλανημένον εἶναι τὸ

ὃ Πέρση ποικιλόδιφρε ἰδὼν ἀπὸ χείρας ἔχουσθαι.

ἔστι γὰρ ἐνταῦθα ἔθνικόν.

¹ Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 160, note 1, now accepts the identity of office, and defends Brillant's general thesis against divergent views of Kirchner and Dinsmoor.

² Feyel's objection to the date as given by Dow is not serious. Cf. *Rev. Et. Anc.*, XL (1938), p. 333.

Evidently Heraclides Ponticus, who wrote a work on oracles in the latter half of the 4th century B. C., quoted these words as an oracular response (cf. Müller, *F. H. G.*, II, pp. 197-198, where this fragment is not noticed). Also, though corrupt in our manuscripts, it clearly should be restored as a single hexameter, which will have had its prototype in such a line as *Od.*, XXII, 316, ending *κακῶν ἀπο χείρας ἔχεσθαι*. The noun needed in front of *ἀπό* is represented in our manuscripts by *ἰδῶν*, *ἰνδ'* or *ιν*; none of these readings scans or makes sense. G. Wolff (*Porphyrîi de Philosophia ex oraculis haurienda*, p. 46, note 2) proposed to read *νεῶν ἀπο*; Lenz (*Herodiani Reliquiae*, 1868, vol. II, p. 690) offered either *τῶνδ' ἀπο* or *θεῶν δ' ἀπο*. But these emendations do not make very good sense, and the scholars who proposed them did not explain their application. We may take it that we have in this prophecy a warning to a Persian to "keep his hands off" something. It was evidently in that sense that Heraclides understood *Πέρση*. If we imagine a likely circumstance for an oracle to utter such a warning, we think of 480 B. C. and Xerxes. I suggest that the proper reading is:

Πέρση ποικιλόδιφρ', ἱερῶν ἀπο χείρας ἔχεσθαι.

"Persian of the richly ornamented chariot (or chair),
keep your hands off temples (or sacred things)."

The reading *ἱερῶν* will scan, and seems a possible source of our present variant readings. The *δ* at the beginning of the line should be omitted, with Wolff. It has been introduced by a copyist on the model of the preceding quotation from Hesiod. I take it that this line is the beginning of a longer prophecy, such as that referred to in Herodotus, IX, xlii-xliii, 1 where Mardonius alludes to an oracle threatening the Persians with destruction, if they sacked Delphi. The penalty for disobedience would be stated in the missing lines, and the whole would have been produced as propaganda to protect Delphi from Persian raiders in 480 B. C.

In addition, one may note that Pollux (VII, 112) describes the phrase *Θεταλὲ ποικιλόδιφρε* as Pythian (cf. also Athen., XIII, 568 d). I take the reference in Heraclides to mean that some contemporaries of his said that the version which he quoted was "erroneous" (*πεπλανημένον*) because of the form *Πέρση* as vocative. I suggest that by the end of the fourth century B. C.

this threatening oracle existed in two versions: one beginning Πέρση ποικιλόδιφρ' the other Θερταλὲ ποικιλόδιφρ'. The second version, I conjecture, had been produced in 370 B.C. as a warning to Jason of Pherae, when it was still expected that he would insist on presiding at the Pythian games of that year.

TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

H. W. PARKE.

A NOTE ON ISIDORE.

Isidore (*Etym.*, 17, 1, 3) says of the god Stercutus: *hic plura instrumenta agriculturæ repperit, primusque agros firmavit*. At least, this is the reading of Lindsay's edition (1911), with no variant indicated. The *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, s. v. *firmit* (col. 810, 35-36), quoting this passage explains "*sc. sterco-rando*," but furnishes no parallel to this use of *firmit*. In 17, 2, 3, where Isidore further develops the subject, he says of *stercus*: *idem et fîmus est, qui per agros iacitur*, and this allusion to *fîmus* suggests that in 17, 1, 3 we should read *fîmavit*. I discovered, however, to my surprise, that this verb is not found in the *Thesaurus*, though cited for later Latin by Du Cange. To see whether it had been suggested for Isidore I examined the editions readily accessible to me, finding *firmit* in the following: Zairer (1472), Mentelin (ca. 1473?), Winters (ca. 1478?), [Scotus] (ca. 1485?), Locatelli (1493), Petit (1520), du Breul (1617), and Otto (1833). In the edition of Grial (1599), however, that of Arevalus (1801) descended from it, and the reprint of Arevalus in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, LXXXII (1850), there appears, in each case without indication of any variant, *fîmavit*.

The facsimile of Cod. Toletanus (nunc Matritensis) 15, 8 of the late eighth century, published in *Cod. Gr. et Lat.*, XIII (1909), on f. 139^r, col. 1, shows *firmit*, but for the examination of other Isidore MSS I have had no opportunity. I suggest, however, that whether *fîmavit* rests on other codices or only on an emendation by Grial (or some predecessor) its correctness is so obvious that the word should be restored to the text of Isidore and the verb *fîmo* given a place in our lexica.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ARTHUR STANLEY PRASE.

REVIEWS.

The Cambridge Ancient History. Volume XII. The Imperial Crisis and Recovery. A.D. 193-324. Edited by S. A. COOK, F. E. ADcock, M. P. CHARLESWORTH and N. H. BAYNES. Pp. xxvii + 849: 10 maps, 1 sheet of plans, 2 sheets of chronological tables. £1-15-0. Volume of Plates V. Prepared by C. T. SELTMAN. Pp. xv + 243. 15s. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, Macmillan Company, 1939.

The task of writing this notice is sad; for it is a duty laid upon the reviewer by the scholar whose too early death has brought the *Journal* which he edited and the University which he adorned the sympathy of all who care for the study of ancient Rome. And sorrow at the loss of Professor Frank is felt by none more keenly than by those of his colleagues whose work lies in Oxford. Not only did he honour Oxford by his presence during his last six months of life, but, though already ailing, he spent himself in the service of its students. His sojourn here will long be gratefully remembered, and not least because in its brief period Oxford came to admire his sterling humanity as much as it had long respected the distinction of his learning.

It is with reluctance, and only after much thought, that I refrain from acting on a suggestion which he made in giving me the opportunity to write these lines—the suggestion that in dealing with these volumes it might be appropriate to say something of matters which lie outside their scope. Their publication completes not only the *Ancient History* but the whole series inaugurated by the Cambridge Press more than forty years ago to tell the tale of our civilization from the earliest times to our own; and that series, revealing as it does successive influences from Ranke's to that of Stefan George, undoubtedly invites reflexion. However soon the contents of the Cambridge Histories may be outmoded by the advance of knowledge or by changes in the direction from which history is approached, these works, as even a contributor may say without apology, will at least retain their value for the student of historiography as mirrors of the varied conceptions of history held during a period in which the nature and function of historical thought were being long and deeply pondered not merely by philosophers but by historians themselves. But Volume XII by itself calls for so much more by way of comment than can be forced into the limits of a review that justice to the editors and their contributors entitles them to all

the space a reviewer can demand; and, even so, much will have to be left unsaid. Nevertheless, perhaps one remark about the *Ancient History* as a whole may be forgiven. Bury's extension of the foundations laid by Acton has proved as solid as the original work, and on it the editors have raised an edifice worthy of those who sketched the earliest plans. But in building they have improved the details. One who in reviewing the first volume mixed criticism with his applause must take leave in reviewing the last to proclaim the gratitude which is widespread for the skill with which early defects have been mitigated or removed. It has been discovered that a text intelligible to the general reader can be combined, with notes which give it value for the scholar; and the editors, becoming more assertive with experience, have contrived to impose on the contributors to later volumes a harmony, not indeed in their opinions on points of detail but at least in their conception of the nature of their undertaking, which once was conspicuously to seek.

In co-operative works occasional discords are inevitable, but it must be said that in their final effort the editors' technique has reached a high degree of competence. Blemishes, indeed, there are, though not perhaps more than must be expected in volumes of this size produced in succession so rapid. Of mere slips and misprints, which can easily be corrected in later editions, there is no need to reproduce a list which has already gone to Cambridge; but there are one or two minor details on which a word may be useful. The maps are not wholly adequate to the text. Readers may save themselves a certain amount of trouble if at the outset they insert, however roughly, at least the following names which are mentioned but not marked: Map 1 or Map 8 or both—Resaina (pp. 17, 87, 127, 131), Nicephorium (pp. 17, 129), Danaba (p. 129); Map 4—Greta Bridge (p. 37, n. 6); Map 9—the Shipka Pass (p. 144). (These page-references do not claim to be complete; but I give such as I have noted because none of these names occurs in the "Index of Maps," and some are absent from the "General Index" too). A clue to the conundrum presented by Map 5 (Roman Britain: the Frontier Country), where sites are variously indicated, without explanation of the reason, by white squares outlined in black, black squares, and black circles, may be found in a passage of the Preface (p. ix) which records that "Map 2" (presumably the second map concerned with Britain—i. e. Map 5) "is based upon the Ordnance Survey Map of Roman Britain." About the translations of chapters originally written in French or German it is less easy to say anything of value. In general they are excellent, and such few difficulties as they present are either too simple or too hard for useful comment here. "Testaments" (p. 130, n. 6) for "testimony" is easy, and "vault,"

almost certainly for "Gruft," on p. 550 is not difficult, though, unless I am mistaken, English usage requires "crypt"; but there is a passage (pp. 244-6) in the chapter on economic life which, though the fault may not be the translator's, to me remains less than wholly plain even after some thought on the obvious possibilities about the precise sense to be attached in a version from German to "activity" and "passivity" in connexion with trade.

The volume opens with two sound chapters, the first by S. N. Miller and the second by W. Ensslin, in which the central thread of Roman history is traced from the accession of Septimius to the death of Philip; and then the enemies of Rome are introduced in three more by L. Halphen on "The Barbarian Background," by A. Christensen on "Sassanid Persia," and by A. Alföldi on "The Invasions of Peoples from the Rhine to the Black Sea." These three, though the caution of Halphen is in strong contrast to the adventurous brilliance of Alföldi, are all admirable in their various ways; but they produce a certain disorder, because to the second there is tacked on a section by Ensslin about the wars with Persia and the third includes an account of the military operations in Europe from Decius to Probus. The result is that emperors fight their battles and disappear before their accessions have been announced: Valerian, for instance, ends his active career by surrendering to Shapur I on p. 135 and becomes Augustus on p. 169, and Aurelian, having waged his European wars on pp. 139 f. and 152 ff., is eventually born on p. 297. It may be suggested that readers not intimately familiar with the third century might follow the history more easily by steering some other course: among various possibilities one is to read pp. 1-125, 165-180, 126-137, 181-202, 222-231, 297-320, 138-164, 202-222, and 232-296 in that order and then to go on continuously from p. 321. At that point they will have been led through the central story to the death of Probus, with digressions in chapter VII by F. Oertel on "The Economic Life of the Empire" and in chapter VIII by R. G. Collingwood on "Britain"; and from it H. Mattingly will carry them on to the death of Galerius. Then follow two constitutional chapters by W. Ensslin on "The End of the Principate" and "The Reforms of Diocletian" before what many may think the best part of a good volume—seven chapters on religion, philosophy, literature and art by A. D. Nock, the late F. C. Burkitt, H. Lietzmann, G. Rodenwaldt, E. K. Rand, and J. Bidez, which are worthily succeeded by two more on "The Great Persecution" and "Constantine" by N. H. Baynes. Most of these it is scarcely possible to over-praise. Nock has done admirable service with a masterly summary of the development of paganism in the third century, which is specially valu-

able for its precise and sober estimate of oriental influence in the West (pp. 422 ff.); Burkitt has bequeathed on pp. 467 ff. what is probably as intelligible an account of Gnosticism as so far exists; Bidez's chapter on "Literature and Philosophy in the Eastern Half of the Empire" is a magnificent piece of exposition, which by itself would ensure long life to the work in which it appears; and Baynes's contributions set out his views on matters which he has made peculiarly his own with a lucidity and fairness which will become what is a fitting climax to the high distinction attained by this volume in its last three hundred pages.

Without wishing to indulge in criticism for its own sake, one must reluctantly take leave to confess a certain disappointment at Rand's treatment of "The Latin Literature of the West from the Antonines to Constantine." To me at least he seems altogether too modest about the functions of the literary historian, and his modesty has results which will not escape the careful reader: there may be many who, after pondering what is said of Arnobius and Lactantius on pp. 607-10, will be grateful that Baynes did not omit the illuminating remarks about these two figures to be found on pp. 650 ff. That particular defect has been repaired; but there are others which have not. The Latin *Panegyrici*, who are rightly said by Baynes (in the Appendix on Sources, p. 712) to be of special value for the history of the early years of the fourth century, cannot properly be dismissed as they are in the last sentence on p. 606, and still less can the treatment of the *Historia Augusta* fairly be described as one of the kind which readers of the *Ancient History* are entitled to expect. Rand may, indeed, be right in his belief about this work, and there are certainly a few now living who would agree with him; but it is hard to think that even they would admit that students had been given anything like adequate information about what is a fundamental problem in the study of the third century until at least the negative part of Dessau's argument had been summarized and discussed. In this volume at large the *HA* is variously handled: to take two examples—Alföldi cuts up the mentions of Gothic wars in *Gallieni duo* and *Claudius* and drastically reconstitutes them in the light of information provided by Zosimus and Syncellus (pp. 721 ff.), whereas Mattingly relates the Aper-story (*Carus*, etc., 13) without comment (pp. 322 f.). What an inexperienced reader will make of things like this it is not easy to divine, nor can one see how he is meant to understand what precisely is the measure of the "due reserve" with which Mattingly justly says that *Aurelian* 25, 4-6 is to be treated (p. 304, n. 1). So far as it goes, the statement on p. 711 that "the acceptance or rejection of details given in the work is bound to be governed by considerations of general probability

and by the extent to which the sources that have been used can be controlled by their re-appearance in later historical writings" is true; but it is of no value as a guide to the use of the *HA* as evidence until it is backed by some reasoned account of the nature of that production. Despite the remarks on pp. 598 f. and 710 f., it might be a formidable task to convince an impartial jury that a serious attempt has been made to fulfil the forecast made in vol. XI, p. 856—that "a discussion of these matters" (the precise date at which the *HA* was produced, and how far and in what way it may be called "tendencious") "will be given in the following volume." There is, indeed, on p. 730 a list of books and articles on the *HA* "in chronological order to show the progress of the discussion" (in which it is to be observed that Mommsen's article in *Hermes* for 1890 is given the date 1909—that of *Ges. Schriften* VII—and put after Seeck's in *Rhein. Mus.* for 1912); but even so, whether the place for it was the chapter on Latin Literature or the Appendix on Sources, readers may legitimately feel aggrieved at the absence of more detailed information on a matter which is of high importance for the study of much more in the third century than the career of Severus Alexander. It may be much to hope; but the editors would do a service to many if, when the time comes for a reprint, they included an addendum on this subject and so repaired what at present may be thought a flaw in the foundations of this volume.

Its value, however, must not be concealed by regrets at a single omission; for its merits are many and great, and not the least is the proper emphasis laid on the religious history of the period. Far-reaching as were the consequences of the social, economic, and constitutional developments, none of these aspects can claim such significance in the story of Western Civilization as the intellectual and religious ferment from which the Christian Church emerged with the strength that secured it peace in A. D. 324 and set it surely on its way to become the dominant religion both in Europe and in other regions of whose culture Europe is the source. In that ferment pagan and Christian elements alike here receive treatment which is more than merely competent; and so much space has rightly been given to these matters that several episodes are handled more than once—and with differences of interpretation which are a welcome invitation to thought. As an example one may take the Decian "persecution," because it is an affair which raises fundamental problems about the relations of Christianity and paganism in the middle of the third century and about the character of the imperial government itself, and because in the present volume it is described in three separate accounts—by Alföldi (pp. 202 ff.), by Lietzmann (pp. 520 f.), and by Baynes (pp. 656 f.). The first of these versions,

which summarizes a view expounded more fully in *Klio*, XXXI. (1938), pp. 323 ff., starts from the conviction that Decius found the Christians generally hated (*Klio*, XXXI, p. 326) and suggests that he may have been personally prejudiced against them because Asiatic believers had served in the forces of his predecessor Philip (*loc. cit.*, p. 328). This hatred is a subject of some importance; for its strength is a presupposition of every theory which maintains that what Decius did was merely to release anti-Christian feeling pent up in the population at large. That anti-Christian feeling existed, and that it was strong in certain places of which Alexandria is the most notorious, there can be no doubt; but to prove so much, which is easy, is not the same as to prove that this feeling was vigorous enough throughout the Empire to provide the motive power of what is represented as a general persecution. The position of the Churches in A. D. 250 is not easy to discern in detail, nor was it everywhere the same; but there are plain indications that a change, perhaps even a great change, had occurred since the beginning of the century. The long periods of peace attested in Cappadocia by Firmilian (Cyprian, *Ep.* 75, 10) and in Africa by Cyprian himself (*De lapsis*, 5) had brought the Church recruits whose surrender in Decius' time suggests that their faith was not such as to survive long if the lives of Christians were made a chronic burden by the hostility of their pagan neighbours (cf., for example, Eusebius, *HE*, 6, 41, 11 ff.—Dionysius Al.). The Christian connexions of the imperial house (*ib.* 6, 28) and Mamaea's interest in Origen (*ib.* 6, 21, 3; cf. Orosius, 7, 18, 7) and Hippolytus (cf. A. Harnack, *Gesch. der altchristlichen Literatur*, I [Leipzig, 1893], p. 621) confirm the impression that Christianity was beginning to be more calmly viewed. And the development of a "Kompromiss-Ethik," of which Clement of Alexandria has left a notable monument in his *Paedagogus*, indicates that Christianity and paganism were drawing towards some kind of *modus vivendi*. Though there was certainly a latent antipathy between pagans and Christians capable of being exploited by agitation, and though in places that antipathy was tense, considerations of which these are a sample impose a doubt about the assumption that hostility was everywhere so fierce as to provide the force behind the events of A. D. 250/1 or even, as is suggested on p. 203, to "induce Decius to act."

The antecedents of these events, however, are not more controversial than the course and nature of the events themselves. One point at least is now beyond serious dispute: as L. Massebieau (*Rev. de l'hist. des religions*, IX [1884], especially at pp. 69 ff.) saw more than fifty years ago, before Egypt had produced fresh evidence in the *libelli*, the obligation to sacrifice was laid not on known or suspected adherents of Christianity alone, but

on the whole of the inhabitants. That fact by itself, since to demand a universal act of sacrifice would have been an almost impossibly clumsy way of merely attacking the Christian communities, which were still only a small fraction of the total population and were not difficult to identify, suggests that something more than a persecution of Christianity was intended; and the story is consequently not to be made plausible without recourse to some hypothesis as that which is to be found on p. 521. There Lietzmann, as also in his *Gesch. der alten Kirche*, II (Berlin-Leipzig, 1936), p. 165, does indeed regard the affair as "the first systematic Christian persecution"; but he rightly adumbrates another aspect of the matter when he adds that Decius "also called to his aid the hearts of his subjects by appointing a general sacrifice of homage and intercession before the images of the tutelary gods of the Empire." This feature of the case is more strongly stressed by Baynes (p. 656) who, developing a point made by E. Schwartz (*Kaiser Constantin und die christliche Kirche*, at p. 42 in the first edition—Leipzig, 1913) and elaborated by Alföldi (*Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Römisch-germanische Kommission* [Berlin-Leipzig, 1930] especially pp. 15 ff.) and Nock (*Harvard Theological Review*, XXIII [1930], especially pp. 255 ff.), insists on the exaggerated respect of the Illyrians for the traditions of Rome as a potent factor in the direction of this affair. "Roman greatness had ever been dependent on the favour of the divine powers—on the maintenance of the *Pax Deorum*: now that the Empire was threatened with unexampled perils, how could success be more surely guaranteed than by a massive demonstration of an Empire's loyalty? It may be suggested that some such thought led the Pannonian Emperor Decius to issue his command that the entire population of the Roman world should by the act of sacrifice attest its devotion to the gods." Such is one way at least of accounting for the facts; and, if it be adopted, the next step is to ask, as Baynes proceeds to do (p. 657), how his determination to enlist the favour of Heaven and how his possible hostility to the Christians respectively affected Decius in his action.

A decision on that point, however, is made more difficult by the presence of a further problem; for the formal object of the sacrifice is in dispute. The first part of Alföldi's study published in *Klio*, XXXI, pp. 323 ff. is an ingenious and persuasive attempt to commend a theory faintly reminiscent of the treatment of a different but not wholly unrelated matter by E. C. Babut (*Rev. hist.*, CXXIII [1916], pp. 225 ff.)—a treatment which met fate at the hands of H. Delehay (Ac. royale de Belgique: *Bulletins de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques*, 5e Série, Tome VII [1921], pp. 150 ff.). Briefly the theory, as stated in the present volume (p. 204), is that "the Principate

based on Republican and juristic concepts" had been converted "into an absolutism which rested on a theological basis: . . . the offering demanded of the Christians by Decius was something other than an expiatory supplication of the gods, and its purpose was not to restore the *pax deorum* but to attest loyalty to the Emperor. . . . The primary purpose of the offering was the welfare of the emperor and it was a matter of subsidiary importance what god received it." Later on the same page there is even a mention of "such offerings to the Emperor-Saviour." In a review there is not space to discuss this doctrine as it deserves; and, since full discussion is here impossible, it will be best to say nothing either about the suggestion that the silence of the *libelli* and other authorities on the subject of the emperor is due to "eine althergebrachte Hypokrisie" (*Klio*, XXXI, p. 334) or about the dangers of excessive confidence in the interpretation of types and legends on coins—a subject on which readers may be invited to reflect by Mattingly's numismatic section in the Appendix on Sources (pp. 713 ff.). What may, however, perhaps usefully be said is a word about the implications which this account involves; for if, as seems to be suggested, pagan polytheism was virtually summarized into the single cult of the emperor, familiar conceptions of the religious history of the third century would need drastic revision. It might then have to be admitted that, as Ensslin puts it (p. 357), "the world of gods was revalued in honour of the emperor as *numen praesens*" and that, as he adds on p. 407, "in all probability, Diocletian recognized in Juppiter, as Aurelian in Sol Invictus, only a manifestation of the one highest, supreme godhead," or even, as Mattingly writes on pp. 329 f.—to me, I must confess, most unconvincingly, that "if we may hazard a guess at the exact sense in which Diocletian and Maximian were related to their divine patrons, we may say that the Genius of each emperor, itself divine and an object of worship, was now declared to be the very Genius of Juppiter and Hercules themselves." On the other hand, it would be necessary to give some different sense from that which seems, in my opinion rightly, to be intended to Nock's brief remarks (p. 414) that "the Illyrian emperors stood for Rome" and that "Diocletian's main policy was Roman," and to seek further explanation of what would then become a surprising statement by Baynes when he says (p. 651) that "we have perhaps laid too much stress upon the significance of the 'solar monotheism' of Aurelian: it is not easy to say how far the exclusiveness of that cult survived its founder's death. . . . It was to no solar monotheism that Diocletian professed allegiance: it was to many gods and to many local cults that he made his dedications. The pagan revival of

Diocletian is essentially polytheistic. Lactantius knew what he was doing when he levelled his sarcasms against the gods and especially against Juppiter and Hercules—the patrons of the reigning Jovian and Herculan dynasties.”

The third century and the career of Constantine still present problems in plenty, and some of the most urgent are concentrated in the episode of Decius; for, once his outlook and intentions have been securely ascertained, knowledge of the paganism which he sought to support and of the imperial position as he conceived it will provide a firmer basis than yet exists for accounts both of the rapid Christian advance after his time and of the political inheritance—now apt, unless I am mistaken, to be more or less misrepresented under the influence of contemporary events—which Diocletian and Constantine had to develop. But there are others besides. Rostovtzeff's theory of the period, for instance, here at least partially accepted by Oertel (p. 264), still calls for closer consideration; and military historians, who even since this volume went to press have been offered fresh grist for their mill in W. B. Henning's account (*Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, IX, pp. 823 ff.) of the Pahlavi inscription (Christensen's *Kb. Z.*—p. 742) discovered at Naqsh-e-Rostam by the Oriental Institute of Chicago in 1936, will find much to their purpose—not least in Alföldi's dashing reconstruction of Gothic movements in the times of Valerian and Gallienus (pp. 148 ff. and 721 ff.). These problems and many more it is one great merit of this volume to reveal. It does not merely set out knowledge as it is to-day but goes on to indicate the directions in which it can be extended; and in its bibliographies, which rise to brilliance in Baynes's unique guide to the Passions and Acts of the Great Persecution (pp. 790 ff.), it provides the starting-points for the next moves forward. No review could exhaust the virtues of this final volume; but, though much that is excellent must be left unnoticed, a word should be said about the lucid and independent chapter in which G. Rodenwaldt carries on his story of art and architecture to the foundation of Constantinople. It is he who, of the authors, is most concerned in the fifth Volume of Plates, which covers the last two volumes of the text; and for these indispensable accessories those who remember the threat in the Preface to Volume I, that the whole series would be left without illustration, will be too grateful even to regret the consistent economy which has been practised from the outset in giving information about the size of the objects reproduced. In my opinion it may truthfully be said that the editors and their contributors have brought the work to a triumphant end by giving the world an interpretation of the period from Septimius to Constantine which carries the subject a stage forward, nor is it a criticism of their prede-

cessors to add that what is here provided will be the necessary foundation of fresh investigations until something even better is produced; and that may not be soon. So we may leave the *Cambridge Ancient History* to serve the purposes for which it was designed, with gratitude to those who have given their time for almost twenty years to its making. Their labour has not been vain; for though co-operative volumes have inevitable defects and though these have not always been controlled so skillfully as now, few of those whose knowledge entitles them to form a judgment can be in doubt that the *Ancient History* is, and for a while will remain, an instrument with a special value of its own for the study of the times with which it deals.

OXFORD.

HUGH LAST.

FRANZ ALTHEIM. A History of Roman Religion Translated by HAROLD MATTINGLY. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1938. Pp. xi + 548. \$5.00.

This volume is more than a translation of Altheim's *Römische Religionsgeschichte*; for the author has incorporated the results of later work of his own and added references to some of the points on which his main conclusions have been criticized by others. We are therefore all indebted to author, translator, and publisher alike for giving us a most important and original work.

The purpose of the book is "to assign to Roman religion its place in the historical development of Rome," and much of it is properly occupied with Roman development in general. Students of Roman history cannot therefore leave it to the students of religion, and on many of the points at issue their comments are much needed. Altheim's work, like the Sphinx, puts questions which cannot be ignored: but they cannot be answered unless specialists in various fields take a hand.¹ The task is the more complex in that the answer must frequently be neither a plain *yes* nor a plain *no*. Altheim wrestles with facts and is determined to find a meaning, in fact, a set of coherent meanings: in consequence he cannot but press things too far and oversimplify. To say this is not in any sense to condemn him. The ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance leave knowledge much as they find it. The price of advance is com-

¹ For general history cf. L. Wickert, *Deutsche Lit.-Zeit.*, 1936, coll. 934 ff., 973 ff.; for linguistic matters, J. Whatmough's review of this book in *Class. Phil.*, XXXIV (1939), pp. 255-266. Virgilian students will note the analysis (pp. 339-49) of the First Eclogue.

monly exaggeration: but after the exaggeration must come a task of accounting and appraisal. The truth probably lies between Wissowa and Altheim:² if it proves, as I suspect it will, to lie nearer to Wissowa than to Altheim, nevertheless Altheim will not only have changed the position, but, what is more, he will have enlarged the perspective.

His introduction, and first two chapters "The forces of early Italian history" and "Italy apart from Rome" exemplify this very well. They rest on an extensive mastery of a very large and scattered archaeological and linguistic literature, and a great skill in seizing the possible significance of details, and so they reconstruct a background which is largely unfamiliar. They do it with much suggestive comment: in particular, they emphasize certain notable features shared by different areas of the pre-Indo-Germanic Mediterranean world, and few, if any, will read them without profit. At the same time, they contain generalizations which seem to me to involve inaccurate or over-abstract thinking. On pp. 3-4 we read that the antagonism of state and church "which runs through all our Western history, is in ancient times absent. Till the appearance of Christianity the histories of states and religions run on parallel lines. Both are intimately connected and mutually condition their historical form." Now this contains a large measure of truth. Graeco-Roman civilization did not know large bodies of men—except the Jews—with sanctions other than those recognized by the state and with independent oecumenical organization. Greeks and Romans alike, though in different forms, unified the secular and the religious. But antiquity, after all, includes the conflicts of secular and religious authority in Egypt and Mesopotamia, the struggle of the Magi and Darius,³ the relations of Hellenistic kings and of the Roman state with native temples and temple-states, and the tolerance, control, and suppression of alien and private forms of voluntary religious activity. To be sure, the last phenomenon involves a parallelism of development, for the existence of such forms of religious life is intimately linked to political conditions. But is this parallelism any less applicable to the development of Christianity? Was not Constantine's action followed by a new union of church and state which was no less intimate? Is the Reformation separable from the growth of nationalism? Let us, then, say rather that, since the growth of Christianity, such antagonism lies much nearer the surface, is fostered by ideas as well as by interests, and has evolved in-

² Cf. above all H. J. Rose, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXVII (1934), pp. 33 ff., and M. P. Nilsson, *Deutsche Lit.-Zeit.*, 1930, coll. 2224 ff.; 1931, coll. 2358 ff.; 1935, coll. 489 ff.

³ Cf. H. S. Nyberg, *Die Religionen des alten Iran* (German translation by H. H. Schaeder), p. 375.

dependent seats of authority with notable power; but the parallelism of development remains.

Again, on p. 47 cremation and inhumation are said to express two absolutely different conceptions of the nature of the dead: a) the final departure of the dead from the realm of the living, b) the return of the body to the bosom of mother earth, which makes them more powerful than in life, and induces the survivors to conciliate them with offerings. This view has indeed been often expressed: but is it sound? In many times and places from which we have direct statements of what men professed to think and feel, the two rites occur in peaceful proximity to one another, or alternate with no visible conflict.⁴ Certainly offerings were from early times made to those dead who had been cremated, in Italy⁵ as elsewhere, and possibly the traces of fire in Mycenaean burial-tombs are due to a survival of the practice of burnt offerings associated with cremation in the habits of the invading Indo-Germans.⁶ In any case, there is no necessary correlation whatsoever between funerary practice and ideas about the after life, and the latter show at most times an extreme and perfectly natural fluidity and vagueness.⁷ The Homeric custom was cremation: but the poet applies to Castor and Polydeuces the concept of the return to the Earth-mother (*Il.*, III, 243-4):

Ὡς φάτο, τοὺς δ' ἤδη κάτεχεν φνσίλοος αἶα
ἐν Λακεδαίμονι αὖθι, φίλῃ ἐν πατρίδι γαίῃ.⁸

If there is a distinction, it is that the concept and fear of the dead man as *der lebende Leichnam* would most naturally arise where the skeleton remains in the earth⁹—though it is found also with cremation—, and that the cult of the relics of heroes

⁴ Cf. Nock, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXV (1932), pp. 321 ff.; Rose, *ibid.*, XXVII (1934), p. 46, and earlier, L. Maltén, *Röm. Mitt.*, XXXVIII-XXXIX (1923-24), p. 303.

⁵ H. J. Rose, *Class. Quart.*, XXIV (1930), pp. 131 f. Cf. Altheim, p. 97. Offerings were made afterwards, as well as at the time of the funeral, to the cremated dead of the Palatine city: von Duhn, *Ital. Gräberkunde*, I, pp. 425 f.

⁶ M. P. Nilsson, *Arch. f. Rel.*, XXXIII (1936), pp. 91 ff.

⁷ Cf. Nilsson, *Rev. hist. phil. rel.*, X (1930), pp. 113 ff.

⁸ Cf. Altheim, p. 94; von Duhn, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 423 f. on the sacrifice of young pigs in connection with the early cremations of the Palatine city and on the presence of remains of wheat and beans in the ash-urns there found.

⁹ Rose, *Class. Quart.*, *loc. cit.*, p. 133; J. Wiesner, *Grab und Jenseits (Religionsgesch. Vers. u. Vorarb.*, 26), pp. 164 f. The burial of infants by a population which normally cremates *may* have a significance; but cf. N. Putorti, *Notizie*, 1913, p. 158 for the converse. Note in Rose, *loc. cit.*, p. 132, cremating *terramare* "cities of the dead" and compare them with the "cities" of which Altheim speaks (p. 48).

was commonly related to the preservation of supposed skeletons or parts of them.

The next section of Altheim's *History*, called "Ancient Rome," is of remarkable interest, dealing as it does with the beginnings of the city, the earliest calendar of festivals, the relation of Roman religion to early Italy, "the Roman form," and the age of Roman myth. Most students will agree that Wissowa's view that *di indigetes* are the native gods, as distinguished from the *di nouensides*, must be abandoned though many will doubt the new interpretation of them as divine ancestors.¹⁰ Further, Altheim may well be right in holding that even the earliest known circle of Roman worships included Greek deities; but his treatment of such acceptance in terms of "divine realities" discerned in the art-representations and cults of the Greeks, and his statement that "one people had had the vision of the god earlier and independently" (p. 124) suit the belief of much later syncretists—as of Apuleius, *Met.*, XI, *P. Oxy.*, 1380, or *Carm. lat. epigr.*, 24—rather than early Rome. We must not think only of Aesculapius and Cybele, whose cults were introduced as *noua* guaranteed useful by the Sibylline books, but also of the practice of *evocatio*. A Roman general, besieging a city in central Italy, could invite its protecting deity to leave his present sanctuary and receive one in Rome. The deity was to have this if, by helping the Romans to victory, he made the Roman people liable to pay its representative's vow. If he did not, there was no interest in worshipping his "divine reality": Veii would suffice for its Juno. Now we are in no position whatsoever to form any estimate of the earliest Rome; but, in default of indications to the contrary, it will be safe to credit it with something like the centralized oligarchic legalism which we know from the oldest forms preserved rather than with this metaphysical romanticism.

I cannot here enter into many of the problems of detail which arise in this section, which is rich and important (e. g. p. 181 on *numen*).¹¹ On p. 174, in the discussion of the *Poplifugium*, H. J. Rose's probable interpretation of it as the festival of a *Juppiter Poplifugus* i. e. *qui fugat populos* should be noted.¹² "It is only the counterpart to a history controlled by divine guidance, that Rome's gods on their side should have preferred to reveal themselves, not in actions beyond time, but in single, historical acts" (p. 199) sounds impressive; but how else did the gods of anyone—except of a few philosophers—"reveal themselves"? The Romans in religion did indeed, unlike the Greeks, remember the foundation-dates of temples and celebrated them

¹⁰ Cf. H. J. Rose, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXX (1937), pp. 165 ff.

¹¹ Cf. Nilsson, *A History of Greek Religion*, p. 166 on *daimon*.

¹² *Class. Quart.*, XXVIII (1934), pp. 157 f.

by festivals (*natalis templi*)¹³ and recorded *prodigia* with regularity at least from 249 B. C.; but we cannot credit them with a philosophical point of view. Rather, these things hang together with their liking for concreteness and regularization. On p. 205 a parallel is drawn between Cacus and the Caeculus of Servius, *ad Aen.*, VII, 678.¹⁴ But their robberies are different; Caeculus gathers a multitude and after long engaging in robbery founds a city: he resembles not Cacus but Romulus and Remus in Livy, I, 4, 9. In a note p. 512, n. 112 (on p. 216) we read "That Virgil rests on valuable ancient traditions has recently been shown in one special case by G. Q. Giglioli, *Nsc.* 1930, 343." The reader who verifies this reference will find that in the sixth century there was a Velthur Tulumne at Veii, and Tolumnius is the name of the augur of Turnus, though Virgil does not represent this Tolumnius as coming from Veii; in other words, Virgil used an Etruscan name; that is all.

The third section, "The Roman Republic" handles the reshaping of cult (Altheim associates the building of the Capitoline temple with a drastic revolution in religious practices and repression of myth), the new influx of Greek cults, the relation of Rome to Italy, and the later intrusion of Hellenism. This too is of great interest.¹⁵ Perhaps Altheim's largest single contribution lies in the emphasis with which he has shown that Rome received in full measure the influences first of the archaic Greek world, and then of the Hellenistic world, and not those of the classical Greek world.¹⁶ This is a fact: but should we perhaps add that the influences of the archaic age in Rome and in Etruria alike were probably in overwhelming measure external, the taste for art-objects and modes of luxury, and only in a small measure inward and bound up with ideas?

To return to points of detail, on p. 270 Altheim, à propos of the foundation of this temple of Ceres, Liber, and Libera in accordance with the Sibylline oracles, says, "Free, deliberate action is no longer possible on man's own initiative; everything done represents the completion of that which has been spoken by the gods (*fatum*). Only at such a behest can an innovation in the state-cult be adopted, a Greek deity be received." New cults were thus received; but so they were in Greece, and in Greece the consultation of oracles operating as such was a commonplace. What

¹³ Cf. *C. I. L.*, I (ed. 2), p. 324 for *feriae* commemorating the establishment of altars to Ceres and Ops.

¹⁴ 768, by error, in the text.

¹⁵ Note especially pp. 280 ff. (brilliant discussion of changes in the early third century and of the part played in them by Q. Ogulnius: Altheim has elaborated this in *Trans. Numism. Congr.*, 1936 [published 1938], pp. 137 ff.), 295 f. on Mens, 306 on *maiores*.

¹⁶ Cf. I. S. Ryberg, *A. J. A.*, XLI (1937), pp. 100 ff. to which Dr. G. M. A. Hanfmann drew my attention.

is peculiar to Rome is not the concept,¹⁷ but the machinery of the *duoviri* (later *quindecimviri*), acting when consulted by the Senate. On p. 290 it is urged that drama at Rome was pushed back into cult-connexions. Surely this gives a false impression. Dramatic performances were associated with *ludi*, religious and funerary; no other suitable occasions existed. Yet, even when a temple formed the background, there is no reference to it in the prologues of the dramas, and the only direct consequence was that the performances were liable to repetition, *instauratio*, if any portent or error occurred (possibly also as an expression of thanksgiving).¹⁸ The objection to stone structures for performances was based on a conservative moralistic reaction and not on any *religio*. On p. 311 Altheim expresses the conviction that an Oriental cult of Dionysos lies behind the Bacchanalia. But we need look no further than Magna Graecia and the Dionysiac representations on South Italian vases (as in Sicily on those of Centuripe). The oath of the initiates, which to Reitzenstein suggested parallels in the Near East, is a natural enough thing, and had perhaps a native Italian background: consider the oath of the Samnite recruits in Livy, 10, 38.¹⁹ With reference to the foreign slaves and their gods (p. 314), I miss any consideration of the Minturnae inscriptions, which show a body of slaves, largely originating from the Near East, united in the worship of Italian deities;²⁰ that is the other half of the picture and is important in view of the continued strength of non-Oriental cults in Imperial Rome with its cosmopolitan population.

The fourth section, "The Augustan Age," includes an interesting analysis of the Secular Hymn of Horace,²¹ but raises various doubts. We read on p. 333 "But what Lucretius aimed at hitting and did indeed hit was that world of Oriental deities, of belief in the beyond and those magical practices that had their sure and unshakable seat, if not among the nobility, in the middle and lower classes of the population." Yet Lucretius' one reference to an Oriental deity is that to Cybele, which is almost respectful; of magic proper he says nothing; and on the after life he is simply following Epicurus, with at most the addition of a certain national grimness. A little later (p. 334) we are told that Horace and Virgil were among the reformers of Roman Religion; would not Horace and Augustus have smiled at this?

¹⁷ Except, for what seems to be the characteristic nuance of *fatum*.

¹⁸ L. R. Taylor, *T. A. P. A.*, LXVIII (1937), pp. 291 ff.

¹⁹ Discussed by O. Casel, *Jahrb. f. Liturgiewissenschaft*, VIII (1928), p. 227, *Das christliche Kultmysterium* (ed. 2), pp. 105 f.

²⁰ *A. J. P.*, LVI (1935), pp. 86 ff.

²¹ P. 389 is excellent on the parallel of Dido's dying words and the Roman *elogium*.

The final chapters, on religion in the post-Augustan age, lie outside the main field of Altheim's early investigations, and, though he makes some very interesting suggestions, his touch seems to me less sure.²² The evidence is here of a different nature, and we may doubt whether any man can be equally at home in this field and in the area of native Roman and Italian worships. The section begins with a chapter "Causes of the greatness of Rome," which includes valuable observations but maintains as its principal thesis that the Romans won in the spirit of *pious Aeneas*. Yet other ancient peoples had their gods, their pieties, their luck, their fates; and no Roman general perished like Nicias. We can, if you like, say that at Rome these things were in a greater measure built into the political structure; but the essential characteristic of Rome in religion is, as Nilsson remarked,²³ the organization of cults under the great *collegia* and, we may add, the definite practical dogmatism with which the will of the *collegia* and of the senate was held to run in heaven as on earth.²⁴

This review is long, but an adequate review would have to be a coöperative enterprise and would fill a whole number of this journal. Of necessity, most of what has been said is devoted to matters on which I disagree. In closing, therefore, I must emphasize that the book as a whole is based on wide and deep reading and is at the same time intensely fresh and provocative and valuable, *multis luminibus ingenii, multae tamen artis*.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK.

JAN ROS, S. J. Die *Μεταβολή* (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides. (Rhetorische Studien, herausgegeben von Dr. E. Drerup, Ergänzungsband I.) Paderborn, F. Schöningh, 1938. Pp. xxiv + 512. RM. 16.


This careful monograph is designed to present in a systematic way those changes in vocabulary, usage, and syntax by which Thucydides achieves a variety of expression and avoids the monotony inherent in a strictly antithetical style. Far the greater part of the work is given to listing and analyzing actual examples of variation under the seven headings (each with many sub-headings) of variation in form or meaning, by similar words, by different words, by the *constructio ad sententiam*, in the

²² As when he says, p. vii, that the religion of the post-Augustan age "has so far been exclusively treated from the angle of ruler-cult." The chapter on the age of the Severi (pp. 455 ff.) seems to me the best in this part.

²³ *Röm. Mitt.*, XLVIII (1933), pp. 245 ff.

²⁴ Nock, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XXXII (1939), pp. 83 ff.

REVIEWS.



gender, number, or case of nouns, in the person, voice, tense, or mood of verbs, and in construction. This undoubtedly is the most valuable part of the work. The very great number of passages adduced and their clear division into categories give even on a casual reading a sense of the richness and subtlety of Thucydides' style that could hardly be had from a less exhaustive study. At the same time, the author's discussion of any given usage and his great care in collecting parallels should prove invaluable not merely for the interpretation of specific passages but perhaps especially for the choice between variants and emendations, both of which the author is at pains to cite. He argues forcefully (pp. 458-9) against emending or choosing variants on the assumption that Thucydides generally maintained a rigid parallelism, and undoubtedly his influence should tend to restore to the text a variety of expression now sometimes obscured. Thus the work should become a handbook for editors of Thucydides. It treats, to be sure, only one of what the author calls (p. 456) the three main elements of the historian's style, the other two being, in his judgment, its departure from normal expression (*ἐξאלλγή*) and its tendency to parallelism, the obverse, as it were, of the tendency to variation here described. Nevertheless, though it thus calls for a companion volume, this monograph embraces so many previous studies and is in itself so thorough, that it may well stand as a more valuable treasury of Thucydidean usage than any compiled hitherto.

It is difficult to give the same unmixed praise to the author's interpretation of his material as to his diligence in collecting and clarity in using it. He begins by setting forth the evidence on *μεταβολή* (*ποικιλία*) or *varietas* as a principle of ancient rhetoric; and, though the majority of his citations are from Dionysius and later rhetoricians (with a few from Cicero and the *Auctor ad Herennium*), he is entirely convincing when he points to Hippias *frag.* 6 (*Vorsokr.*², II, p. 331, 15), Isocrates (*Contr. Soph.*, 16, *Antid.*, 47, *Phil.*, 27) and Aristotle (*Rhet.*, I, 11 and III, 12) as adumbrating the principle much earlier. Aristotle's remark that a style intended for reading should avoid *asyndeta* and repetitions of the same idea in different ways, though both these mannerisms are permissible, even desirable, in speaking, tallies essentially with Isocrates' statement (*Phil.*, 26); but even without this testimony it would seem certain that the earliest sophists, emulating as they did the dignity of verse, made men well aware of the distinction between ornate and practical prose. The former would have followed the poetic, varied, and pregnant style then associated with the narratives and generalizations of verse; the latter would have maintained the lucid plainness of the *ὑπόμνημα*.¹ But, although then there is every reason to believe

¹ Cf. W. Aly, "Formprobleme der Frühen Griechischen Prosa," *Philologus*, Supplementbd. XXI, Heft III (1929), pp. 44-63.

that Thucydides, being much under the influence of the earliest sophists, would naturally have sought variety as one of the objects of his style, the author's two further contentions, first, that his actual inconcinnities reflect this principle and this alone, and then that, being as varied as it is, his style is unique, seem neither probable in themselves nor to follow from the evidence.

To take these two points in order, the view that most or even many of the examples of varied usage adduced by Ros primarily reflect the historian's conscious or unconscious search for variety does scant justice to other and often noted qualities of his mind and style. As one out of very many possible instances, consider the passage II, 63, 2-3, where Pericles remarks of empire, *ἥς οὐδ' ἐκστῆναι ἐν ὑμῖν ἔστιν, εἰ τις καὶ τόδε ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεδιώς ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀνδραγαθίζεται*, and then, three lines later, sums up his position in the general statement *τὸ γὰρ ἀπράγμων οὐ σφάζεται μὴ μετὰ τοῦ δραστηρίου τεταγμένον*. On p. 157 the author cites the differing forms *ἀπραγμοσύνη* and *τὸ ἀπράγμων* as an example of *μεταβολή*. Neglecting the fact that the neuter adjective is preferred to the general noun in the second sentence partly for reasons of symmetry, one may rather consider what is accomplished by the mere shift from noun to adjective. Such abstract neuters probably came into common use through the example of the scientific writers of the fifth century. Certainly the fragments of Anaxagoras and Diogenes abound in these forms which not only replace substantives where none exist, but possess a greater immediacy and concreteness than existent substantives, at the same time sharing their abstractness.² Now no one would deny that Thucydides, like his teachers the sophists, surveyed human events with that sense of universal law with which the physical scientists had viewed the cosmos. Yet, since he wrote not a treatise on society but a history of actual events, he faced the double task of expressing not only the abstract law but the immediate occurrence and in such a way that the law might seem to emerge from the occurrence. This latter purpose is served in the present passage by the change from the purely abstract feminine to the more concrete and vivid neuter. Again, the combination of the general with the specific appears in such a characteristic coupling as *ἐπιτρέψαντες τοῖς ἐννέα ἀρχουσι τὴν φυλακὴν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτοκράτορσι διαθεῖναι* (I, 126, 8), listed by the author on p. 149 as an example of *μεταβολή*.

One could continue much farther enumerating those attitudes either native to Thucydides or inherent in his task which, rather than any simple stylistic rule, seem to have dictated his actual varieties of expression. For example, besides his desire to com-

² Cf. Classen-Steup, *Thukydides*, I (1919), introd., p. LXXV, "Durch die Verwendung der Neutra wird . . . die abstrakte Allgemeinheit der betreffenden Begriffe für den vorliegenden Fall in eine mehr greifbare, eine konkretere Form gekleidet."

bine the individual and the generic, there is his feeling for fact, his wish to report what actually happened. In so momentary an event as he relates in I, 48, 2, καθορῶσι τὰς . . . ναῦς μετεώρους τε καὶ ἐπὶ σφᾶς πλεούσας, cited by Ros on p. 161, one sees him augmenting the vaguer μετεώρους by a more precise phrase, and time and again, as in the example cited at the end of the last paragraph, a second construction appears to differ from a preceding simply because it conveys more exact and detailed information. Related to this striving for accuracy is the compactness of style with which he tries to present at one time several different aspects of a situation; also the vividness, born of experience in battle and nurtured on the many accounts which he must have heard, with which he alters tense and construction to portray more exactly the scene as it was. Finally, there is an element tending to variety which is difficult to feel even in a foreign language that one knows well but which is at once apparent in the best prose or verse of one's own tongue, namely, the degree to which mere sound in ways too delicate to be analyzed dictates an unusual but entirely happy collocation of words. In a suggestive chapter W. R. M. Lamb² some years ago observed the same quality of bold experimentation in the style of Thucydides as appears among the English prose-writers of the seventeenth century. But without pressing the analogy one can at least agree that Thucydides, inspired by those teachers who first conceived for prose as high a destiny as that of verse, felt free to seek those bold and unusual effects, that *curiosa felicitas*, which are most marked in Greek verse and, wherever found, are proverbially a matter of ear, not of rule. In sum, the title of Ros' book, *Die Μεταβολή als Stilprinzip*, is misleading; much more so is his habit of explaining each example of variation by this one stylistic principle. His book, as has been said, is extremely useful because it sets forth very thoroughly those changes in expression which no one would deny are highly characteristic of Thucydides. But the explanations given for those changes are limited and stereotyped.

Then, the contention most clearly expressed on pp. 458-63 that the style of Thucydides is unique and thus, one gathers, not representative of his age is difficult to accept without many reservations. Aristotle's distinction between the styles designed for hearing and for reading was noted above; indeed the author's own argument that Thucydides, in seeking variety, followed a stylistic tenet of his time refutes his own conclusion. It is interesting to test Aristotle's statement by the fragments of two works of the sophist Antiphon, the one of which, the *Ἀλήθεια*, is a closely reasoned tract clearly meant for reading, while the other, the *Περὶ Ὀμολοίας*, is a sophistic speech.⁴ Now the style

² *Olio Enthroned* (Cambridge, 1914), pp. 308-12.

⁴ Aly, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-5.

of the former is very regular, and purposely so, since the author's difficult train of thought, expressed as it is by general nouns, articular infinitives, and abstract neuters, needs the bare clarity of parallel and contrasting clauses. Occasionally he varies his constructions—for instance, in *frag. A*, col. 5, 9-13 (*Vorsokr.*⁵, II, p. 350) he concludes a series of relative clauses by a participial clause, and in *frag. C*, col. 2, 3 (*ibid.*, p. 355) continues the causal dative τῷ μύσει by the construction καὶ ὅτι—but, on the whole, he is regular both because he wishes to be clear and because, unlike Thucydides, he is wholly concerned with abstract ideas. In the *Περὶ Ὀμονόας*, on the other hand, one notes a large number of the same variations that Ros has listed—for instance, change of mood (λέγωμεν . . . λεγέσθω, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 358, 5-6), change of tense (ἐκτῆσθαι . . . κτᾶσθαι, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 358, 4, and most marked in the narrative passage, *frag. 54*), variation of similar words (τὸ λυπηρόν . . . λύται . . . λυπήματα, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 358, 9-13), joining of different classes of words (τὸ ξὺν . . . τὸ μήκος τοῦ βίου, *frag. 50; ibid.*, p. 360, 4-5), change of number (γάμων . . . γυναικός, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 357, 14, and most marked in ἀξιώσαντα καὶ ἀξιοθέντα after ἴσα φρονούντας, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 358, 2-3), variety of construction (τοῦ βίου ἐς τὴν ξυλλογὴν . . . τοῦ βίου τῆς ξυλλογῆς, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 359, 6-12), irregularity of construction (χαλεπαὶ μὲν ἐκπομπαὶ governing τοὺς φίλους ἐχθροὺς ποιῆσαι, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 358, 1-2; contrast the regular construction with χαλεπὸν in the next line), general variety of structure (φροντίζων ἤδη πάντα πλέα καὶ ἐξοίχεται τὸ νεοτήσιον σκίρτημα ἐκ τῆς γνώμης καὶ <τὸ> πρόσωπον οὐκέτι τὸ αὐτό, *frag. 49; ibid.*, p. 360, 1-3). The list could be continued even in the few fragments that we possess; how much more might it have been, were the whole work extant.

Or again, many examples of the same variety appear if, in the lack of any extended work of the early sophists, one read through a play of Euripides with Ros' categories in mind. Such a list gathered hastily from the *Medea* alone covered two pages and contained something like a hundred entries, and that although, as Drerup pointed out,⁶ Euripides has less in common with the poetic and antithetical style of Thucydides (and, he argued, of the older sophists) than with the periodic structure and purer usage of Thrasymachus. To set down that list in detail is perhaps unnecessary, but two items of it may be of interest. Summing up his case that Thucydides' style is quite unusual, Ros (p. 456) cites certain examples in German and says, "Zu Wasser und zu Lande" wird bei Thuk. "zu Wasser und auf dem Lande." But one reads in the *Medea*, 193, ἐπὶ τ' εἰλαπίνας καὶ παρὰ δελπίνας. Again, he sees (pp. 268, 280) in the changes of

⁵ "Theodoros von Byzanz," *Jahrbücher f. class. Philologie*, Supplementbd. XXVII (1902), p. 229.

tense in Thucydides' narratives a mark of his individual style, but in the *ρήσεις* of the *Medea* historical presents are freely mingled with aorists (1161-63) and imperfects (1189-90) and these with each other (1146-7). As I have argued elsewhere,⁶ Thucydides' descriptions were undoubtedly to some extent modeled on the *ρήσεις* of tragedy, and his use of tenses presumably merely bears out the fact.

To conclude, in essence the varieties of Thucydides' style suggest not that he was an individual stylist utterly at variance with the fashions of his day but rather that he fully shared those fashions. Doubtless, as was suggested above, he attempted to combine the abstract and the actual in a way that the sophist Antiphon, for instance, did not in the *Ἀλήθεια* or the *Περὶ Ὀμολίας*, and in general his penetrating mind may well have conceived, especially through his long years of exile, wider and more inclusive purposes for his book than any for which his contemporaries had striven. To that extent then the style of his narratives and speeches alike would in fact be unique and, as such, no true guide to the speech and thought of his contemporaries. And yet the very fact that in his youth in Athens he could be led to conceive such a style is the surest proof that he followed standards then generally received and that those standards subserved a varied prose, more bold, more akin to verse, than any of the following period. Lamb's analogy of seventeenth century prose is instructive here. One could say that the bold flights of Milton's pamphlets and Donne's sermons are more individual because more experimental than the simpler and more conventional writings of the eighteenth century, for instance, those of Addison or Steele. Yet to say that Milton's prose entirely differs from Donne's would be absurd since both in fact embody the contemporary standard of artistic prose. Just so, the similarities noted above between Thucydides, Antiphon, and Euripides permit individual differences within a fundamentally similar concept of lofty, dignified expression. And when, as I have tried to show elsewhere,⁷ still other elements in the thought and style of Thucydides seem marked by the intellectual influences surrounding his early years in Athens, there is added reason for believing that the varieties of usage taken by Ros to prove the uniqueness of Thucydides' style in fact prove its dependence on an older theory of sophistic prose which, on the one hand, aimed at profound and searching generalizations and, on the other, at the heightened diction of poetry. That theory surely encouraged a bold uniqueness of expression, since prose, except in the *ὑπόμνημα*, had not yet achieved a cast of language quite different from verse. In a sense, therefore, one may call

⁶ "Euripides and Thucydides," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLIX (1938), pp. 61-4.

⁷ See the previous note.

Thucydides' effects, like those of Milton, unique. But in another and more important sense, it seems truer to see in them an example of contemporary usage, perhaps heightened and intensified but in essence faithful.⁸

JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

DAVID M. ROBINSON and PAUL AUGUSTUS CLEMENT. Excavations at Olynthus. Part IX. The Chalcidic Mint and the Excavation Coins found in 1928-1934. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938. Pp. xxxi + 431; 36 plates. \$15.00.

The great number of silver coins of the Chalcidic League found in the excavation of Olynthus has created both an opportunity and an obligation to make a complete study of that beautiful coinage. Dr. Clement has for some years been gathering material for a corpus, and the result is a monograph which commands the gratitude and the admiration of numismatists. Casts have been collected from all sources in an effort to make the work as complete as possible.¹ The whole material is arranged in a system so logical and clear that new discoveries will fall readily into place. This is discussed in an admirable section on the Relative Chronology in which analysis of the style, the dies, and the hoards results in a series which may be considered definitive.

There follows a section on Absolute Chronology in which 432 is proposed as the date for the beginning of the ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΩΝ coins. This would not be invalidated by the acceptance of 479 as the date of the origin of the Chalcidic state (as proposed by Hampl); but 432, the year of the alliance with Potidaea and Bottiaea and the revolt from Athens, is the more probable date on literary grounds, strongly supported by the numismatic arguments. The year 379 when Olynthus capitulated to the Spartans is supported by the numismatic evidence as a likely point for the beginning of the series signed by the magistrates, eleven in number, the first nine of whom held office for three years, the last two for four years between them. This period of the magis-

* The subject is discussed at greater length in "The Origins of Thucydides' Style," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, L (1939), pp. 36-84.

¹ Two apparent omissions are not actually such. The tetradrachm published by Prowe, *Trudy. Moskovskoe numismaticheskoe obshchestvo*, Tome II, p. 32, No. 2, Pl. II is Clement's No. 97 e; that published by E. S. G. Robinson, *Num. Chron.*, XVII (1937), p. 238, No. 6 is his No. 83 a. On p. 54 in tetradrachm No. 81 c for R. Jameson read H. de Nanteuil.

trates is worked out with an elaborate mathematical demonstration that the normal term of office must be three years and neither two, four, nor any amount less or greater. Since 348 is certainly the terminal date for all the Chalcidic coinage, the thirty-one years of the magistrates (nine at three years + two at two years) must have begun in 379.

It is perhaps unfortunate that the chronology of the bronze is not treated in this section but much farther along in the book (pp. 298-300). The bronze, in three denominations, probably began with or just after Group J of the silver (*ca.* 398-395) when the quantity of tetrobols issued diminished. Thereafter it seems to have been struck continuously. But the discovery that Bottiaean reverses were struck with the same obverse dies as Chalcidian reverses shows that Bottiaean bronze was being issued at Olynthus. It is suggested that this may have been done by or for a Bottiaean element in Olynthus, possibly to be connected with the anti-Macedonian party in the town, 357-348. This would imply that the muled obverse dies were the last used with Chalcidic reverses, and that the Chalcidic bronze is to be dated 398-357, the Bottiaean 357-348. Otherwise this is a case of Olynthus minting for the Bottiaeans outside the city and the series will be simultaneous, perhaps 398-348. The question is one which can be settled only by an intensive study of the excavation's bronze coins, now at Athens. It is to be hoped that Dr. Clement will have the opportunity and the public spirit to duplicate his achievement with the silver by an arrangement of the bronze, a still more difficult task but one that would be even more useful, at least to excavators, whose dating is so frequently dependent on the bronze coins.

The first part of the volume continues with individual analyses of the hoards, with a general discussion of types, symbols, and inscriptions and with a note on forgeries. The second part contains a catalogue of the coins found in 1934, a résumé, with commentary, of all the finds of 1928 and 1931 as well as 1934, and a concluding discussion of the evidence of the coins. The résumé not only makes all the coins available together, but greatly improves on the presentation in *Olynthus* III and VI. Nevertheless, this is the least satisfactory part of the book, for it is vitiated by special pleading particularly unfortunate because it is utterly unnecessary. It is the excavator's contention "that the Northwest Quarter was abandoned about the time of the reign of Cassander and the rest of the excavated area about 348" (p. 370). So far as the numismatic evidence goes, this contention is overwhelmingly supported. As shown by the tables (pp. 364-367) there are 3528 coins which must have been issued before 348, while adding together all those classed as "before and after 348," "after 348" and "doubtful" we only have a

total of 319, of which 31 are Roman or later and so cannot affect the question.

In spite of the obvious sufficiency of this testimony there is much ingenuity and some perversity shown in attempting to reduce to an absolute minimum the number to be dated after 348. To this end the "doubtful" column contains not only those issues as to whose date authorities disagree, but also those where the excavator seems to be the only doubter. For example: the table contains one coin of Megara classed as doubtful with the remark "conventional date: Cent. III B. C." The basis for the doubt must, one would suppose, be some cogent dating opposed to the conventional one. But the discussion (pp. 348-350) is an attack on the suggestion of "the third quarter of the third century B. C." offered by F. O. Waage.² The argument is not that Waage's arrangement is wrong but that it is uncertain. Well, I suppose Waage himself would have no hesitation in admitting that; but, uncertain though it is, it is at present the only arrangement available, and it seems to me much too useful a one to be abandoned except for better evidence. What is the conclusion from Olynthus? That the coin is not later than Cassander (316-297). And on this basis it is listed doubtful, *that is, either earlier or later than 348!*³

This is the most extreme instance, but in the cases of Eleaus, Hephaestia, Myrina, Salamis, Heracleia Pontica, and Cyme as well, the authorities cited are unanimous for a late date, but the coins are in the "doubtful" column. In the sense of "not proven" of course they are "doubtful," but if the word means that there is equal reason to consider them early or late, it is hardly proper. It is noticeable that the same authorities, with the same basis for their opinions are accepted without question when their dating is before 348 (e. g. Cypsela). But what is the use of all this exertion? The placing of this handful of coins cannot affect the general conclusion, and the general conclusion can only be used for placing them on the assumption that because there are ten times as many early coins as late it is therefore ten times as likely that any particular coin will be early. Surely this is not seriously proposed as a reason for rejecting Head and Babelon.

Where this issue does not enter in there is much valuable material in the commentary, particularly in the treatment of Macedonian coins. I have dwelt with disproportionate length on what seems to me a mistake in method, not in the least

² *Greek Bronze Coins from a Well at Megara.*

³ It must be noted that on p. 371, note 11, it is admitted that three pieces, of which one is that from Megara, were probably lost in the second half of the fourth century. But why make the admission where not one reader out of a hundred will find it?

because I would question the conclusion as to the dating of the site, but because I dislike to see small red herrings dragged across the difficult trail of numismatic chronology, and because the authority of so very admirable a book might easily be taken as final.

The Plates are a great improvement over former volumes, and particular mention should be made of the fine four-diameter enlargements of seven obverses and one reverse. Finally, the inclusion of a sketch map of the site is a valuable addition.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

ALFRED R. BELLINGER.

FRANZ CUMONT. *L'Égypte des Astrologues*. Bruxelles, Fondation Égyptologique Reine Élisabeth, 1937. Pp. 254.

In 1936 Wilhelm Gundel published the text of a Latin Renaissance manuscript containing the *Liber Hermetis Trismegisti*. In a penetrating study Gundel established that portions of the text must be a translation of Greek astrological literature of the third century B. C. The bulk of that literature has perished, but comparison of the new text with the standard astrologers of post-Ptolemaic times—Manilius, Valens, Firmicus, Rhetorius—leaves no doubt of a common heritage from Greek works written in Egypt in the third and second centuries B. C. Since the Hellenized Egyptian priests who were responsible for the early compilations naturally made numerous references to the social and, in a lesser degree, the historical and political phenomena of their environment, the continued neglect of the astrologers as an historical source seems not to be justified. But few historians have a sufficient command of their specialized terminology to disentangle the factual from the imaginative in their obscure subject-matter, and consequently, taking his cue from Gundel, Professor Cumont, who has no superior among modern students of astrology, has culled from the sources for the use of Egyptologists and papyrologists such data as are pertinent to their interests. Cumont is not concerned with the development of astrology in Egypt but with the society in which that development took place. His book is a description of Ptolemaic Egypt derived from the astrological literature.

After a preface which gives a brief sketch of the fortunes of astrological studies since the Renaissance and emphasizes the value of the ancient authors for the understanding of Egyptian society, the author devotes an introduction of some ten pages to an evaluation of the *Liber Hermetis* as an historical source and its relation to the later astrologers. The introduction has considerable value for the general scholar inasmuch as it provides a bird's-eye view of the present status of astrological scholarship.

The significant discovery that the standard literature—Manilius, Valens, etc.—has its roots in the Ptolemaic period, has brought the chief problems to a sharp focus. Investigations in ancient astrology have entered a period of intense interest in "Quellengeschichte." That this stage has been reached at all is due to the prolonged and devoted labors of men like Cumont, Boll, Kroll, and Gundel; but many decades will pass and many technical monographs will have been written before the historian will feel any assurance in venturing into the astrological morass. For this reason, all the more, scholars will not hesitate to express a profound gratitude to Professor Cumont for having written a very readable book in which he places the experience of a lifetime spent in the study of astrological texts at the disposal of laymen.

The plan of the book is consonant with its purpose. Two large divisions entitled (1) Government and Society (pp. 25-112) and (2) Religion and Morality (pp. 113-206), give us in a running text, which will please the general reader as well as the scholar, an account of the major activities and phases of life in Ptolemaic Egypt: the royal court, the army and the civil service, city and country, work and play, religion and its devotees, gnosticism, divination, magic, manners and morals, law and its victims, life after death. It is an account conditioned by the limitations resting on the experience of the priestly writers and by the limitations of astrology itself. The astrologers had no great experience of imperial or dynastic ambitions or of the internal administration of Egypt. Their knowledge, for example, of the organization of the Greek cities is most meager (pp. 71 ff.). In respect to social and moral history, astrology itself is at fault. Like magic, it has a special attraction for people when they are in trouble or driven by arrogant ambition or caught in a maelstrom of passion. It is to astrological prediction and magical device that men turn to excuse or conceal their own insufficiency. Naturally the astrological writings yield a dark and painful picture. Once these restrictive factors, however, have been admitted, a valuable criterion has been evolved for estimating such information as can be extracted from the astrologers.

At least as important as the text itself is the body of notes, which occupy easily more than half the space. Cumont has given abundant references with extensive quotation from the sources. The passages are arranged to illustrate the Ptolemaic relations of the later compilations; and, quite apart from their main purpose, they will make a strong appeal to scholars interested in the history of Latin translation from the Greek or in materials for lexicography. To his own notes the author has frequently appended signed notes of great value from the hand of a brilliant papyrologist and historian, Mlle. Claire Préaux. The impression that results from her remarks is decidedly more

favorable to the hard-working, commonplace life reflected in the papyri, as a true picture of the daily round, than to the rather unbalanced exaggerations that we expect and find in astrology. From it, as from the Roman authors, the Egyptians of antiquity obtain a reputation for turbulence and unrest; they are a people given to magic and strange cults. The papyri seem to tell another story as well. If the ancient Egyptians, like their modern descendants, were restless under foreign domination, a number of other peoples, ancient and modern, have shared that weakness with them. In texts less feverish than the astrological and the magical and less prejudiced than the Roman, we see the great mass of the Egyptian people laboring to feed Rome, marrying, begetting children, educating them for trades and professions, struggling for higher social status, celebrating religious festivals with music and dancing. If there were Egyptians guilty of parricide, incest, rape, theft, assault, they were perhaps no different from thousands of others all over the civilized world at all times who have broken through the restraints of moral codes. On the whole, I venture to say, the utility of the astrological literature for social history will depend on the maintenance of constant control with the less emotional data of the papyri.

An appendix (pp. 207-216) illustrates the basic thesis of the volume, that the relatively late astrological literature preserves and adapts Greek works compiled in Egypt at least as early as the second century B. C., by attempting to fix the source of Firmicus Maternus VIII, 18-31, in that period. The discussion is a model of sound reasoning, and the conclusions are as valid as the methods of historical deduction can make them. Most important is Cumont's view that the words *satis felices nascuntur eunuchi, et quibus regni tuitio credatur* conceal a reference to Eulaios, the eunuch who was associated with Linaios in the guardianship of Ptolemy Philometor. Very ingenious as well is the suggestion that *duplex regnum* describes the rule of Ptolemy Physcon over Egypt and Cyrenaica after 145.

The book concludes with valuable indexes of Greek and Latin words, a list of passages in the astrologers to which Cumont has made critical contributions, and an analytical table of contents. Here and there throughout the volume false accents in the Greek and misprints, especially in the Latin, detract from the pleasure of a well composed and printed page; but these will give no trouble to the classicist. Readers not familiar with papyrological literature will find the following errors confusing: p. 57, n. 4 Winckler for Wilcken; p. 62, n. 5 Vertel for Oertel. The Paniskos letter cited by Mlle. Préaux on p. 65, n. 3 may now be studied in a new edition in *P. Mich.*, III, 214. The edict of Philopator addressed to the priests of Dionysus (*B. G. U.*, 1211), which Cumont interprets in the traditional way (p. 152, n. 4),

is now given a more prosaic and more likely turn by Eitrem, *Symbolae Osloenses*, XVII, pp. 33 ff.

These minutiae¹ are not a fitting epilogue to a review of an agreeable book, competently conceived and expertly executed, which may well have the effect of adding breadth and depth to the work of papyrologists and historians. For the historian the evidences of chronological stratification are the indispensable beginning, and the example which Cumont sets in this regard is salutary. Passages borrowed from Oriental sources may be identified by traces of non-Hellenistic institutions and thought, e. g., "king of kings" and "satraps" (p. 22) or the impassable gulf between kings and magnates on the one hand and the masses (*δημοι, δχλοι*) on the other (pp. 68, 74). Adaptations of the Roman period (p. 70, n. 3) must be retranslated into terms of the Ptolemaic age, and Roman interpolations must be isolated (p. 73, n. 6). From literal or awkward Latin translations the original Greek must be recovered (pp. 16 f., 210, 212), and this task requires a highly developed *Sprachgefühl* supported by extensive and precise historical knowledge. The finesse and intuition, the keen perception of differences, the erudition, the delicate method necessary to disentangle the threads of thought and to sense at times even the suppression of thought is beautifully illustrated in what I do not doubt is the best chapter of the book, that on survival after death (pp. 200-206), where Cumont is on ground peculiarly his own.

H. C. YOUTIS.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

MERIWETHER STUART. The Portraiture of Claudius: Preliminary Studies. New York, 1938. Pp. xiv + 93. (Columbia Univ. diss.).

Curiously, the extant portraits of Claudius figure in this monograph only by way of an appendix. The monograph itself is concerned with the evidence for portraits which, though doubtless they once existed, have long since disappeared. To the cynical it will seem that the problem, so limited, belongs to that shadowy group exemplified by the problem of the number of angels one might reasonably expect a needle's point comfortably to serve as a dancing-floor.

¹ It would be a pity to deprive American university men of choice samples of Cumont's modernity: p. 67 "Ils enlevaient aussi les enfants, comme les 'gangsters' américains, pour en exiger une forte rançon"; p. 74 "... les villes grecques, on le sait, avaient coutume d'accorder la bourgeoisie à des bienfaiteurs étrangers, et, sous l'Empire, la vanité des grands se plut à accumuler ces naturalisations honorifiques, comme certains le font aujourd'hui des décorations." Decorations, of course, are the French equivalent of honorary degrees.

Part I is a collection and discussion of references to the non-extant portraits of Claudius. Records of the sometime existence of portraits are to be found in Dio, Josephus, and perhaps Pliny (pp. 1-6), a single papyrus (pp. 6-13), numerous statue-bases or possible statue-bases bearing the name or part of the name of Claudius (pp. 13-36); and at least one reverse type of those which appear on coins struck by Claudius and Nero (pp. 36-39). Of these sources only one gives any considerable body of data, the inscribed bases. Something more than a hundred are listed, first according to their provenience (pp. 14-22), next according to their date (pp. 22-28), and finally according to their dimensions (pp. 28-36). The heavy duty of carrying the commentary on the items of this cumbersome tripartite list is borne by the footnotes, generally sufficiently interesting to cause one to regret that the position of notes and text is not reversed.

The list of inscriptions accepted as portrait-dedications of Claudius falls short of a desirable degree of certainty in two respects. For somewhat less than half is there information specifically identifying as a base the monument bearing the inscription (p. 13, note 93), and in the absence of this information the touch-stone used for the identification of a portrait-inscription is the presence of the emperor's name in the dative case for Latin inscriptions, in the accusative for Greek, a criterion that can obviously lead to inaccuracy as the author warns (p. 14). Mutilation leads to further difficulties with various items of the list. I note several examples from the earlier parts of the list: *C. I. L.*, VI, 36895 (p. 14, note 98); *C. I. L.*, IX, 6361 (p. 15, note 100); *C. I. L.*, V, 4309 (p. 15, note 103); *C. I. L.*, XIII, 1038 (p. 15, note 107). These examples may serve to show that a student interested in the inscriptional data will doubtless find it necessary to struggle with the ponderous volumes of the *Corpus* (and other sources) before he can be quite sure with what degree of reasonableness a given inscription is listed as a record of a non-extant portrait.

I note a few additions and corrections. On p. 18, *s. v.* Ephesus, add as a bracketed inscription according to Stuart's convention (p. 14 with note 95) *Forschungen in Ephesos*, III, p. 94, No. 3. Under the same rubric correct the last line of the text printed in *L'Année Epigraphique* by that in *Forschungen in Ephesos*, III, p. 110, No. 19. Under Cos add Maiuri, *Nuova Silloge Epigrafica di Rodi e Cos* (Florence, 1925), No. 468 (cf. Nos. 462 and 464, and for the dative in Greek dedications see Stuart's note 115 on p. 17), No. 469, and No. 680 (as a bracketed inscription). On p. 16, *s. v.* Macedonia, apropos of *I. G.*, IX², 81, cf. *B. C. H.*, XLVIII, 1924, p. 366. To the list of doubtful portrait-inscriptions on p. 19 add *Hesperia*, IV (1935), pp. 57 f., No. 20. In all references to the article "Claudius

(256)" in the third volume of Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Realencyclopädie*, for Gaheis read Groag (the proper author of the greater part of the article), except if the reference be to cols. 2836-2839 (the end of the article over the signature of Gaheis).

Numismatic evidence potentially relevant to an iconographic study of a Roman emperor is of two kinds. First, there is the possibility that some contemporary statue or group is to be found represented in a reverse type. This kind of evidence has been examined (pp. 36-39), and it has been found that in one reverse type alone is there any probability attached to the identification of a sculptured Claudius portrait (*B. M. C. Roman Empire*, I, p. 201, Nos. 7-8). The second and more interesting line of enquiry, the possibility of the existence of models on which are based the portraits preserved on the obverses of coins, is ignored. To develop this would require a wearisome amount of classification, and to establish the thesis might entail a too subtle argument; yet a rigorous classification of the types of heads on an emperor's coinage would be clear gain, and such phenomena as the curiously similar and very fine heads of Claudius which appear on a tetradrachm struck at Ephesus in A. D. 41/2 (? *B. M. C. Roman Empire*, I, Pl. 34, No. 1) and on an aureus struck at Rome under Nero in A. D. 54/5 (? *ibid.*, Pl. 38, No. 7) lead one to suspect that the existence of models might not be impossible to establish.

Part II (pp. 40-67) contains an analysis of the data assembled in the first part "for their contribution to: 1) the chronology of the extant portraits of Claudius; 2) the geographical distribution of Claudius' portraits throughout the empire; 3) the relationship between the erection of portraits in honor of Claudius and his administrative, military, and personal activities; and 4) the statue types of Claudius' portraits." Concerning (1) it appears that, since practically all the records of the non-extant portraits of Claudius which can be dated belong to the period of his reign (and more specifically to the periods of his accession, of his British triumph, of his marriage with Agrippina, and finally to the period of the *divus* Claudius), likewise the extant portraits which cannot be dated are doubtless to be attributed to the same period. A probability that needed no buttressing testimony from the non-extant portraits. Concerning (2) the thing of interest to determine is the degree of the emperor's popularity throughout the empire. For the determination of this an adequate foundation cannot be had with a single group of data. Concerning (3) the chief conclusions are those already implied under (1). Concerning (4) we have the by no means novel information that the emperor's non-extant statues represented him standing togate, nude, seated, on horseback, and riding in a chariot.

Stuart's appendix lists with bibliography 34 statues and busts of Claudius. Of these 21 are listed in the chapter on Claudius in volume II of Bernoulli, *Römische Ikonographie*. Stuart's list of possible portraits contains four items, one known to Bernoulli. Sixteen pieces were rejected by Bernoulli (Stuart, p. 77, note 389); in addition to these sixteen Stuart gives 32 pieces as forgeries or portraits incorrectly identified as Claudius. Half of the 32 items rejected by Stuart are to be found in Bernoulli's catalogue; of these Bernoulli had accepted four, listed one as Tiberius, of two had accepted parts, concerning six had expressed doubt either of their authenticity or of their attribution, and for three had reserved his opinion because the pieces were inaccessible to him. Bernoulli, for all his cavalier neglect of the evidence for non-extant Claudius portraits (Stuart, p. xi, paragraph 1), none the less manages to suffer little in comparison with his successor. Yet Stuart's list is a very welcome modernization of Bernoulli's catalogue of sculpture. It would have been even more welcome, if with each of the previously published items a concise description had been included with the bibliography. The truth is that what is needed is a complete modernization of Bernoulli's work. Let each item have an accurate description, a concise bibliography, a good illustration; if the non-extant portraits must be catalogued, let them go to an appendix. I hope that Mr. Stuart's interest in iconographical studies continues sufficiently strong to cause him to undertake the work—but I hope that he will abandon in citing his literature the weirdly individualistic system of abbreviations which he has seen fit to employ in the Claudius monograph.

PAUL A. CLEMENT.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

W. SCHADEWALDT. *Homer und die homerische Frage*. Berlin, de Gruyter, 1938. (Sonderabdruck aus "Die Antike" Band XIV.) Pp. 22.

KARL REINHARDT. *Das Parisurteil*. Frankfurt a. M., Klostermann, 1937. (Wissenschaft und Gegenwart No. 11.) Pp. 31.

The Homeric question, according to Professor Schadewaldt, is fundamentally concerned with the nature of the poetical creator and the poetical creation. The greater part of the lecture here printed is an elucidation of this thesis in the form of an interpretative sketch of the history of Homeric scholarship since the time of Wolf. Seeking at first to get along without Homer and to understand the poetry as the immediate product

of the folk, time, tradition, etc., Homeric interpretation, as it became more historical, has been gradually forced back to the poet. That the "analysis" of the poetry itself has moved in this general direction can be recognized, Professor Schadewaldt contends, by three phenomena especially. In the first place, the elements with which the "analysts" reckon have become more and more extensive. Secondly, the general plan of the whole poem has asserted itself more and more markedly, no matter if it be placed at the beginning, middle, or end of the development. Finally, the once abused "redactor" gradually became a "reviser," then a "poet," and at last has become the originator of the plan of the whole, Homer.

For Professor Schadewaldt Homer is a rhapsode, a poet who could write, not an improviser; the *Iliad* is his own structure, built with traditional materials and according to traditional forms but his own just as the building is the architect's own creation even though its stones and beams were taken from older structures. The detailed evidence in support of the portrait of the poet here sketched is reserved for another study (now published in *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, XLIII, nr. 6 [1938], pp. iv + 182); the present analysis of the course of Homeric studies at least justifies the author's contention that belief in the existence of the poet and in the poem that we have as his work is a possible working hypothesis and not the worst of those that have come and gone in the history of Homeric criticism.

If the analytical hypotheses have done nothing else they have forced the Homerists to read the text of the *Iliad* with close and serious attention and to abandon the light-hearted assumption of a poet who sang in an unconscious frenzy whatever words the instant Muse put upon his lips; every attempt to "explain" the poem by means of external monuments and historical reconstructions has contributed to the growing awareness that the poem can be understood only by painstaking study of the text itself and by means of the hypothesis that that text is the work of a poetical genius who consciously employed all the materials ready to his hand for a meaningful and artistic purpose.¹ This

¹ Cf. Calhoun, "Homeric Repetitions" (*U. of California Publ. Class. Phil.*, XII [1933], p. 25): "We have gradually learned that in every part of the text is traditional material that can only be the collective work of ages and in every part are touches that can only be from the hand of a great master. We are beginning to suspect that the two cannot be neatly separated. The facts seem to admit the hypothesis of a supremely great poet, working with traditional material, who left the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* substantially in the form in which we have them."

conclusion is clearly indicated by Schadewaldt's analysis of the course of Homeric studies during the past century and a half; and that analysis is given the most emphatic kind of justification by the contemporaneous appearance of Reinhardt's beautifully incisive monograph on the judgment of Paris.

The point of departure taken by Reinhardt is the ivory comb found in the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta and dated by Dawkins about 700-650 B. C. On this comb is depicted the judgment of Paris; and Reinhardt points out that, if this story could be popularly known at the turn of the eighth century, the basis of all the analytical hypotheses as to the oldest stratum of the *Iliad* is upset, for the spirit of the story runs counter to everything that the analysts have considered typically "archaic."²

In both *Iliad* and *Odyssey* stories are occasionally indicated or recounted which could not have been fitted into the epic action even had the poet wished it. Such, for example, is the story of Penelope's web, only twice recounted—and both times in the same words—yet presupposed everywhere by the traditional epithet of Penelope, "the prudent"; the story itself would fit neither the epic action nor the character of the suitors who must be blind with *hybris* but may not be dolts, and it is therefore merely referred to while Penelope's "prudence" is transmuted and manifested in direct situations (e. g. 18, 250-283). So the judgment of Paris is mentioned only once in the *Iliad*; but the import of this narrative transformed into epic situations operates both in the Olympian and in the human scenes. For example, the notion that the factions of the gods in the war reflect historical events (Wilamowitz) collapses when one examines the motives for their specific actions; and Reinhardt shows that the motives of Hera and Athena are essentially different from those of the other gods and that the hatred of these two for Aphrodite and the Trojans everywhere points to the judgment as the presupposition of the situations in which this hatred is expressed. The judgment of Paris makes sense only as the introduction to the story of Troy's destruction; but the motive of the two dissimilar brothers must have been part of this pre-Homeric tale in which the good-for-nothing, "Dysparis," brings to destruction his peerless brother along with the whole city. Hector as brother of Paris is at least as old as Hector the opponent of Achilles (in the *Iliad* the death of Achilles itself is treated as a moment in the opposition of the two brothers and contributes to the tragedy

² Wilamowitz attempted to interpret the seated figure as Zeus instead of Paris, an indication of the implications which the "analyst" saw in the discovery. For a trenchant criticism of the distinction between an "archaic" and a later attitude toward the gods as an analytical criterion of the age of different strata in the *Iliad* cf. Calhoun, "The Higher Criticism on Olympus," *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 257-274.

of Hector), and this part of the story operates in the human situations as the judgment itself does in the Olympian scenes.

Not merely details but the whole divine-human plot of the *Iliad* presupposes the story of the judgment;³ and yet the frame of the poem is the "Wrath of Achilles." This problem is not to be solved by making the "Adventure of Paris" a "later" growth on the kernel of saga; the question concerns the origin of this combination, the spirit in which these two became one. Now the "Wrath" is such a subject as Achilles might sing in his tent, a heroic song. The "Rape of Helen," however, is a novel to which the judgment belongs as cause to effect. This novel was old when the ivory comb was made, old, therefore, when the Greeks first began to colonize the region of Troy; it must have arisen in the time when men remembered the fall of Troy as a wonder and a warning and sought by this story to explain the event. The attitude of the human participants toward the event would have received little attention in the old story; such expressions of emotional attitude belong originally to heroic song. The man who first transmuted the story of Paris into epic situations and looked at it from the point of view of the inner spiritual dissension was the poet of the *Iliad* to whom it occurred to use the traditional form of presentation to create a self-contained world.

Reinhardt's little monograph deserves the rather full outline here given because it is an excellent example of the kind of analysis which alone can lead to a real understanding of the structure of the Homeric poems. Even on the preliminary plane of criticism which consists in distinguishing the "older" and "newer" characteristics of the poems it demonstrates conclusively that dissection rather obliterates than illuminates the difference between the material which the poet used and the form which he imposed upon that material, and it should stand in the history of Homeric studies as another mile-stone on the road leading away from those scholars of whom an American Homerist has said: "Ils goûtent les poèmes homériques comme les gourmets goûtent les artichauts, qu'il faut préalablement réduire en tout petits morceaux."⁴

HAROLD CHERNISS.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

³ Reinhardt is apparently unaware that Prof. John A. Scott reached the same conclusion in his paper, "The Choice of Paris in Homer," *Class. Journ.*, XIV (1919), pp. 326-330.

⁴ Calhoun, "Nausicaa et Aristarque," *Revue des Études Homériques*, IV (1934), p. 10.

HERMANN RIEFSTAHL. Der Roman des Apuleius: Beitrag zur Romantheorie. (Frankfurter Studien zur Religion und Kultur der Antike, XV.) Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1938. Pp. 133.

MARGARETHA MOLT. Ad Apulei Madaurensis Metamorphoseon Librum Primum Commentarius Exegeticus. Groningae, M. de Waal, 1938. Pp. xxiv + 122.

Riefstahl's book is a study in comparative literature, and the author is ultimately led to relate the story of the golden ass to examples of the *Bildungsroman* in German literature which, often in the form of ego-narrative, trace the development of the individual through his contacts with the external world (pp. 95-125). At the same time the romance of Apuleius is presented as an artistic unit, not merely an aggregate of loosely connected episodes, and as an issue of the writer's intellectual interests and personality, "ein künstlerisch gestaltetes Anschauungsbild der existenziellen Lebensgrundlage des Neuplatonismus" (p. 133).

The hero, Lucius, is an isolated entity, without any close contacts with the life of the community, with no definite occupation, no fixed scheme of life. As a human being he roams from place to place. His aloofness is accentuated when, in his transformation, he is isolated not only from human beings but from other animals (p. 27). As a means of escape from this isolation he turns to magic, but the effect of magic is only to enrich his knowledge of the world and his experience. His actual escape is attained only in comprehension of the *Allgottheit* and in mystical union with it through the mysteries of Isis (p. 48).

Some of the general line of thought is dimly foreshadowed in the old commentaries of Beroaldus and Bosscha, and more recently (1933) by Braga; Kerényi has emphasized religious propaganda in Apuleius' work as well as in the Greek romances. But Riefstahl approaches the story from the standpoint of an aesthetic critic, eschewing historical criticism (pp. 4-8) and establishing the artistic unity of the work and its harmonious relation to what is known of Apuleius' philosophical creed. No reader can deny that, without some such philosophical conception of Apuleius' purpose, the supposedly autobiographical eleventh book of the narrative stands as a more or less detached episode at the conclusion of the work. On the other hand one hesitates to inflict upon the simple story of the first ten books philosophic considerations expressed in pretentious terminology and deplores a tendency to squeeze out of this part of the romance confirmatory evidence of an underlying philosophy. The author

is not insensitive to the concrete details as well as the philosophical implications and draws a good picture of the cultural background of the narrative (pp. 50 ff.). The eleventh book is often easily compared with portions of Apuleius' philosophical treatises though even here Riefstahl is somewhat fanciful (e. g. pp. 49-50); but in finding symbolism in the *Eselsgestalt* of the hero, and in straining the significance of *multiscius* and of the hero's notable curiosity (pp. 27-29) to fit his theory, the author hardly conciliates even a sympathetic reader.

Even in an aesthetic appreciation one can hardly neglect some historical considerations. Lucian's *Asinus* clearly indicates that Apuleius reflects a Greek original in the main outline of action as it appears in the first ten books of the Latin version. If Apuleius added the eleventh book as a new conclusion to the story it is rather surprising that one should find in the first ten books any significant traces of philosophical conceptions which serve to integrate the earlier portion of the narrative with the concluding book. Nor may one safely stress differences between Lucian and Apuleius (pp. 37-44) if Lucian's version is a rough abbreviation of the same Greek original. The study of sources is obnoxious if it ends in mere description of sources but Riefstahl leaves us, despite his admirable aesthetic purpose and stimulating theory, with a fear that we may be floundering in a deep sea of philosophical abstractions.

Modern commentary on Apuleius' story is so desirable that even a fragmentary portion is welcome. The work by Margaretha Molt contains a helpful bibliography, and brief sections on the sources, date of composition, structure, and style. One would expect, as more pertinent to commentary on the first book, a full treatment of the perplexing problems of the prooemium, which are too briefly dismissed on pp. 3-4 and in the commentary on the preface. The commentary itself is without distinction and seldom goes so deep as to add much to our knowledge. I limit myself to a few adverse or commendatory remarks:

1, 13: *forensis* contains no reference to the Roman forum, as the comment seems to imply. The commentator understands it correctly as a synonym of *exotici* but why the clause "qua in foro Romano homines utuntur"? 2, 2: the difficult *desultoria scientia* is interpreted as a reference to magic; as the author has transformed his language from Greek to Latin, so magic in the narrative has metamorphosed human beings. This is a reversion to older views, and has, at least the advantage of giving *scientia* its proper value. 4, 23: *modico secus* is interpreted as "aliter ac modicum erat," perhaps the worst error of judgment in the commentary. One should at least quote and use the *paulo secus* of *Florida*, 16 (Helm, p. 24, 2) to reach an understanding of the phrase, not to mention the use of *secus* as a mere suffix in ad-

verbs such as *forinsecus*. 4, 12: it may be doubted whether *generosum* means "nobilem, divinum." From the etymology and the context one should discover the force of "spirited." 4, 7: Helm, as well as the commentator, should be condemned for taking *occipitium* as anything but an anatomical word. It is the back of the head, naturally thrown as far back as possible to receive the spear and so seeming to be lower than the throat. 5, 2: it is a queer form of statement to say (on *qui sim*) that *qui* is a relative pronoun used for the interrogative. 6, 3 *tu . . . larvale simulacrum* means more than merely "tu . . . quasi larva." 6, 21: here, I think, the reading of the MSS (except for *timida*) should be preserved: "iam adlubentia proclivis est sermonis et ioci et scitum et cavillum, iam dicacitas <in>timida." The two *iam*'s bring out the balance between the two nominatives, the three *et*'s connected four genitives and reveal *scitum* and *cavillum* as genitive plurals, not nominatives. Emendations are superfluous. 9, 11: the objection to Löfstedt's explanation of *quae cum subinde* is based on the fact that other examples are found only in later writers. One wonders what would become of most of Löfstedt's investigations if that were a valid objection. 15, 19: the questions both of text and meaning are unsatisfactorily handled. The MSS-reading is wholly sound in my opinion: there is no occasion to eliminate *pater meus*. In the vocative expressions one says in Latin *pater mi* and *frater mi*, but not *comes mi*; therefore, when these are quoted in the form of nominatives, the result is *comes et pater meus et frater meus*. Nor is there any sound objection to the use of any one of these as endearing expressions in this context.

HENRY W. PRESCOTT.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

MARIA DE COLA. Callimaco e Ovidio. (Studi Palermitani di Filologia Classica, 2.) Palermo, Casa Editrice Trimarchi, 1937. Pp. 131.

Two monographs have now appeared in this new series of classical studies, published under the direction of the distinguished Hellenist, Professor Lavagnini of Palermo. The first study¹ discussed the relation of Martial to the Greek epigram. The second, the monograph under review, is devoted to the analogous problem of Ovid and Callimachus.

Knowledge of the text of Callimachus has grown notably during the last thirty years owing to the publication from time to time of papyrus finds, especially in the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, the

¹ Orsola Autore, *Martiale e l'Epigramma Greco*, 1937.

Papiri della Società Italiana and the *Papiri d. r. Università di Milano*. These data have been utilized to elucidate details by Malten, Heinze, Pfeiffer, Wilamowitz, Cahen, Rostagni, Coppola, and many others; but none of these scholars has studied anew in the light of them the comprehensive question of the dependence of Ovid upon Callimachus. This lacuna the author of the present work attempts to fill, with paramount emphasis upon the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*.

The four chapters into which the book is divided treat the topic chronologically: (1) *Callimaco nelle opere giovanili di Ovidio*, (2) *nelle Metamorfosi*, (3) *nei Fasti*, and (4) *nell'Ibis*. In the first group, De Cola deduces, the influence of Callimachus is slight, limited to an occasional phrase, an epigrammatic motif, or to the suggestion of a subject which Ovid will then develop in a manner entirely alien to that of his model. In the art of the *Metamorphoses*, Callimachus (and, in particular, the *Aitia*) plays a more important rôle. Though the conception of a collection of transformations comes to Ovid only indirectly, through Nicander and Parthenius, they in turn were influenced directly by the *Aitia*; and in the working out of single episodes, in the appropriation of certain legends, and in the employment of definite technical devices of framework, Ovid shows the immediate inspiration of Callimachus. The *Fasti* leans more heavily still upon the Cyrenian. Ovid drew his erudite material from the *Antiquitates* of Varro and arranged it according to the model furnished by the *Aitia*; the structure of the *Fasti* is that of Callimachus and as the Hellenistic poet is ever present, speaking personally in his poem, so it is with Ovid in the *Fasti*. In the *Ibis* the influence of Callimachus and Alexandrinism upon Ovid reaches its culmination. Ovid found in the Greek *Ibis* both the suggestion for his Latin poem, and the plan of the work: *devotiones-historiae*, maledictions against an enemy in the first part and, in the second, a series of tragic fates drawn from history and myth called down upon the head of his unhappy foe. In the other poems of exile literary origins are negligible: we have the poet speaking sincerely, however weakly and unworthily, and the break with the spirit of Alexandrinism is complete.

Such are the conclusions of this treatise, briefly summarized. A careful reading of the detailed process, however, by which they are arrived at leaves the reader with no deep conviction of their finality. In this type of study, argument from assumptions, which may or may not be true, holds too large a place. For all our debt to the papyri, the fragments of the *Aitia* are even now lamentably few and its artistic framework and development still indeterminate. To accept other scholars' reconstructions of the *Aitia*, assembled from all possible sources including the works of Ovid, and then to deduce from this synthetic Callimachus the relation of the Roman poet to the Greek in the broader matters

of technique leads nowhere. Yet De Cola, while frequently protesting against it, is only too prone to follow this method.

Again the author detects conscious imitation in details where parallels are almost unavoidable: coincidences of vocabulary, turns of phrase, metrical echoes, motifs, and versions of myth. These are cited at length, whereas, granted the nature of Roman education in Ovid's day, Greek literature of necessity formed a large part of the *lingua franca* of all cultured men and unconscious reminiscences would be inevitable. But even so, the collection and discussion of these parallels was a thing worth doing, provided the limit of their import is understood. In fact, not the least useful portion of the study are two tables of the parallel passages which are discussed, one arranged in the order of the works of Ovid, the other in the order of the fragments of the works of Callimachus. Here is convenient material for other students.

In spite of a certain lightheartedness in the checking of references and in proofreading, which rarely however causes confusion, the author is to be congratulated on producing a conscientious and serviceable study and one written in a style which is singularly frank and clear. Her skillful utilization of the *ΔΙΗΓΗΣΕΙΣ*, brief summaries of the poems of Callimachus which were discovered in a Tebtunis papyrus in 1934 and published by Norsa and Vitelli, is characteristic of the admirable command which she everywhere displays of the vast bibliography, especially in the field of the recent papyrus finds. Furthermore, the originality of Ovid's art is nowhere impugned, but everywhere affirmed—a welcome variation of the usual refrain.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE.

WM. STUART MESSER.

ELIZABETH VISSER. *Götter und Kulte im ptolemäischen Alexandria*. Amsterdam, N. V. Noord-Hollandsche Uitgevers-Mij., 1938. Pp. 131. (Allard Pierson Stichting, *Archivist. Bijdragen*, V.)

The city of Alexandria was never a village. Suddenly, as if he were wielding the power of his father Zeus, its great founder created in the desolate delta an area of low barometric pressure. Like clouds scudding before the wind, the populations of the civilized world poured into the vacuum. A city without a past, without legends, without traditional institutions, became instantly the most cosmopolitan, and shortly the greatest, city in the world. Nominally a Greek city, it was occupied by men from every corner of the eastern Mediterranean, Greeks, Macedonians, Syrians, Asiatics of every kind, and of course Egyptians. For

three hundred years, until Alexandria and Egypt became a part of the Roman empire, this polyglot throng was governed by descendants of the Macedonian Ptolemy. Of the religious life of this city, within this period, the author of the present dissertation undertakes to render an account. But she imposes immediately necessary limitations on the scope of her inquiry. She not only confines herself to the Ptolemaic period and the city of Alexandria itself, omitting from consideration the rest of Egypt and the Hellenistic world in general; she also directs her attention solely to the religion of *Greeks* who were resident in Alexandria. Furthermore, the evidence which she employs for her reconstruction she obtains solely from written documents,—the ancient authors, papyri, and inscriptions. By way of explanation of her disregard of archaeological material she points out that the factor of uncertainty in this material is very great, that the greater part of it is difficult to date, that the part of it which relates to religion belongs mostly to the imperial period, that excavations in Alexandria have yielded little of value for the Ptolemaic period, and that this little is difficult of access. Coins alone, which can be surely dated, she has used freely. We may accept these conditions in reading the dissertation, but we may still suspect that something might have been learned from archaeological sources. Precisely what the author has done is to collect the evidence for all Greek cults in Alexandria and to discuss each cult separately. Every possible god is studied as a candidate for a place among the gods to whom Greek cults were addressed, and his credentials are examined in detail,—theoporic names, deme names, decrees, dedications, direct evidence in literature and papyri. In many cases the discussion turns principally on the question whether the god in question was the object of a Greek cult or an Egyptian cult. In view of the long-standing identification of Greek and Egyptian gods, this question is one of great delicacy, especially as it appears that sometimes gods referred to by Greek names were the objects of particularly Egyptian cults, and sometimes the Greeks had adopted the worship of native Egyptian gods. One wonders whether in the actual life of Alexandria the distinction was so clear as the author tries to make it for the purpose of her dissertation. In general, the discussion is of the nature of a commentary on the evidence, and there is scarcely a page of continuous discourse, narrative, descriptive, or argumentative. By way of supplement, and to introduce some measure of human values, the author adds an essay on religion in the Hellenistic poets. Though this is confessedly only a sketch, it is circumspect, discreet, and reliable. Many shrewd things are said, and there is sensible and understanding criticism. The most valuable part of the dissertation, however, as the author herself points out, is

the Quellenverzeichnis (pp. 65-101), together with a Verzeichnis alexandrinischer Bürgernamen (pp. 103-127). The latter, it may be remarked, is particularly useful because it is not confined to the Ptolemaic period. The abbreviations of the titles of books and articles will be troublesome to readers who are not so familiar with the literature as the author herself, and the dates of publication are too often omitted. Whether the list of sources is reasonably complete can be determined only by specialists in their use of the book.

IVAN M. LINFORTH.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

R. P. AUSTIN. *The Stoichedon Style in Greek Inscriptions.* (Oxford Classical and Philosophical Monographs.) London, Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. xii + 130; 14 plates. \$3.50.

This book, the first of its kind, is devoted entirely to one pattern used in the cutting of Greek inscriptions. From such studies important results have begun in late years to follow: the method is right. Austin sticks to his subject and gives us a straightforward history: origin aesthetic, place Attica, date not before *ca.* 550 B. C.; development slow, with only 24 stoichedon inscriptions known before 480 B. C. (list, p. 7); the style dominant, but not used exclusively, down to *ca.* 300 (long surveys: Attica, ch. VI; elsewhere, ch. VII); then, for economic reasons, "the decline"; the rather sudden end, *ca.* 225; and an occasional archaistic use later.

There are some keen observations and sound ideas: that public documents down to *ca.* 490 B. C. were almost never engraved on stone; that early "stoichedon" inscriptions often show vertical strokes of letters in vertical alinement (e.g. the epitaph of Phrasikleia, *I. G.*, I, 1014 a, of which Austin provides a much improved drawing: this he says may be the earliest stoichedon inscription); that after *ca.* 485 B. C. stoichedon is based on a chequer pattern drawn on the stone before letters were cut—the chequers actually inscribed are listed on p. 28; and he suggests that publications should give the measurements of the vertical and horizontal intervals between the one-time-existent chequer-lines. He studies how the desire to end lines with syllables (or words), a tendency which showed itself rarely before 300 B. C. in decrees (other classes of documents are also well studied on pp. 46-49), modified the pattern; he is the first to print an account of the tribute-quota lists as respects stoichedon, recognizing in general the true procedure used in the headings by the lapidaries, namely a loose stoichedon wherever chequers were not first drawn on the stone; and he discovers an interesting tendency to abandon stoichedon in 411-403 B. C.

All this, and much more, is good to have. Various particulars had better be discussed elsewhere; if the book has a general weakness, that weakness arises from sticking too close to the history, to the neglect of method. Hardly a single text is significantly improved, or dated more accurately. An attempt, for instance, to restore the heading of the tribute-quota list *S. E. G.*, V, 8 would have shown the need for a precise definition, and a working test, of strict stoichedon; also for a classification of its variants. Margins, which are sometimes of crucial importance, and which had to be considered by the lapidary whether or not he laid out a chequer, are not mentioned. "The decline," actually a period of ups and downs, of experiments, and of good new achievements, could profitably have been studied more closely. His weakness in this period is most evident, since he has been anticipated in some points and has missed others: cf. Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens*, p. 5; and I may perhaps refer to *Hesperia*, II (1933), p. 442; *A. J. A.*, XL (1936), pp. 62-65 and 175; *Harv. Stud. Class. Philol.*, XLVIII (1937), pp. 140-149. W. S. Ferguson's *Tribal Cycles* has definitely supplanted Dinsmoor's *Archons of Athens* for the dating of second century archons (Austin, p. 113).

Closer attention to inscriptions which are not stoichedon would likewise have been profitable for details and for a general perspective. The stoichedon pattern was used commonly for only about 260 years in Athens (ca. 485-ca. 225 B. C.), for a shorter period elsewhere; and it never held a monopoly. A prime reason for this is not economy nor incompetence but the fact that, even apart from the ends of lines, stoichedon inscriptions are not as easily legible as those which are not stoichedon. Vertical alinements within a continuous text mislead the eye, and in fact are avoided by modern printers. The explanation of why the Athenians used stoichedon as much as they did must be found in their love of logical orderliness, plus conservatism.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

STERLING DOW.

W. W. TARN. *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. Cambridge, University Press; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1938. Pp. xxiii + 539. \$8.

This is one of the great books in the field of ancient history. An occasional Schliemann may recover an epoch of human history by excavation, but rarely does the historian have this good fortune by the mere utilization of existing materials. In order to see what Tarn has really done, one has only to look, for example, at the *Cambridge History of India*, or at Cary's *Legacy of Alexander*, or at the excellent sketch which appeared last year

in Newell's *Royal Greek Portrait Coins*. The fact, however, is that we have understood neither the significance nor the course of Bactrian history, which is hardly surprising in view of the fragmentary evidence. It is no exaggeration to say that Tarn has recovered what can be recovered of the story of the fifth Hellenistic dynasty, which must now be treated as part of the history of Hellenism, and not as part of the history of India, where it has no meaning.

Throughout his book Tarn is careful to say, when necessary, "this is theory, not fact"; indeed, his book will undoubtedly lead to further studies. But this is not the place for details. The significance of the Greek kingdom of Bactria and India is this: Whereas the other Hellenistic kingdoms were not voluntarily limited by the rights of the native subjects, except in religious matters, the Bactrian Greeks tried to put into practice Alexander's dream of coöperation between peoples. We see this most clearly in Demetrius' organization of his broad realm, which stretched from the Jaxartes to Barygaza, and from the Persian desert to the middle Ganges; in his creation of Taxila, his capital, as an Indian rather than a Greek city; in the bilingual coinage; and in his admission of Indians as citizens of Demetrias in Sind, which was contrary to the Seleucid practice with regard to Greek cities with dynastic names. Demetrius was to be an Indian king no less than a Greek one. The explanation of his rapid conquest and the extraordinary distances he traversed, which would have been impossible had he, like Alexander, met consistently hostile peoples, is to be found in his wise use of Buddhists as political allies, for India was then torn by religious dissension.

Demetrius had inherited many of the ideas of his father, Euthydemus, and of Alexander. Unlike any of the other Successors, the Euthydemids gained the support of Iran, which Alexander had recognized as vital. Thus, for the first time, we understand that "the thousand cities" of Bactria means that the Euthydemids so raised the general level of the serf population, and therefore of the villages, that the serf village evolved into an organized and quasi-autonomous township. This was one of the most important things done by the Greeks in Asia, for it was this which really touched the native mass.

There is no space to show how this book ties in with and illuminates the West, though there is a lucid description of the Seleucid settlement of Asia. Antiochus IV does, however, emerge as something of a statesman, and not as half a fool. Why did he revise the legend on his coinage and, abandoning the Apollo type, exhibit Zeus with his features? Why was he willing to leave Egypt, when brusquely ordered out by the Roman envoy? And what was the meaning of his extraordinary festival

at Daphne, a regular Roman triumph? He had a plan, to refound Alexander's empire in the East, since Rome was shutting him off from the West, and he was succeeding. Eucratides, then, conquered Bactria as his lieutenant; he was no Bactrian rebel, though he led a rebellion in the name of the reigning Seleucid.

Tarn's main period is the half-century between 206 and 145 B. C., roughly the reigns of Euthydemus, his son Demetrius, and Demetrius' son-in-law Menander. The other Bactrian kings, however, find their place. But there is much else; the date of "Trogus' source," which is so important, is put at about 85 B. C.; the reconstruction of the wanderings of the nomadic hordes of Central Asia sounds convincing, though I know nothing about the subject; and Gandhara art definitely began in the first century B. C. The book is written in a graceful style and concludes with an excursus on the *Milindapanha*, twenty-one appendices, a plate of coin-portraits, a pedigree of the Euthydemids and Eucratides, and three maps.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

FRANÇOIS THOMAS. *Recherches sur le développement du pré-verbe latin ad-*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1938. Pp. xx + 107.

This monograph traces the semantic development of Latin *ad* in verbal composition. Starting with the original local use of the designation of proximity, it developed various figurative meanings and finally became attenuated so that in many instances it became a mere "prosthetic" element which added nothing to the sense. Such a growth is a complex affair which involves the recognition of so many factors in semantic development that it is difficult to do justice to all of them in a hundred pages, and the author therefore had to limit himself to such aspects as seemed particularly important. He also had to take for granted the original sphere of *ad*, although, for instance, the question whether it at one time always implied motion, as suggested by the invariable accusative case governed by it, is not without effect also on the history of the verbal prefix *ad-*. Only by deciding this question could one know whether the compound *adesse* "be present" is due to a pregnant use of *ad* (be present as the result of arriving), or whether the verbal compounds of this type continued the wider IE use of the prefix, which is reflected in Gothic by the occurrence of *at* with dative as well as accusative.

The derived uses of *ad-* the writer treats under four captions. The first is the so-called middle use (accepted only with qualifications), e. g., *accipio* "I take to (myself)," or "I accept" can be rendered by the middle of a word meaning "to take" in

Greek. Quite properly the author recognizes that this is merely incidental, that the prefix was here conceived in its original meaning, and that its use as a substitute for the middle voice never became established as an independent category.

The chapter on the second derived category is entitled "Sens additif et sens intensif." Thus from *addo* "place at the side of" and then "add" the prefix went to words like *adsumo* "prendre en ajoutant, s'adjoindre, ajouter." The latter illustrates another complexity which has not been recognized sufficiently. In its original use *adsumo* "I take to (myself)" shows the proper local sense of *ad-*. Did the derived meaning "ajouter" develop within the compound itself without analysis of its two parts, or is it merely a development of the meaning of the prefix apperceived as a distinct element? Obviously Mr. Thomas would have to answer this question before he can legitimately use such a word as evidence for the semantic history of *ad-*.

A third derived value is established as "amener à un procès," which is recognized as a figurative use of the original meaning of motion to a place. He compares *accedo ad urbem* "I approach the city" with *addormisco* "I am approaching the sleeping stage, I am going to sleep."

As the last derived category the author classifies that in which *ad-* is a mere prosthetic element, i. e., an element which has lost its distinctive sense altogether, e. g., *adsumo* later became equivalent to *sumo*.

Undoubtedly Mr. Thomas has made an interesting and on the whole persuasive contribution to the history of verbal prefixes. That opinions will vary on many an individual case is self-evident and cannot be avoided. Were one to criticize his point of view in general, two principal objections present themselves. He has not recognized sufficiently the semantic grouping of words into congeneric classes, the patterning of one associated word after another, a factor in the development of all formatives, which is often more important than their meaning as abstracted by semantic analysis, but often without distinct apperception by the speaker. The second main criticism concerns the failure of the author to recognize that semantic classifications may have more of a descriptive than an historical value, and that many examples can be classified in more ways than one. In the case of *adsumo*, repeatedly mentioned above, there would e. g. be many occurrences for which only the original speaker or writer could have decided the question whether he used it mechanically as equivalent to the simplex *sumo*, which would make *ad-* a "prosthetic element," whether he thought of the prefix as emphasizing the meaning of the verb, or whether he still had in mind the original local sense of designating proximity.

ADELAIDE DOUGLAS SIMPSON. *M. Minucii Felicis Octavius. Prolegomena, text and critical notes.* New York, 1938. Pp. 110.

Miss Simpson lays all college Latin teachers under obligation, for she gives us here, in her Columbia University thesis, an admirable edition of a charming and thoughtful little book which is highly suitable for classes in Latin literature; I have found that students always enjoy it. The *Octavius* is mild and reasonable Christian apologetics, far removed from the fiery rhetoric of Tertullian or the contemptuous argumentation of Jerome. It reads like Cicero or Seneca; it seems impossible that anything so urbane could have been published after Tertullian. Miss Simpson summarizes the wealth of discussion over its date, and prefers the period of Antoninus Pius. Her edition is based on Waltzing's, and gives the variants of P; it is obvious that much remains to be done in constituting the text. She has also made a thorough study of the metrical clausulae on which she concludes: "It is very much a matter of doubt whether the accentual cursus can be discovered in Minucius"; and yet, in the passage she transcribes on p. 23 as a typical period (VI, 2), out of 19 clausulae, 18 are correct accentually. It is a pity no one seems to have followed up A. C. Clark's and my observations on the accentual clausula in Latin as far back as Petronius; such a study will be most repaying.

Miss Simpson has wide command of all that has been written in ancient and modern times, dealing with Minucius; her bibliography is exhaustive. She is to be congratulated on her accurate and scholarly presentation of one of the most delightful essays in all literature.

CHARLES UPSON CLARK.

CITY COLLEGE, NEW YORK CITY.

The Journal wishes to call attention to the recently established Department of Indic Studies at the Library of Congress. The study of Indic literature, philosophy, religion, law, sciences, art, archaeology, history, anthropology, social institutions, linguistics, current political trends, etc. will be developed—the term "Indic" denoting not only India proper but all contiguous territories influenced by Indic culture, Burma, Ceylon, Siam, Indo-China, Java, Sumatra, Bali, Central Asia, and Tibet. The aims of the department are to explore and supplement existing Indic materials in the Library of Congress; to establish an American center for the collection, systematization, and dissemination of Indic bibliographical data; and to coöperate with scientific bodies and individual scholars in the Indic field.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Bendz (Gerhard). Index verborum Frontiniani verba quae Strategematis continentur cuncta complectens. Lund, *O. W. K. Gleerup*, 1939. Pp. 92. (Lund Univ. Arsskrift, N. F. Avd. 1, Bd. 34, Nr. 4a.)

Buckler (W. H.) and Calder (W. M.). Monumenta Asiae Minoris Antiqua, VI. Monuments and Documents from Phrygia and Caria. Publ. for the Am. Soc. for Arch. Research in Asia Minor by the *Manchester Press*, 1939. Pp. xxii + 166; 73 plates.

Bulletin du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague, IV (Ann. 1937-38). Copenhagen, *Binar Munksgaard*, 1939. Pp. 18. D. Cr. 2.

Cohoon (J. W.). Dio Chrysostom, II. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. vi + 435. (L. C. L.)

Colson (F. H.). Philo, VIII. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xxiv + 458. (L. C. L.)

Corbett (James). Catalogue des manuscrits alchimiques latins, I: Manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de Paris antérieurs au XVIIe siècle. Bruxelles, *Sec. administ. de l'union académique internationale*, 1939. Pp. 365.

Deferrari (Roy J.), Barry (Sister M. Inviolata), McGuire (Martin R. P.). A Concordance of Ovid. Washington, *Catholic Univ. of America*, 1939. Pp. ix + 2220.

Della Valle (Guido). Gaio Memmio dedicatario del poema di Lucrazio. Rome, *Bardi*, 1939. Pp. 731-886. (Accad. dei Lincei, *Rendiconti*, XIV, fasc. 7-12.)

Deutsch (Rosamund E.). The Pattern of Sound in Lucretius. Diss. Bryn Mawr, 1939. Pp. viii + 188.

Donnelly (Francis P.). Cicero's Manilian Law. New York, *Fordham Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. x + 93. \$.75. (Fordham Univ. Classics.)

Downey (Glanville). A Study of the Comites Orientis and the Consulares Syriae. Princeton, 1939. Pp. 22. (Abstract.)

Evans (Elizabeth C.). The Cults of the Sabine Territory. Pp. xv + 254; 7 plates. (Papers and Monographs of the Am. Acad. in Rome, XI, 1939.)

Guthrie (W. K. C.). Aristotle, On the Heavens. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xxxvi + 378. (L. C. L.)

Harrison (Thomas Perrin, Jr.) and Leon (Harry Joshua). The Pastoral Elegy, An Anthology. Edited with introduction, commentary, notes, and translation. Austin, *Univ. of Texas*, 1939. Pp. xi + 312.

Havelock (E. A.). The Lyric Genius of Catullus. Oxford, *Blackwell*, 1939. Pp. xii + 198. 8s. 6d.

Hubaux (Jean) and Leroy (Maxime). Le mythe du Phénix dans les littératures grecque et latine. Paris, *B. Dros*, 1939. Pp. xxxvi + 266. 90 fr. (Bibl. de la Fac. de Phil. et Let. de l'Univ. de Liège, LXXXII.)

Jaeger (Werner); translated by Gilbert Highet. Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture. Oxford, *Blackwell*, 1939. Pp. xxix + 420. 15s.

Johnson (Rozelle Parker). Compositiones Varias from Codex 490, Biblioteca Capitolare, Lucca, Italy. Urbana, *Univ. of Illinois Press*, 1939. Pp. 116. \$1.50. (Illinois Stud. in Lang. and Lit., XXIII, No. 3.)

Jones (Charles W.). Bedae Pseudepigrapha: Scientific Writings Falsely Attributed to Bede. Ithaca, *Cornell Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xv + 154. \$3.

Jouai (L. A. A.). De Magistraat Ausonius. Nijmegen, *J. J. Berkhout*, 1938. Pp. 279.

Kowalski (Georgius). Commentarium Codicis Vaticani Gr. 107 in Hermogenis *περὶ ὁράσεων* et *περὶ εὑρέσεων* cum scholiis minoribus in omnia praeter praexercitamenta opera. Leopoli, 1939. Pp. lii + 159; 1 plate. (Acta Sem. Phil., II, fasc. 5-7.)

von Kraus (Carl). Des Minnesangs Frühling Untersuchungen. Leipzig, *S. Hirsel*, 1939. Pp. xii + 475. 25 M.

La Flesche (Francis). War Ceremony and Peace Ceremony of the Osage Indians. Washington, *Gov't. Printing Office*, 1939. Pp. vii + 280; 13 plates; 1 fig. (Smithsonian Inst., Bur. of American Ethnology, Bull. 101.)

Lindskog (Cl.) and Ziegler (K.). Plutarchus Vitae, IV, 2: Indices. Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1939. Pp. xxxvi + 266.

Mendner (Siegfried). Der Text der Metamorphosen Ovids. Bochum-Langendreer, *H. Pöppinghaus*, 1939. Pp. 81.

Merkx (P. A. H. J.). Zur Syntax der Kasus und Tempora in den Traktaten des hl. Cyprian. Nijmegen, *Dekker & van de Vegt*, 1939. Pp. xv + 141. fl. 3.50. (Latinitas Christianorum Primaeva, fasc. 9.)

Middelmann (Franz). Griechische Welt und Sprache in Plautus' Komödien. Bochum-Langendreer, *H. Pöppinghaus*, 1938. Pp. 116.

Moreau (Joseph). L'ame du monde de Platon aux Stoiciens. Paris, *Les Belles Lettres*, 1939. Pp. 200. 40 fr.

Moreau (Joseph). La construction de l'idéalisme Platonicien. Paris, *Boivin & Cie*, 1939. Pp. 515. 75 fr.

Murray (A. T.). Demosthenes, Private Orations, II. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. viii + 419. (L. C. L.)

Oellacher (Hans). Griechische literarische Papyri II, mit Autoren-, Namen-, Wort-, und Sachindex zu I und II von Hans Gerstinger und Peter Sanz. Baden bei Wien, *Rudolf M. Rohrer*, 1939. Pp. 108; 1 plate. (Mitt. aus der Papyrussammlung der Nationalbibliothek in Wien [Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer].)

Oldfather (C. H.). Diodorus Siculus, III (Books IV-VIII). Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. v + 433. (L. C. L.)

Pearson (Lionel). Early Ionian Historians. *Oxford Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. viii + 240. \$5.

Préaux (Claire). L'économie royale des Lagides. Bruxelles, *Fondation égyptologique Reine Elisabeth*, 1939. Pp. 646.

Robertson (A. J.). Anglo-Saxon Charters. Edited with translations and notes. Cambridge, *Univ. Press*; New York, *Macmillan Co.*, 1939. Pp. xxv + 555. \$8.

Roussel (Pierre). Sparte. Paris, *E. de Boccard*, 1939. Pp. 216; 16 plates.

Schläpfer (P. Lothar). Untersuchungen zu den attischen Staatsurkunden und den Amphiktyonenbeschlüssen der Demosthenischen Kranzrede. Paderborn, *F. Schöningh*, 1939. Pp. 246. M. 12. (Rhet. Stud. Univ. Nymwegen, Heft 21.)

Stella (Luigia Achillea). Importanza di Alemeone nella storia del pensiero greco. Rome, *Bardi*, 1939. Pp. 55. (Accad. dei Lincei, *Memorie*, VIII, fasc. 4.)

Wallace (Edith Owen). The Notes on Philosophy in the Commentary of Servius on the Eclogues, the Georgics, and the Aeneid of Vergil. Columbia Univ., 1938. Pp. 200.


Westington (Mars McClelland). Atrocities in Roman Warfare to 133 B. C. Chicago, distrib. by Univ. of Chicago Libraries, 1938. Pp. iii + 139.

White (H. G.) and Oliver (James H.). The Temple of Hibis in El Khargeh Oasis, Part II: Greek Inscriptions. Pp. xlii + 71; 13 plates. \$3.50. (Metropolitan Museum of Art, Egyptian Exped. Publ., XIV, 1939.)

Wijnberg (S.). Antiphon's eerste Rede mit vertaling en commentaar. Amsterdam, *H. J. Paris*, 1938. Pp. 162.

Young (Rodney S.). Late Geometric Graves and a Seventh Century Well in the Agora, with an Appendix on the skeletal remains: Geometric Athenians, by J. Lawrence Angel. Athens, *Am. School of Class. Stud.*, 1939. Pp. ix + 250; 156 figs. (*Hesperia*, Suppl. II.)

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY



VOL. LXI, 2

WHOLE No. 242

THE BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL WAR OF 220-217 B. C.

In this paper no attempt is made to discuss all the causes of the Social War (War of the Allies). Such an undertaking would be far too large for one article, since it would entail an inquiry into the history of practically every state in Greece in that period. My aim is more modest. There are three subjects in particular which I wish to investigate: first, the political background of the Social War; second, the political affiliations of Messenia in these years, for in the relations of Messenia to the Achæan and Aetolian Leagues, I believe, is to be found probably the most fundamental cause of the Social War; and third, the violent prejudices of Polybius whenever he is treating any opponent of the Achæan League. Evidence for Polybius' bias will appear on almost every page of this paper.

Polybius¹ begins his discussion of the causes of the Social War with the following remarks:

Αἰτωλοὶ πάλαι μὲν δυσχερῶς ἔφερον τὴν εἰρήνην καὶ τὰς ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ὑπαρχόντων δαπάνας, ὥς ἂν εἰθισμένοι μὲν ζῆν ἀπὸ τῶν πέλας, δεόμενοι δὲ πολλῆς χορηγίας διὰ τὴν ἐμφυτον ἀλαζονείαν, ἣ δουλεύοντες αἰὲν πλεονεκτικὸν καὶ θηριώδη ζῶσι βίον, οὐδὲν οἰκεῖον, πάντα δ' ἡγοῦμενοι πολέμια. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον, ἕως Ἀντίγονος ἔζη, δεδιότες Μακεδόνας ἦγον ἡσυχίαν. ἐπειδὴ δ' ἐκεῖνος μετέλλαξε τὸν βίον, παῖδα καταλιπὼν Φίλιππον, καταφρονήσαντες ἐξήτουν ἀφορμὰς καὶ προφάσεις τῆς εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἐπιπλοκῆς, ἀγόμενοι κατὰ τὸ παλαιὸν ἔθος ἐπὶ τὰς ἐκ ταύτης ἀρπαγὰς, ἅμα δὲ καὶ νομίζοντες ἀξιοχρεῶς εἶναι σφᾶς πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν αὐτοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς.

¹ IV, 3, 1-3.

I have quoted this passage in full to illustrate at the outset Polybius' rabid prejudice against the Aetolians.² This prejudice and the concomitant partiality for the Achaean League and Aratus must constantly be borne in mind, for they distort Polybius' whole account of the causes of the Social War and of the war itself. The reasons for this war were more complex than Aetolia's lust for plunder, and, in order to have any understanding of them, it will be necessary to trace the course of history in Greece from 229 B. C. Such a survey must inevitably concentrate upon certain aspects of the Cleomenic War.

I

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

The situation in Greece in 229, thanks to the labors of many scholars, has become reasonably clear. Macedon was struggling for her very existence. The Dardanians were pouring in from the north, and to the south, Thessaly—probably supported by the Aetolians—was in revolt.³ Philip, the son of Demetrius II who had died early in this year,⁴ was too young to cope with the emergency. Therefore the Macedonian army assembly made Antigonos Doson, the son of Demetrius the Fair, guardian, and before long he was proclaimed king.⁵

The Aetolian League in the first few months after the death of Demetrius II reached its greatest extent.⁶ It incorporated Hestiaeotis, Thessaliotis, and the rest of Achaia Phthiotis, and,

² Walek, *Rev. de Phil.*, XLIX (1925), pp. 33-34, is scarcely exaggerating when he calls Polybius' picture of the Aetolians little better than a caricature; cf. W. W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas*, p. 208. This whole paper will show that I cannot agree with the judgment of F. W. Walbank, *Aratos of Sicyon* (Cambridge, England, 1933), p. 11, that "almost everything Polybios says against the Aetolians can in fact be easily justified."

³ Justin, XXVIII, 3, 14; cf. Plut., *Arat.*, 34, 5. See Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 748; Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, IV, 1, p. 638.

⁴ Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), pp. 254-258.

⁵ F. Granier, *Die Makedonische Heeresversammlung* (München, Beck, 1931), pp. 123-126; P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 393-395.

⁶ Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 748; for the latest treatment of this question, see R. Flacelière, *Les Attolien à Delphes* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1937), pp. 253-259.

by extending from the Gulf of Pagasae to the Ambracian Gulf, completely barred the Macedonians from any land route to southern Greece. In the Peloponnese also Aetolia had a strong foothold, for she was in close relations with Elis, Messenia, Phigalea, and the four Arcadian cities, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Tegea, and Caphyae.⁷ In addition, the alliance with the Achaean League, made shortly after the death of Antigonos Gonatas, was still in effect.⁸

The Achaean League, too, did not fail to profit by the confusion into which Macedon had been thrown. For many years Aratus had been driving tyrants—usually supported by Macedon—out of the various cities of the Peloponnese and attaching these cities to the Achaean League. In the years 229-228 he succeeded in putting an end to the last tyranny in the Peloponnese. There was no longer any Macedonian influence south of the Isthmus, and Aratus had finally achieved what had been his aim for a score of years. The Achaean League now “embraced Achaea, Sicyon, Corinth, Megara, Argos, the Argolid and the coastal cities, Aegina, Megalopolis and the larger part of Arcadia.”⁹ The goal of Aratus undoubtedly was to include

⁷ Fortunately we are not concerned with the exact relations between the Aetolians and these peoples. The Aetolians had been on close terms with Elis since at least the middle of the third century (Polyb., IV, 5, 4; 9, 10; cf. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 239-240; Swoboda, in *R.-E.*, V, s. v. “Elis,” 2410-2413). With Messenia they had a long-standing alliance (Polyb., IV, 6, 11). As a result of a decree of the Aetolian League, the Messenians voted *isopoliteia* with Phigalea ca. 244 (Ditt., *Syll.*³, 472; cf. Flacelière, *ibid.*; Walbank, *J. H. S.*, LVI [1936], pp. 66-71). In 221 B. C. Polybius, IV, 3, 6, speaks of Phigalea as *συμπολιτευομένη τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς*. In the period under consideration Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Tegea were, according to Polybius, II, 46, 2, τὰς Αἰτωλοῖς οὐ μόνον συμμαχίδας ὑπαρχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμπολιτευομένας τότε πόλεις, and the same is probably true of Caphyae (Plut., *Oleom.*, 4, 4). For the vexed problem concerning the date at which these cities became members of the Aetolian League, see A. Ferrabino, *Il Problema dell' Unità Nazionale nella Grecia Antica*. I. *Arato di Sicione e l' Idea Nazionale* (Firenze, 1921), pp. 292-293; P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 409-411; Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), p. 251, n. 6.

⁸ Polyb., II, 44, 1. The Achaeans and Aetolians co-operated in trying to help the Coreyraeans against the Illyrians at the battle of Paxos in the first half of 229 (Polyb., II, 9, 8-9; 10, 1; see Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII [1930], p. 250).

⁹ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 750.

the whole Peloponnese in the Achaean League,¹⁰ but grave difficulties stood in the way. First, as mentioned above, the Aetolian League had considerable influence in the Peloponnese and second, and more important, there was Sparta. The age old traditions of Sparta gave little promise that she would relinquish any of her independence and individuality by joining a federation like the Achaean League, no matter how excellent it might be.

Such was the situation in 229, but very rapidly it became better for Macedon and worse for Aetolia. Antigonus Doson acted with extreme vigor. He at once put an end to the Dardanian invasion and in 228 succeeded in recovering Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis.¹¹ Thus Aetolia suddenly and unexpectedly found that Macedon once again had a strong ruler. Much to her chagrin she realized that any attempt to expand northward would involve great difficulties and dangers. Conditions in the Peloponnese also were becoming less favorable to her because of the rapid and ambitious growth of the Achaean League. Was Aetolia to be prevented from further expansion by Macedon in the north and by the Achaeans in the south?

There is little doubt, then, that Aetolia's ambitions had received a rude rebuff by 228. Consequently the passage in Polybius (II, 45), which tells that the Aetolians out of envy for the prosperity of the Achaeans joined hands with Antigonus Doson and Cleomenes for the purpose of partitioning the cities of the Achaean League, at first glance seems sufficiently plausible. Further consideration, however, makes the formation of this triple alliance seem so incredible that it will be necessary to investigate at some length the relations to one another of Macedon, Aetolia, Sparta, and the Achaean League.

The date of this supposed alliance is the first point to be ascertained. The passage in Polybius apparently refers to the year 228, for it follows immediately on the sentence which speaks of the incorporation of Argos, Hermione, and Phlius in the

¹⁰ Cf. Plut., *Cleom.*, 3, 4.

¹¹ See my paper, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIII (1932), pp. 126-155, especially pp. 140-143. My contention, which was overlooked by Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 253 ff. and chapter VII, has been accepted and confirmed by S. Dow and C. F. Edson, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLVIII (1937), pp. 165-168, and by P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 396 and 407-408.

Achaean League in 229.¹² It also describes Doson as *κυριεύοντα μὲν τῶν κατὰ Μακεδονίαν ἀσφαλῶς*, a description which could refer only to a time after he had driven back the Dardanians and recovered Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis—therefore not before 228.¹³ Now in 229 we know that the Aetolians were still allied with the Achaeans.¹⁴ Plutarch¹⁵ tells us this, and also it was in this year that the two leagues together sent aid to the Corcyraeans, Apollonians, and Epidamnians, and fought a losing battle against the Illyrians at Paxos.¹⁶ Thus in 229 both the Achaeans and Aetolians were hostile to Macedon, for the Illyrians were allies of that kingdom.¹⁷ According to Polybius, however, in the following year the situation was changed. The Aetolians abandoned the Achaeans and made common cause with the two worst enemies of the Achaean League, the Macedonians and Cleomenes.¹⁸

¹² Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 750.

¹³ P. Tréves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII (1935), pp. 24-25; cf. S. Dow and C. F. Edson, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-168.

¹⁴ The alliance between the Achaeans and Aetolians dates from the death of Antigonus Gonatas (Polyb., II, 44, 1). Under the circumstances the alliance was natural, for both leagues were actuated by hatred and fear of Macedon, the Achaean League, because Demetrius II was trying to uphold his father's policy of tyrants in the Peloponnese (Polyb., II, 44, 3), the Aetolian League, because Demetrius II, having married Phthia, the daughter of Olympias of Epirus, was trying to prevent the Aetolians from wresting away the Epirot share of Acarnania (see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 744).

¹⁵ *Arat.*, 34, 5.

¹⁶ Polyb., II, 9-10; see Holleaux, *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), p. 250.

¹⁷ Demetrius II had come to terms with Agron in 231 (Polyb., II, 2, 5). We do not know whether this understanding was immediately renewed by Doson. Nevertheless it is correct to say that Illyria and Macedon were friends in 229, because Acarnania was in alliance with Illyria (Polyb., II, 6, 9-10; 10, 1), and Acarnania was on the best of terms with Macedon; see Polyb., II, 2, 5; Flacellère, *op. cit.*, p. 251; E. Oberhammer, *Akarnanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas im Altertum* (München, Ackermann, 1887), pp. 156-160.

¹⁸ The inevitable hostility between the Achaean League and Sparta is well described by E. A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy*, 2nd ed. (London, 1893), pp. 338 ff. The addition of Megalopolis and Argos to the League in 235 and 229 respectively naturally increased this hostility owing to the long-standing grievances between Sparta and these two cities. Obviously Macedon had no liking for the League which was responsible for driving all Macedonian influence out of the Peloponnese.

One thing is certain. Even if the Aetolians attempted to form this triple alliance, they did not succeed. Max Klatt¹⁹ long ago saw this, adducing, among other proofs, such convincing ones as the following: (1) Sometime after Cleomenes' revolution in the autumn of 227²⁰ envoys from Megalopolis at the instigation of Aratus went to Doson to ask for help in case the Aetolians should lend assistance to the Spartans.²¹ In their speech the Megalopolitans referred only to the possibility of a coalition between the Aetolians and Spartans; not a word was said about any triple alliance. In fact, if this triple alliance had been formed, it is highly improbable that the Megalopolitan envoys would ever have gone to Macedon. (2) If the Aetolians had been in alliance with Cleomenes, certainly he would not have spoken so bitterly about them as he did in the course of his revolution.²² (3) If the Aetolians had been in alliance with Cleomenes, Aratus would not have called on them for help in the winter of 225/224.²³

Thus it is obvious that Polybius made an error when he stated that an understanding was reached between the Aetolians, Doson, and Cleomenes. There is still the question, however, whether the Aetolians ever attempted to form such an alliance. The evidence is decidedly against such an assumption. First, it is hard to conceive of the Aetolians making such a proposition to Doson after the defeat they had experienced at his hands in his recovery of Thessaliotis and Hestiaeotis in 228.²⁴ Second, Polybius (II, 47, 3-9), contradicting his former statement, implies that the Aetolians did not negotiate with Macedon when he says that after Cleomenes' successful revolution in 227, Aratus, dreading the audacity of the Aetolians, decided to anticipate them in an approach to Doson. Aratus had to make this approach secretly so as to avoid being outbidden by the Aetolians and Cleomenes. Thus in 227 we find, contrary to Polybius'

¹⁹ *Forschungen zur Geschichte des Aolischen Bundes. Erster Teil. Quellen und Chronologie des Kleomenischen Krieges* (Berlin, Haack, 1877), pp. 41-42. I have amplified Klatt's remarks somewhat.

²⁰ For the date, see Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 764; Beloch, IV, 1, p. 702.

²¹ Polyb., II, 47-49.

²² Plut., *Cleom.*, 10, 6.

²³ Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2; cf. Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 758.

²⁴ See above, p. 132 and n. 11.

previous statement (II, 45), that the Aetolians had as yet made no overtures to Antigonus.²⁵

The mention of Aratus' approach to Antigonus Doson brings us to the much debated subject of the negotiations between the Achaean League and Macedon. Polybius' treatment (II, 47-52) of these negotiations is notoriously confusing, but a careful analysis of them is essential to a proper understanding of the years under consideration. In order to clarify the following

²⁵ P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XII (1934), pp. 409-411, argues on the basis of Ditt., *Syll.*³, 501, that Doson was trying to stir up trouble for the Achaean League. This inscription from Tegea concerns the conferring of *prozemia*, *isopoliteia*, etc. by the Tegeans upon Agesandros, son of Nicostratos, a Thessalian from Scotussa in Pelasgiotis—hence the Macedonian part of Thessaly. Treves accepts the date 229/228 as given in Dittenberger. He agrees that Tegea along with Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Caphyae passed from the Aetolians to Cleomenes between 229 and 228. He argues that Doson in his treaty with the Aetolians either advised or commanded them to cede these cities to Cleomenes. The Aetolians would be compensated for renouncing a base in the Peloponnese by expansion in Thessaly and to the west. By this move Doson would damage the accord between the Achaeans and Aetolians and would arouse hostility between the Achaeans and Sparta. This in turn would lead to the Cleomenic War which was bound to be profitable to Doson. For various reasons, of which I list a few, I cannot accept Treves' ingenious interpretation of this inscription. (1) The date 229/228 is only conjectural (see *I. G.*, V, 2, 11). (2) Even supposing that the date 229/228 is correct, the granting of *isopoliteia*, etc. to an unknown Thessalian need not be such a significant matter. (3) A full refutation of Treves' theory is to be found in Polybius, II, 46. In this chapter Polybius first speaks of the transfer of Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Caphyae (for Caphyae, see Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 4) from the Aetolians to Cleomenes, and then he goes on to say that after this (*κατὰ τοὺς ἐξῆς χρόνους*) Cleomenes began to fortify the Athenaeum in the Belbinate (cf. Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 1-2). There is general agreement among scholars (e.g., Beloch, IV, 1, p. 697; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 753; Walbank, *Aratos*, pp. 73, 192; W. H. Porter, *Plutarch's Aratus* [London and New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1937], p. LXVI), however, that Cleomenes took the Athenaeum in summer 229. Thus it is clear that the four Arcadian cities passed to Cleomenes *at the latest* in early summer 229. At this date Macedon was suffering from the chaos which followed on the death of Demetrius II, and was in no position to give orders to the Aetolians who were engaged in seizing large parts of Thessaly. Treves himself (p. 407; see also Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII [1935], p. 25) does not date the peace between Macedon and Aetolia until 228. Consequently we can be certain that Doson had nothing to do with the Spartan acquisition of Tegea, Orchomenos, Mantinea, and Caphyae.

discussion, it will be helpful to paraphrase Polybius' account of the first embassy sent to Doson (II, 47-50).—When the (Cleomenic) war had now been going on for some time, in the conduct of which Cleomenes, who had staged his revolution, was showing great energy, Aratus, fearing the audacity of the Aetolians, determined to ruin their plans. He decided if possible to reach an understanding with Doson. He felt that this ought to be done secretly in order not to have Cleomenes and the Aetolians as competitors and so as not to discourage the Achaeans as a whole by calling on outside help. He selected two Megalopolitans—Nicophanes and Cercidas—, his guest friends, to be his confidential agents. Since Megalopolis had been hard hit by the war and also since the relations between that city and Macedon had been friendly for generations, the choice was a natural one. It was easily arranged that these two men should be appointed envoys by Megalopolis. They then proceeded to Doson, after having received permission from the Achaeans and private instructions from Aratus. They demonstrated to the king the danger first for the Achaeans and then for himself which would arise from an alliance between the Aetolians and Cleomenes. After expatiating on the unbridled ambitions of these two parties, they begged him to consider whether it would not be wiser for him to fight in the Peloponnese against Cleomenes with the aid of the Achaeans and Boeotians than to abandon the Achaeans and consequently have to fight in Thessaly for the Macedonian kingdom against the Aetolians, Boeotians, Achaeans, and Spartans. They said that the Achaeans would try to oppose Cleomenes alone, but, if the Aetolians should attack them and fortune should desert them, they urged him to go to their aid. Aratus would attend to the necessary terms. Antigonus wrote a letter to the Megalopolitans, promising assistance if the Achaeans gave their permission.²⁶ The ambassadors returned to Megalopolis, and the city was greatly pleased at the king's letter. Sometime later at a meeting of the Council of the Achaean League, the Megalopolitans urged the Achaeans to summon Antigonus at once. The Achaeans were of the same opinion. Then Aratus, who had heard privately from Nico-

²⁶ This shows that the embassy was not an official one from the Achaean League, but an exclusively Megalopolitan one. See Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-366.

phanes and Cercidas of Doson's good will towards him and the League, arose and persuaded the Achaeans to try to save themselves by their own efforts, but, if that proved impossible, then to summon the Macedonians—.²⁷

Obviously the question of the date of this Megalopolitan embassy is important. I believe that it was after the Spartan revolution, as Polybius (II, 47, 3 ff.) says. Before proceeding any further, however, I must give my reasons for discarding the date assigned by Walbank²⁸ who has revived with some changes the views of Ferrabino.²⁹ Walbank contends that the envoys were dispatched in September 229. He is impressed by the emphasis Polybius places on the Aetolian menace and maintains that the speech of the envoys to Doson (II, 49), which stresses the dangers to the Achaean League—and subsequently to Macedon—of an Aetolo-Spartan alliance, makes nonsense if dated winter 226/225, as it usually has been, but “is admirably adapted to the situation in autumn 229.”

P. Treves³⁰ has shown some of the improbabilities inherent in assigning the year 229 as the date for the beginning of negotiations between Aratus and Antigonos. Quite correctly he calls attention to the fact that the Achaean League did not declare war on Cleomenes until 228 after Aristomachius had become *strategos*. In the autumn of 229 there was no diplomatic break between the Achaeans and Aetolians which, according to Polybius, was the cause of the appeal to Macedon. Furthermore, it would be ridiculous for Polybius to insist so vehemently on the necessity of seeking aid from Macedon if war with Cleomenes had not yet been declared. Certainly Aratus was not going to turn to Doson unless he was absolutely forced to do so.

To make Treves' arguments still clearer, I shall enlarge upon his objections and add some further ones of my own. (1) In 229 Megalopolis had not suffered sufficiently from the undeclared war with Cleomenes to warrant Polybius' description of her evil plight (II, 48, 1-3). Cleomenes had fortified the Athenaeum in the Belbinate—a district in dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta; that was the nearest approach to actual warfare which

²⁷ The embassy had achieved Aratus' purpose; he now knew that in case of necessity he could rely on Doson for assistance against Cleomenes.

²⁸ *Aratos*, pp. 74 ff.; 190 ff.

²⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 68-77; 255-262; 295.

³⁰ *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII (1935), pp. 24-25.

had occurred save for Aratus' rather laughable failure to take Tegea and Orchomenos.³¹ It is true that probably in this year the Aetolians had acquiesced in Cleomenes' seizure of the four Arcadian cities—Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyae. Since these cities had belonged to the Aetolian League,³² it might be argued that the Aetolian acceptance of the new situation meant that it had reached some understanding with Sparta. I might also suggest, however, that the Aetolians were at the time so busy trying to win over Thessaly from Macedon³³ that they would have been unable to prevent Cleomenes even if they had so desired. Possibly, as has been suggested many times,³⁴ the Aetolians were glad to strengthen a rival of the Achaean League, but it has already been shown³⁵—and will be shown again—that they made no alliance with Sparta. Without doubt the acquisition by the Spartans of this wedge between Megalopolis and Argos must have been highly disturbing to the Achaeans. Still, to maintain that in 229 Cleomenes was a serious menace to the Achaean League is to base arguments on events which happened several years later. In 229 Cleomenes had as yet done nothing to distinguish himself. He had won no great victories, and the ephors, who were still in control of the Spartan government, were afraid of war with the Achaean League and were restraining him.³⁶ In short, there was nothing in the situation of 229 to justify an appeal from the Achaean League—or from any of its members—to Macedon.

(2) Another reason against the contention that Aratus sent an embassy to Dison in 229 lies in the relations between the Achaeans and Macedon in that year. In the spring of 229 the Achaeans and Aetolians together had fought against the Illyrians and Acarnanians, allies of Macedon, at the battle of Paxos.³⁷ Thus in spring 229 the Achaeans were still allied with the Aetolians and still at war with Macedon. It seems strange if a few months later the Achaeans should be asking Macedon for help against the Aetolians.

³¹ Polyb., II, 46, 5; Plut., *Cleom.*, 4.

³² Polyb., II, 46, 2; Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 4. See above, p. 131 and n. 7.

³³ See above, p. 130.

³⁴ E. g., Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 753; Freeman, *op. cit.*, pp. 341-343.

³⁵ See above, pp. 132-134.

³⁶ Plut., *Cleom.*, 4, 3.

³⁷ See above, p. 133 and n. 17.

(3) The improbability of such an embassy in 229 can be made even clearer. It was after the death of Demetrius II early in 229 that Aratus, by causing their tyrants to resign, was busily incorporating Argos, Hermione, and Phlius in the Achaean League,³⁸ and the negotiations for the liberation of Athens were going on from 229 to 228.³⁹ It is an extraordinary idea, to say the least, that Aratus should simultaneously be destroying Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese and in Athens, and be requesting Macedonian help (with the knowledge that Doson would insist on obtaining Acrocorinth).⁴⁰ There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Megalopolitan embassy to Doson took place after Cleomenes' revolution, as Polybius (II, 47, 3 ff.) very clearly says. It might be added that considering the desperate straits of Macedonia in 229⁴¹—Dardanian invasion, Thessaly in revolt, Athens and various Peloponnesian cities breaking away from her—there would be as much likelihood in assuming that Doson asked the Achaeans for help as that Aratus turned to Doson.

It cannot be denied, however, that there is a problem in Polybius' account of the Achaean negotiations with Doson. First he says (II, 47-50) that, after Cleomenes had staged his revolution, Aratus sent the Megalopolitan envoys to Doson. This embassy resulted in an understanding between Antigonus and the Achaeans. The Macedonian king was to bring help if the Achaeans by themselves could not hold out against the Spartans and Aetolians (that there really was no question of any Aetolian interference will be demonstrated more clearly later). Then Polybius (II, 51, 2-7) speaks of a second embassy sent by the Achaeans to Doson after Ptolemy, abandoning the Achaean League, began to support Cleomenes, and after the Spartan king had been victorious near the Lycaenum,⁴² at Ladoceia,⁴³ and at Hecatombaeum.⁴⁴ The first two of these battles occurred before Cleomenes'

³⁸ Polyb., II, 44, 3-6; Plut., *Arat.*, 34-35.

³⁹ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 748-749; Walbank, *Aratos*, pp. 189-190.

⁴⁰ Polyb., II, 51, 6; cf. 49, 9; 50, 8. See Porter, *op. cit.*, p. LXXIV. Ferrabino's arguments, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72 and 262, that Aratus expected Doson to be willing to aid him without receiving any territorial reward, have no foundation in fact.

⁴¹ Cf. M. Cary, *C. R.*, XLVIII (1934), p. 37.

⁴² Date 227; Plut., *Arat.*, 36; *Cleom.*, 5.

⁴³ Date 227; Plut., *Arat.*, 36-37; *Cleom.*, 6.

⁴⁴ Date 226; Plut., *Arat.*, 39; *Cleom.*, 14.

revolution in 227. Since Polybius on this occasion mentions events which had occurred before Cleomenes' revolution, it might seem as if he were confusing this second embassy with that of the two Megalopolitans, Nicophanes and Cercidas. I think not, and I believe that a simple explanation of this seeming confusion can be given.⁴⁵

After the Spartan revolution in the fall of 227,⁴⁶ the two Megalopolitans at Aratus' instigation went to Doson and reached a partial understanding with him. This was before the battle of Hecatombaeum, but after the battles of the Lycaean and Ladoceia. This last encounter in the territory of Megalopolis was a bad defeat for the Achaeans and in it Lydiades was killed. Thus Polybius' remark (II, 48, 1-3; cf. 55, 2-3), that the Megalopolitans were hard hit by the war at the time Aratus planned the first approach to Macedon, undoubtedly refers to the period shortly after Ladoceia. This first embassy must be dated between the fall of 227 and the spring of 226.⁴⁷ After hearing the report of the envoys, Aratus, now feeling confident that in case of necessity he could rely on Antigonos, persuaded the Achaeans to try to carry on the war by themselves. Then in the course of the year 226 occurred the bad Achaean defeat at Hecatombaeum. Aratus was desperate. Polybius, wishing to emphasize the terrible position in which Aratus found himself, very naturally enumerates the major disasters which Cleomenes had brought upon the Achaean League.⁴⁸ Two of these battles had occurred before the Spartan revolution, but Polybius, in his effort to demonstrate what a menace Cleomenes was, mentions Lycaean and Ladoceia as well as Hecatombaeum. By this dramatic technique Polybius gives the impression that there was only one possible solution for the plight of the Achaeans and that was to summon Doson—τότ' ἤδη τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι διδόντων ἀναστροφὴν

⁴⁵ Cf. Beloch, IV, 1, p. 707, n. 1.

⁴⁶ See above, n. 20.

⁴⁷ Polybius unfortunately is particularly vague at this point in his use of technical terms, but Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. LXXII-LXXIII, is undoubtedly correct in his suggestion that the two Megalopolitans received permission to go to Doson at the autumn *synodos* of 227 and made their report before the spring *synodos* of 228. See below, n. 164.

⁴⁸ Cf. Walter Bettingen, *König Antigonos Doson von Makedonien*, Inaug. Diss. (Jena, Weida i. Th., Thomas and Hubert, 1912), p. 36, n. 3; also P. Treves, *Athenaeum*, N. S., XIII (1935), p. 27.

ἡγάκαζε τὰ περιστώτα καταφεύγειν δημοθυμαδὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀντίγονον.⁴⁹ At this point Polybius compresses his account excessively as is evident from his devoting less than a page to the events from the time of Hecatombaeum in 226 to the desertion of Corinth to Cleomenes in the winter of 225/224.⁵⁰ In fact, no official Achaean embassy was sent to Doson until the Achaeans voted to do so at the spring meeting in 224. Polybius himself (II, 51, 5-7) states that after Hecatombaeum there was a delay in sending envoys to Doson because the Achaeans could not agree to surrender Corinth to him and they knew that he would not come to their aid unless he received that city. Another reason that no official embassy could be dispatched at this time was that the Achaeans were negotiating with Cleomenes from the morrow of Hecatombaeum until early summer 225.⁵¹ Aratus was undoubtedly negotiating privately with Doson in this period. Plutarch⁵² tells us that at this time the most important matters between him and Doson were settled, and this knowledge helps us to understand why Aratus so confidently destroyed any hope of a reconciliation with Cleomenes. The rest of the year 225 was a series of triumphs for Cleomenes, and in the winter Corinth voluntarily deserted to him. This defection, however, removed the last difficulty about summoning Antigonos, and at the spring meeting at Aegium the Achaeans voted to call him to their assistance.⁵³

This interpretation of the negotiations seems to me the only acceptable one. Polybius distinctly says that Aratus' first approach to Doson was after the Spartan revolution. The embassy of the two Megalopolitans must have occurred between autumn 227 and spring 226.⁵⁴ Admittedly the sources for this period

⁴⁹ Polyb., II, 51, 4.

⁵⁰ For the date see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 758.

⁵¹ Plut., *Arat.*, 39; *Cleom.*, 15; 17; cf. Porter, *op. cit.*, pp. LXXIV-LXXV.

⁵² *Cleom.*, 17, 1.

⁵³ Polyb., II, 52, 1-4; Plut., *Cleom.*, 19; *Arat.*, 42.

⁵⁴ It may be well to quote the lines in which Polybius specifies the time at which Aratus decided to send the Megalopolitans to Doson (II, 47, 3)—ἥδη δ' ἐπὶ ποσὸν τοῦ πολέμου προβαίνοντος, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομέους τότε πατριὸν πολίτευμα καταλύσαντος καὶ τὴν ἔννομον βασιλείαν εἰς τυραννίδα μεταστήσαντος, χρωμένου δὲ καὶ τῷ πολέμῳ πρακτικῶς καὶ παραβόλῳ, προῤῥώμενος Ἀρατος τὸ μέλλον κτλ.—There is nothing in this passage to justify the interpretation that the words χρωμένου κτλ. refer to the period after Hecatombaeum or to the year 225. Polybius is giving the motive for

are bad, but, if we reject the testimony of Polybius, we enter the realm of pure speculation. Hence I cannot agree entirely with the chronology for the years 229-225 as given by Dow and Edson in a recent study.⁵⁵ They have adopted Tarn's⁵⁶ date of early 225 for the initial negotiations of the Achaean League with Antigonus. They have made, however, an important observation (*op. cit.*, p. 179, n. 1) about these negotiations by pointing out that the Megalopolitan envoys in their speech to Doson implied very clearly that at that time Boeotia was friendly to Macedon. When Doson set out for Caria, however, Boeotia was hostile to Macedon—hence friendly to the Aetolian League. It will be recalled that the Boeotians did not attack Antigonus when his fleet was grounded at Larymna, and Polybius informs us that as a result of this episode Boeotia soon went over to Macedon.⁵⁷ It is clear, then, that the first Achaean embassy must be dated after the Carian expedition. Dow and Edson have given a new date, 226, for this event. But since to me the evidence in Polybius is conclusive that the first embassy occurred between fall 227 and spring 226, it seems necessary to return to the traditional date of 227 for the Carian expedition.⁵⁸

This is not the place to undertake a long discussion of the reconstruction of the events of the years 229-225 as given by Dow and Edson, but in a few remarks I believe it can be shown that the date of autumn 227 to spring 226 for the initial Aratus-Doson negotiations can be fitted into their system at the expense of only a few changes. Their arguments (*op. cit.*, pp. 172-176) to explain Eusebius' statement that Doson ruled for twelve years—namely that Eusebius erroneously added three years as *epitropos* to the reign of nine years—seem sound. They believe that the

the first embassy by saying—the war already lasting for some time, and Cleomenes having destroyed the ancestral constitution and having changed the lawful kingship into a tyranny, and also conducting the war energetically—. The present participle *χραμένην* is parallel to *προβαλλόμενος*. The fact that Cleomenes after the revolution was engaged in improving the Spartan army (Plut., *Cleom.*, 11) naturally contributed greatly to Aratus' alarm and to his decision to try to reach an understanding with Doson.

⁵⁵ *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLVIII (1937), pp. 163-180; chronological table, p. 179.

⁵⁶ *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 756.

⁵⁷ Polyb., XX, 5; see Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280.

⁵⁸ Beloch, IV, 2, p. 549; Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, pp. 722 and 752.

proclamation of Antigonus as king must be connected with the suppression of the revolution in Macedon. These two events they place in late summer or autumn 227. Since they assign (*op. cit.*, p. 165, n. 1) the death of Demetrius II to April 229, Doson's *epitropēia* lasted for two years and at least five or six months, which could well be called three years. They ascribe the Carian expedition to 226. This date, they argue (*op. cit.*, pp. 168-172), gives a motive for the Athenian decree, passed late September or October 226, in honor of the philosopher Prytanis of Carystus who had undertaken for Athens a mission to Doson. The Athenians, worried by the Carian expedition, realized that they must reach a definite understanding with Macedon.

I suggest the following emendations to their chronology. The revolution in Macedon occurred in early summer 227. I see no reason for assuming that it was a prolonged affair. Unfortunately the passage in Justin (XXVIII, 3, 11-16) gives scanty information. A probable cause of the sedition is as follows.⁵⁹ The Macedonians had been fighting constantly since 239. The proposed Carian expedition in 227 was the final straw, and the army mutinied.⁶⁰ Doson by his firmness suppressed the sedition just as Philip V quieted an incipient mutiny on a smaller scale in the year 218.⁶¹ After the restoration of order Doson was proclaimed king. Since I am not convinced by the arguments of Dow and Edson for dating the death of Demetrius II in April 229, but prefer Holleaux's date of February or March 229 for this event,⁶² the proclamation of Antigonus as king about July rather than late summer or autumn really does not reduce the time of Doson's *epitropēia* at all. It would still be two years and about five or six months. Thus I maintain that Doson set out on his Carian expedition in the summer of 227, probably in July.^{62a} As explained above, Boeotia went over to Macedon as a result of the Larymna episode. Hence Boeotia would have been allied with Macedon at the time of the embassy of Nicophanes and Cercidas.

⁵⁹ The victories of the federal movement throughout Greece may well have been a contributing factor; see Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 751.

⁶⁰ There is nothing in Justin's account against the assumption that the "seditio minax" was merely an army mutiny rather than a country-wide revolution.

⁶¹ Polyb., V, 25.

⁶² *Rev. Ét. Gr.*, XLIII (1930), pp. 254-258.

^{62a} See below, n. 164.

A word should be added about the embassy sent by Athens to Antigonos in the autumn of 226. Dow and Edson claim that the Carian expedition is the only known motive for Prytanis' mission. The following suggestions, I believe, are pertinent. It is probably true that the Athenians were alarmed by the Carian expedition, but that does not signify that they immediately sent an envoy to Antigonos. And there are other reasons why Athens should have been disturbed at this time. Without doubt it had become known that Aratus had sent envoys to Doson between fall 227 and spring 226. Athens could not have looked with indifference on the possibility of the Macedonians once again appearing in southern Greece. After the Achaean defeat at Hecatombaeum in 226, the probability that Doson would bring aid to the Achaeans seemed even more imminent. The anxiety arising from Doson's expected appearance in the Peloponnese and from his Carian expedition explains satisfactorily the Athenian embassy to the Macedonian king.

After this discussion of Aratus' negotiations with Antigonos we must return to Polybius' statement that the Aetolians in 228 formed an alliance with Doson and Cleomenes to partition the cities of the Achaean League. It has already been shown⁶³ that the Aetolians in reality never formed this alliance and in all probability never even attempted to do so. An endeavor must now be made to explain why Polybius' account of the Cleomenic War, although it mentions not a single aggressive act of the Aetolians, definitely creates the impression that they were a serious menace to the Achaeans in these years. I believe that a satisfactory explanation can be given—at least as satisfactory as the meagre condition of the sources permits.

In the years 229 and 228 Aratus had little or no cause to be concerned about the Aetolians. It is true that it was probably in 229 that Aetolia apparently acquiesced in Cleomenes' seizure of her Arcadian cities, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyae,⁶⁴ which can be construed as an anti-Achaean act,⁶⁵ but to offset this it should not be forgotten that it was in the spring of this same year that the Aetolians and Achaeans fought as allies at the battle of Paxos.⁶⁶ The Aetolian policy at this time

⁶³ See above, pp. 132-135.

⁶⁴ See above, p. 138.

⁶⁵ Beloch, IV, 1, p. 697; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 753.

⁶⁶ See above, p. 138.

can perfectly well be explained by the fact that they were too much occupied in central and northern Greece to interfere in the Peloponnese, for it was in the years 229-228 that they acquired large parts of Thessaly from Macedon and then lost most of them again.⁶⁷ It is not known whether a formal peace was concluded between Macedon and Aetolia, but in any case open hostilities seem to have ceased by the end of 228. The establishment of some sort of truce between the two powers, however, is far from implying that they immediately began to act as allies in an attempt to partition the Achaean League.⁶⁸ Aratus' appeal to the Aetolians for help against Cleomenes⁶⁹ in the winter of 225/224 is proof that they had done nothing openly hostile to the Achaeans, for if he had known that they had formed, or even attempted to form, an alliance with Macedon and Cleomenes against the Achaeans, as Polybius (II, 45) says they did, naturally he would not have appealed to them.⁷⁰ On the other hand the Aetolian refusal to send aid shows that the good relations between them and the Achaeans which had existed during the reign of Demetrius II had really come to an end. One reason that the Aetolians would not help Aratus was undoubtedly their fear of Macedon.⁷¹ Another was that they probably were glad to see the Achaeans hard pressed by Cleomenes. They did not want any power to become too strong in the Peloponnese. Certainly they did not want Cleomenes to become complete master of that region. Evidence for the poor relations between Sparta and the Aetolians is seen in the ill-natured way in which Cleomenes spoke of them in the course of his revolution⁷² and in their failure to furnish him any support throughout the war.⁷³

Thus Aratus had no sound reason to fear any hostile moves from Aetolia and Macedon. The real object of Aratus' fear was,

⁶⁷ See above, pp. 130-132.

⁶⁸ Polybius, IV, 3, 2, admits that the Aetolians made no move against the Achaeans when he says—οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον, ὥς 'Αντιγόνοιο ἔζη, (the Aetolians) δεδιότες Μακεδόνας ἤγον ἡσυχίαν. This passage also shows clearly that there was no alliance of any sort between the Aetolians and Antigonus.

⁶⁹ Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2.

⁷¹ See above, n. 68.

⁷⁰ Cf. Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

⁷² Plut., *Cleom.*, 10, 6.

⁷³ If the Aetolians had not been determined to remain neutral in this war, they undoubtedly would have aided their ally Elis when that country was invaded by Aratus in 227 (Plut., *Cleom.*, 5).

of course, Cleomenes. Not only was the Spartan king winning many victories, but also there was a large element in the Achaean League which was openly well-disposed to him. These adherents of Cleomenes apparently were not exclusively from the masses—hoping for social revolution such as Cleomenes had achieved in Sparta—, for it seems that some of the leading men in the Achaean League were leaning towards the Spartan king because of dissatisfaction with Aratus.⁷⁴ Aratus, however, was adamant in his refusal to come to terms with Cleomenes. As we have seen, from the autumn of 227 he was carrying on negotiations with Doson. Scholars, while attempting to explain Aratus' decision, have frequently sought to excuse and justify his conduct.⁷⁵ Admitting that he may have been jealous of Cleomenes, they argue that he was striving to prevent the spread of social revolution, and that Macedon seemed the best safeguard against such a movement. Now it is true that the constitution of the Achaean League had many oligarchic elements,⁷⁶ and it is obvious that Aratus was opposed to any such measures as redistribution of land and cancellation of debts. Still, too much emphasis must not be placed on Aratus' fear that Cleomenes would carry out such measures throughout the Peloponnese. Cleomenes had revived Sparta by his revolution and certainly he was not interested in strengthening other states in like manner. To do so would thwart his purposes.⁷⁷ Much has also been said to show that Aratus, with his back to the wall, was convinced that alliance with Macedon—even if at the cost of a certain amount of liberty—promised a better lot for the Achaean League than submission to Cleomenes. There is no question that Cleomenes was aiming at the hegemony of the Peloponnese;⁷⁸ he wished to regain for Sparta at least some of the prestige it had lost at Leuctra. This Spartan hegemony would naturally spell the end of the grand days of the Achaean League. Such a scheme of things was the very opposite of what Aratus wanted since his

⁷⁴ Plut., *Cleom.*, 17, 3.

⁷⁵ E. g. B. Niese, *Geschichte der Griechischen und Makedonischen Staaten* (Gotha, 1899), II, p. 322; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 706-707; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 756-757.

⁷⁶ Walbank, *Aratos*, p. 28; Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 739.

⁷⁷ Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 759; Niese, II, pp. 322-323.

⁷⁸ Plut., *Cleom.*, 15, 1; *Arat.*, 41, 3.

goal was to include Sparta and the whole Peloponnese in the Achaean League.⁷⁹

I shall not attempt to answer the unanswerable question as to whether Aratus was, or was not, justified in bringing the Macedonians once again into the Peloponnese. But I do feel that the attempts to justify Aratus' decision have a tendency to go too far. He, if anyone, knew the disadvantages of being under the Macedonian aegis. Had he not devoted his life to driving tyrants out of the Peloponnese—the majority of whom had been supported either by Gonatas or by Demetrius II? Polybius (II, 47, 5 ff.) is merely trying to vindicate his hero when he says that Aratus felt that he could trust Doson. The very fact that the Macedonian king refused to bring aid to the Achaeans until he was promised Acrocorinth⁸⁰ shows that fundamentally Doson's ideas were not so different from those of his predecessors.⁸¹ Hence I believe it is a mistake to minimize the part that jealousy of Cleomenes played in Aratus' decision. For years Aratus had been the first man in the Achaean League—in fact, in the whole Peloponnese—and he could not endure to resign this position of pre-eminence to another and younger man. If Cleomenes became hegemon there would be no place for Aratus in the new order of things, but, if Cleomenes were crushed by Macedonian help, then Aratus could still be the most prominent figure in the Peloponnese, even if dependent on Macedon. But most outstanding man he had to be at any cost. He had demonstrated this before in his rather unsavory opposition to Lydiades.⁸² Plutarch⁸³ emphasizes this almost pathological streak of jealousy in Aratus. It is true that Plutarch here is drawing on Phylarchus, the eulogizer of Cleomenes, but we shall never obtain a clear picture of Aratus' motives if we consider only the Polybian account which is admittedly derived from Aratus' Memoirs.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Plut., *Cleom.*, 3, 4-5.

⁸⁰ Polyb., II, 51, 6; 52, 4; Plut., *Arat.*, 38, 6; 41, 4.

⁸¹ Doson's determination to maintain control of the Peloponnese is further attested by his keeping and garrisoning Orchomenos (Polyb., IV, 6, 5-6; Plut., *Arat.*, 45, 1) and Heraea (Polyb., II, 54, 12-13; Livy, XXVIII, 8, 6; XXXII, 5, 4), and by his quartering troops in the Peloponnese under Taurion—*τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ βασιλικῶν πραγμάτων* (Polyb., IV, 6, 4).

⁸² Plut., *Arat.*, 30, 3; 35; 37; cf. Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, pp. 749-750.

⁸³ *Cleom.*, 16.

⁸⁴ Polyb., II, 56, 2.

One point is clear. After Cleomenes' revolution Aratus became convinced that the Achaean League would probably need outside help if it were to resist successfully the Spartan king. Macedon seemed the most likely source of assistance.⁸⁵ Granting that Aratus was morally convinced that the presence of the Macedonians was preferable to submission to Cleomenes, it is manifest that he needed cogent reasons to justify his appeal to Doson. There were too many elements in the Achaean League which were favorable to Cleomenes and opposed to Macedon to permit Aratus to take this step unless he could produce persuasive arguments for its necessity. If he were not careful he would lay himself open—whether justly or not is immaterial—to the accusation of being motivated by jealousy of Cleomenes. His endeavors not to assume the sole responsibility for turning to Macedon, but to share it with the Megalopolitans, show very clearly that Aratus realized that he was treading on dangerous ground.⁸⁶ He knew perfectly well that the advent of the Macedonians would mark the end of the *de facto* liberty of the Achaeans. We may be sure, therefore, that Aratus, before turning to Doson, disseminated as much propaganda as he could to justify his step. To him were due the rumors that Aetolia was joining with Macedon and Cleomenes to partition the Achaean League—rumors which, although they had no sound foundation, might well inspire terror. Despite the fact that the Aetolians did not raise a hand against the Achaeans at this time, Aratus spread the report that they really were the chief trouble makers, that they were responsible for goading Cleomenes on. As the outstanding man in the League and by means of his oratorical ability, he was in a strong position to influence public opinion, and the Spartan acquisition of the Aetolian cities, Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, and Caphyae, gave him excellent material with which to work. Such statements he incorporated in his Memoirs in his endeavor to

⁸⁵ About this time Ptolemy Euergetes abandoned the Achaean League and began to support Cleomenes (Polyb., II, 51, 2; cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, pp. 93; 200). Later the Aetolian League and Athens refused aid to the Achaeans (Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2).

⁸⁶ It is true that Megalopolis, because of its good relations with Macedon (Polyb., II, 48, 2), was the logical city to send envoys, but Polybius emphasizes very clearly Aratus' desire for secrecy (II, 48, 4) and his wish to avoid sole responsibility (II, 50, 5-9).

defend his appeal to Macedon.⁸⁷ Now Polybius tells us himself⁸⁸ that for the history of the Cleomenic War he relied on Aratus' Memoirs, preferring them to the account of Phylarchus which was too pro-Spartan.⁸⁹ Consequently, if we always bear in mind the all-important fact that Polybius is following Aratus' attempted justification of his highly questionable actions, we can understand perfectly the otherwise incomprehensible statements about the policy of the Aetolians during these years. This policy was one of remaining utterly aloof from the struggle which was going on in the Peloponnese. They sent aid neither to the Achaeans nor to Cleomenes. Undoubtedly they were well pleased to see the two chief powers of the Peloponnese tearing one another to pieces. When Doson agreed to assist the Achaeans, they

⁸⁷ For the above discussion (pp. 145-148) I am much indebted to some valuable remarks in Freeman, *op. cit.*, p. 359, and in I. M. J. Valetton, *De Polybii Pontibus et Auctoritate Disputatio Critica* (Societas Artium Disciplinarumque Rheno-Traiectina, J. W. Leeflang, 1879), pp. 154-157.

⁸⁸ II, 56, 1-2; cf. 40, 4; also Plut., *Arat.*, 38, 7-8.

⁸⁹ It is true that Polybius says just before he begins his account of the Megalopolitan embassy to Doson that Aratus in order to keep his plans secret was forced to do and say many things quite contrary to his real purpose. Polybius (II, 47, 11) adds the words—ὡν χάριν ἔνια τούτων οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήμασι κατέταξεν—. At first glance these words seem to support Walbank's contention (*Aratos*, pp. 12, 191) that for the Megalopolitan embassy Polybius did not follow Aratus but rather the Megalopolitan traditions with which, as son of Lycortas, he naturally was familiar. I cannot agree with this assumption for several reasons. First, Polybius (II, 56, 2) says expressly that he is following Aratus for the history of this period. Second, Polybius (II, 47, 11) does not say that Aratus omitted the account of the Megalopolitan embassy in his Memoirs, but only failed to mention some matters—ἔνια τούτων—. These omissions on the part of Aratus and the fact that Polybius' first two books are merely an introduction—προκατασκευή (I, 3, 8-10)—to his history explain satisfactorily why the account of the negotiations with Macedon is somewhat confused. It is also hard to see why the Megalopolitan tradition should vary from Aratus' version. The two Megalopolitan envoys to Doson were πατρικοὶ ξένοι of Aratus (Polyb., II, 48, 4), and in their interview with the Macedonian king they spoke almost exclusively κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς τὰς Ἀράτου καὶ τὰς ὑποθέσεις (Polyb., II, 48, 8). Thus the account which later Nicophanes and Cercidas spread throughout Megalopolis was undoubtedly based on the description of the state of affairs which Aratus had given them—and in that description much emphasis was placed on the danger threatening from the supposed understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes.

were disappointed,⁹⁰ not because of any particular partiality for Cleomenes, but because they realized that he would probably be crushed by the combined force of the Macedonians and Achaeans. As a result, the Achaeans, even if partly under the Macedonian aegis, would become more predominant than ever in the Peloponnese, and obviously that would not please the Aetolians. Their refusal to allow Doson to advance southward by way of Thermopylae in 224, although strictly within their rights as a neutral power,⁹¹ nevertheless shows that they were ill-disposed to the coalition against the Spartan king.

II

SOME IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE SOCIAL WAR.

In the first part of this paper an attempt has been made to show that Polybius' account of the decade preceding the Social War is not entirely reliable. This unreliability lies in certain malicious and groundless accusations and insinuations against the Aetolians which he transferred from Aratus' Memoirs to his own History. The result is that Polybius' whole account of the Cleomeneic War—which forms the essential background to the Social War—conveys the impression that the Aetolians were so hostile to the Achaeans that the outbreak of the Social War was merely the logical development of their enmity and machinations. The Social War, however, owed its origin to circumstances other than the depravity of the Aetolians. With the background afforded by the preceding pages we are now ready to examine some of the immediate causes of the conflict which was soon to embroil all Greece except Athens. Once again we must not let Polybius' great reputation as a scientific and impartial historian blind us to his unreasoning prejudice against the enemies of the Achaean League.

Despite the neutrality of the Aetolians during the Cleomeneic War, there is no doubt that its outcome was highly unsatisfactory

⁹⁰ Polyb., II, 50, 5.

⁹¹ Polyb., II, 52, 8; cf. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 758. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 280, suggests very sensibly that the alarm felt in Aetolia over the defection to Macedon of Boeotia, Opuntian Locris, and Phocis between 227 and 224 probably contributed to the determination not to interfere in a war of uncertain issue.

to them. Not only was Cleomenes thoroughly defeated at Sellasia and forced to flee to Egypt, but the position of their enemies was greatly strengthened. In the course of the war Antigonus Doson had formed, and assumed the leadership of, the Hellenic League, the membership of which comprised the Achaeans, Epirotes, Phocians, Macedonians, Boeotians, Acarnanians, and Thessalians.²² To this list should be added the Euboeans and Spartans,

²² Polyb., II, 54, 4; IV, 9, 4; cf. Plut., *Arat.*, 38, 6. Since the Hellenic League played an important rôle in Greek history for some years, it is worth while to note when the various states entered into alliance with Macedon. Boeotia, which had for years been vacillating between Aetolia and Macedon, definitely became a Macedonian ally in 227, the year of Doson's Carian expedition (see above, pp. 142-143; cf. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 279-280). Boeotia at this time included either the whole or part of Hypocnemidian (Opuntian) Locris. For our purposes we need not concern ourselves with the vexed question whether all Hypocnemidian Locris belonged to Boeotia or whether part of the country had the separate status of ally of Macedon (see Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 429-433; Klaffenbach, *Klio*, XX [1925], pp. 68-88; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 280, n. 3). The Epicnemidian and Ozolian Locrians at this time belonged to the Aetolian League (Klaffenbach, *ibid.*). Megara also belonged to the Boeotian League, having left the Achaean League, with its permission, when Cleomenes blockaded the Isthmus and thus isolated her (Polyb., XX, 6, 8; see Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 433-434). The date of the Phocian alliance with Macedon is much disputed (Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 376; 402-403; 529; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 248, n. 3; 286-287). For our purposes it is sufficient to know that the alliance was in effect certainly by 224, although Aetolia still controlled certain Phocian cities such as Drymaea, Tithonium, and, of course, Delphi (Polyb., IV, 25, 8). All Thessaly, save Achaia Phthiotis, was reconquered by Macedon in 228 (see above, p. 132). According to Polybius, IV, 76, 2, its status was that of a subject rather than of an ally. The Acarnanians, since the beginning of the expansion of the Aetolian League, had been in close relations with Macedon (Oberhummer, *op. cit.*, p. 176). Good relations still existed in 231, for it was then that Demetrius II sent the Illyrian Agron to aid Medeon against the Aetolians (Polyb., II, 2, 5). In 230, for self-protection, the Acarnanians formed an alliance with the Illyrians (Polyb., II, 6, 9-10), in this policy following the lead of Macedon. Epirus had become an ally of Macedon on the occasion of the marriage of Demetrius II to Phthia (P. Treves, *Rend. Linc.*, Ser. VI, VIII [1932], p. 183). With the overthrow of the Epirot monarchy between 235 and 231 (Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 747; Beloch, IV, 1, p. 635) the new republic allied itself with the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues (Polyb., II, 6, 1), but in 230, lacking confidence in the aid these two leagues could furnish, it abandoned that alliance and together with Acarnania

although it is impossible to say whether the former should be reckoned as allies or subjects of Macedon.⁹³ The Spartans were treated generously after their defeat, but were compelled to join the Hellenic League.⁹⁴ Since the chief rival of the Achaeans in the Peloponnese had been humbled, it looked as if Aratus might some day be able to achieve his aim of incorporating that whole region in the Achaean League. The only allies left to the Aetolians south of the Isthmus were the Messenians,⁹⁵ the Eleans,⁹⁶ and the Phigaleans,⁹⁷ and of these the Messenians had long been threatening to ally themselves with the Achaeans and Macedonians—that is, to join the Hellenic League.⁹⁸

Thus after Sellasia the Aetolians found themselves in an extremely unfavorable position, for they were completely surrounded by a hostile alliance.⁹⁹ In whatever direction they might hope to expand they were confronted by members of the Hellenic League. To the north were Thessaly, Macedon, and Epirus, to the east, Boeotia, Phocis, and Hypocnemidian Locris, to the west, Acarnania, while to the south, the Achaean League supported by Macedon was by far the strongest power in the Peloponnese. The Aetolians, contrary to the accusations of Polybius, had remained entirely neutral during the Cleomenic War, but they had not profited by that neutrality. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that their interference in the Peloponnese in 221 after the death of Doson was motivated by more than their love for plunder, as Polybius would have one believe. They could not run the risk of having the Peloponnese totally blocked to their enterprises. It must, moreover, have seemed a particularly opportune time for interference, because they knew that the Achaeans had neglected all military preparations since Sellasia,¹⁰⁰ and also they were convinced that nothing was to be feared from the

formed one with the Illyrians, thus once again coming into close relations with Macedon (Polyb., II, 6, 9-10). It was probably at this time that Ambracia and Amphiloehia broke away from Epirus and joined the Aetolian League (Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 384-385; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 252).

⁹³ Niese, II, p. 336. Tarn, *O. A. H.*, VII, p. 759, and Beloch, IV, 1, p. 712, classify the Euboeans as allies.

⁹⁴ Polyb., II, 70, 1; see Beloch, IV, 1, p. 718.

⁹⁵ Polyb., IV, 3, 9; 6, 11.

⁹⁶ Polyb., IV, 5, 4.

⁹⁸ Polyb., IV, 5, 8.

⁹⁷ Polyb., IV, 3, 6.

⁹⁹ Cf. Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

¹⁰⁰ Polyb., IV, 7, 6-7; Plut., *Arat.*, 47, 1-2.

seventeen year old Philip V who had succeeded Dóson as king of Macedon.¹⁰¹

Polybius, as we have seen in the passage quoted at the beginning of this paper, lays all the responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities on the Aetolian lust for plunder. When we take into account the evil plight of the Aetolians in 221, however, we are in a position to realize that other factors may have been influencing them. Polybius himself unconsciously admits that they had reason to be disturbed by developments in the Peloponnese when he says that Dorimachus was sent to Phigalea on a public mission (*κατὰ κοινόν*)—professedly to guard the city but in fact to spy on Peloponnesian affairs.¹⁰² The choice of Phigalea as a lookout was natural, for the city was either a member of the Aetolian League or at least an ally,¹⁰³ and it was an excellent base for operations in Messenia.¹⁰⁴ And Messenia was unquestionably the state in which Aetolia was primarily interested at the time.

Polybius¹⁰⁵ gives the following account of Dorimachus' actions. While he was at Phigalea a band of brigands gathered around him to whom he gave permission to plunder in Messenia, a friend and ally of Aetolia. The Messenians complained, and finally Dorimachus was forced to give them satisfaction. On his return to Aetolia, he persuaded his friend Scopas and other leading Aetolians that it would be profitable to make war on the Messenians. He maintained that it would be easy to find an excuse since the Messenians had long been wronging the Aetolians by threatening to join in an alliance with the Achaeans and Macedonians. In short, the reason for the Aetolian expedition which followed was the one which, according to Polybius, inevitably motivated the Aetolians, namely, passion for plunder, in this particular case coupled with indignation at a personal insult inflicted by the Messenians on Dorimachus.

To understand the real reasons for the Aetolian policy in Messenia we must investigate, in so far as the scanty sources permit, first the relations between the Messenians and the Aeto-

¹⁰¹ Polyb., IV, 3, 3; 5, 3.

¹⁰² Polyb., IV, 3, 5-7.

¹⁰³ Polyb., IV, 3, 6, implies the former, IV, 79, 5, the latter.

¹⁰⁴ This is clear from Polyb., IV, 31, 1; cf. M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les Monarchies Hellénistiques au III^e Siècle avant J.-C.* (Paris, 1921), pp. 196-197; Walbank, *J. H. S.*, LVI (1936), pp. 66-68.

¹⁰⁵ IV, 3, 5-5, 10.

lians, and then the relations between the Messenians and the Achaeans. In the year 244 or shortly thereafter the Aetolians entered into close ties with Phigalea and Messenia.¹⁰⁶ The alliance between the Aetolians and Messenians was natural since at the time the former were engaged in an anti-Spartan policy¹⁰⁷ and, as is well known, the latter were almost invariably hostile to Sparta. In the ensuing years, however, the Aetolian attitude changed. Worried over the thriving condition of the Achaean League, they were glad to see Cleomenes appear as its rival. The Aetolians remained neutral, as we have seen, during the Cleomenic War, but obviously they were much disappointed by its outcome. Not long after the death of Antigonus Doson, the Spartans and Aetolians began to negotiate concerning an alliance.¹⁰⁸ If we ask ourselves whether the Messenians would have reacted to developments in the Peloponnese in the same way as the Aetolians, the answer must be in the negative. The rise of Cleomenes to power must have alarmed them greatly. He was clearly trying to restore Sparta to her pristine hegemony in the Peloponnese, and the Messenians must have realized that his ambitions were a menace to their independence. Thus it is not surprising that the relations between Aetolia and Messenia were far less good in 221 than they had been in 244. It is true that Polybius¹⁰⁹ says that the Aetolo-Messenian alliance was still in effect in 221, but he frequently speaks of alliances as still existing when in truth they had really ceased, although they may not have been formally annulled.¹¹⁰ Now if the Messenians were

¹⁰⁶ Ditt., *Syll.*², 472. For their long-standing alliance with the Messenians, see Polyb., IV, 6, 11; cf. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, p. 733; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 620-621; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Walbank, *J. H. S.*, LVI (1936), pp. 64-71.

¹⁰⁷ King Agis of Sparta had marched out in 241 to help Aratus against the Aetolians (Plut., *Agis*, 13-15; *Arat.*, 31). After the execution of Agis in 241, many of his supporters fled to Aetolia. In the following year the Aetolians, using the desire to restore the exiles as an excuse, invaded Laconia and did great damage (Polyb., IV, 34, 9; IX, 34, 9; cf. Plut., *Cleom.*, 10, 6; 18, 3). For these events see Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 734, 743-744; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 626-629; Flacelière, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-243.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb., IV, 16, 5; 22-24; 34-36.

¹⁰⁹ IV, 3, 9; 6, 11; 15, 10.

¹¹⁰ E. g. in IV, 15, 10, Polybius speaks of the Aetolo-Achaean alliance as still being in existence. Such a statement is absurd when one re-

drifting away from the Aetolians, it is highly probable that they were drawing closer to the Achaeans. To this subject we must now turn.

The first evidence which can be gleaned from the sources for good relations between the Messenians and the Achaean League is that after Cleomenes captured Megalopolis in the winter of 223/222, the Megalopolitans sought refuge in Messene.¹¹¹ This fact, when it is considered in conjunction with Messenia's fear of Cleomenes, leads me to wonder why scholars have either rejected¹¹² or neglected Pausanias' statement (IV, 29, 9) that the Messenians fought on the Achaean side at Sellasia. It is true that there are two objections to crediting Pausanias. The first is that Polybius in his rather detailed account of the battle (II, 65-69) does not list them as participants, but it should be noticed that he does not mention the Phocians and Thessalians who, as members of the Hellenic League, presumably were present. The fact that the Messenians did not belong to the Hellenic League at this time might help to explain Polybius' failure to speak of them. The second objection is that, when the Messenians applied for admission to the Hellenic League,¹¹³ it seems strange, if they had aided the allies at Sellasia, that no mention was made of this fact. On the other hand the readiness of the allies to receive the Messenians into the League,¹¹⁴ despite the probability of such action leading to war with the Aetolians,¹¹⁵ might be argued as showing that the allies felt an obligation toward Messenia.

Notwithstanding such objections as these, there are strong reasons to believe that the Messenians aided the Achaeans at Sellasia. This assumption harmonizes well with their reception of the Megalopolitan fugitives and with their fear of Cleomenes. It also gives a motive (more plausible than that Philip II had done likewise over a hundred years before) for the presentation to Messenia of Denthaliatis¹¹⁶ which Doson took away from

members that the Aetolians had just badly defeated the Achaeans at Caphyae. See my paper, *J. R. S.*, XXVI (1936), pp. 32-34.

¹¹¹ Polyb., II, 61, 4; 62, 10. Plut., *Cleom.*, 24, 1; *Philopoemen*, 5; Pausanias, IV, 29, 7-8.

¹¹² Niese, II, p. 412, n. 1.

¹¹⁴ Polyb., IV, 10, 1.

¹¹³ Polyb., IV, 9, 2; 15, 2.

¹¹⁵ See below, pp. 162-163.

¹¹⁶ Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 43; cf. Beloch, IV, 1, p. 718.

Sparta after the battle. The presence of the Messenians at Sellasia and their acquisition of Denthaliatis also help to explain the hostility of the Spartans towards them.¹¹⁷

In any case, whether we accept Pausanias' statement or not, it is clear that long before Dorimachus began to interfere in Messenia, the Messenians were turning towards the Achaeans. When Dorimachus was giving reasons to justify an Aetolian attack on the Messenians, he said that they had for long been wronging the Aetolians by offering to join the Achaeans and Macedonians.¹¹⁸ Polybius as usual refuses to admit that the Aetolians had any grievance. He maintains that the Aetolo-Achaean alliance was in effect even after the battle of Caphyae¹¹⁹ and hence the Aetolians should have had no objection to their allies, the Messenians, becoming allies also of the Achaeans. Such a statement is absurd.¹²⁰ That alliance, formed early in the reign of Demetrius II,¹²¹ had definitely come to an end in the Cleomenic War. This is proved by the Aetolian refusal to aid the Achaeans¹²² and to permit Doson to go south by way of Thermopylae.¹²³

There is only one possible explanation of the Messenian situation. In the course of the Cleomenic War and the period immediately thereafter the Messenians and Aetolians were gradually drifting apart. This was natural since the former, as usual, adhered to their anti-Spartan policy while the latter, as a result of the flourishing condition of the Achaean League, were leaning more and more towards Sparta. Polybius¹²⁴ says that in 221 and 220 the Aetolo-Messenian alliance was still in effect. So it may have been *de iure*, but *de facto* it was almost defunct. This misunderstanding between the Aetolians and Messenians gave Aratus a golden opportunity, and he was not the man to fail to capitalize on such a chance. When Polybius (IV, 5, 8) says that the Messenians had for long been promising to join in alliance with the Achaeans and Macedonians, it is impossible not

¹¹⁷ Polyb., IV, 5, 4. It might be remarked that Polybius, IV, 5, 5, does not imply that the Messenians did not fight at Sellasia. The passage merely states that Messenia was not ravaged in the course of the Cleomenic War.

¹¹⁸ Polyb., IV, 5, 8.

¹¹⁹ IV, 15, 9-10.

¹²⁰ See above, p. 154 and n. 110.

¹²¹ See above, p. 133 and n. 14.

¹²² Plut., *Arat.*, 41, 2.

¹²³ Polyb., II, 52, 8.

¹²⁴ IV, 3, 9; 6, 11; 15, 10.

to recognize the work of Aratus. This was not the first time that he had weaned an ally from an enemy.¹²⁵ Thus the reason for the dispatch of Dorimachus to Phigalea is manifest. He was supposed to undermine the pro-Achaean party in Messenia and to try to restore that country to the Aetolian fold. Aetolia, hemmed in as she was by the Hellenic League, could not afford to allow an old ally—even if at present disaffected—to join her enemies. To the Aetolians, the Achaean interference in Messenia was an out and out hostile act, and it was unquestionably this interference which was one of the prime causes of the Social War.¹²⁶

There is no need to repeat Polybius' tirade against Dorimachus.¹²⁷ It is clear that Dorimachus was able to achieve nothing constructive in Messenia, for the pro-Achaean party there, trusting in Achaean support,¹²⁸ was too strong for him. But his mission had not been wholly in vain. He had acquired first-hand information about the Achaean intrigues and, when he returned to Aetolia, he made a full report to Scopas who, according to Polybius, was more influential than the *strategos* Ariston. Polybius¹²⁹ claims that Dorimachus was so infuriated at the Messenians that by various arguments he won over Scopas and his friends to his way of thinking, and that this group of men alone was responsible for making war on the Messenians, Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians. Scholars in general have tended to agree with Polybius.¹³⁰ It should be remembered, however, that Polybius is never willing to admit that the Aetolians had a legitimate motive for their actions. We have seen above that he concealed the evidence for Achaean interference in Messenia. On this particular occasion it suited his purpose better to lay all the blame for ensuing events on a small group of men, for, if he had blamed the Aetolian League as a

¹²⁵ Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, pp. 121 ff.; maintains that Megalopolis was responsible for interfering in Messenia. Despite his elaborate arguments, it seems to me more logical to see here the activity of the leading man in the Achaean League.

¹²⁶ Niese, II, p. 411, n. 1, has shown that the Messenian towns, Pylos and (probably) Cyprassia, belonged at this time to the Achaean League.

¹²⁷ IV, 3, 5-4, 9.

¹²⁸ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 124.

¹²⁹ IV, 5.

¹³⁰ E.g. Tarn, *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 763-764; Beloch, IV, 1, pp. 719-721; Niese, II, pp. 409, 423.

whole, it would have been harder to hide the fact that the Aetolians had a reasonable grievance against the Achaeans. Without doubt Dorimachus and Scopas were the leading spirits in the aggressive policy which was adopted, and certainly there was an anti-war party in Aetolia,¹³¹ but the election of Scopas¹³² as *strategos* for 220/219 shows very clearly that the Aetolian people approved the course of action he and his friends had been advocating. It seems safe to state, therefore, that by 221 the Aetolians realized that it was imperative for them to take the offensive at last. Their neutrality during the Cleomeneic War had been disastrous to them, for in the course of this war the Hellenic League had been formed with the result that the Aetolians were completely surrounded by enemies who were all in alliance. Now one of these enemies—the Achaeans—was trying to entice Messenia from them. It was high time for the Aetolians to act, for soon it would be too late.

As war was not actually declared between the Hellenic League and the Aetolians until the summer of 220, for the sake of completeness the intervening events will have to be traced briefly. Since my aim is not to discuss all the causes of the Social War but merely to emphasize that the political affiliations of Messenia were a fundamental contributory factor to the outbreak of hostilities, we need linger only over those episodes in which that country was involved. Polybius¹³³ says that Scopas and his friends, persuaded by the arguments of Dorimachus, immediately made war on the Messenians, Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, and Macedonians. They seized a royal Macedonian ship near Cythera and sold both ship and crew. They pillaged the coast of

¹³¹ Polyb., IV, 36, 2.

¹³² Polyb., IV, 27, 1. There are various other passages in Polybius, of which I need mention only two, which prove that the Aetolian League as a whole approved of the policy of Dorimachus and Scopas. (1) When Dorimachus was inciting Scopas to an aggressive policy against Messenia, he spoke of how popular such a policy would be with the *πληθος των Αιτωλων* (IV, 5, 6). (2) After the battle of Caphyae the Aetolian assembly (an extraordinary meeting; see M. Holleaux, *B. C. H.*, XXIX [1905], p. 363, n. 2) voted to maintain peace with the Achaeans only on condition that they abandoned their alliance with the Messenians (IV, 15, 8-9). This resolution shows very clearly that the Aetolians had no intention of resigning Messenia; in other words they gave a vote of approval to Scopas and Dorimachus.

¹³³ IV, 5, 10-6, 2.

Epirus and tried to seize Thyrium in Acarnania. Unfortunately Polybius merely enumerates these events and consequently it is difficult to explain their significance. The Aetolians, we know, felt they had nothing to fear from Philip, the seventeen year old king of Macedon,¹³⁴ and they probably were convinced that without the support of Macedon the efficacy of the Hellenic League was a thing of the past. Their enterprises may well have been intended to put the Symmachy to the test.

In the Peloponnese events moved rapidly. The Aetolians seized a fort called Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis, but before long were ousted by Timoxenus, the Achaean *strategos*, and by Taurion, the Macedonian general left behind by Doson to supervise affairs in the Peloponnese. Then shortly before Aratus became *strategos* in May 220 the Aetolians once again invaded the Peloponnese. They raided the territory of Patrae and Pharae and proceeded to Phigalea whence they made an incursion into Messenia.¹³⁵

At the spring meeting of the Achaean *synodos* the members from Patrae and Pharae registered their complaints against the Aetolians, and an embassy from Messenia arrived begging for help. The Achaeans voted that aid should be sent to the Messenians and that the *strategos* should assemble the troops of the League. This levy was to decide what course of action should be followed.¹³⁶ The decision of the council shows clearly that the Achaeans had no intention of leaving Messenia to the Aetolians. Polybius does not say specifically that an Achaeo-Messenian alliance was proposed at this time, but the vote to send assistance can hardly be interpreted otherwise. The council could only propose an alliance; it was the function of the *synkletos*—in this case the levy acting in that capacity—to ratify the proposal.¹³⁷

It was Aratus who undertook the task of mustering the Achaean troops. He was especially exasperated at the Aetolians and entered upon the office of *strategos* five days before the proper date.¹³⁸ In obedience to his orders the Achaean forces assembled at Megalopolis. Once again the Messenians appeared and this time they asked to be admitted to the Hellenic League. This request could not be granted by the Achaean assembly, for natu-

¹³⁴ IV, 3, 3; 5, 3.

¹³⁵ Polyb., IV, 6, 3-12.

¹³⁶ Polyb., IV, 7.

¹³⁷ Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129; Beloch, IV, 2, pp. 233-234.

¹³⁸ Polyb., IV, 7, 8-11.

rally the admission of new members was the business of the Symmachy as a whole.¹³⁹ It seems that it was the Achaean council rather than the assembly which was competent to propose the admission of new members. In any case it was the former which, at its next meeting, passed the resolution to send envoys to the various allies about this matter.¹⁴⁰ The Achaean levy, however, did ratify the Achaeo-Messenian alliance which had been proposed shortly before by the council.¹⁴¹ Since it was realized that there was a pro-Aetolian party in Messenia, the Messenian envoys were ordered to leave their own sons as hostages in Sparta. The purpose of this stipulation obviously was to prevent the Messenians from coming to terms with the Aetolians and to bolster the wavering loyalty of the Spartans to the Hellenic League.¹⁴²

After the Achaean levy had passed these resolutions Aratus sent a message to the Aetolians ordering them to evacuate Messenia and not to set foot on Achaean territory. The Aetolians, alarmed by the mustering of the Achaean troops, decided to obey.

¹³⁹ Polyb., IV, 9, 1-4.

¹⁴⁰ Polyb., IV, 14, 1; 15, 1-2; cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

¹⁴¹ The following evidence certainly implies that the alliance was ratified: after this meeting Aratus ordered the Aetolians to evacuate Messenia (Polyb., IV, 9, 7). Polybius (IV, 15) informs us that the Achaean council at its next meeting charged the *strategos* to aid Messenia in case of another Aetolian invasion, that the Achaeans did not abandon the Messenians, that the *strategos* informed the Messenians how many troops they should contribute, and that the Aetolians voted to maintain peace with the Achaeans provided they gave up the Messenian alliance. This evidence, it seems to me, completely disproves Ferrabino's contention (*op. cit.*, pp. 129-130) that Aratus rejected the Achaeo-Messenian alliance because he preferred to have Messenia become a member of the Hellenic League. It is quite true that by this step Aratus hoped to involve the whole Symmachy in the war against Aetolia, but the admission of Messenia to the Hellenic League did not preclude a special alliance between the Messenians and the Achaeans. Ferrabino himself (p. 129) admits that every member of the Symmachy could form separate alliances.

¹⁴² Polyb., IV, 9, 5; cf. Walbank, *Aratos*, p. 116. Since Polybius makes no further mention of these hostages, Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, p. 131) may be correct in saying they were not given, but he is wrong in maintaining that the Achaeans did not support the Messenians (see above, n. 141). I cannot agree with his arguments (pp. 128, 149) that Aratus in this matter of the hostages was offering Sparta a "political mortgage" on Messenia. In his desire to placate Sparta Aratus certainly was not going to throw Messenia into the arms of the Aetolians.

The Aetolian *strategos* Ariston, who was at Cyllene in Elis, was requested to send the transports to Pheias, an island off the coast of Elis. After two days the Aetolians, heavily laden with booty, departed from Messenia. Aratus waited two days and then, thinking the Aetolians were going to sail from Pheias, dismissed all save 3000 foot and 300 horse of the Achaeans. With these forces and with Taurion's soldiers he marched toward Patrae with the idea of keeping watch on the Aetolians.¹⁴³ Polybius' narrative for the next few chapters (10-13) is confusing.¹⁴⁴ Fortunately for our purposes it is unnecessary to investigate the motives which were actuating the Achaeans and Aetolians at this time. The following events alone need concern us. The main body of the Aetolians, for reasons which are not clear, after having dispatched the booty marched into Arcadia. At Caphyae they inflicted a bad defeat on the Achaeans commanded by Aratus. Then they proceeded through the Peloponnese and, after making an attempt on Pellene and plundering the territory of Sicyon, they departed by the Isthmus.

Shortly after these events a meeting of the Achaean council was held.¹⁴⁵ The disaster at Caphyae had convinced the Achaeans that they alone could not oppose the Aetolians.¹⁴⁶ Therefore it was resolved to send envoys to the various members of the Hellenic League asking for help and also for admission of the Messenians to the Symmarchy. The *strategos* was instructed to levy 5000 Achaean foot and 500 horse with which to assist the

¹⁴³ Polyb., IV, 9, 7-10, 2.

¹⁴⁴ Polybius (IV, 10, 3-10), in brief, says that Dorimachus, fearing lest the Achaeans should attack him while embarking, sent off the booty and then marched into Arcadia. Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, pp. 132 ff.) has pointed out the contradictions in Polybius' account of events from the Aetolian departure from Messenia through the battle of Caphyae. He maintains that Aratus attacked the Aetolians while embarking and that consequently the only path of escape left to them was through Arcadia. This theory is hard to accept, for it seems most unlikely that Aratus with a small army would have marched through Elis, an ally of Aetolia. Walbank (*Aratos*, p. 117) follows Polybius when he writes: "But meanwhile distrust of the Achaeans, and a desire to provoke their depleted army, caused Dorimachus to change his plans." There is an obvious *non sequitur* here. If the Aetolians "distrusted" the Achaeans, one would have expected them to sail off with their booty rather than to invade Arcadia.

¹⁴⁵ Polyb., IV, 14, 1.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

Messenians in case of another Aetolian invasion. These resolutions were carried out. The envoys were sent and Aratus enrolled the stipulated number of Achaeans. In conformity with the decree of the council he also ordered the Messenians and Spartans to contribute each 2500 foot and 250 horse.¹⁴⁷

Shortly after the meeting of the Achaean council, the Aetolian assembly convened.¹⁴⁸ The Aetolians voted to remain at peace with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians and with all the other states. With the Achaean League also they voted to maintain peace provided the Achaeans abandoned their alliance with Messenia. These resolutions show that the Aetolians at the time were trying to avoid becoming involved in a struggle with the Symmarchy as a whole, but that they were as determined as ever that the Achaeans should keep out of Messenia. Polybius waxes very indignant over the Aetolian decree. He claims that the Aetolians were allies of both the Achaeans and Messenians and consequently that it was highly unreasonable for them to object to the Achaean-Messenian alliance.¹⁴⁹ As usual he is attempting to paint the Aetolians in as dark colors as possible. We have seen above¹⁵⁰ that the Aetolo-Achaean alliance was dead. The true situation was that the Achaeans, now enemies of the Aetolians, had won the Messenians over from the Aetolians. Naturally the Aetolians considered this an hostile act and a legitimate *casus belli*. Their one aim now was to destroy the alliance between the Achaeans and Messenians. By voting to maintain peace with the rest of the Symmarchy they were hoping to bring it to pass that the Hellenic League would abstain from the struggle in the Peloponnese.¹⁵¹

Their hopes seemed to be partly justified by the replies of the

¹⁴⁷ Polyb., IV, 15. Ferrabino (*op. cit.*, p. 139) claims that the resolution to assist the Messenians was in anticipation of their admission to the Hellenic League. It is more logical to explain this resolution and the levying of Messenian troops on the basis of the Achaean-Messenian alliance (see above, p. 160 and n. 141). Ferrabino (*ibid.*) and Walbank (*Aratos*, p. 120) are certainly correct in saying that the smallness of the Achaean levy shows that the Achaeans were counting on support from the Symmarchy.

¹⁴⁸ Polyb., IV, 15, 8. This was an extraordinary meeting; see n. 132.

¹⁴⁹ Polyb., IV, 15, 8-11.

¹⁵⁰ See above, p. 158 and n. 110.

¹⁵¹ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-141.

various members of the Symmarchy to the Achæan envoys.¹⁵² The allies agreed to receive Messenia into the Hellenic League, but they voted to remain at peace with Aetolia. This has been called a weak move,¹⁵³ but it was not as weak as it seems at first glance. The Aetolians had voted to make war on the Achæans unless they abandoned the Messenian alliance, but now the Messenians, in addition to being allies of the Achæans, had also become members of the Hellenic League. Thus the demands of the Aetolians had not been met, and, if they carried out their threat to attack the Achæans, the Hellenic League was bound to go to the assistance of one of its members. After the next Aetolian invasion Philip wasted no time in marching to the Peloponnese in answer to Aratus' appeal.¹⁵⁴ Since the Aetolians had returned home after the Caphyæ incident, possibly Philip hoped they would remain quiet for a while; in any case he did not wish to appear as the aggressor in a general Hellenic War.¹⁵⁵

The Aetolians, although not desiring hostilities with the Hellenic League as a whole, had no intention of abandoning their enterprises in the Peloponnese. Their *strategos* Ariston remained at home and stated that he was keeping peace with the Achæans—a rather ineffectual conciliatory gesture towards the Hellenic League.¹⁵⁶ Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, however, set forth with a large force.¹⁵⁷ They proceeded through Achæa and seized the Arcadian town Cynaetha.¹⁵⁸ Ferrabino¹⁵⁹ has given a probable explanation of the motives behind this Aetolian undertaking. Cynaetha had been for long the victim of

¹⁵² Polyb., IV, 16, 1-3. Polybius speaks only of the Epirotes and Philip, but undoubtedly the other allies followed the lead of Macedon.

¹⁵³ Walbank, *Aratos*, p. 120.

¹⁵⁴ Polyb., IV, 19, 1; 22, 1-7.

¹⁵⁵ See the pertinent remarks of M. Nicolaus, *Zwei Beiträge zur Geschichte König Philipps V von Makedonien*, Inaug. Diss. (Berlin, Ebering, 1909), pp. 19-20.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Ferrabino, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

¹⁵⁷ Polyb., IV, 16, 11-17, 2. Shortly before this Aetolian invasion Demetrius of Pharos and Scerdilaïdas had sailed from Illyria and made an attack on Pylos. The Aetolians had co-operated with them in this undertaking (Polyb., IV, 25, 4; IX, 38, 8). After failing in their attempt, Demetrius had sailed to the Cyclades, but Scerdilaïdas had agreed to join the Aetolians in invading Achæa (Polyb., IV, 16, 6-11). For the activity of the two Illyrians in these years, see my paper, *J. R. S.*, XXVI (1936), pp. 24-39.

¹⁵⁸ Polyb., IV, 17-18.

¹⁵⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 142-144.

social revolution. At the time under consideration the anti-revolutionary Achaean party was in control. The Aetolians had entered into negotiations with the revolutionists and with their collaboration they gained control of the town. Thus the Aetolians were attempting to weaken the Achaean League by supporting the movement for Social Reform in the Peloponnese. This policy of the Aetolians naturally brought them into close relations with Sparta where the faction of Cleomenes was still strong; in fact, shortly before this time a secret alliance had been made between the two states.¹⁶⁰

From Cynaetha the Aetolians marched to Cleitor. Failing to persuade this town to abandon the Achaeans and form an alliance with them, they attacked it, but without success. Then they returned to Cynaetha which they offered to their ally Elis. When the Eleans refused the gift, the Aetolians kept the town for themselves. On hearing of the approach of the Macedonians, however, they burned it and then advanced to Rhium whence they returned home.¹⁶¹

It was in the course of this Aetolian invasion that Aratus appealed to Philip for help.¹⁶² The limits of this paper have now been reached. With the assembling of the delegates from the various members of the Symmachy at Corinth, the issues which we have been discussing assume a Panhellenic complexion. Suffice it to say that, after numerous accusations had been brought against the Aetolians, war was unanimously declared.¹⁶³ My purpose throughout has been to illustrate Polybius' violent prejudice against the Aetolians and partiality for Aratus and the Achaean League. This bias has greatly impaired the accuracy of his account of the years under consideration. In his treatment of the Cleomenic War, the entirely unwarranted impression is created that the Aetolians were a serious menace to the Achaeans, and thus Aratus' appeal to Antigonos Doson is made to appear both inevitable and right. The only cause for the Social War which Polybius gives is the ungovernable passion of the Aetolians for booty. The Achaean intrigues in Messenia are not even mentioned. Admittedly, other factors ultimately contributed to the declaration of war by the Hellenic League against the Aetolians, but there seems to be little room for doubt that one

¹⁶⁰ Polyb., IV, 16, 5.

¹⁶¹ Polyb., IV, 19.

¹⁶² Polyb., IV, 19, 1.

¹⁶³ Polyb., IV, 25.

of the important causes of the Social War—and in many ways the most fundamental one—was the natural resentment of the Aetolians at the way in which Aratus had induced the Messenians to abandon them for an alliance with the Achaeans.¹⁶⁴

JOHN V. A. FINE.

WILLIAMS COLLEGE.

¹⁶⁴ The latest work on the Achaean assemblies, which I did not see until after this paper was written, is by André Aymard, *Les Assemblées de la Confédération Achaïenne* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1938). I am not completely convinced by his arguments that the *synodos* as well as the *synkletos* was only a primary assembly. See the pertinent remarks of M. Cary, *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), pp. 154-155. It has seemed wise to let my references to the Achaean council stand rather than to lengthen my paper unduly by entering into a controversy which, after all, is largely irrelevant to the matters under discussion.

F. W. Walbank, who has read this article in manuscript, has written me that in his forthcoming biography of Philip V of Macedon (Cambridge University Press) he has attempted to show that Doson could have been ready to sail for Caria by May 227. If his arguments are sound—and from his letter I gather they are—, May is certainly preferable to July as a date for the departure of this expedition. Nevertheless, I still believe that July is a possible date since we have no evidence that Doson was planning an extensive campaign.

THE FUNDAMENTAL OPPOSITION OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE.

(Continued from p. 53.)

5. The contrast between Aristotelian logic and Platonic dialectic

a) Apart from the faithful observation and analysis of phenomena it is the "logos," the terms of human language, in which Aristotle seeks the very source of truth. Thus he is the father of "logic," the originator of "philology" and of the historical research of the following generations³⁰ but at the same time of all the barren scholasticism of words. The definitions on which Aristotle bases the ideas are nothing but nominal definitions as they naturally result from the analysis of the human language. Thus the logic by which Aristotle replaces Platonic dialectic is of necessity a mere logic of concepts, i. e. of nouns, of their classification into genera and species and of the subsumption of the individual under them. As a natural system this logic has a certain justification in organic nature, yet it is restricted to the realm of thinking which alone remains if the peculiarity of mathematical thinking as immediate truth is denied and reduced to the mere abstraction of concepts. Plato, in proving the hypothetical character of all science which consciously or unconsciously bases all its knowledge upon ultimate axioms, refers to mathematical thinking as a model. Aristotle, on the other hand, sees only the circumscribed result of scientific thinking, as if one could understand and define its objects in isolation and could deduce one proposition from another.³¹ In every scientific, especially in every mathematical definition, however, an unknown is not simply reduced by analysis to a known but different unknown concepts are determined at once in their mutual relation. Yet, if one were to try according to such an "analytical" logic to take the single concepts of a mathematical definition³²

³⁰ Cf. A. Boeckh, *Enzyklopaedie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* (1877), p. 12.

³¹ Cf. e. g. Aristotle, *Anal. Prior.* 46 b 29; *Anal. Post.* 74 a 25; *Metaphysics* 1025 a 32; 1086 b 35.

³² As an example of a mathematical definition compare that of the irrational which is put by Plato in the *Theaetetus* (148 A, cf. 148 D) as a model of a truly scientific definition. Concerning the importance of the verbal context for the *logos* cf. also *Sophist* 263 A.

out of their verbal context and to define each of them separately as an individual noun through genus, species, and differentiae, one would kill the very nerve of mathematical thought.

It was an insight, fundamental for the understanding of mathematics, that its definitions deal with relations and that, consequently, the nominal logic of attributes and classes is not sufficient for comprehending the peculiarity of mathematical propositions. It is in just this particular sense that Plato recognized the relation as the basic concept of mathematics: a substantial concept (as for instance "finger") is undialectical and no problem for thought.³³ But what appears to the senses at the same time with its exact contrary, as does the great and small, the basic concept of mathematics, that is dialectical and evokes the soul thereby from sensual perception to pure thought. It is, then, through the idea of the "one" and of the "equal" (i. e. through the *πέρας* of the *agathon*) that from the mere relativity of the great and small and its *ἄπειρον* there comes to be measure and thereby definite number (*Philebus* 23 C-26 B, especially 25 A; D).

Platonic dialectic, thus discovering that hypotheses and relativity are the basic principles of mathematics and of science in general, is in itself a merely hypothetical treatment of the philosophical *ἀρχαί*. Whereas the Pythagoreans held the "odd" and "even" (or the *πέρας* and *ἄπειρον*) to be the ultimate principles of being which the Eleatics again found in the "identical," "immovable one," Plato demonstrates that all the *ἀρχαί* are mere hypotheses and traces them back to the idea of the *agathon* as the only *ἀνπρόθετον*. The single *εἶδη*, thus revealed to dialectic in their relation to each other and to the *agathon*, begin to shift and to become only grades of the dialectical process which leads to the *agathon*.³⁴

In place of this hypothetical dialectic Aristotle sets up his

³³ *Republic* 523 B-524 D; a "finger," in its phenomenal appearance is always in the same way "finger," a "man," "man" (cf. also *Parmenides* 130 B-C, *Phaedrus* 263 A, *Republic* 603 D). Concerning the Platonic concept of relativity cf. *Republic* 438 B, 479 B; *Charmides* 168 E; *Phaedo* 102 B; cf. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1088 a 21 ff.

³⁴ *Republic* 511 B; cf. *Philebus* 16 ff.; *Sophist* 251-264; *Parmenides* 137-166, etc. Concerning the interpretation of *Republic* 509 ff. cf. v. Fritz, *Philologus*, LXXXVII (1932), pp. 149 ff. and Dehn, *Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte der Mathematik*, IV, 1 (1937), p. 4.

metaphysics as the doctrine of the *ἀρχαί*. Since he denies the idea of the *agathon* (*Eth. Nic.* I, 4), which for Plato is the very link by which all the *εἶδη* and all the individual things are united into "one" (*Phaedo* 99 C), he acknowledges only a multiplicity of ultimate principles which, through the inductive analysis of being, appear to him as ultimate *ἀρχαί* (*Eth. Nic.* 1098 b 3; *Metaphysics* I, 3; IV, 2; *Physics* II, 3, 7; *Anal. Post.* 76 a 31). Only in so far as all these have an "analogous" relation to the one nature of being, do they belong to a unified science, metaphysics (*Metaphysics* 1003 a 33-b 14; 1066 b 10; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 b 27; cf. pp. 41, 52, *supra*). For him every branch of science, then, has its own *ἀρχαί* from which it must deduce apodeictically everything else according to the rules of his logic, and it is very characteristic that instead of the Platonic idea of the *agathon* to him the *ἀρχὴ ἀντιθέτος* is the formally logical law of contradiction.

According to this general conception of science as a system to be constructed on definitions and deduced from them Aristotle's logic of science and mathematics is basically a logic of subsumption and classification, i. e. of the formal ordering of scientific propositions which, in reality, can be attained only through an entirely different and truly productive process of thinking.

b) Since in the dialogues of Plato's later period, especially in the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*, a certain preference for terminological divisions (*διαίρεσις*) is to be found, scholars have thought to see here a development from the dissimilar dialectic of the early Socratic dialogues to that kind of classificatory logic which is so important for Aristotle.²⁵ To be sure, besides "epagoge," "diaeresis" is the most essential part of Plato's dialectic, but this diaeresis is more than a method of classification and different from it, its principal aim being the distinction between idea and phenomena.²⁶ Here, then, it is not a matter of dividing certain genera into coördinate species of equal value but, on the contrary, of distinguishing wholly different grades of existence which

²⁵ Cf. Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles*, pp. 54 ff.


²⁶ This distinction is described by Socrates in the *Parmenides* as the real task of Platonic dialectic (*διαίρεσθαι*) *χωρὶς ἀδρά καὶ ἀδρά τὰ εἶδη*, . . . *χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τοῦτων . . . μετέχοντα* 129 D, 130 B; cf. 133 D; cf. also *Republic* 476 A ff.; *Gorgias* 467 E; *Sophist* 253 D, 259 D, etc.

are related to one another as idea to reality, as the ever constant state of idea (στάσις) to the changeable state of the perceptible things (κίνησις).

The things within our human world are entirely separated from the divine world of ideas: it is the name alone that they have in common; they are "homonymous," as Plato himself says (*Parmenides* 133 D; *Phaedrus* 266 A; *Philebus* 57 B-D; cf. p. 35 *supra*). This difference between idea and phenomenon is compared in the *Phaedrus*⁸⁷ to the bilateral construction of the body: although we call our left hand a hand just as we do our right hand, yet the left hand is only "homonymous," in every respect a counter-image and inferior to the right one; and every part into which each of them can be subdivided has the same essential character as the whole. In the same way is the sphere of the human world a homonymic counter-image of the divine idea, and each of these two realms is subdivided again according to the same proportion as regards their truth and non-truth, but in another dimension as it were.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ 265 E ff. This passage, as Stenzel also points out (*op. cit.*, p. 62), represents the same diaeresis as the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*.

⁸⁸ I. e. κατὰ μήκος not κατὰ πλάτος (*Sophist* 266 A). What is meant by this expression follows from Aristotle (*De Caelo* 299 b 23; cf. Simplicius, *ad loc.*, p. 574, 25 ff.) and can best be explained by a diagram:



This diagram shows at first sight how every part of the divine sphere is reflected by one of the human. The highest concept of existence is the concept of "technē." The demiurgic technē is divided into the "divine" (AC) and into the "human" (A'C') in the dimension of

This dichotomy, therefore, as Plato himself expressly states (*Politicus* 262 C ff.), is not a merely logical one, so that the parts of the division are opposed to one another only according to logical contradiction, as A and non-A, but it is an objective contradiction, such as between "odd" and "even," or "right" and "left."³⁹ It is the contrast between true existence, idea, and the non-existence of mere appearance. All the subdivisions reflect over and over again this original difference which is implied in the idea itself (cf. p. 46 *supra*). The individual ideas are to the original idea of the one *agathon* "in regard to their truth and non-truth" as the objects of this visible world are to their origin, the sun (*Republic* 509 ff.).

It is evident that this "hypothetical diaeresis" (Aristotle, *Anal. Prior.* 46 b 29; *Anal. Post.* 91 b 17) of the Platonic dialectic is aiming at something entirely different from Aristotle's classificatory logic. Aristotle from the point of view of his syllogistic opposes it as insufficiently conclusive just because of its hypothetical character. It is, therefore, not true at all that in these dialogues Plato developed his dialectic in the direction of the Aristotelian logic.

Of a different meaning though are those merely facetious divisions in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*, the wittiness of which is based on the very fact that they overlook every difference of rank and thus bring together the most heterogeneous things. Or will one really believe that Plato is serious in defining the sophist as a fisherman who fishes for pupils or as a merchant who trades in knowledge or in subordinating under the species of hornless, tame bipeds who live in flocks the men with whom the statesman has to deal? It is expressly stated here (*Politicus* 266 C) that it is most ridiculous to ascribe men to the noblest and to the lowest species and that this method here is no more concerned about the sublime than about its opposite (cf. also *Sophist* 227

breadth. Each one of them is again subdivided according to whether it produces real things or only their images in a different dimension, that of "length," just as in the *Republic* (509 ff., 534 A) a line is divided by mathematical diaeresis according to a certain proportion "in regard to its truth and non-truth": $AD:DC = A'D':D'C'$. Every part of the human sphere is thus a counterpart of one of the divine sphere.

³⁹ Cf. the Pythagorean system of contradictions (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 986 a 22 and Ross, *ad loc.*).

B). Nature, above all organic nature, however, is the very realm where this classificatory division of species is scientifically justified. In the morphology of plants and animals it has its place up to the present day, and it was already practiced by ancient physicians.⁴⁰ Within this domain Plato, too, doubtless acknowledged the value of this method which was cultivated so much by his pupils.⁴¹

It is certainly true that in his later period after the *Theaetetus* Plato included the sphere of empirical reality, of nature, in his considerations to a much greater extent than before.⁴² But that does not prove, as has been claimed, a complete change of his philosophical point of view. Even at the end of the *Sophist*, the dialogue in which this method plays such an important part, Plato reveals through the concept of the divine demiurge beyond this region of existence the realm of the idea itself, of the *agathon*, after which it is fashioned. We see, then, that even here in his latest period the whole sphere of nature, the empirical world, for him remains absolutely separated from the real existence of the transcendent ideas.⁴³ It is true, as Aristotle from his point of view of continuity objects to the Platonists⁴⁴ that here being falls into different episodes "like a bad tragedy"; but it is this conception of being which forms the very essence of Plato's philosophy. He is the first and only philosopher of the classical Greek period to see the absolute good, God, beyond this world which he considers, therefore, to be merely created (*Timaeus* and *Sophist* 265 C ff.). Thereby he transgresses, in fact, the boundary of the peculiarly Greek notion

⁴⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus* 270 B; Mnesitheus, frags. 3 and 4 *apud* Galen, XI, 3, K.; Dietz, *Scholia ad Hippocratem et Galenum*, I, p. 238. Cf. W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* (1938), pp. 9 and 87, note.

⁴¹ Cf. Speusippus, frags. 5 ff. Lang; Epicrates, *F. O. A.*, II, 287 K., and above all Aristotle in his *Historia Animalium*.

⁴² Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 13 ff.; Stenzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 54 ff. and pp. 46, 53 *supra*. The indifference of the classificatory method towards the value of the diverse things which are combined here under one term would hardly be appropriate for Socrates whose philosophy is concerned with the ethical alone and pays so little attention to nature (*Phaedo* 96 ff.; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 987 b 1); therefore this method is attributed to the Eleatic.

⁴³ Cf. p. 48 *supra*.

⁴⁴ E. g. to Speusippus (*Metaphysics* 1076 a 1; 1090 b 19); cf. Alexander, *Metaphysics*, pp. 815, 28; 179, 22 and Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 4 a 14.

to which the world, nature itself, is God, and anticipates the Christian conception of the world, though in a specifically Greek form. It is for this reason that the transcendence of the idea remains incomprehensible even to his direct pupils. All of them and particularly Aristotle return to the limits of the Greek conception of being, nature.

6. The Platonic doctrine of the so-called ideal numbers
and its criticism by Aristotle

It has always been a difficulty for the interpretation of Aristotle's criticism of Plato that that form of the doctrine of ideas which Aristotle has in mind in which the ideas are numbers is not easily found in the preserved Platonic dialogues. What Aristotle refers to apparently is the other form of Platonic philosophy with which he became acquainted in the Academy through Plato's lectures (cf. pp. 41 f. *supra*). These speculations, no doubt, were Plato's chief interest during the last years of his life, as even after his death they were the focus of his pupils' philosophizing; Aristotle was right, therefore, in saying that for these Platonists philosophy had become identical with mathematics (*Metaphysics* 991 b 13; cf. 995 a 6; 1078 b 10; 1084 b 24), whereas Plato himself wanted mathematics to be studied only for the sake of the other, i. e. the idea of the *agathon* (*Republic* 531 D; 533 B). Thus the doctrine of the ideal numbers has been used as a new argument to show that Plato in his old age taught an entirely new philosophy, even different from that which is known from his later dialogues, and that Aristotle conceived his own theories in criticizing this late Platonic philosophy.

Aristotle begins the account of this Platonic doctrine, which he gives in the *Metaphysics*, with clear words (987 b 18): "Since the ideas are the cause (of existence) for the other things, their elements are the elements of everything that exists. As matter, the "great" and "small" are principles, as form of existence, however, the "one." For the ideas, the numbers, consist of them (i. e. the "great" and the "small") by means of participation in the one." Therefore, the ideas are numbers (cf. also *De Anima* 404 b 24; *Metaphysics* 1091 b 26; *Physics* 209 b 33) and they consist, like numbers, of two elements of existence, on the one hand of the "one" as the true existence (*Metaphysics*

1087 b 15), on the other hand of its opposite which Aristotle here calls the "great" and "small" or the *δύαδ ἀόριστος*, in other places the "indefinite" (*ἄπειρον*), "many" and "few," the "unequal," "relative," "other" or "non-being" (cf. *Metaphysics* 1087 b 16, 25; 1089 a 25, b 4-11; 1088 a 15, 21; 1091 b 32; 1092 b 32, etc.). That, however, is exactly the same conception of the dialectical structure of existence in general that we find not only in the dialogues of Plato's late period⁴⁵ but also as early as in the *Republic* (525 A) and in the *Phaedo* (102 B ff.), the only difference being that Aristotle expresses it in terms of his ontology whereby it assumes a coloring not quite adequate to its original intention. That Aristotle actually does not mean to give any other doctrines is proved by his unmistakable reference to its discussion in the *Sophist* (237-240; 256-260; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1089 a 1 and the commentators, *ad loc.*).

New is only the term *δύαδ (ἀόριστος)* which Aristotle uses here as elsewhere for the other element of the idea.⁴⁶ Aristotle explains that Plato assumed this "other" nature (apart from the one) to be a "two," because from it the numbers, "except the first, can easily be produced (*γενναῖσθαι*) as out of a mold (*ἐκμυαίον*)."⁴⁷ This element, however, as Aristotle says, is the

⁴⁵ Cf. *Philebus* 16 C ff.; 24 ff.; *Sophist* 237 ff.; *Parmenides* 130 B, and pp. 45 f. *supra*.

⁴⁶ According to Aristotle this term was coined by Plato in that lecture "On the *agathon*" (cf. frag. 28, Rose²).

⁴⁷ *Metaphysics* 987 b 33. The arithmetic of the Pythagoreans as well as that of Plato is a dyadic system, its principle being the divisibility of number into two equal groups, the "odd" and the "even" (cf. Plato, *Laws* 895 D; *Politicus* 262 E; *Phaedo* 104 A; *Gorgias* 451 A; *Charmides* 165 E; *Theaetetus* 185 D; *Republic* 510 C; *Parmenides* 143 C; *Protagoras* 356 E; *Hippias Major* 302 A; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 986 a 17; 990 a 9; *Categ.* 12 a 6; *Anal. Post.* 73 a 40; *Metaphysics* 1004 b 10; 1084 a 2, etc.). In this system, moreover, the prime numbers are taken as a sub-species of the odd (*Parmenides* 143 C; Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1084 a 3 ff.; Alexander, *Metaphysics*, p. 769, 20; Speusippus, frag. 4, 25 Lang). The whole series of number is deduced from these two basic forms, the "odd" and the "even." Since the Pythagoreans and Plato reduced physical body to mathematical body and again the mathematical dimension to numbers as the very substance of everything, the "odd" (or the *ἑν*) and the "even" (the *δύαδ* or the *δύαδ ἀόριστος*) become the ultimate elements (*στοιχεῖα*) of all things. These elements, in turn, are identified with the essential characteristics of the limit (*πέρας*) as the form and of the limitless (*ἄπειρον*) as the matter of things. For Plato the numbers are

same principle of the *ἀρετων* which the Pythagoreans too assume, only that Plato wanted to indicate the twofoldness of the relativity of the "great" and "small," i. e., the δύο *ἀρετα* (cf. *Metaphysics* 1088 a 15; *Physics* 203 a 15, 206 b 28). This thought is well known to us especially from the *Philebus*, in the terms of which Porphyry actually explains it (*apud* Simplicius, *Physics*, p. 453, 31 Diels). And if Aristotle says, furthermore, that Plato here differs from the Pythagoreans only in so far as he assumed, according to his dialectical method, that the numbers thus derived from these two elements are separated from the particulars, i. e. that they are transcendent ideas, this is also in accordance with the *Philebus* (15 ff.) and with the *Republic* (525 ff., cf. p. 49 *supra*).

Plato assumes three absolutely separate regions of existence: the true existence of the idea, the empirical existence of the sensible world, and in between the two the realm of the mathematical (cf. p. 50 *supra*). In the Socratic dialogues he had discussed the idea of the *agathon*; in the *Timaeus*, as also in the *Philebus*, he had shown on the other hand how this world through the "medium" and "bond" of the mathematical becomes an image of the true idea; in order to complete the contour of his philosophy in every direction there still remained for him to prove that this middle realm of the mathematical again is an image of the idea and of the *agathon* as outlined in the *Republic* (509 ff.; cf. *Phaedo* 99 C). With this philosophy he has dealt, however, in none of the writings which are preserved, but only in those famous lectures "On the *agathon*."⁴⁸

However important this doctrine of the ideal numbers must

ideas because they consist of the *στοιχεῖα τῶν πάντων* (*Metaphysics* 987 b 16). The production of numbers out of these two elements and their transcendent existence, then, is the chief object of Aristotle's criticism. A more detailed study of these mathematical doctrines in their relation to the development of Greek philosophy I hope to publish soon.

⁴⁸ Here Plato treated, according to Aristotle (Aristoxenus, *Harmonics* II, 30 M): "of the numbers, of geometry, of astronomy, and finally of the fact that the principle of limit is the one good." Aristotle in his *Physics* 209 b 15 mentions these doctrines as the "unwritten" (*ἀγραφα*), and they were certainly intended to remain unwritten, as Plato in the *Phaedrus* (276 A ff.) and in the *Seventh Epistle* (cf. p. 37 *supra*) requires for such philosophical discussions. It was thus against his intention that Aristotle and other pupils published them (cf. Simplicius, *Physics*, pp. 151, 6 and 453, 25).

have been for the philosophizing of Plato himself and of the Academy during the last period of Plato's life, it nevertheless cannot have supplanted but must rather have supplemented his original conception of the *agathon* which is referred to even by the title of these lectures. Aristotle's criticism makes it recede rather into the background. Merely by representing these thoughts as a purely theoretical doctrine he deprives them of their very core, i. e. of their relation to the very self of the philosopher, to the unity of acting and thinking in which alone that idea of the *agathon* is realized as the ultimate origin of everything.⁴⁹ Moreover, where Socrates in the Platonic dialogues occasionally proposes such a speculation of numbers a tone of sceptical self-irony is never missing which introduces them as poetry, as inspiration of the Muses or as old fables;⁵⁰ they cannot be taken quite seriously if confronted with the ultimate criterion of this incomparable conscientiousness with regard to truth. It is hard to believe, therefore, that Plato in those lectures should have propounded his doctrine of numbers, as for instance that curious production of numbers out of the "one" and the "indefinite two," as dogmatically as Aristotle makes it appear, without at the same time making clear its necessarily hypothetical character.⁵¹

⁴⁹ We must remember what Plato says in the *Seventh Epistle* (341 B) in regard to such systematic outlines of his philosophy: "That certain people have written about these things, I know, to be sure, but what they are they do not even know of themselves." This may refer also to such a report as the Aristotelian concerning the doctrine of the ideal numbers: what is lacking there is the Socratic principle, that consciousness of the philosopher himself whose existence is determined by the *agathon*, in whom alone for Plato these thoughts acquire their essential meaning and intrinsic truth (cf. also *Epinomis* 988 B and *Sophist* 267 B).

⁵⁰ Cf. e. g. the discussion of the so-called "nuptial number" in the eighth book of the *Republic* (545 D) or the Pythagorean theory in the *Philebus* (16 C, 20 B ff.).

⁵¹ In fact, the other hearers of these lectures, such as Xenocrates (frag. 54 Heinze) and Speusippus (frag. 54 Lang), regard the Platonic production of numbers as mere "hypotheses." In like manner Aristotle takes in its literal meaning what by Plato was meant to be mere hypothesis or mythical simile, as for instance the creation of the world in the *Timaeus* (29 B) or the doctrine of *anamnesis* in the *Meno* (81 A ff.), and he turns his criticism against it as against a doctrine in the strictest sense of the word (*De Caelo* 280 a 30; *De Anima* 430 a 23, and the commentators *ad loc.*). In *Metaphysics* 1093 a 5, according to

What is really at the bottom of this concept of the generation of numbers is the notion of that reduction of the numbers and ideas in general to the two ontologically basic elements of the "one" and the "multiplicity" (of the "limitless" and the "indefinite two," cf. p. 46 *supra*). The true essence of this concept is clear even through its Aristotelian reproduction: everything in so far as it is "one being" has in itself the imprint of the *agathon*, God, and thereby reflects the true character of the original idea to which it owes the origin of its being.⁵² Everything that is is one only through its partaking of the idea of the *agathon* which harmonizes and "binds together" the multiplicity into unity (*Timaeus* 31 C ff.; *Gorgias* 507 E; *Laws* 757 A; *Republic* 525 E; *Philebus* 20 C ff., etc., cf. pp. 45 f. *supra*). In itself everything would be without unity and consistency, falling apart into infinity as mere dimension of matter and space the bottom of which can never be touched even with the most extensive bisection—it would be the fathomless abyss of non-being which appears as the resulting remainder of every bisection⁵³ as that which is in between two "ones."⁵⁴

Syrianus' interpretation (*ad loc.*, p. 190, 12), Aristotle is referring to such speculations as that of the nuptial number and takes them for strictly dogmatic (compare also *Metaphysics* 1092 b 26 with *Philebus* 25 ff.). Likewise he understands the generation (*γένεσις*) of numbers as a real one (*Metaphysics* 1088 b 14-35; 1091 a 12-27; 1091 b 24), although he must admit that Plato talked about this generation in the same hypothetical way as in the *Timaeus*, i.e. merely θεωρησάτω ερεκεν (*Metaphysics* 1091 a 28), in a way similar to those who draw geometrical figures διδασκαλίας χάριν (*De Caelo* 280 a 1, and the commentators *ad loc.*).

⁵² That the *agathon* is the *εἶς* itself and that, therefore, "every unity becomes a kind of *agathon*" is unambiguously testified to by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 1091 b 14-15; 988 a 10; *Eth. Nic.* I, 4) for him who hesitates to draw this conclusion from the Plato passages themselves discussed above.

⁵³ Thus Porphyry, *apud* Simplicius, *Physics*, p. 453, 38 ff. Diels. This Platonic conception of the insubstantiality of matter which is made manifest through its infinite divisibility was used by Augustine (e.g. *De immortalitate animae* 12, *De genesi* II, 8; IV, 13; *Epistolae* III, 2) to show that the material world in itself is nothing and owes its being only to its being created by God, which is the condition of its consistency.

⁵⁴ This becomes manifest first in the number "two" in which each "one" of the two ones is one: "For in the 'two' the unity first falls

What to naïve appearance seems most certain and sound, the continuum of this solid corporeality, vanishes before the exact thought into the insubstantial relativity of "being other" and "non-being" as its real truth (cf. e. g. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 992 b 2; 1092 b 1; *Physics* 187 a 15; 189 b 15, etc.). It is just this in which the philosophical profundity and truth of the Platonic thought consists: this world—for that "dyad" of the more and less, expressed in our language, is nothing else than the idea of the world just as that "one" is the idea of God—this world in its true being can be in fact only hypothetical relativity without real substance, if it is determined by merely mathematical laws to the degree which astronomy and harmonics had already recognized at that time (cf. e. g. *Republic* 530 ff.).

Aristotle, on the contrary, who holds by "the phenomena" and interprets them according to common sense, cannot imagine a mathematical, quantitative definition or, in general, a relation without a fundamental, solid substance of which the relation is only a predicate (e. g. *Metaphysics* 1088 a 15; 992 b 1; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 21; *Metaphysics* 990 b 17). In the different forms of the logico-grammatical "predication,"⁵⁵ in the "category," he believes that he grasps the true metaphysical structure of being in general. To him there are as many kinds of "predication" as there are kinds of being, i. e. ways in which within the individual substance the idea proceeds from mere potentiality to material realization (cf. p. 52 *supra*). Thus for him even the idea is predicated as a *quale* as it were, not different from "the white" for instance, i. e. as an accident (*συμβεβηκός*) always in reference only to one particular basic substance (*Categ.* 3 b 18; *Physics* 186 a 25; *Metaphysics* 1087 b 34, etc.); the idea in itself is non-being (*Metaphysics* 1087 a 1, cf. 1088 b 3). By means of this doctrine of categories he tries to refute Plato's conception of the transcendence of the idea (e. g. *Metaphysics* 1089 a 1-1090 a 2); and it was for this purpose probably that Aristotle first developed

asunder (in the two ones between which gapes nothingness)." For Plato, therefore, as for the Pythagoreans (cf. Ross *ad loc.*) the "two" is the true "idea of the line" and thereby of dimension in general (*Metaphysics* 1036 b 12, and Alexander, *ad loc.*, p. 512, 37).

⁵⁵ Cf. the *πρώσεις* *Metaphysics* 1089 a 26 and the interpretation of Brentano (*Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles* [1862], pp. 85 ff.).

this theory of categories as a logical instrument.⁵⁶ While for Plato the idea is the being of God, absolutely separated from the particulars which only partake of it, for Aristotle it is inherent in them, even in the sense of categories. While for Plato the fundamental notions⁵⁷ serve to separate everywhere being from appearance, idea from particular, the Aristotelian categories are meant to express just the inseparable unity of idea and individual substance, the inherence of the idea in the subject.

7. The contrast between Plato's and Aristotle's conception of *voûs*

Against our interpretation that the transcendence of the idea is quite foreign to Aristotle one objection may have already presented itself: does Aristotle not expressly define the *voûs* which to him is the *εἶδος εἰδῶν*, the essential and highest principle of his philosophy, God himself, as transcendent, as *χωριστός* (*De Anima* 430 a 17; 413 b 26; *Metaphysics* 1078 a 22, etc.)? The *voûs* enters the human soul *θύραθεν*, from without (*De Gen. Animal.* 736 b 28; 744 b 21) and, similar to the Platonic idea, is in itself the unmoved principle which simply as object of *eros* moves the world and everything in it (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 1 ff.). *Noûs* is the divine into which man himself must be transformed during his life in order to become immortal as far as possible (*Eth. Nic.* 1177 b 26), just as for Plato it is the goal of life to become similar to God. Reminiscences of Platonic formulations are unmistakable here. Has Plato's transcendent idea not been replaced by Aristotle's *voûs*?⁵⁸ The picture which Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* (XII, 7) draws of his philosophy reminds us of that of the Platonic *Timaeus*. Here, as there, the world has in itself its true principle of life, and it is its *voûs* which directs it in its movement. Also with Plato the soul of the world, of this "visible god," is conceived as luminary ether

⁵⁶ Concerning the Aristotelian theory of categories cf. v. Fritz, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, XL (1931), pp. 449 ff.

⁵⁷ E.g. the five *γένη* or *εἶδη* of the *Sophist* 254 D: the "identical" and the "different," "rest," "motion," and "being" in general; cf. the other antinomies such as "similar" and "dissimilar," "one" and "two," "like" and "unlike" in the *Theaetetus* 185, *Timaeus* 37 A, etc.

⁵⁸ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 230 and 245, etc.

which surrounds and pervades the globe of the fixed stars (*Timaeus* 34 B; cf. *Republic* 616 B), and the *voûs* is inherent in the soul as its higher principle (*Timaeus* 30 B; *Sophist* 249 A; *Philebus* 30 C, etc.).

But whereas for Plato in the *Timaeus* above the soul and its *voûs* there is still the world of the idea as the true god toward which the glance of the *voûs* is directed, for Aristotle this highest grade of being is lifted off, as it were. Here the ideas are reduced to thoughts of the *voûs*, God, which He thinks in thinking Himself (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 20). For Plato the ideas are in the "super-celestial region," and the *voûs* has to ascend, therefore, beyond the heaven in order to behold the ideas there above (*Phaedrus* 247 C; cf. *Republic* 508 C ff.); for Aristotle the soul and its *voûs* are the very place of the ideas,⁵⁹ which are not above the *voûs* but within it. The *voûs*, then, is for Plato not the highest being, but beyond it⁶⁰ stands, as cause of every being and all truth, the idea of the *agathon* which "illuminates" the *voûs* in its turn, thereby creating its power (*δύναμις*) of thinking and understanding; for Aristotle, on the contrary, the *voûs* is the *δύναμις* or "the idea of the ideas" (*De Anima* 432 a 2; 429 a 15).⁶¹ For Aristotle the *voûs* is transcendent only in so far as it is the true substance which is presupposed by all other (*Topics* 135 a 1; *Metaphysics* 1028 a 34), as the Beyond of the merely sensible perceptible, the unmoved origin of all motion. But it is just for this reason that it is nothing but the true substance, the God of this world.⁶² Although the *voûs* is conceived as the unmoved God who moves the world merely as an object of its *eros*, as the teleological cause of the world, similar to the Platonic idea, yet, on the other hand, He is the immediate source of all

⁵⁹ Aristotle, *De Anima* 429 a 27 (τόπος εἰδῶν), cf. Asclepius, *Metaphysics*, p. 69, 19.

⁶⁰ Aristotle (frag. 49 Rose³) only once mentions the Platonic conception of the divinity as ἐπέκεινται τι τοῦ νοῦ as it follows from the quoted passage of the *Republic* (509 B) and cites it as another possible conception of God besides his own (cf. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 163).

⁶¹ With Plato it is the εἶς which is the idea of ideas, cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 988 a 10.

⁶² I. e. of this sphere of fixed stars with which are coördinated almost as His equals or to which are subordinated the other similarly visible gods of the different spheres with their respective *voûs*; and it is this Olympic Pantheon to which Aristotle refers the words of the *Iliad* (B 204) εἰς κόλπον ἔστω, cf. *Metaphysics* 1076 a 4.

its movement and at the same time the true matter of its basic substance. The different "causes" (*telos*, substantial form, motion, and matter) as distinguished by Aristotle coincide in the actual subject-object identity of the *voûs* (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 20; *De Anima* 430 a 2). The *voûs* is thus the divine core of nature, its architectonic intelligence⁶³ which produces all organic growth, its true entelechy and energy. This God, then, although He dwells in the ether and is superior to the change of the terrestrial world, and in that respect is transcendent, yet is finally immanent in nature as its true substance.

This system, to be sure, is an impressive rational construction in which everything is harmonized without a breach, as Aristotle boasts against Plato.⁶⁴ The movement of the world has for Plato its origin—and that is decisive, as the Aristotelian criticism

⁶³ *De partibus animal.* 645 a 9 ff. ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις; for other passages cf. Bonitz, *Index*, 174 b 14 ff.; cf. also p. 53 *supra*.

⁶⁴ The transcendence (*δαιμονία ὑπερβολή*) of the *agathon* is explained by Socrates in the *Republic* (509 D) through that line which is divided according to an "analogy" of which the single sections symbolize the different realms of being; each of these sections is to be thought of as being divided according to the same analogy, down to the *ἀτομὸν εἶδος* (cf. p. 169 *supra*). The true meaning of this simile lies in the fact that the *agathon* itself does not occur in any of these sections of being. It is expressed only through this "bond" of the (geometrical) "analogy" which as unity ties all being together into one (*Timaeus* 31 C; cf. *Phaedo* 99 C). God, as the transcendental good, can be known only by analogy. Thus, everywhere He is to be grasped only by similes; but in everything, even in the sensible, a likeness of Him can also be recognized (cf. Syrianus, *Metaphysics*, p. 162, 1). Only dialectic succeeds in approaching Him Himself (*Republic* 533 A; *Epistle* VII, 341 C, 344 B). Aristotle, on the contrary, denies this transcendent idea of the *agathon* with the characteristic argument that man, even granted that it exists, cannot attain it anyhow (*Eth. Nic.* 1096 b 32). The transcendent idea of the *agathon* is replaced by him with the *δν* as ultimate *δν* (*Metaphysics* 1033 a 32-b 34; 1054 a 13; 1091 b 20, etc.), i.e. "God or the *voûs* (*Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 24) as the true "substance" and "energy" of the world (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 22), as *ens perfectissimum* which is not the *agathon* but which is preëminently *ἀγαθόν* besides the other *ἀγαθά* (*Metaphysics* 1072 b 19; 1091 b 15; *Eth. Nic.* 1096 a 24; cf. p. 182 *infra*). The many *agatha* are "one" however only in so far as they all, like the *δν*, "analogically" are related to "*δν*," namely to the substance (*Eth. Nic.* 1096 b 26). Thus the Aristotelian system culminates in the ontological principle of the "analogia entis" which is opposed to that of Plato which may be called "analogia boni."

rightly emphasizes—in an entirely different principle, separated from the idea of the *agathon*, namely in the soul, in the life of the universe, in the daemonic spontaneity of its “self-movement.”⁶⁸ We may add that the passages in the *Timaeus*, the *Republic*, the *Symposium*, the *Phaedrus*, from which we drew Plato’s opinion about the position of the *νοῦς* within the gradation of being, are not meant by Plato as ἀληθὺς λόγος, as Aristotle evidently takes them and to which he opposes his own system as another dogmatic doctrine, but as a symbolic myth. Even concerning this principal discussion of the transcendent *agathon* in its relation to the *νοῦς* and its object, being, Socrates in the *Republic* (506 C; 509 C) admits that he is speaking as of something about which he really has no knowledge and that he is saying what seems likely to him at the moment. What Plato is sure of is only this μέγιστον μάθημα of the *agathon* as the ultimate; no longer hypothetical, principle of all thinking and being, wherefrom he concludes the necessarily hypothetical character of all thinking as well as of its objects, the ideas,⁶⁹ and the hypothetical dialectic as the true philosophical method. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the *νοῦς* itself is the highest principle and comprehends therefore in comprehending itself (“imme-

⁶⁸ Cf. *Phaedrus* 245 C ff.; *Laws* 895 A ff.; *Timaeus* 34 ff., and p. 53 *supra*; cf. also Aristotle, *Topics* 140 b 4; *De Anima* 404 a 21; *Metaphysics* 1071 b 37, etc.

⁶⁹ Natorp has already stressed, to be sure, the hypothetical character of the Platonic idea; but by interpreting the ideas, in the manner of the Neo-Kantians, merely as “suppositions of thought” (*Platos Ideenlehre*, p. 150 and *passim*; but cf. second edition, pp. 487 ff.) as merely logical principles; as laws rather than things, he completely reverses the Platonic conception. The individual idea is indeed hypothesis for Plato, not because it is assumed only by thinking, but because it is really posited by the principle of the *agathon*, by God Himself (i. e. the *φύρουργός* of the idea in the mythical metaphor of the *Republic* [597 D]). The individual idea is posited together with the other ideas in the unity of being, i. e. the world of the ideas, the image of which is the unity of this heaven (cf. p. 45, n. 13 *supra*); therefore it can be understood only in relation to them and to the *agathon*, i. e. as hypothesis. The subjective interpretation of the Neo-Kantians is here entirely out of place. And the same is true of the concept of transcendence: the *agathon* is not transcendent only in the sense that it is beyond thinking and subjective consciousness, but also in the sense that its supposition lies beyond all being, i. e. beyond all definite, perceptible existence in general.

diately" and through "contact," just as does sense-perception (the sensible) those ultimate truths from which everything else is concluded and through which it is mediated (*Metaphysics* 1051 b 24; 1072 b 20; *Anal. Post.* 72 a 7; 84 b 39; 100 b 8; cf. also Theophrastus, *Metaphysics* 9 b 15). The *voûs* itself, even here, is the true being, and as the *ens perfectissimum*, as God, it is, though not the *agathon*, yet essentially *agathon* (cf. p. 168 *supra*). Thus from this highest point of the system the completely different character of the Aristotelian doctrine becomes manifest.

It is true, the passages in which Aristotle celebrates the *voûs* as the divine principle of the world undoubtedly recall by reason of their hieratic language similar phrases of Plato and therefore probably belong to Aristotle's earlier period;⁶⁷ yet, this fact does not provide an argument for the assumption that Aristotle at that time still adhered to the Platonic doctrine of ideas or at least was sympathetic to it.⁶⁸ Nor is this proved by his early exoteric writing which seemed indeed to emphasize less strongly his opposition to Plato.⁶⁹ It is not in accordance with the conception of Attic urbanity, constantly required by Plato himself for philosophical discussions, to bring the controversies of the school into the open in such popular writings intended for a wider circle.

Plato, as we saw, never changed in regard to his fundamental philosophical conception of God as the transcendental good.⁷⁰ For a philosopher like Plato for whom the realization of his own *ἀρετή* is the necessary presupposition for the knowledge of the true being, of the *agathon*, this being can remain only transcendent idea, because it is recognized by the philosopher as just that which he himself is not and which he, being conscious of his own limitations, of his own non-being and ignorance, is able therefore to conceive. That implies, however, Plato's irreconcilable opposition to the Aristotelian concept of philosophy as a

⁶⁷ Cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 230, cf. pp. 228 and 248.

⁶⁸ Cf. Appendix *infra*.

⁶⁹ Cf. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 23-102; but cf. also frags. 8 and 9 Rose and H. G. Gadamer, *Hermes*, LXIII (1928), p. 155.

⁷⁰ If the *Seventh Epistle* is genuine, Plato himself "as an old man" would have expressly stated it there in a way similar to that of the *Seventh Epistle* (cf. pp. 36 ff. *supra* and Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, p. 178).

merely theoretical science of being which is able to know the world and the objects in it, even those of ethics, through the logical analysis of their phenomenal appearance, and to comprehend and teach them through general concepts which are equally true for everybody.

It proves the greatness of Greek philosophy that there even this ultimate philosophical contrast which we recognize throughout the history of philosophy found its classical expression. Not that any true philosopher could ever lack entirely either of these two poles—in the tension of this contrast between theoretical objectivity and ethico-religious existence philosophy in general has its place. But the point is which one of these two poles is decisively accentuated; Aristotle is the most imposing representative of that attitude of purely theoretical objectivity and faithful phenomenological observation which are the chief characteristics of the descriptive sciences of nature and of philologico-historical research. Without Plato, however, there would not exist what since has been and alone should be called philosophy: that power of thought which is able to change man in his innermost existence by stimulating his moral volition together with his desire for the knowledge of exact science.

ERICH FRANK.

APPENDIX.

According to Jaeger, Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*, particularly in three passages, confesses himself to be still a Platonist (cf. W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles*, pp. 190 ff. and following him Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, p. 406):

1) 1086 b 14: *ὁ δὲ καὶ τοῖς λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας ἔχει τινὰ ἀπορίαν . . . καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν τοῖς διαπορήμασιν ἐλέχθη πρότερον, λέγωμεν νῦν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τις μὴ θήσει τὰς οὐσίας εἶναι κεχωρισμένας, . . . ἀναιρήσει τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς βουλόμεθα λέγειν.* Jaeger. (p. 194) translates: "Wenn man die Existenz für sich seiender Wesenheiten nach Analogie der sinnlichen Einzeldinge bestreitet (wie dies Aristoteles selbst tut), so hebt man die οὐσία in dem Sinne wie wir Platoniker sie verstehen, auf." The difficulty in question is that which in the third Book (1003 a 6; cf. Alexander, p. 787, 8) is thus formulated: *πρότερον καθόλου εἶναι ἢ ὡς λέγομεν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι, σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τοιοῦδε, ἢ δ' οὐσία τόδε τι* (cf. p. 52 *supra*). It is obvious that in the passage the words οὐσίαν, ὡς βουλόμεθα λέγειν cannot mean the Platonic conception of οὐσία which Aristotle here actually refutes and declares to be μὴ οὐσία (1087 a 1); it is rather, as in the

third Book, the Aristotelian conception of the *τόδε τι* (thus also Alexander, *ad loc.*, p. 787, 18). This explains also the expression *βουλόμεθα λέγειν* or merely *λέγειν* (1003 a 7): "As we (in opposition to Plato) intend to understand it."

2) 1091 a 31: *ἀπορίαν μὲν ταύτην, πότερόν ἐστὶ τι ἐκείνων οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ἢ οὐ, ἀλλ' ὅστερογενῆ.* Jaeger paraphrases this: "Wir Platoniker setzen an die Spitze der Philosophie und den Anfang der Welt das Gute an sich . . . oder höchste Gut, . . . Spensipp dagegen das Gute . . . als am Ende des Prozesses sich selbst verwirklichend"; in this way Aristotle, as Jaeger states, claims that he himself is more truly Platonic than Spensippus. In fact, Aristotle is in agreement with Plato in so far as he too puts the *agathon* as the "arche" at the beginning; however, in the following he desires to show not this accord with Plato but rather the impossibility (*δυσχέρεια*) of the Platonic concept of the *agathon* from which he as well as Spensippus starts, although the latter draws wrong conclusions from it. Also in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1096 b 5; cf. *Metaphysics* 1093 b 11) Aristotle refutes the Platonic *agathon* with similar arguments, in order to declare the opinion of Spensippus, on the contrary, to be more plausible. Even Jaeger's interpretation of *οἷον βουλόμεθα λέγειν* is not entirely impossible here; still it seems more likely to me that this emphatic expression, its obvious meaning taken into consideration in 1086 b 19, is meant by Aristotle to express here too: "The *agathon* itself as we (in opposition to Plato) intend to understand it."

3) 990 b 17: *ὅπως τε ἀναρροῦσιν οἱ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν λόγοι, ἃ μᾶλλον εἶναι βουλόμεθα οἱ λέγοντες εἶδη τοῦ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναι.* That, to be sure, is the reading of Codex E and of Asclepius alone, whereas A, b, Γ, Alexander, and the identical passage of Book XIV, 4, 1079 a 14 read *βούλονται*. Jaeger, however (pp. 192-3, following Blass), deletes the *οἱ λέγοντες εἶδη* in E as an interpolation from the parallel passage in Book XIV and interprets, accepting the reading of E: "Sie heben dasjenige auf, dessen Existenz wir Platoniker in noch höherem Grade für wichtig halten als die der Ideen selbst, nämlich die Prinzipien der Ideen." Aristotle would, then, adhere to that Platonic doctrine of the *ἀρχαί* of the ideas which he attacked most ardently in the immediately preceding chapter 6 and in the following paragraphs. That is hard to believe. This difficulty disappears, to be sure, if one reads *βούλονται* with Alexander and the majority of the manuscripts. If, however, for general reasons of textual criticism the *βουλόμεθα* of E and Asclepius seems preferable in this case, we must interpret the first person plural here as in the other places of the first and third Books, namely that Aristotle wants to express by it *οἰκεῖα ἀναρρεῖν*, as he says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* 1096 a 13: "Since friendly men have introduced the forms" (thus also Alexander, *Metaphysics*, pp. 78, 1; 106, 9; 196, 23). But if there these Platonic opinions seemed to him to belong to the family as it were, still there as here he refutes them expressly, that is, he does not sympathize with them, not to mention the fact that by "we" he does not mean so much to identify himself with Plato himself (except perhaps in 991 b 7) as rather with

his pupils, the Academicians (cf. Jaeger, *Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik* [1912], p. 32) like Xenocrates and Speusippus. For it is only for them (and for Aristotle) that the denial of ideas and their replacement by πολλὰ ἀρχαί (1028 b 18; Asclepius, *ad loc.*; cf. 1075 b 37, etc.) as well as the denial of the idea of artefacts (991 b 6; 990 b 11; cf. Ross, *ad loc.*) or of the relative as a separate γένος (990 b 16) can be valid. It was probably on account of these difficulties (as developed here by Aristotle) that Speusippus and Xenocrates, as Aristotle frequently emphasizes (1091 a 37; cf. p. 172 *supra* and 1090 a 2; 1086 a 2, etc.), had been led to abandon the Platonic conception of ideas. For, even though he does not completely succeed in carrying them along with his radical conclusions, yet he obviously wanted to do so. The first person plural probably is taken over from the special treatise *Περὶ ἰδεῶν* (cf. Karpp, *Hermes*, LXVIII [1933], p. 391) which was written, perhaps, while Plato was still alive and from which this whole passage in Books I and XIII is but an excerpt (cf. p. 47, n. 16 *supra*). In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1138 b 23), however, he uses the first person plural also in quoting a Platonic definition of virtue which he opposes some pages later 1144 b 22-27.

From all these arguments it follows that in the passages quoted by Jaeger Aristotle does not necessarily still adhere to the Platonic idea, even though he may certainly have been still conscious of his community with the Academy.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE TRIBES ANTIGONIS AND DEMETRIAS.

In honor of Demetrios Poliorketes and his father, Antigonos, the Athenians added two new tribes, Antigonis and Demetrias, which, in this order, were placed at the head of the list of twelve tribes. They were officially instituted in the Athenian year 307/6 B. C. some time after the fifth prytany.¹ As recently as the publication of Dinsmoor's *Archons of Athens* (p. 450), the maximum number of demes assigned to the two Macedonian tribes was twenty-four; two, and perhaps more, incorrectly. Recent material from the Athenian Agora has revealed four new demes for these two tribes, and it is now possible to add still two more as well as to review the evidence for former identifications.

In *I. G.*, II², 2413, which Hondius (*ad S. E. G.*, III, 142) classified as a diaitetai or klerouchoi list, Kirchner as a register from Pandionis and Leontis, and Gomme (*The Population of Athens*, p. 51, note 2) as a bouleutai list, the names are arranged under five demotics: [...⁵.] *ιείς* (with 1 name),² *Κυθήριοι* (2), *Κυδαθηναίεις* (12), *Αἰθαλίδαι* (2), and *Ποτάμοι* (*Δειραδιῶται*) (1 + ?). The restoration which suggests itself for line 1 is [*Παιαν*]*ιείς*,³ and, indeed, it is known that *Παιανὰ καθύπερθε* regularly had one representative in the boule.⁴ Four of these demes are definitely established as members of the tribe Antigonis,⁵ so the conclusion seems inescapable that the fifth, Kytheros, concerning whose tribal affiliation in the period 307-200 B. C. nothing has been known, must now be identified as a part of that same tribe. The inscription, then, is a fragment of a bouleutai list and may be provisionally dated in the year 304/3 B. C., when one of its number is already known to have held one of his two eligible councillorships.⁶

¹ See Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 220-221 and Glotz-Roussel-Cohen, *Histoire Grecque*, IV, p. 330, note 79. Cf. also Wilhelm, *Anatolian Studies Presented to W. H. Buckler*, pp. 348-349.

² The spacing is in accord with the transcription in *I. G.*, II, 1024.

³ Cf. Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 53, note 2.

⁴ See *I. G.*, II², 1740, lines 44-45, and Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

⁵ Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp. 444-447.

⁶ *Εὐχόσιος Ἐπιμηθείδου Κυδαθηναίως* (line 11) is known from *I. G.*, II², 486, lines 8-9; *I. G.*, II², 597 *add.*, lines 4-5 (= Robert, *Collection*

Similarly, in the case of *I. G.*, II², 2437, which is dated in the second half of the third century B. C., the extant fragment preserves a list of names arranged under five demotics. Four of these demes, Oion (Kerameikon), Kothokidai, Hippotomadai, and Phyle, are assigned with certainty to the tribe Demetrias.⁷ It follows, therefore, that the fifth, Potamos, was also from Demetrias and that the inscription is to be recognized for the first time as a portion of a bouleutai or prytany list.⁸ Whether this Potamos is to be identified as καθύπερθεν or ὑπέρερθεν cannot be determined from the number of councillors (2). Before 307/6 B. C., Potamos καθύπερθεν was regularly represented by two councillors; Potamos ὑπέρερθεν by one.⁹ But after the creation of the two new tribes, it appears from *Prytaneis*, no. 36 and *I. G.*, II², 2437 that both might be represented by two. It is to be noted that Potamos Deiradiotes was assigned to Antigoni, Potamos καθύπερθεν or ὑπέρερθεν to Demetrias, with the other third remaining in Leontis. It has formerly been held that all the demes of Demetrias with the special exception of Diomeia were taken from the last six (V-X) of the original tribes,¹⁰ but, as appears below, this rule no longer applies.

The evidence for the composition of the two Macedonian tribes is presented below. The table is based on those of Schoeffer in *R.-E.*, s. v. *Δῆμοι* and of Dinsmoor in the *Archons of Athens*, pp. 444-447, but there are many additions. The name of the deme is followed by its original tribal affiliation and its trittys location. Next is given the evidence for its assignment to Anti-

Frœhner, no. 3; cf. Klaffenbach, *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1937, pp. 1682-1683) and *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 297, lines 9-10, to have been a councillor in 304/3 B. C.

⁷ For Kothokidai and Hippotomadai, see Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, p. 445; for Oion and Phyle, see the table below.

⁸ The original left edge of the stone is said to be preserved, and in the case of bouleutai lists Tribe II was usually placed in the second column. On the other hand, the presence of small demes in the leftmost column militates against the interpretation of the document as a prytany list. The absence of patronymics does not afford a clue, for their omission is the exception in both bouleutai and prytany lists of the fourth century. Sundwall (*Eranos*, XXV [1927], p. 192) had noted that the deme representation in this fragment was identical with normal bouleutic representation, so he conjectured that the inscription contained praise for a committee of the boule.

⁹ See Gomme, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

¹⁰ See Dinsmoor, *op. cit.*, p. 448.

gonis or Demetrias; then, its probable representation in the boule so far as this is known. The assignments are corroborated in many cases by the secretary cycle (for the latest table, see Meritt, *Hesperia*, VII [1938], pp. 131-139), but this has been built up, for the most part, on the evidence of deme affiliation, so it has not been included in the following.

ANTIGONIS

IDENTIFICATIONS CERTAIN.

Agryle B. From Erechtheis. Town-deme.

I. G., II^a, 832. *Hesperia*, II (1933), nos 13 and 14 (= *Prytaneis*, no. 8). Bouleutai 3.

Aithalidai. From Leontis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II^a, 665; 770; 1706, line 95;¹¹ and 2413, line 19. Bouleutai 2.

Eitea A. From Akamantis. Inland-deme (?).

I. G., II^a, 665, line 44. Bouleutai ?

Gargettos. From Aigeis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II^a, 478, line 38; 681, lines 8-9; 912, line 21 (see Dow, *Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 189); 1704, line 1; 1706, line 55. *Hesperia*, VII (1938), no. 20, line 41. Bouleutai 4(?).

Ikaria A. From Aigeis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II^a, 766, lines 22-23 (see Kirchner, *ad loc.* and Bates, *The Five Post-Kleisthenean Tribes*, p. 10); 912, line 22. Bouleutai 4 or 5.

Kydathenaion. From Pandionis. Town-deme.

I. G., II^a, 665, line 46; 912, line 11; 1706, lines 15, 141, and 155; 2413, line 6. *Prytaneis*, no. 32(?). Bouleutai 12.

Kytheros. From Pandionis. Inland-deme.¹²

I. G., II^a, 2413, line 3. Bouleutai 2.

Lamprai A. From Erechtheis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II^a, 681, line 10; 792, line 18; 852, line 5; 1706, lines 35 and 43(?). *Hesperia*, II (1933), nos. 13 and 14 (= *Prytaneis*, no. 8). Bouleutai 5.

¹¹ All references to *I. G.*, II^a, 1706, are to Dow's publication in *Hesperia*, II (1933), Plate XIV.

¹² So Solders, *Die ausserstädtischen Kulte und die Einigung Attikas*, p. 108. Gomme (*op. cit.*, p. 58) classifies it as a town deme.

Paiania καθύπερθεν.¹³ From Pandionis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 378, line 7 (= *Hesperia*, VII [1938], p. 99); 478, line 34; 2413, line 1. Bouleutai 2.

Pergase A. From Erechtheis. Inland-deme.

I. G., II², 912, line 22. *Hesperia*, II (1933), nos. 13 and 14 (= *Prytaneis*, no. 8). Bouleutai 2.

Potamos Deiradiotes. From Leontis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 488, lines 5-6; 2413, line 22. Bouleutai 1 or 2.

IDENTIFICATION UNCERTAIN.

Deiradiotai. From Leontis. Coast-deme.

This deme must be assigned to one of the Macedonian tribes in accord with *I. G.*, II², 1706, line 105. Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 448) has favored Antigonis, because Potamos Deiradiotes, with which Deiradiotai was closely associated, was assigned to it, and he has been followed by Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 177).

Bouleutai 2.

IDENTIFICATIONS INCORRECT.

Ankyle B. Aigeis.

The only evidence for the removal of this deme from Aigeis was offered by Kirchner in *Rhein. Mus.*, LIX (1904), p. 299, on the basis of *I. G.*, II², 678, lines 20-21 (third century), where Ankyle furnished only one prytanis for Aigeis as against two in *I. G.*, II², 1747 (ca. 350 B. C.) and 1749 (341/0 B. C.). This transfer has been accepted by Schebelew, Dinsmoor, Gomme, *et alii*, although variations of one representative for a deme are numerous in the prytany and bouleutai lists. See below.

Phegaia A. Pandionis.

The assignment of this deme to Antigonis has been rejected by Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 189) in the light of his new reading for *I. G.*, II², 912, line 24.

DEMETRIAS

IDENTIFICATIONS CERTAIN.

Anakaia B. From Hippothontis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 1706, line 96; see below p. 193. Bouleutai 2(?).

¹³ See Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 12, note 1.

Atene B.¹⁴ From Antiochis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 502, line 8; 1706, line 135. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 12.
Bouleutai 3(?).

Daidalidai. From Kekropis. Inland-deme.

Hesperia, IX (1940), no. 10. Unpublished Agora prytany list
(Agora Inv. No. I 1804 plus 1870). Bouleutai 1.

Diomeia. From Aigeis.¹⁵ Town-deme.

I. G., II², 1706, line 1 (see Dow, *Hesperia* III [1934], p. 180).
Hesperia, IX (1940), nos. 10 and 11. Bouleutai 1.

Hagnous. From Akamantis. Inland-deme (?).

Stephanos of Byzantium, s. v. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 11.
Bouleutai 4+.

Hippotomadai. From Oineis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 681, lines 16 and 17; 1706, line 52; 2437, line 13.
Hesperia, IX (1940), no. 11. Unpublished Agora prytany list
(Agora Inv. No. I 1804 plus 1870).
Bouleutai 1.

Koile. From Hippothontis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 665, line 51; 681, lines 12 and 13; 838, line 8. *Hesperia*,
VII (1938), no. 20, line 45; IX (1940), nos. 10 and 12.
Bouleutai 1.

Kothokidai. From Oineis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 681, line 14; 697, line 7; 1706, line 25; 2437, line 10.
Bouleutai 2.

Melite. From Kekropis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 488, lines 6-7; 665, line 49; 792, line 21; 1704, line 2.
Hesperia, IX (1940), nos. 10 and 12.
Bouleutai in fourth century 17.

Oion Kerameikon. From Leontis. Inland-deme (?).

I. G., II², 2437, line 8. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 11. Unpublished
Agora prytany list (Agora Inv. No. I 1804 plus 1870).
Bouleutai 1.

Phyle B.¹⁶ From Oineis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 1706, line 143 (see below); 2437, line 15. *Hesperia*,
IX (1940), no. 10. Bouleutai 4.¹⁷

¹⁴ For the division of Atene, see below, pp. 192-193.

¹⁵ See Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 143, note 1.

¹⁶ For Phyle being divided, see Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 76.

¹⁷ Sundwall (*Eranos*, XXV [1927], p. 192) states that a demotic was inscribed in line 20 of *I. G.*, II², 2437. This gives the number of four for the bouleutai of Phyle B, as against three for the undivided tribe in the period before 307 B. C.

Poros. From Akamantis. Town-deme (?).

Hesperia, IX (1940), nos. 10 and 12.

Bouleutai 1.

Potamos καθύπ. or υπέν. From Leontis. Town-deme (?).¹⁸

I. G., II², 2437.

Bouleutai 2.

Thorai. From Antiochis. Coast-deme.

I. G., II², 832, lines 6-7; 1708, lines 38 and 45. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 10.

Bouleutai 4(?)

Xypete. From Kekropis. Town-deme.

I. G., II², 478, line 33; 681, line 15. *Hesperia*, IX (1940), no. 10.

Bouleutai 1

IDENTIFICATION UNCERTAIN.

Amphitrope B. From Antiochis. Coast-deme.

Assignment to Demetrias was made for the first time by Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 447) on the basis of *I. G.*, II², 1492, line 98. This evidence was earlier questioned by Bates (*op. cit.*, p. 17). During the period of twelve tribes Amphitrope had four prytaneis from Antiochis and after 200 B.C. it continued to be represented by four. Bouleutic representation of Amphitrope B, then, may be estimated at 1.

IDENTIFICATION INCORRECT.

Bate. From Aigeis. Town-deme.

This deme was assigned to Demetrias by Kirchner (see *ad I. G.*, II², 2362), Schebelew, and Gomme (*op. cit.*, p. 57) because of its omission from a register of prytaneis now published as *Prytaneis*, no. 10. Omission of demes from complete prytany lists is sufficiently well attested (Dow, *Prytaneis*, p. 28, and Pritchett, *Hesperia*, IX [1940], pp. 124-126), so Kirchner's assignment is not justified in the light of present evidence.

As noted above, there is no valid evidence for the assignment of the deme Ankyle B to Antigonis. The archon Archelaos with his secretary Μόσχος Μοσ[χίωνος 'Α]γκυλῆθεν (*I. G.*, II², 844, 848; cf. *Prytaneis*, no. 36) has been assigned by Ferguson (*Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 27) and Meritt (*Hesperia*, VII [1938], p. 138) to the year 212/1 B.C., which requires a sece-

¹⁸ So Gomme (*op. cit.*, p. 59) and Kirchner (*ad I. G.*, II², 2362). Solders (*op. cit.*, p. 90), however, locates it near Gargettos and Erchia, which are both inland demes. This would place Potamos some distance from the other demes which comprise the inland trittys of Leontis (see the map in Hommel's article in *R.-E.*, s. v. Trittys, col. 369).

tary from Antigonis (I), although Dinsmoor (*Archons*, p. 218) has noted that the only reason for this assignment has been based on the requirements of the secretary cycle. Beloch, Roussel (*Ξένα*, pp. 86-88), and Wilhelm (*Beiträge*, p. 78), on historical grounds, dated this archon very soon after the date when Athens received her freedom from Macedonia, and, indeed, the year 222/1 B. C., which requires a secretary from Aigeis (IV), is otherwise unoccupied and may now be assigned to Archelaos.¹⁹

In the year of Diokles (215/4 B. C.), it has hitherto been assumed that the tribe Aigeis was represented by two archontes (see Dow, *Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 177); this being the only example of double representation in the list of Athenian archontes published as *I. G.*, II², 1706. The first thesmothetes of the year was from Aigeis, and the reading for the demotic of the Polemarch was read in Dow's text (*Hesperia*, II [1933], Plate XIV, line 143) as Φηγ[ού], although he stated on page 445, and repeated the following year (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 180), that the readings on the stone favored Φάλα. In the photograph published in *Hesperia*, II (1933), p. 439, and on the squeeze, it appears that the second letter may equally well be an upsilon, and in the fifth letter space there is preserved the upper part of a sigma. The demotic is Φυλάσ(ιος), and the Polemarch was from Demetrias, which was not otherwise represented in the archonship of Diokles. Furthermore, this new determination settles the problems of the division and allocation of the demes Atene and Anakaia and of the supposed irregularities in the order of the archontes in the year of Menekrates (220/19 B. C.).²⁰ As a result of the assignment of the Polemarch of 215/4 B. C. to the tribe Demetrias, this official's cycle of allotment, which began in 223/2 B. C.,²¹ requires a tribe other than Demetrias for 220/19 B. C. The Polemarch of this year is known to have been from Atene (*I. G.*, II², 1706, line 93), so it

¹⁹ Less satisfactorily, the year 209/8 B. C. might be suggested; see Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, p. 36, note 7. For the removal of Euthykritos from 222/1 B. C., see Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LX (1939), p. 260.

²⁰ For the date, see Meritt, *Hesperia*, VII (1938), p. 138.

²¹ See Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 177. Cf. Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, pp. 50-53, and Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 76. Since it is now established that the Polemarshs of 224/3 and 220/19 B. C. came from the same tribe, Antiochis, the cycle must have begun after 224/3 B. C.

follows that a part of Atene remained in Antiochis. In turn, the elimination of the possibility of the Polemarch of 220/19 B. C. being from Demetrias permits the assignment of the second thesmothetes of this year, from the deme Anakaia (*I. G.*, II², 1706, line 96), to the second Macedonian tribe, and indeed the tribal order so requires. With some reason, Dow had supposed in *Hesperia*, III (1934), pp. 177 and 180, and reaffirmed in *Prytaneis*, p. 133, that Atene was not divided and that the archontes of the year of Menekrates were not arranged in the tribal order. But the new evidence does not support this, so the earlier allocations of Dinsmoor (*Archons*, pp. 447-448) may be followed.²²

In conclusion, the following statistics may be noted: Antigonis was made up of demes taken from Erechtheis (3), Aigeis (2), Pandionis (3), Leontis (3?), and Akamantis (1); Demetrias of demes taken from Aigeis (1), Leontis (2), Akamantis (2), Oineis (3), Kekropis (3), Hippothontis (2), and Antiochis (2 or 3). The bouletic representation for the various demes of Demetrias, roughly computed from fragmentary bouletai and prytany lists as well as Gomme's figures for the fourth century, gives a total of approximately 50 and suggests that the roster of Demetrias is complete; that of Antigonis, on the other hand, totals only about forty, and suggests the possibility of unassigned demes for this tribe.²³

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

²² Cf. Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), p. 76, note 14.

²³ In Dinsmoor's recent volume, *The Athenian Archon List in the Light of Recent Discoveries*, received after this article was in final proof, he argues (pp. 55-57) that within the period to which he wishes to assign *I. G.*, II², 477, on historical grounds there is no place for its secretary (from Potamos) in his revised Ferguson-Meritt scheme of secretarial tribal cycles (Scheme A on page 54). He posits that the secretary must be assigned to Antigonis (I) and the inscription to 278/7 B. C. As a result of our new information concerning Potamos (I, II, and VI), this particular argument against the Ferguson-Meritt scheme no longer applies. Dinsmoor's return (pp. 160-161, 232) to the archonship of Ergochares (now assigned to 226/5 B. C.) as the date for the creation of the tribe Ptolemais would leave unexplained the break in the archontes' cycle which it is now demonstrated occurred after 224 B. C. (note 21 above) and will be reexamined elsewhere.

THE ATHENIAN CLERUCHY ON SAMOS.

Sundwall was the *editor princeps* of the naval record published in the *Editio Minor* as *I. G.*, II², 1609. His conclusion about the date of this inscription is expressed in these words: "Die Kleruchen-Sendung, welche vor 361 wohl am ehesten in Frage kommt, ist die nach Samos, die Beloch ins J. 365/4 verlegt (*Griech. Gesch.*, II, 274, 2). Unsere Urkunde wäre also ein Auszug aus dem Rechenschaftsbericht der Werftaufseher d. J. 365/4."¹ He had already observed that the inscription must ante-date the year 361/0 when Kallistratos went into exile (*loc. cit.*, pp. 50, 55). That the cleruchic expedition mentioned in lines 88-111 was destined to go to Samos was for Sundwall only a mere conjecture.² Fraenkel (*Ath. Mitt.*, XXXVIII [1923], pp. 21-2) could not accept his date on the grounds that Pasion, a contributor of naval equipment in this text, was dead in 370/69. Sundwall (*loc. cit.*, p. 54) had been aware of this difficulty, but he had assumed that the heirs of Pasion had paid back his defalcations. Fraenkel replied that, had Pasion's heirs returned the equipment which was still owed, the text would have said so. His objection seems valid, since in such cases the text is specific in recording the names of all parties concerned (cf. *I. G.*, II², 1622, 359-64). Fraenkel's argument and date have been accepted by Kirchner in his new edition, *I. G.*, II², 1609. I believe, however, that there is evidence that Sundwall's conjecture about the date of *I. G.*, II², 1609 is correct. But before we consider this evidence it will be necessary to study a passage from another epigraphical text.

There follows an excerpt, lines 3-12, of *I. G.*, II², 1952:

[Ἐρεχθ]ηίδος
 ---- ἦς
 5 ---- ος Καλλίο
 ---- ς Εὐνόμο
 ---- ἦς Δουσιμάχο
 [Δαμπτρ]ῆς καθύπερ
 [---- β]ολος Ἰσχυρίο

¹ *Ath. Mitt.*, XXXV (1910), p. 50

² His conjecture was accepted by Busolt-Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, p. 1266, note 1.

10 -----ς Ἰσχυρίο
 -----ας Φιλίνο
 [Λαμπτρ]ῆς Πάραλοι

It is part of an inscription containing a list of names of Athenian cleruchs. Their destination, like that of those named in *I. G.*, II², 1609, has remained problematical, because the stone is broken away at the place where the name of the colony must have been inscribed. The letter-forms are typical of the fourth century B. C., especially of the decade 370-60. For this reason the various editors, Koehler (*I. G.*, II, 960) and Kirchner (*I. G.*, II², 1952) were disposed to assign the text either to the cleruchy of Samos or to that of Potidaea.

In the above lines the demes are clearly part of the tribe Erechtheis. An investigation will show that two names therein, namely, Kallias and Eunomos are known to have been members of the deme Euonymon. Aeschines mentions Antikles, son of Kallias of Euonymon, who sailed as a cleruch to the island Samos (*I.*, 53). This Kallias has been identified as the hellenotamias of 410/09 (*P. A.*, 7864). Eunomos would be an ancestor, probably a grandfather, of the hieropoios of about 322 B. C. (*P. A.*, 5869). I can find no evidence about the third member of this deme.

It cannot be a mere coincidence that a Kallias of Euonymon should be known from literary evidence to have been father of a cleruch sent to Samos in 361/0,³ and that a Kallias, also of the tribe Erechtheis and probably of the deme Euonymon, was father of a cleruch sent forth at about the same time. From these indications it would seem probable that both these men are one and the same. This identification would show that *I. G.*, II², 1952 is concerned with Samos.

³ Aeschines (*I.*, 53) says of Antikles: οὗτος μὲν οὖν ἀπεστίν ἐν Σάμῳ μετὰ τῶν κληρούχων, and the scholiast observes: εἰς Σάμον κληρούχους ἐπεμψαν Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ' ἀρχοντος Ἀθήνησι, Νικοφύμου (361/0 B. C.). The scholiast on this passage does not present independent evidence for his date of the cleruchy, but he bases his observation on the narrative of Aeschines. Soon after Antikles' departure to Samos as cleruch, Timarchos became acquainted with Hegesandros just back in Athens from the Hellespont where he had served as tamias under Timomachos in 361/0 (Aesch., *I.*, 56; Beloch, *Attische Politik*, p. 297). An earlier dispatch of cleruchs had been sent to Samos in 365/4 soon after its capture, and another was sent in 352/1 (Glötz-Cohen, *Hist. Graeciae*, III, 1, p. 189, note 48).

This interpretation receives confirmation from another name in the same passage of *I. G.*, II², 1952. In line 11 we find [-----] as Φάλινο of whom Kirchner says "eius frater videlicet n. 1609, 91." The man named in line 91 is Philinos of Lamptrai, a trierarch in the cleruchic expedition of *I. G.*, II², 1609. Since *I. G.*, II², 1609 and 1592 are closely contemporary, both these men named Philinos are identical. The word "frater" should be corrected to read "pater." Philinos, I believe, accompanied his son as trierarch in the fleet which carried the cleruchs to Samos. We now have two bits of evidence from independent sources which show (1) that the cleruchs of *I. G.*, II², 1952, through the connection with the speech of Aeschines, are members of the cleruchy on Samos, and (2) that the cleruchic expedition mentioned in *I. G.*, II², 1609 is also connected with Samos through its link with *I. G.*, II², 1952.

The excerpt quoted above I would now restore as follows (lines 3-7):

[Ἐρεχθ]ηίδος
 [Ἐδωνυμ]ῆς
 [---⁴⁻⁵---]ος Καλλίου
 [---³⁻⁴---]ς Εὐνόμο
 [---⁴⁻⁵---]ης Δυσιμάχο

I have added the approximate number of missing letters in each name.

We must now return to Fraenkel's chief argument against a date in 365/4 for *I. G.*, II², 1609. The phrases describing Pasion's contributions and obligations are (lines 85-6): ἀγκύρας δ[ύο] ἅς Πασίων ἄχαρ εἰσένηγκεν, and (line 87): σχοινία ἃ Πασίων ἄχαρ ἀπέδωκε. Fraenkel assumed that these goods were "contributed" and "paid back" in the year of the inventory. Rather, these phrases only designate specific equipment such as "the two anchors which Pasion contributed" or "the hawsers which Pasion gave back" with no indication of the date. Pasion certainly returned his equipment before his death in 370/69, but his equipment was still in use in 365/4.⁴

⁴ Fraenkel suggested the years 372/1-370/69, and especially 372/1, as the date of this naval inventory (*loc. cit.*, p. 22). This in itself is highly improbable, because Timotheos in 372/1 was away in Egypt in the service of the King of Persia (Beloch, *Griech. Gesch.*, III, 1, pp. 159,

There were three cleruchic expeditions to Samos: 365/4, 361/0, and 352/1. The evidence adduced from Aeschines shows that Antikles, son of Kallias of Euonymon, went to Samos in 361/0. Kallistratos' exile in the autumn of 361 and his death *ca.* 355 make it impossible to date *I. G.*, II², 1609 after the year 365/4. Therefore, since *I. G.*, II², 1609 and 1952 must be dated in the same year because of the close link between Philinos (the trierarch on a cleruchic expedition) and his son (a cleruch sent to Samos), *I. G.*, II², 1952 must also be dated in 365/4. It will be noted that Kallias had two sons, one of whom [---⁴⁵---]os went to Samos in 365/4, while the other, Antikles, went to Samos in the second installment of cleruchs in the year 361/0.

The phraseology used in certain lines of the naval record *I. G.*, II², 1609 is significant. Trierarchs in this text are found only with their demotics; generals need no demotic where they are mentioned in their official capacity. For example, in lines 116-117: Χάρης: οὗτος παρέλαβεν καὶ ἐκτέπλευκεν ἐ[χων . . . ^{navis} . . .] ἥς Μόσχος Ἀγγε καὶ Εὐθύμος Παλλην [τριηραρχοῦσι].⁵ Here Chares is distinguished from his trierarchs by his lack of demotic; he needs no title, and this is true also of Chabrias in line 116. Although both Chabrias and Timotheos are generals in 365/4, in lines 100 and 95 where they are mentioned as trierarchs they receive their demotics; but, as was noticed above, Chabrias in his official capacity as general receives no demotic. The reason for the distinction is that they had no connection as generals with the cleruchy to which they were attached as trierarchs, for the cleruchy had its special leaders, the κληρουχάρχοντες.

Phanostratos of Kephisia appears as a trierarch in line 92 of *I. G.*, II², 1609. According to the speech of Isaeus (VI, 27) delivered in 364/3 he had been a trierarch under Timotheos. This trierarchy followed shortly after the death of his brother-in-law, Philoktemon, at Chios. The historical problem of this mysterious battle near Chios has been attacked in many ways (cf. Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus*, 1904, p. 512; Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, II², p. 549, note 1), and it has always been pointed out that no conflict in the neighborhood of Chios before that of 357 is elsewhere recorded. I would suggest that during the

212), and could not have served Athens as a trierarch as this text demands (*I. G.*, II², 1609, line 100).

⁵ I have restored here on analogy with *I. G.*, II², 1607, line 4 *et passim*.

ten-month siege of Samos a skirmish occurred near Chios. This is not improbable, for we know that another city close by, Erythrae, is in some way concerned in the official report of Timotheos made after his capture of Samos (*I. G.*, II², 108). By this interpretation not only Samos was involved, but also Chios and Erythrae, in the expedition of Timotheos. Philoktemon, then, was killed in 366/5 near Chios during a sea-battle. Shortly thereafter, Phanostratos, his kinsman, sailed out as trierarch in the cleruchic expedition to Samos (*I. G.*, II², 1609, line 92). This would have to be the expedition "under Timotheos" which is mentioned in Isaeus. This receives confirmation from Sundwall's restoration in lines 81-2 of *I. G.*, II², 1609 of [Χαίρεστρ]ατος Κηφι, for Chairestratos had served only once as trierarch before 364/3 (Isaeus, VI, 60) and was too young to have served in the Theban war. In my opinion the dating of *I. G.*, II², 1609 helps to date these disputed events in the aforementioned speech of Isaeus, as well as the cleruchic inscription *I. G.*, II², 1952. To conclude, we have in the fragmentary inscription *I. G.*, II², 1952 a partial list of Athenian cleruchs dispatched to Samos in 365/4; the cleruchic expedition mentioned in *I. G.*, II², 1609 is concerned with Samos and dates that naval record in 365/4, and the battle near Chios mentioned in Isaeus, VI, is connected with the siege of Samos conducted by Timotheos in 366/5.

EUGENE SCHWEIGERT.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

O. MICH. I, 24.

In his great edition of Michigan ostraca Professor Leiv Amundsen¹ has published as number 24 a brief text of seven lines which recalls such considerably longer lists as *B. G. U. IX*,² 1893, and *Berl. Leihg.*³ 3 and 4 Verso. The text looks very much like an excerpt from a ledger in which public dues on grain land were recorded; the ostrakon may have served as a receipt. The person concerned is Marcus Titianus Val . . . ,⁴ who held land of various categories—hieratic, catocic, *epibolé*—at Phil . . .⁵ in the second century A. D., and *O. Mich.* 24 fixes his obligations, and probably payments, with respect to it. Since a recent examination has thrown additional light on the arithmetic of the ostrakon, a new edition may not be unwelcome.

The dues as printed in Amundsen's edition present the following scheme:

Type of land	Charge	Extra charge	Total
hieratic	4 1/4 art. +	2/3 1/6 1/12 art. =	4 1/2 art.
<i>epibolé</i>	1 1/2 1/3 " +	1/4 1/12 " =	2 1/6 "
hier. <i>epib.</i>	2 2/3 1/6 1/12 " +	1/3 1/12 " =	3 1/3 "
hieratic	2 " +	1/3 " =	2 1/3 "
catocic	1/12 " +	1/24 " =	1/6 1/12 "
			<hr/>
			12 1/2 1/12 "

When the account is checked, no discrepancy appears between the grand total and the five partial totals, but the first and fifth partial totals are found to be obviously incorrect. $4 \frac{1}{4} + 2 \frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{6} \frac{1}{12} = 5 \frac{1}{6}$, not $4 \frac{1}{2}$; $1 \frac{1}{2} + 1 \frac{1}{24} = 1 \frac{1}{8}$, not $1 \frac{1}{6}$. A second feature of the account contributes more subtly to a reader's uneasiness. In the measurement of artabas, the

¹ *Greek Ostraca in the University of Michigan Collection*, Part I (Ann Arbor, 1935).

² Heinz Kortenbeutel, *Steuerlisten römischer Zeit aus Theadelphia* (Berlin, 1937).

³ Ture Kalén, *Berliner Leihgabe griechischer Papyri* (Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift, 1932, Filosofi 1).

⁴ Amundsen prints Οὔα(λ) and records Οὔά(λῆς) as a suggestion made by Prof. Sam Eitrem.

⁵ The ostrakon has Φιλ(), which suggests Philadelphia; but other place-names in the Fayyum begin similarly. In his Geographical Index (p. 210) Amundsen recognizes the strong claim of Philadelphia, but naturally refrains from a positive identification.

combinations $1/6$ $1/12$, which occurs here three times, and $1/4$ $1/12$ are contrary to good usage. $1/6$ $1/12$ is normally given as $1/4$; $1/4$ $1/12$ as $1/3$.⁶ A third and most serious difficulty arises from the relation of the extra charges to the principal sums. In payments of the kind recorded on this ostrakon, the extra charge is normally $1/7$ of the principal in the calculation of rents; $1/6$, in the calculation of taxes.⁷ On this basis, even after allowance has been made for the use of $1/24$ as the smallest fraction of an artaba,⁸ the extra charge on the first item is much too high, and that on the third item slightly low.

These considerations have led me to reexamine the ostrakon, and I am now able to offer a revised text which almost wholly eliminates the obscurities of the *editio princeps*.⁹

1. Μάρκ(ος) Τιτιανὸ(ς) Οὐαλ()¹⁰
2. Φιλ()¹¹ $\overline{\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma \gamma\eta\varsigma}$ (πυροῦ ἀρτάβας) δῆ', $\overline{\pi\rho\sigma\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\upsilon\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\nu}$
 $\overline{\beta\kappa\delta}$, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) δὲ γ'
3. ἐπιβολ(ῆς) (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\overline{\alpha\lambda\gamma\kappa\delta}$,¹² $\overline{\alpha\lambda\gamma\delta}$,¹³ (πυρ. ἀρτ.) βϛ'

⁶ See the interesting remarks of Kalén, who has shown extraordinary skill and acuteness in unraveling the arithmetic of tax papyri, in *Bérl. Leihg.*, p. 232; cf. Ulrich Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyruskunde* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1912), I, p. lxix, for the combination of fraction systems in measuring artabas.

⁷ *Bérl. Leihg.*, pp. 235 f., 238; *B. G. U.* IX, p. 51; S. L. Wallace, *Taxation in Egypt from Augustus to Diocletian* (Princeton, 1938), 38 f.

⁸ Cf. Wilcken, *Griechische Ostraka* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1899), I, 749 f.

⁹ My readings have had the advantage of a careful check by Dr. O. M. Pearl. I should wish no one to lose sight of the fact that the new text, apart from the fractions, remains substantially as published by Amundsen. The hand is a difficult one, and I am fully conscious of my indebtedness to Amundsen's unusual expertness in the decipherment of ostrakon texts.

¹⁰ See note 4.

¹¹ See note 5. There is no doubt that Φιλ() is a place-name. The arrangement—place-name, land-category, payment—is exactly that which occurs repeatedly in *B. G. U.* IX, 1893, and *Bérl. Leihg.* 3 and 4 Verso.

¹² $\overline{\alpha\lambda\gamma}$ Amundsen; *gamma*, however, is clearly followed by a numeral, which, on arithmetical grounds, can be only $1/12$ or $1/24$. Comparison with the style of $\gamma\iota\beta$ in line 4, which follows the pattern of the same combination in *B. G. U.* IX, 1893 (pl. 2), has convinced me that $\overline{\gamma\kappa\delta}$ is easier to accept in line 3.

¹³ $\overline{\pi\rho\sigma\mu\epsilon\tau\rho\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha}$ $\overline{\alpha\lambda\gamma\delta}$ Amundsen. I am unable to see any vestige of

4. $\epsilon\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\pi\iota\beta\omicron\lambda(\eta\varsigma)$ (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\overline{\beta\beta\kappa\delta}$, $\overline{\gamma\iota\beta}$, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\gamma\eta'$ ¹⁴
5. καὶ εἰς Μάρκ(ον) Φιλ() λο(ιπογραφοιμένων)¹⁵ ζ (ἐτους)
 $\delta\mu\omicron\iota\langle\omega\rangle\varsigma$
6. $\epsilon\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma$ $\gamma\eta\varsigma$ β , γ , (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\beta\gamma$
7. κατ(οικικῆς) $\gamma(\eta\varsigma)$ (πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\acute{\iota}\beta$, $\acute{\kappa}\delta$, (πυρ. ἀρτ.) η , (γίνονται)
(πυρ. ἀρτ.) $\iota\beta\iota$ $\acute{\iota}\beta$

The account in its new form may be analyzed as follows:

Type of land	Charge	Extra charge	Total
hieratic	4 1/8 art. +	2/3 1/24 art. =	4 1/2 1/3 art.
<i>epibolē</i>	1 1/2 1/3 1/24 " +	1/4 1/24 " =	2 1/6 "
hier. <i>epib.</i>	2 2/3 1/24 " +	1/3 1/12 " =	3 1/8 "
hieratic	2 " +	1/3 " =	2 1/3 "
catœcic	1/12 " +	1/24 " =	1/8 "
			<hr/> 12 1/2 1/12 "

HERBERT C. YOUTIE.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

π. The first fraction is certainly 1/4, but the ostrakon is so badly worn at this point that Amundsen's recognition of the fraction is a real achievement. The second fraction, at first glance, appears to be 1/12, as read by Amundsen. In preferring 1/24 I have been guided by a palaeographic comparison of ι and κ in the two fractions and by the arithmetical exigencies of the line. Since the total continues to be 2 1/6 and the principal sum is greater than Amundsen's 1 1/2 1/3, the extra charge cannot be as high as 1/4 1/12. My reading is nevertheless very uncertain.

¹⁴ γγ Amundsen. The remnant of the fraction is suitable for either reading. 3 1/8 must be preferred because the new reading of the principal sum, 2 2/3 1/24, is beyond doubt.

¹⁵ εἰς Μάρκ(ον) Φιλ() λό(γον) Amundsen. Φιλ() is a place-name (notes 5 and 11), and decidedly awkward between Μάρκ(ον) and λό(γον). I have therefore preferred the accusative of the person after εἰς—a common construction with names of account (e.g. B. G. U. IX, pp. 118, 148), and the resolution λό(ιπογραφοιμένων), "for arrears." Presumably, lines 2-4 contain payments for the current seventh year, although no date is given, while lines 6-7 record payment of arrears for the sixth year. For similar combinations of current payments and arrears see *Berl. Leihg.* 4 Verso, *passim*.

VALERIUS MAXIMUS IN CERTAIN EXCERPTS OF THE TWELFTH CENTURY.

For many ancient authors the importance of epitomes, excerpts, adaptations, and versifications for the study of the text has been all too slowly recognized. Their value can be very great in the case of a writer like Valerius, whose moral exempla are so admirably suited to quotation and whose text as constituted at present is not satisfactory. From the early epitomes of Paris and Nepotianus down through the excerpts of Heiric, the versification of Tortarius, the contributions of a host of lesser excerptors and epitomizers who were busy through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance and who are as yet nameless and unnoticed, and the references in such writers as John of Salisbury, Peter of Blois, and Vincent of Beauvais the popularity of Valerius is well attested. Paris, Nepotianus, Tortarius, and others have already proved their worth;¹ we cannot always expect such finds, as I shall demonstrate below, and there are obvious dangers, but it is highly necessary that the mass of material be examined and that we convert to our use whatever, with sufficient authority, supplements or refutes readings in the extant manuscripts of the full text of Valerius.

I treat here citations from Valerius in two manuscripts of the twelfth century.² Vaticanus latinus 1869³ (x), a parchment codex of 210 folios, size 0.328 x 0.234 meters, written in two columns, contains the works of various ancient and mediaeval authors, mainly historians, some in full, some epitomized or excerpted. Included, e.g., are the *History of Alexander the Great* by Curtius Rufus, the *Chronicles* of Freculphus, a compendium of the *Res Gestae* of Alexander by Julius Valerius,

¹ For recent work cf. *T. A. P. A.*, LXV (1934), pp. 35-46; *C. P.*, XXXII (1937), pp. 70-72, 349-359; *Speculum*, XII (1937), pp. 516-518. These articles will define the relationships of certain manuscripts mentioned here, as L (Laurentianus 1899), A (Bernensis 366), G (Bruxelensis 5336), and F (Gudianus latinus 166).

² I have examined these manuscripts personally and also possess photostats of certain portions.

³ Cf. Sanford, *T. A. P. A.*, LV (1924), p. 228 and Nogara, *Codices Vaticani Latini*, III (1912), pp. 309 ff..

and certain *Letters* ascribed to Alexander. The manuscript is of interest in connection with the transmission of the Alexander story in the Middle Ages. Folios 209-210 contain excerpts from the story drawn from such authors as Pompeius Trogus, Gellius, and Seneca. Interspersed with these are two passages assigned to Valerius Maximus in the margin and a third, not assigned, which may have some connection with our author.⁴ Unfortunately they are all more or less free adaptations and of no great service in our study of the text of Valerius. The first, from VII. 2 ext. 10, adds a detail not included in the Valerius version. The second, from IX. 5 ext. 1, is closer to the text than either of the other two, but still somewhat garbled. The third, which relates the episode of VIII. 14 ext. 2, may perhaps more readily be referred to those verses in Juvenal beginning at *Sat.*, X, 168 which are found quoted at the end of this manuscript.

With Monacensis 22004⁵ (w), of the same century, the picture is entirely different, and a more extended treatment of this manuscript will therefore be in order. It is a large parchment codex of 174 folios, measuring 0.475 x 0.315 meters, and bound in thick boards which have been covered with a white skin tooled in diamond shapes. In addition to the present number the back bears a yellow slip of paper with the indication *Wess. 4* and an

⁴ Since these passages are very short, and not printed elsewhere, I quote them here:

I. Phylippo vero ipsum quadam die increpante quod eos quorum amicitiam muneribus comparaverat sibi fideles estimaret respondit, "A liberalitate," inquit, "istud mihi, pater, provenit."

II. Sic igitur virtus ac felicitas Alexandri tribus insolentie gradibus exulavit (it is of interest to note that A² reads *exulavit* as against *exultavit*, cf. Kempf's second edition of Valerius [1888], p. 442; citations by page and line in this article unless otherwise indicated refer to this edition): fastidio nanque Phylippi Iovem Hammonem patrem ascivit, tedio morum et cultus (*morem exultus* L^{A1}) Macedonici vestem et instituta Persica assumpsit, spreto mortali habitu divinum emulatus (*aemulatus*, *aem* in ras. A *caput latus* L¹ *captatus* L²) est. Ob hoc suis magis odibilis, quod patrem, quod civem, quod hominem demum exuere pudori non erat.

III. Eique videbatur totius orbis angusta possessio que deorum omnium sufficit domicilio; unum illud, unus Pelleo iuveni non sufficit orbis. Estuat infelix angusto limite mundi. Igitur insatiabilis laudis et glorie. . . .

⁵ Cf. Halm-Meyer, *Catalogus Codicum Latinorum Bibl. Regiae Monacensis*, II, 4 (1881), p. 17.

orange square of paper reading *Kr. 2*. Beneath the papal book-plate on f. 1 are two hexameters⁶ which further show that the manuscript was at some time at the Benedictine abbey of Wessobrunn in Upper Bavaria. The text begins in two columns on the verso of f. 1 with a Latin version of the *Bellum Judaicum* of Josephus in brown ink, with titles and initials in red. In a darker ink but probably in the same hand there follow on ff. 168v-172v the *Excerpta de Libro Valerii Maximi Dictorum Factorumque Mirabilium*. Folios 172v-174 contain portions from the *Saturnalia* of Macrobius.

The excerpts from Valerius cover portions of the entire nine books and occur as follows: ⁷ I. 1 ext. 3; 5. 9; 7 ext. 8; 8 ext. 15, 17, 16; II. 4. 2; 6. 10; III. 2. 11, 19; 3 ext. 3, 4; 7. 1c; IV. 3. 1; V. 1. 10; 3. 4; 6 ext. 1, 4; VI. 3. 9; 4. 1, 2, 4; 5 ext. 3, 4; 9 ext. 1; VII. 2. 1, ext. 1, 4, 6, 11; *III. 7 ext. 1; IV. 1 ext. 1; VII. 3. 2, ext. 1, 7; IX. 2 ext. 1; 3 ext. 3, 4; VII. 5. 2; 6. 2, 3; VIII. 7. 1, 2, ext. 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15, 16; IX. 12. 1, 2, ext. 2, 6, 9; 13. 2, ext. 2, 3, 4; 14. 1, ext. 1.*

A comparison of readings reveals interesting relations with other manuscripts of Valerius. Our *w* will stand with LA in some cases: p. 12. 14, *epydauriae w epidauriae* L¹A *epidauri* L²G; 42. 24 *somnio* wLAF *somno* G; 116. 14 *os* wLA *ore* G; 120. 11 *dimicamus* wLA *dimicandum est* GF; 294. 6 *quod* wLA *quo* GF. It does not appear, however, to be narrowly allied with either one of these manuscripts. With G there are striking parallels, and in both Γ and *w* we can almost see the excerptors at work as they strike out those passages which are not essential to their narrative: 24. 16 *inconsiderantius* wGF *inconsideratius* LA; 42. 17 *somnium* wGF *somnum* LA; 54. 25 *oculis*—*admirabilius* om. wΓ; 55. 3 *et* om. wΓ; 55. 4 *modo* om. wΓ; 68. 19 §3 om. Γ §3-II. 6. 9 p. 79. 23 om. w; 120. 7 *ordine* wGF *ordo* LA¹ *ardore* A²; 132. 24 *oportunum locum* w *oportum locum* Γ *oportunum* LAG; 178. 2 *accersitis* wΓ *arcessitis* LAG; 221. 18 *quam praeclarum*—*inhumatum iacuisset* 222. 1 om. wΓ; 222. 2 *quoque* om. wΓ in ras. G; 237. 27 *sed ut*—*transgrediar* om. wΓ; ⁸ 258. 13 *sequitur*—

⁶ Wessofontani proba sum possessio claustrī,
Heus! Domino me redde meo: sic iura reposcunt.

⁷ I have italicized those which depart from the normal order.

⁸ Cf. here 387. 9 *atque ut*—*actum transgrediar* and 430. 12 *trans*—

exemplum om. wΓ; 289. 23 *magno scelere—causa qui*] *metellus* w *magno—concitata est* and *longe—causa qui* om. Γ; 290. 3 *sobrietatis* wΓ *sobrietati* L^A; 292. 15 *cum* om. wΓ; 351. 1 *autem* om. wΓ; 355. 14 *potius* om. wΓ; 439. 1 *pars* om. wΓ *pars*] *urbs*, in ras. A; 458. 9 *singularem fati—sepulcrum habere*t 13 om. w §1 om. Γ. There are in addition passages where one portion will be omitted by *w* and a larger or smaller portion by Γ, as 68. 11 *quae inchoata—senatus consulto* 14 om. w *quae—cautum est* 14] *cautum est etiam senatus consulto* Γ; 120. 15 *ceterum ut—III. 3 ext. 2 p. 132. 18* om. w *ceterum ut—exequamur* om. Γ; 238. 15 *invalidae ad—V. 6. 8 p. 257. 9* om. w §5 om. Γ; 257. 10 *sunt—exempla* om. w *sed ut attingam* Γ *propositi*] *add. attingam* G; 257. 25 *ab eodem—V. 6 ext. 3 p. 258. 12* om. w *ab eodem—manavit* 26 om. Γ; 290. 7 *horridum C.—fracta cessit* VI. 4. 1 p. 292. 13 om. w *horridum C.—supercilium nam* 8] *gallus quoque sulphicius* Γ; 465. 19 *supplicium irato—finis fuit* 22 om. w *Alexander enim Thebe* 22] *quem tamen eadem* w *cuius timoris* 21—*interemit* 23 om. Γ. But although both Γ and *w* are twelfth century, *w*, on the basis of readings alone, cannot come from the more extensive epitome, nor does it derive from eleventh-century G: 12. 1 §3 om. Γ; 24. 12 *adnotatu dignum—sub quo* om. Γ; 24. 13 *occiderit* om. Γ; 42. 25 *victor* om. Γ; 116. 10 §11 om. Γ; 143. 15 *percunctatus* wL^AΓ *percontatus* G; 160. 9 *proximum etsi—potest experimentum* 10 om. Γ; 257. 22 *obiectum* w *obiect* L² AGΓ *obiectae* L¹; 258. 14 *magnitudine* w *magno* L¹A *marusini* L³ *marginē* G *modo* mrg. A e Par. Γ; 292. 15 *omnium consensu—eumque sub* om. Γ *omnium consensu—sub excusatione* 16 om. G; 317. 3 *rediens*] *repetens* Γ; 334. 11 §2 om. Γ; 355. 2 *voluerunt* w *voluistis* L^A1 *voluisti* A²G *coegit* Γ; 439. 3 *in puerili—valuit namque* 4 om. Γ; 458. 8 §1 and *vix veri* 15—*idem valuit* 16 om. Γ.

Of very great interest to scholars has been the work done by the second hand of A. Our manuscript demonstrates three centuries later a knowledge of this hand: 160. 9 *adeoque* wA²G *adaeque* L *adaeque* A¹; 317. 2 *cum* wΓ om. L^A1 *suprascr.* A²; 458. 22 *non* wA²Γ om. A¹G. This knowledge cannot have been gained through G or Γ, as witness 160. 10 *experimentum*] *add.*

grediemur nunc—rubor inest 13, where only *w* omits these passages which are clearly mere transitions.

tamen wA²; 388.5 *dixit* w *edixit* A² *edidicit* L (Kempf erroneously reads *edidit*) GA¹ *edicit* F⁹. Agreement with A² is, however, by no means uniform.

In conclusion I cite readings in which *w* departs entirely from the tradition as we have it in manuscripts so far collated. These readings vary in value. Future work alone will reveal whether they are conjectures by the scribe or are descended from another tradition of which there are traces elsewhere: 42.18 *ut*] *quod in* w; 68.17 *remissioni*] *propter remissionem* w; 68.18 *gentis*] *genti* w *nota*] *innata* w; 79.25 *memoria*] *memoriae* w; 79.26 *dedisse* w *datas* LA¹G *datos* A² *dare* F; 238.12 *sarcina*] *sarcinatus* w; 238.14 *succurrit*] *occurrit* w; 329.1 *adstricta*] *affectata est* w; 334.22 *peractis*] *factis* w; 339.22 *imperasset*] *imperavit* w; 343.2 *timensque*] *add. ne* w *dare*] *daret* w;¹⁰ 343.3 *avertit*] *armavit* w; 355.1 *atque* w *aeque* L¹AG *equae* L²; 384.15 *didicit*] *didicerit* w; 384.20 *cogitur*] *congregaretur* w; 439.9 *ordinem*] *add. composuit* w; 458.20 *nuntio*] *add. accepto* w.

DOROTHY M. SCHULLIAN.

ALBION COLLEGE.

⁹ There are a few cases of erasure perhaps involving A²: 159.24 *et* om. w eras. A; 339.21 *ante* w in ras. A om. LGF; 458.18 *mater* w in ras. A e Par. om GF. I hope at a later date to show a relation with a manuscript of Valerius as yet unnoticed.

¹⁰ Paris, whom A² knew, has *timens ne—daret*, and this reading was adopted by Halm in his edition of 1865.

A NOTE ON THE NEW INSCRIPTION FROM SAMOTHRACE.

In a recent number of *A. J. P.* (LX [1939], pp. 452 ff.) G. Bakalakis and R. L. Scranton have published an interesting inscription from Samothrace, a decree in honour of Epinicus, commander of Maronea in the name of the king Ptolemy. The most interesting feature of this inscription is the almost complete coincidence of its lines 15 ff., i. e., of the part where the usual formulae of the honorary decrees come to an end and the enumeration of real facts begins, with the lines 7 ff. of the well known inscription of Hippomedon, the governor of Hellespontus and Thrace of Ptolemy Euergetes I, also found at Samothrace (*I. G.*, XII, 8, 156; *S. I. G.*³, 502). This coincidence in the substantial parts of the two decrees, I mean those parts which relate to military and financial assistance given to the city for protecting it in difficult times, makes it very probable that the two decrees are contemporary and refer to the same events. We know little of the hierarchy of the officers and officials of the Ptolemies, but it is fair to suggest that the commander and governor of Maronea was a subordinate of the governor of the Hellespontus and Thrace.

The forces which defended Samothrace consisted of two parts: detachments of the Ptolemaic army, including artillery, and a detachment of mercenary soldiers hired by the city for protection. For these last the Samothracians had no money and asked the Ptolemaic officers to advance it to them. These mercenaries have an individual name (like all mercenaries). It is one and the same in the two inscriptions. In Hippomedon's decree it was read by the first editors [τοῖς] βραδέων and this word is restored by the editors of the Epinicus' decree (line 26: βραδέων), the most important letters of the word being mutilated. Now, βραδέων gives no sense in the connection in which it stands. It has been explained as mercenaries "late in coming," which is pure nonsense. Bakalakis' and Scranton's "in later times" I simply do not understand. Now, several years ago L. Robert (*B. C. H.*, LIX [1935], pp. 425 ff.), who saw the impossibility of βραδέων, consulted G. Klaffenbach on this subject, and with the help of a squeeze read with certainty instead of βραδέων—

Τραλέων, the name of a Thracian tribe very popular among the Hellenistic rulers as a source of mercenary soldiers. I have no doubt that a careful examination of the photo and squeeze of the Epinicus inscription will confirm the reading of Robert.

As regards the problem against whom Euergetes through his generals defended Samothrace, the new inscription eliminates the possibility that the enemy was Antigonus Doson. The aggressors were barbarians, that is to say, either Thracians or the Celts of the kingdom of Tyle under their king Cavarus. I cannot enter into the discussion of this problem and refer to the quite recent paper of Chr. M. Danov in *Bull. Inst. Arch. Bulg.*, XII (1939), pp. 216 ff. and 253 f. (German résumé). It is well known how heavy was the pressure of Cavarus on Byzantium about this time.

M. ROSTOVITZEFF.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

ADDENDUM.

It seems possible to correct the reading of the editors at another point also. In lines 27 ff. they read and restore as follows:

βουλόμενος ἀκόλουθα
 πράττειν τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως αἰ-
 ρέσει καὶ τοῖς προὔπερεμένοις
 [τε] κα[ι] τ[ο]ι[ς] φ[ι]λανθρώποις πρὸς
 [τ]ῇ [πό]λ[ιν] τῆς [ίκετ]είας τε ἀπο-
 σταλείσης πρὸς αὐτόν, κτλ.

I suspect that an examination of the photograph of Mr. Bakalakis would show that it was possible to read rather

καὶ τοῖς προὔπηγμένοις
 [πα]ρ' α[ι]τ[ο]ῦ [φ]ιλανθρώποις πρὸς
 [τ]ῇ [πό]λ[ιν] τ[ῆς] [ρεσβ]είας, κτλ.

This would bring the passage rather in conformity with the usual expressions of inscriptions of this type and period.

C. B. WELLS.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

ANOTHER LITERARY PAPYRUS IN THE FITZ- WILLIAM MUSEUM, CAMBRIDGE.

In addition to the fragment of the *Medea* of Euripides, which was published by Mr. D. Page in *Class. Quart.*, XXXII (1938), pp. 45 f.,¹ a small papyrus fragment, *Pap. F. M. 2* (measuring 1.8 x 4 cm.), was given to the Fitzwilliam Museum in 1933. The groups of letters which survive are written by two different hands in the "Zierschrift" of the late first or the early second century A. D.,² and read as follows:

Recto (first hand): λθγ
 μν̄
 ωστ
 θεκ
Verso (second hand): μον
 υοε
 σειτ
 μ̄μα

Recto line 2: The line of abbreviation which begins over μν̄ was originally prolonged over the second ν.

Verso line 3: σετ is a possible reading.

The groups of letters in recto lines 1 and 2, and in verso lines 2 and 4 are not common; but the fragment is too small to be interpreted with certainty. An attempt, however, may be useful. In considering possible clues as to the nature of the fragment, it occurred to me that the following four pairs of verses of Euripides and Sophocles, and, as far as I could see, only these pairs, might be restored:

Recto: Eur., *Hecuba*,

- 503: [Τα]λθύ[βιος ἤκω Δαναϊδῶν ἐπηρέτης]
504: [Ἀγαμέ]μν(ο)γ[ος πέμψαντος ὃ γύναι μέτα]
20: [τροφαῖσιν,] ὥστ[ις πόρθος, ἠδ' ἐξόμην τάλας]
21: [ἐπεὶ δὲ Τροία]θ' Ἐκ[τορός τ' ἀπόλλυται]

¹ This text now has the signature PAP. F. M. 1: It belonged, perhaps, to the same roll as Pap. Rendel Harris No. 38. Cf. *Journ. Egypt. Arch.*, XXIV (1938), p. 94.

² Cf. W. Schubart, *Griechische Palaeographie* (1925), pp. 116 f., figs. 76-78 and 81.

Verso: Eur., *Iph. A.*,

790: [τίς ἄρα μ' εὐπλοκά]μου [κόμας]

791: [ῥύμα δακρ]υόε[ν τανύσας]

Soph., *Ant.*,

689: [λέγει τις ἢ πρᾶσ]σει τ[ίς ἢ ψέγειν ἔχει]

690: [τὸ γὰρ σὸν] (δ)μμα [δωνὸν ἀνδρὶ δημότῃ]

It should be noticed that these verses have a kind of alphabetical order. Recto lines 1 and 2 begin with τ and α, lines 3 and 4 with τ and ε, verso lines 1 and 2 with τ and ρ. Verso lines 3 and 4 are not alphabetical, but introduce a new author. Did Alexandrian or local Egyptian scholars try to compile a verse index of Euripides, Sophocles (and Aeschylus?), so as to be able to look up passages they read or heard without knowing the actual source? In any case it is worth mentioning that the writer of the recto left so much space before recto lines 1 and 3, and the writer of the verso before lines 2 and 4 that there must have been a reason. This space could, in the present writer's opinion, have been easily used for inserting notes to indicate poet, play, and place of verses, and, perhaps, for adding short scholia. The abbreviations³ of recto line 2 and verso line 4 point similarly to a grammatical purpose for the text.

F. M. HEICHELHEIM.

CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

³ Bilabel, *R.-N.*, II A, 2296, s. v. "Siglae." I wish to thank Dr. W. Morel and Mr. I. G. Tait for allowing me to discuss the readings and problems of the difficult text with them.

REVIEWS

Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Library, Manchester. Volume III. Theological and Literary Texts (Nos. 457-551). Edited by C. H. ROBERTS, M. A., with an introductory note by HENRY GRUPPY, Librarian. Manchester, at the University Press, 1938. Pp. xvii + 217; 10 plates.

After an interval of twenty-three years, during which time most of the texts here published were secured, this, the third volume of the P. Ryl., is added to its valued predecessors. One notes with pleasure that the fourth volume, destined to contain documents of the Ptolmaic, Roman, and Byzantine periods, the last mentioned group of which had originally been assigned for publication by the late Dr. A. S. Hunt as Vol. III of the series, may be expected to appear in the near future.

Of the ninety-five texts here presented, only three have been published, no. 457 (St. John's Gospel, xviii, of the first half of the second century, the earliest record of the existence of this much discussed work); no. 458 (Deuteronomy, xxiii-xxviii, from the unprecedentedly early date of the second century B. C.); and no. 460 (Fragment of a Testimony Book, from the fourth century). These need not concern us, therefore, except to note that, of course, advantage has now been taken of several valuable reviews and articles dealing with the original publications.

One point only might be noted, and this is the suggestion (repeated from the earlier publication), on the basis of a calculation of the average number of letters in each line, that the name Jesus was not abbreviated, as one should expect. But since occasionally abbreviations in three letters are found, and even, though rarely (H. A. Sanders, *Harv. Theol. Rev.*, XIX [1926]; pp. 215 ff.), four letters, a deviation of no more than two or three letters in a line varying from 28 to 35 letters is perhaps too slight upon which to base such a proposal. One might observe that the lines containing the name written out in full have but 33 and 35 letters, and if the forms were abbreviated they would contain presumably at least 30 or 31 letters, while two other perfectly full lines contain the much smaller number of only 28 letters. Similarly, in the Deuteronomy fragment the word for Lord is written in full, in a line of 28 letters; but if this were reduced to its ordinary short form of two letters, the line in question would still have one more letter (24) than the fourth line below it, which has only 23. Here also, therefore, it

would seem preferable to assume the existence of the contracted form; at all events there is no substantial reason for suggesting the contrary. Finally, while the writing in general is pretty regular, considerable spaces between words, or even between letters within words, are left in the *recto*, lines 2 and 3, and in the *verso*, lines 1 and 2, a circumstance which further vitiates any precise calculations based merely upon the average number of letters in a line. In one instance also (*recto*, 2) the scribe clearly leaves a small space before the beginning of a separate clause after *επει*, and the possibility that this same thing might have been done often, if not always, as also in the fragment from Deuteronomy, constitutes still another objection to basing any inherently improbable hypothesis on a precise calculation of letters—especially when even this calculation fails to prove quite all that is expected of it. Again, on no. 458, line 1, the note reads: "This line as it stands is rather longer than the rest," whereupon certain hypotheses are proposed. But as a matter of fact this line contains no more letters (30) than two others, and actually fewer letters than at least three others (31, 31, 32). Hence if *σου* were retained in the phrase *ταῖς χερσίν σου* the line would, indeed, be longer by one letter than any other; yet if *τῇ χερὶ* be read, then *σου* can be retained without changing the length at all. In such uncertainties the *ars nesciendi* might be more safely practiced.¹

459. The commentary on l. 3, speaking of a "new verse," rather than the beginning of a new sentence or clause, unfortunately seems to suggest that "verses" were recognized and marked in the early MS tradition.

463. Part of a hitherto unknown apocryphal *Gospel of Mary (Magdalene)* has fortunately been compared with a Coptic version, covering much the same ground, reported by Professor Carl Schmidt, of Berlin.

465, l. 33. ἀξ[ιολογίαν] proposed by Mr. E. C. Radcliffe seems not to occur in older Greek, but the liturgy at this point apparently deviates from the normal phraseology. The word is correctly formed, and it actually appears in Modern Greek (although as a technical term in philosophy and ethics).

409, 34. For the extremely rare *μυσάγματα* see also Euseb., *Vita Const.*, 3, 26 (P. G., 20, 1088 A 1).

¹ A good illustration of the danger of drawing conclusions from the mere number of letters in lines of varying length is that of Milne, who from a slender fragment of a speech by Lysias inferred that there was no room for *τά* before *τοιαῦτα*, an emendation of Herwerden's, in § 47; but when the remainder of the very same column came to light (here no. 489), *τά* actually appears there, because this particular line is, as a matter of fact, some two or three letters longer than any other in the entire text.

472, 3. Although *manduco* be "rare in classical Latin," it was doubtless common in vulgar speech (cf. the *Manducus* of the *Fab. Atellana*) from which it must have risen to the surface again in Christian literature.

472, 6. This is interesting for an instance of punctuation with a period at a full stop in a Latin MS from ca. 300 A. D.

473 brings a new fragment of the *Histories* of Sallust, but unfortunately the (in any event quite trivial) incident cannot be precisely placed. So extraordinary is the unparalleled expression *irae et doloris in / talibus sociis amissis*, where one would expect *e talibus*, if it be a prepositional phrase at all, that I feel tempted to suggest something like *ia[n]*, for the traces of the last letter might just as well, perhaps, represent an A as an N.

477, a considerable fragment, from the fifth century, of Cicero's *Divinatio*, is especially disappointing in that so early a testimony to the text of a work known otherwise only from late and relatively poor MSS, makes no positive contribution to the question of textual criticism other than the already long familiar conclusion that large numbers of the errors in late MSS existed also in the common book-trade tradition during classical times no less. The additional words *modo altercandum* in l. 45 are almost certainly genuine, partly as furnishing in a clearly intended climax an admirable intermediate term between the colorless *disserendum* and the extremely energetic *omni ratione pugnandum certandumque*; and partly on Clark's principle that the longer of two forms is a little more likely, *ceteris paribus*, to be genuine than is the shorter.² Here the longer is not only stylistically superior, but its omission through similarity of forms (the word *modo* occurring thrice within a series of five words, and the other two having the last four letters identical) is quite readily explicable.

478 adds a considerable specimen of a Greek word-by-word, or phrase-by-phrase, translation of Vergil to pieces already known from Milan (in part from the very same book), Vienna, Florence, and Oxyrhynchus, and the fragments recently found near Gaza and shortly to be published by the competent hands of C. J. Kraemer and E. L. Hettich. To me it is a pleasure to observe that the emendation by Emil Baehrens at *Aen.* 1, 646 (*caro* for *cari* of the MSS), which, though a distinct improvement in sense, has been quite uniformly passed over in silence by nearly all subsequent editors (Ribbeck alone excepted, I believe) is supported by the Greek version (the Latin being lost at this point). Baehrens was really a great critic, whose very excesses (and they were frequent) are apt to be more illuminating than the timidities of lesser men.

² In this connection it is also noteworthy that the papyrus elsewhere contains two words that Hirschfelder had proposed to delete.

Nos. 482-521 contain the "New Classical Texts (Greek)," all but the first dozen being tiny scraps that defy identification. On the others a few miscellaneous comments may be made. The bits from Comedy are relatively unimportant.

482 is a fragment of presumably fifth century tragedy, dealing, most likely, with the legend of Telephus. In line 3 the supplement at the end remains uncertain. From the fairly clear context it appears that Telephus (?) is being (a) urged (4. 6), (b) to descend (3), (c) from a cliff or promontory (12), (d) at night (5. 12), and therefore secretly, and (e) say something to sailors, skippers, or a fleet in general (4. 6. 7), (f) in the hope eventually of sailing under convoy (17), (g) to enter boldly the presence of some prince in his palace (10). *πέρραμα* might be used, apparently, of citadels other than that of Troy, but the expression here would be difficult in view of (e). Page's suggestion of *πελάγια* is hardly suitable, since the fleet is probably anchored, as normally at night, with the personnel on shore. Nearly a dozen other supplements have occurred to me, most of them requiring a somewhat metaphorical use of language, indeed, but tropes, of course, in tragedy are characteristic of the general style, and particularly prominent in lines 11, 12, and 15. *πεδάρσια* suffers from the same defects as *πελάγια*. *περίρριστα* would imply that the fleet was anchored among a group of islands, which, though possible, seems hardly likely. *περιφανή*, *περιφερῇ*, and *περίσταδον* might be too inconsistent with (d). *περίτομα* goes poorly with (c). *πέύκινα*, "the structures of pine wood," might conceivably be a bold trope for "ship" (cf. Eurip., *Med.*, 4, where the *πέυκη* is taken as the typical material of a seagoing vessel, and similarly Aristoph., *Eq.*, 1310); *πέισματα*, "the stern-cables," with which ships were made fast to the land, might suggest vividly enough the bivouac of a fleet on shore; and, similarly, the same general idea could be conveyed with *περίβολα* "the precincts" or "encampment," or even *περίπολα*, "the patrollings" or "patrols," although I know of no supporting parallels for such usages. *πενδιακά*, "the open plain," is not inconsistent with (c), for a man naturally descends from a cliff to level ground, and a fleet would certainly anchor along a plain, rather than beside a precipice, if it were at all possible. This word has also the advantage of being used by Lysias in that sense, and is thus supported after a fashion. On the whole, therefore, I should be inclined to propose either *πενδιακά*, or better, *πέισματα*, for the latter, even though without exact parallel known to me, is a lively expression for a fleet at anchor along shore, and in addition does not require a resolved foot, something that occurs nowhere else in these 12 lines, except, of course, in the not quite certain supplement of the first half of this same line.

486 is from a second-rate epyllion on Hero and Leander.

487 is interesting as based closely on the *Odyssey*, but differing markedly in detail from the account of Homer. It seems to be a local Egyptian product of relatively late date, possibly no more than an exercise in composing verse.

489 besides containing the immediate remainder of a fragment of the first oration of Lysias (at London), has what would amount to half a dozen paragraphs from the beginning of a wholly new speech, an Ὑπὲρ Ἐρυξιμάχου μείναντος ἐν ἄσπεϊ, which confirms, in the main, what was already known about the confused times following Lysander's occupation of Athens. The only new word in the vocabulary of Lysias (judging from the Index by D. H. Holmes, in the Papyrus fragments) seems to be *χρησιότητα* (line 64). This is noteworthy as being, apparently, the very earliest instance in the best Attic prose (for the greatest prose authors of the fourth century avoided it), and the second recorded instance at all, of a word (coined possibly by Euripides) which, though twice in Isaeus, and occasionally in Middle and New Comedy, was relatively late to secure general recognition.⁸

490. A highly abbreviated epitome (presumably) of an anonymous history of Philip, though written within a century of the events recorded, is unhappily too summary to offer any new evidence on the campaigns of Amphissa and Chaeroneia, which it principally treats, with a touch on a Thracian campaign at the beginning and a word about a palace-revolution in Persia at the close. The whole account of the Amphissa campaign covers no more than 12 short lines, and that of Chaeroneia about 30 (i. e. ± 6 and 15 lines respectively of an ordinary text).

Similarly a fragment treating the Second Punic War (no. 491) is extremely brief, and though written presumably not more than 70-80 years after the event, deals with only a minor diplomatic manoeuvre. The editor considers the possibility that we have here a fragment of Polybius, but the unrecorded word *αἰχμαλωσία*, and *σύν* (extremely rare), make difficulties, as is properly noted. The suggestion of Sosylus is not quite satisfactory, either, since his one considerable fragment (Jacoby, *F. Gr. H.*, 2B, pp. 903-5) shows a nervous and rhetorical coloring, which is natural enough in a man who taught Hannibal Greek (Nepos, 13, 3), and hence was presumably a professional rhetor, but is quite alien to the simple and even jejune style of the present fragment. One might, therefore, not unreasonably conjecture that we have here a bit from Silenus, who covered the same ground. To be sure we do not possess even a single

⁸ The pap. seems to read *τοίχων* in l. 107 referring to the Long Walls. Here Mr. Roberts is undoubtedly right in correcting to *τειχῶν*, because of (a) the catachresis involved, (b) the extensive and uniform usage of Lysias himself elsewhere (Holmes lists 23 examples of *τειχος* against none of *τοίχος*), and (c) the fact of two other itacistic misspellings in the same fragment (*κάλλειον* and *πυλειῶν*).

specimen of his actual diction, but the remark of Cicero about him (*De Divin.*, 1, 49: *is autem diligentissime res Hannibalis persecutus est*) is probably significant, since most of us when we praise painstaking diligence and let the matter rest there, generally mean to hint that there is relatively little to be said for literary attractiveness.*

492, a fragment touching on the Persian War, is deplorably mutilated, since the style seems sober and modest. Hiatus may have been avoided, for I notice only one instance in addition to the inevitable one in the fixed phrase γῆς καὶ ὕδατος. If so, the work presumably belongs to the fourth century, or later. Since the technical phrase, thrice used in Herodotus (7, 32, 131 and 133, and only here in his work), is ἐπὶ γῆς αἰτησιν, it might conceivably be that in lines 63-4 one should supply ἐ[π' αἰτησιν γ]ῆς, for these letters would seem to fill the necessary space pretty well.

493, Aesop's Fables, a MS from the first half of the first century, consists of five recognizable tales, equipped each with a promythium, and at least one other with an epimythium, artistically put in the lips of the last speaker. My colleague, B. E. Perry, who is highly conversant with this whole range of literature, kindly contributes the following brief comments:

"103 ff.: Γλαῦξ καὶ ὄρνιθες is essentially the same as χελιδὼν καὶ ὄρνιθες (Chambry, 350), except that the χελιδὼν thereafter lives with men. Phaedrus has the same version (*Aves et Hirundo*, app. 12) as class I, except that the flax plant is there substituted for the oak and the ἕξος. 74 and preceding: As the editor points out, this epimythium probably belongs to Chambry, 132. The same idea is also in 262, as already observed; but 132 in the MSS comes immediately before *Hercules and Plutus*, which in the papyrus starts with l. 75. Mr. Roberts reports incorrectly the order in the MSS, no doubt because he assumed that their order was identical with Chambry's, whereas it is the reverse. Hence these two fables appear in both the papyrus and the Class I MSS in exactly the same order. . . . In contents the papyrus agrees more closely with the anonymous prose fables of Class I than with any other collection or author. It represents, so far as we can judge, the same general corpus of fables as Class I, though in an independent textual recension. The variations here indicate that in antiquity, even more than in Byzantine times (11th-14th cent.), great liberties were taken in stylizing such *litterarisches Gemeingut*. Aesop, in fact, seems never to have been actually quoted, but each time the story

*The reversal of the words "peace" and "war" in the translation of the last section must be a mere slip, since the correct situation is clearly recognized in the introduction.

is told anew in different words or variations of detail. The substance of Class I, even where it differs slightly from the papyrus, has presumably an equal claim to antiquity, since the variants are found also in ancient authors (Phaedrus, Babrius, Dio). The variants on the first fable in the pap., Aesop, Class I, Aristotle, and the Bodl. Paraphrase (Babrius) indicate that Class I is here not dependent on Babrius but goes back of him. Although the text of the papyrus differs widely from that of Class I, the fundamental similarity in style, the manner, the color, is impressive. Certainly the papyrus version resembles Class I far more than it does Class II, III (Accursiana), or the Bodleian paraphrase. In detail one might note that the fable is here uniformly called *λόγος* as in Class I, not *μῦθος*, as predominantly elsewhere in the tradition both direct and indirect (the technical rhetoricians). The promythian formula here, *πρὸς . . . ὅδε λόγος ἐφαρμόζει*, has a close counterpart in a recurring type of epimythian formula in Class I: *οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀρμόσειεν ἂν πρὸς . . .* (Cham., 150. 165. 224); *οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἀρμόττει πρὸς . . .* (41. 293); *πρὸς . . . ὁ λόγος ἀρμόζει* (109. 156); *πρὸς . . . ὁ λόγος ἀρμόδιός ἐστιν* (322).

ἀτὰρ, which occurs thrice in the pap. is familiar in Class I in the phrase *ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ἡμᾶς* in the epimythia (10 times in Class I, but nowhere else). Note *ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ὁ π* [. . . in line 125, where possibly *ὑμᾶς* or *ὑμεῖς* should be supplied; cf. Chamb., 86, *ἀτὰρ οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὃ παῖδες* etc., which, just as in the pap., is not the epimythium, although it contains the moral, but the final utterance of one of the characters. In view of the formulaic nature of this phrase and its normal occurrence at the end of a fable, it should probably be restored in lines 143 and 151 of the papyrus (perhaps without *καὶ* in 151). The presence in Class I of 8 or 10 recurring, stereotyped epimythian formulae (three of which, including *οὗτος* in l. 73 are used in this papyrus), may possibly indicate that the Class I corpus was made up on the basis of almost as many different ancient editions of the fables, each of which editions, like the papyrus and the Bodleian paraphrase (here simply *ἔτι*), had its own thoroughly standardized pattern of epimythium or promythium. In l. 131, *οὐρ* is probable on the analogy of l. 73: both are epimythia after a familiar pattern of Class I. The use in the pap. of both epimythia and promythia, at times apparently within the same fable, is well paralleled by Phaedrus. Contrary to the editor's implication on p. 126, the Bodl. paraphrase, which he cites in Cham., 144, places the moral always at the beginning, i. e. has only promythia. Chambry, however, transfers these morals to the end. The asyndeton in l. 58, instead of being 'harsh even for this type of literature' (Roberts) is quite common in Class I

(e. g. Cham., 4. 14; 3. 6; 17. 4; 267. 3 and 5), as also in the *Life*. But as much as anything else, it is the simple, rapidly moving sentences of the narrative which make me feel that the papyrus collection typifies the conventional style of the fables in Class I, and, if that be so, we must regard this stylistic convention, hence Class I, as ancient. What we *know* to be Byzantine is quite different. Indeed the chief significance of this papyrus, as I see it now, is that it tends, by strong analogy, to support the hypothetical antiquity of Class I."

Lines 74 f.: [ἀμαρ]τάνων ἕκασ[τ]ος αἰτιάται[ι θεός], (or Τύχην) comes so close to being a perfect trimeter, as it stands, that one is tempted, in view of the large number of hidden verses in certain prose fables⁵ to suggest that αἰτιάται may have been intended to scan as three long syllables with synesis of the second and third (a variety of that metrical device, which, though rare, is well established [W. Christ, *Metrik*², pp. 29 f.; P. Maas, *Griech. Metrik*, § 120], and, if tolerable anywhere, might surely be so in verse at this general level). Lines 77 f.: εἰσία is practically certain, from the parallel in Chambry. If ἀνεδέξατο is felt to be too long (but even then it makes a line no longer than the quite certain one; 75), one might suggest, with an easy change of subject, ἀπεδήμει, which is shorter by one letter, and there are at least three other lines here of that same length. One wonders if, conceivably, due to the similarity of sound in itacism, the two phrases ὡς εἰς θεός of the papyrus, and ἰσοθεωθεῖς of the MSS (ἀπαξ in any event) may not have had a common origin, and the latter form perhaps be due to a desperate attempt to make sense out of some such reading as that in the papyrus, which had become slightly corrupted. If so, then Class I and the papyrus would be drawn still closer together. Line 138: σφυρα might just about as well be σφυρά as σφύρα, and if so, suggest a quite different context, although I find nothing in Aesop to correspond. And yet Aesop 346 (Chambry) is not the only fable to treat of a blacksmith shop. Ignatius 8 (condensed to the point of obscurity) does the same, as also Aesop 77 (Chambry) and especially 117 (Chambry), where the snake going into the smithy asked (ἤτει) and received (λαβόν) gifts of food from all the other tools (παρὰ πῶν σκευῶν), among which the hammer could not possibly have been omitted, since it is the smith's tool κατ' ἐξοχήν. If this suggestion be at all plausible, then in lines 132-3 one might propose ἔρα]νον λήψ[ειν προσδοκούσα (the animal in question here seems to be feminine, perhaps an ἔχιδνα rather than an ἔχis, and, incidentally, in the modified variant given by

⁵ As in the Crusius ed. of Babrius, pp. 234 f.; Phaedrus is wholly in senarii; and compare the thousands of verses in the collections of the closely related fable and gnome.

Phaedrus [4.8] it is a *viper*), comparing *ἐρανον* and *λαβών* in fable 117; in 136-7 *ἐ]πειτα τὰ ἀ[λλα σκεύη]*, comparing *παρὰ τῶν σκευῶν*; in 138-9 *αὐτ[ῇ] ἐδίδουσ[αν]*, comparing *δοῦναι*, *διδόναι* and *λαβών*; *εἶπεν* corresponds with an *εἶπεν* (the file speaking), in the same relative position in the fable; with *ἐγὼ μέ[ν . . .]* (c. 19) . . . *λαμβάνω* compare *οὐ διδόναι ἀλλὰ λαμβάνειν παρὰ πάντων εἴωθα*, which suggests *ἐγὼ μέ[ν οὐ διδόναι εἴωθα ἀλλὰ]* *λαμβάνω* [*παρὰ πάντων . . .*].

494-521 are miscellaneous unidentifiable scraps of verse and prose, any one of which may suddenly acquire significance if and when adjoining pieces of the same work come to light elsewhere, as will probably be the case with one or another of them.

507 *recto* may possibly derive from some comments upon the *δμώνυμοι*, numerous notes upon whom appear in the scholia, especially those to Homer. There were three such with the name Orestes in the *Iliad* alone, and of course two famous ones with that of Aias. In this direction seem to point *αἶ δ' Αἴας*; *Αἴας δέ*; and *ἑτεροι*. One might, then, supply *ἀπ[ὸ Ναρούκας or Δοκρίδος or Σαλαμίνος, or something of the sort; ἐγνώκ]αμεν πολλούς . . .*; [*τελαμών]ος ἑτεροι . . .*; *ὡς Ὀρέστην [μὲν τὸν τοῦ . . .*; and, since one Orestes was called *πλήξιππος* (E 705), even divide in line 6 *καθ' ἱππ[ων or ἱππ[εῖαν or ἱππ[ασίαν vel simile quid]*—all of which remains, of course, highly problematical.

522, a fragment from Ptolemy, once more shows how readings previously supposed to be interpolations from a later date (this time the recensions of Pappus and Theon) now appear in a text within a century after the author's death. *Νικότεραι* (l. *-τερα*; cf. my article in *R.-E.*, s. v. "Nikotera," 554) in line 36 is the only mention of the place in Greek, and, although the editor rightly regards its interpolation here as due to a confusion with *Nikaia* (Nizza), whose longitude is ascribed to it, the fact that *Nicotera* was known at all to an Egyptian of this period shows that the town must have been of considerably more importance (perhaps a port of call for the Egyptian grain trade), at least at this time, than the few references to it might otherwise suggest.

523, an astronomical table, is especially interesting to me in giving several new examples of an omicron, with an ornamental line above it, probably representing an expanded upsilon for the abbreviation *ὀ(δέν)* (so suggested first by Dr. F. E. Robbins on P. Mich. [1936] 3, 151 and independently by Dr. J. G. Smyly here on p. 149), which is used for zero, as is a simple omicron in MSS of Ptolemy (cf. T. L. Heath, *Manual of Greek Mathematics* [1931], p. 23), but restricted there to the notation of sexagesimal fractions. In these other papyri, however, the *ο* or *ου* stands for zero degrees and has nothing whatever to do with fractions. This looks very much like an independently Greek

origin for the symbol which is identical with our own zero, and this already familiar usage presumably helped in getting zero adopted, in a position-value system, for the absence in a number of a particular denomination (units, tens, hundred, and the like). The papyri in question all date from the third or early fourth century.⁶

Several astrological and medical fragments of minor interest follow; then an almost contemporary bit of Harpocration (but why not under "Extant Greek Authors"?), which in line 7 confirms an emendation by Sauppe, but a few lines below supports the text of Theopompus against modern proposed alteration; a couple of fully elaborated conjugations of *ποιεῖν* and *πλείν*, as elsewhere *νικᾶν* and *γράφειν*, but not the *τύπτω* or *λύω* of Byzantine and modern Grammars; a grammatical fragment where the rather timidly suggested correction of a *γ* to a *ρ* is really certain, because there immediately follows a typical example of the *σχῆμα Πινδαρικόν*; welcome addition to the knowledge of the *Scholia Minora*, the scholia called D, and similar valuable work on Homer, which richly deserves a new and complete edition, where I should suggest at lines 1 and 2 *ἡκ*||[*ον*] *ημένους ὀδόντας* (several lines are longer than this, and the particular form is attested from a verse in Plutarch); an Homeric glossary; and what is doubtless a schoolboy's table in the Roman money system.

Under "Extant Greek Authors" we find considerable fragments of both the eccentric and the vulgate tradition of Homer. In 539 the new line for 100 of *Iliad* A ends *έθελῃσιν*. Since elsewhere in the *Iliad* this form occurs at the end of the line only in the formula *αἶ κ' έθελῃσιν*, and since a condition of some kind is here implied (as also in the vulgate reading), I suggest that supplement here. The rest of the line might then be reconstructed in several ways, one of which I offer *exempli gratia*: [*καὶ τότε λοιγὸν ἀπόσει Ἀπόλλων, αἶ κ' έθελῃσιν*]. Similarly for verse 110 from which the papyrus differs utterly one might venture to supply something like the following, again *exempli gratia*, which, in bitterly casting a doubt upon the validity of the claim to speak for Heaven, would seem to fit the general situation

⁶ The last word, apparently, has not yet been said on the origin of the symbol for zero in a position-value system. The old story that it was a relatively early Hindoo invention diffused by the Arabs is now viewed a bit sceptically, and it can hardly be shown that the Hindoos actually employed zero in this way before ca. 500 A. D., which is some three and one-half centuries after Ptolemy, and at least two full centuries after the papyri in question. See J. Tropicke, *Geschichte der Elementar-Mathematik*, I (1930), 17, 20-26, 40 f.; and O. Neugebauer, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Mathematik*, I (1934), 5, 11, 42 f., 78, both influenced by the important critical studies of G. R. Kaye. Since the above was written I have noticed that Abel Rey (*Rev. des Études Grecques*, XLVIII [1935], pp. 527-33) argues for the origin of the zero-symbol in the initial letter of *ὀδόν*. M. Rey depends considerably upon an article by G. S. Colin, *Journ. Asiatique*, CCXXII (1933), pp. 193-215.

quite as well as the somewhat colorless recapitulation of the MSS: $\epsilon\iota\delta[\epsilon\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma\sigma\omicron\iota]\ \epsilon\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\nu\ [\epsilon\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \nu\eta\mu\epsilon\rho\epsilon\varsigma\ \epsilon\nu\iota\sigma\pi\acute{\epsilon}\iota\nu]$.

In editing the complete text of 540 it might have been well to indicate in the *apparatus* the correct readings (like Ἑλλάδα for Ἀλλάδ[α] in 683) even though these corrections had been made by Milne in the earlier publication; and this has been done in the edition of the prose summary.

A few relatively unimportant shreds from extant texts of Euripides, Thucydides, Xenophon, Pseudo-Demosthenes, and Lycurgus bring one to the elaborate indices and the plates.

In general the book is beautifully and accurately printed (two or three trifling blemishes that will disturb no one are all that I have noted). The editorial workmanship maintains in erudition, ingenuity, and judgment the very highest standards of performance by the author's celebrated fellow-countrymen, and may well be viewed with pride by that distinguished scholar, Wilhelm Schubart, to whom, as teacher and friend, the volume has been dedicated.

W. A. OLDFATHER.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS.

M. POHLENZ. Hippokrates und die Begründung der wissenschaftlichen Medizin. Berlin, de Gruyter, 1938. Pp. 120. RM. 6.

This book is a new vindication of the doctrine of Hippocrates and his work in opposition to recent and earlier scepticism. The system of the founder of scientific medicine is reconstructed from the two Pre-Alexandrian testimonies still available (pp. 63-79) and then identified with theories of a few of the so-called Hippocratic writings (pp. 79-80), especially with those of *Airs Waters Places* and *Sacred Disease*; the latter treatises are analyzed at great length in the first part of Pohlenz' book (pp. 3-62). Finally Hippocrates' importance for later generations and his influence on them are evaluated (pp. 81-96). An appendix containing the footnotes and a short survey of recent literature (pp. 97-120) complete the work.¹

Pohlenz' main problem is the determination of Hippocrates' system; all the other inquiries made are either supplementary to this or based on its solution. The question as to how the testimonies of Plato (*Phaedrus* 270 C) and of Aristotle's pupil Meno (V, 35 ff.)² are to be interpreted, therefore, must be the chief topic of this review also. Like Pohlenz, I shall deal first with the later testimony of Meno who relates the Hippocratic ex-

¹ In the meantime Pohlenz has given a summary of his views in *Die Antike*, XV (1939), pp. 1 ff.

² *Anonymi Londinensis ex Aristotelis Iatriois Menoniis et aliis Medicis Eclogae*, ed. H. Diels, *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, III, 1 (1893).

planation of diseases and then consider that of Plato, the earlier witness, who describes the Hippocratic method only (cf. Pohlenz, p. 75).

Pohlenz claims that the account given in the *Meno-Papyrus* has never been analyzed before as it should have been; for the original words of Meno have not been clearly distinguished from later additions on the part of the doxographer who made the excerpts from Meno's history of medicine (p. 65). The text, as it stands, so Pohlenz says himself, unmistakably attributes to Hippocrates an explanation of diseases by the *φῦσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττώματων*, "Gase, die sich aus den Perittomata entwickeln" (p. 66). Yet, according to Meno, Pohlenz maintains, Hippocrates spoke of *φῦσαι* alone (p. 67) and explained diseases through the air taken into the body with nutrition (p. 68). The concept of the air excreted from the remnants of food is an interpolation of the doxographer (p. 67) which must be eliminated so as to make the text intelligible and consistent (p. 68).

It seems strange that Pohlenz should charge the doxographer with having altered Meno's words. For the report in question, at the beginning (V, 36-37) and at the end (VI, 42), is expressly characterized as the opinion of Aristotle, i. e. of Meno. The doxographer disagrees with this opinion, so much so that he adds his own views concerning Hippocrates' doctrine which he outlines in accordance with some of the so-called Hippocratic writings (VI, 43 ff.). Why, then, should he have changed Meno's account? And if he did, why has he interpolated a concept which he himself later on does not ascribe to Hippocrates? Or has the later description of the Hippocratic theory, so utterly at variance with the previous one, been added by somebody else? Pohlenz, who does not enter into these questions at all, seems to believe that not only the doxographer but also a third person may have participated in the preparation of the excerpts as they are preserved (p. 65).

However these difficulties may be accounted for, Pohlenz thinks that he can prove the probability of the assumed alteration by two facts: the doxographer, he says, has classified all the theories with which the Hippocratic doctrine is grouped under a term originally foreign to them, namely that of *περιττώματα* (p. 65); besides, he has introduced into the summary of the Platonic theories a concept which is not to be found in the Platonic text (p. 66). I am not prepared to decide whether Hippocrates himself could use the word *περιττώματα*. That, in the sense of remnants of food, it occurs for the first time in Diocles' fragments does not prove that it was not used before (contrary to Pohlenz, pp. 65-66); the material preserved from earlier writings is too scanty to allow such a conclusion.³ It is, however, the less

³ I note that Ilberg, in his copy of Diels' edition of the *Meno-Papyrus*, now in the Institute of the History of Medicine at the Johns Hopkins

necessary to discuss this question since Pohlenz himself in his argumentation puts all emphasis on the alleged misrepresentation of Plato's views: "... wie unbekümmert . . . der Doxograph nicht nur formal umstilisiert, sondern auch sachlich umgestaltet, können wir in einem Fall (*scil.* in the Plato-report) noch mit Händen greifen," he says (p. 66).⁴

I shall not insist that the doxographer, if he is not correct in his description of the Platonic doctrine, need not necessarily be incorrect in his representation of the Hippocratic dogma. I rather ask whether he really misrepresents Plato's theory. Pohlenz claims that the doxographer ascribes to Plato, as he does to Hippocrates, an explanation of diseases by the φύσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττώματων (XVII, 46-47); this term, however, does not occur in the *Timaeus* on which the résumé is obviously based; the doxographer, then, has falsified his source (cf. Pohlenz, p. 66). But the text of the Plato-report reads thus (XVII, 44-47):

παρὰ [δὲ]
τὰ περιττώματα συνίστα[νται] τριχῶς
αἱ νόσοι, ἢ π[α]ρ[ὰ] τὰς φύσας [τὰς ἐκ τ(ῶν)] πε-
ριττωμ[ά]τ(ων) ἢ παρὰ χολήν ἢ φλέγμα.

It is then, first of all, not the doxographer who, as Pohlenz says, speaks of air excreted from the περιττώματα. The concept of the φύσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττώματων is a conjecture of the editor of the papyrus. If the words, as restored, do not correspond to the Platonic text, the editor has erred, not the doxographer.⁵

But one may object: even if φύσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττώματων is a conjecture, the words φύσαι and περιττώματα (cf. also XVII, 14) are preserved in the papyrus, and yet neither of them is to be found in the *Timaeus* (cf. Pohlenz, p. 66). Does this difference not suffice to prove a misunderstanding of Plato's views and, consequently, to cast suspicion upon the correctness of the representation of Hippocrates' views? To be sure, Meno speaks of φύσαι, whereas Plato speaks of πνεῦμα (*Timaeus* 84 D). But it is

University, refers (Index s. v. περισώματα) to E. Howald, *Hermes*, LIV (1919), pp. 187 ff. and G. Méautis, *Philologische Wochenstift*, XLV (1925), pp. 184 ff.; both authors endeavour to prove the early occurrence of κάθαρσις and περιττώματα.

⁴ K. Deichgräber (*Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse [1933], Nr. 3, p. 153) was the first to assume this inaccuracy of the report on Plato. Diels (*Hermes*, XXVIII [1893], p. 425), however, had already asserted the methodological value of the Plato-account, because it affords a check on Meno's reliability. For other minor divergencies cf. A. Rivaud, *Platon, Œuvres Complètes*, X (1925), p. 115, n. 4. Cf. note 13 *infra*.

⁵ It is misleading, it seems to me, for Pohlenz in quoting the papyrus (p. 66, n. 2) not to indicate the lacunae and emendations. Especially if an argument is based on such a text, the reader is entitled to be informed about what is preserved in the original and what is modern conjecture.

the air that has entered the human body with which Plato is concerned, and this air is commonly called *φύσα* or *φύσαι* by physicians.⁶ Plato himself was aware that the term which he uses was antiquated and that, already in his time, *φύσα* was the more common medical expression (cf. *Republic* 405 D).⁷ The change in terminology made by the doxographer is, then, certainly no falsification of Plato's opinion. Moreover, it is true that Plato does not use the expression *περιττώματα*. Yet, the second cause of illness which he mentions is phlegm, the third bile (*Meno*, XVII, 47; *Timaeus* 85 A ff.). These qualities, in Aristotelian language are named *περιττώματα*.⁸ The third class of diseases (*Timaeus* 84 C) which Meno is paraphrasing comprises then two species which are correctly referred to by the term which Meno introduces.

But what about the *φύσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων*, if this is the correct restoration of the lacuna? Pohlenz is right in pointing out that in *Timaeus* 84 D Plato is discussing the air which the human being breathes (p. 66). Yet, in *Timaeus* 84 E, a passage which, strangely enough, is not quoted by Diels, who in his notes refers only to *Timaeus* 84 C-D, the first way in which illness arises is characterized thus: *πολλάκις δ' ἐν τῷ σώματι διακριθείσης σαρκὸς πνεῦμα ἐγγενόμενον καὶ ἰδυνάτοῦν ἔξω πορευθῆναι*. . . . This Martin takes to mean: "Souvent aussi, la chair se trouvant raréfiée dans quelque partie du corps, il s'y engendre de l'air, qui, n'en pouvant sortir . . ." ⁹ Such a sense, however, could well be epitomized by *φύσαι ἐκ τῶν περιττωμάτων*. For disintegrated flesh is the material from which, according to Plato, bile, phlegm, etc. are produced.¹⁰ Moreover, Meno, in consequence of the importance of the *περιττώματα* in all three cases, would with some justification have subordinated them to the general heading *νόσοι παρὰ τὰ περιττώματα* (XVII, 45).

Of course, one cannot decide whether Meno understood the

⁶ Cf. *Breaths*, chap. 3 (*Hippocrates*, ed. J. L. Heiberg, *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, I, 1 [1927], pp. 92, 20; 95, 15, etc.); cf. Pohlenz, p. 67, n. 2, and p. 67 where he himself understands *φύσα* as air breathed in by the human being.

⁷ I was reminded of this passage by H. Cherniss.

⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *Historia Animalium* 511 b 9; Pohlenz (p. 66, n. 2) also refers to this passage, yet, in his interpretation of the Plato passage, takes the word to mean remnants of food, a meaning which it cannot have either here (XVII, 45) or before (XVII, 14), although in the Hippocrates-account it is used in the limited sense of remnants of food (cf. Aristotle, *De Generatione Animalium* 724 b 28; Pohlenz, p. 65, n. 3).

⁹ Th. H. Martin, *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, I (1841), p. 225. Already Marsilius Ficinus translates: *Saepe etiam intra corpus discretæ et rarefacta carne innascitur spiritus: qui cum foras egredi nequeat*. . . (quoted from Plato, ed. I. Bekker, III, 2 [1817], p. 126). With Martin's translation agree R. D. Archer-Hind, *The Timaeus of Plato* (1888), and F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (1937).

¹⁰ Cf. *Timaeus* 82 C, and A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (1928), p. 591.

Plato passage as do Martin and others. It is also possible to translate the words in question differently: "And often, when the flesh is disintegrated, air which is enclosed in the body and is unable to pass out. . . ." ¹¹ Such an interpretation is suggested as the right one by the fact that in 84 D, too, it is not air alone which, according to Plato, brings about illness; it is air combined with some other substance, with *ρεύματα* which are produced from phlegm (cf. *Timaeus* 85 B, and for the expression *ρεύματα* again *Republic* 405 D). If the lungs are filled with these rheums, the usual passage of the air is hindered, and it is for that reason that diseases are caused. If in 84 E Plato is also referring to the air coming from outside, the discussion of air as cause of diseases would be uniform. In both cases, as distinguished by Plato, air would be harmful only together with some other substance, with rheums or with disintegrated flesh in Platonic terms, with phlegm or bile, or in Aristotelian categories with *περιττώματα*. Meno, then, may have spoken of *φύσαι μετὰ περιττωμάτων* ¹² and he would have been equally justified in calling the third class of diseases *νόσοι παρὰ τὰ περιττώματα*. The advantage of such an emendation is that in his summary, then, he does not omit the explanation of diseases brought about by air from outside (84 D), although one must not forget that his résumé as a whole is not exhaustive and that he leaves out other points also.

At any rate, whatever restoration is adopted, the trustworthiness of the Hippocrates report cannot be disproved on the evidence adduced by Pohlenz. Many other instances, moreover, confirm the correctness of the data given in the papyrus (cf. Deichgräber, *op. cit.*, p. 159). It is true that sometimes the account is enlarged by the addition of similes ¹³ and that the language is colored by later terminology, but the basic facts, it seems, are authentic. What Meno relates about Hippocrates,

¹¹ Plato, *Timaeus* etc., with an English translation by R. G. Bury (The Loeb Classical Library), p. 229; cf. Taylor (*op. cit.*, p. 601) who interprets: "... whenever an abnormal 'division' or cavity is formed within the flesh, wind collects to fill it, and is unable to find a proper outlet." Cf. also A. Rivaud, *op. cit.*, p. 217: "Souvent aussi, la chair se disjoint à l'intérieur du corps; de l'air s'y enferme et, ne pouvant pas en sortir. . . ."

¹² Cf. *Timaeus* 83 E *μετὰ πνεύματος αἷμα*; 83 B *ξανθὸν χροῶμα μετὰ τῆς πικρότητος*. According to the above interpretation I propose to read in the papyrus:

παρὰ [δὲ]
τὰ περιττώματα συνίστα[νται τριχῶς]
αἱ νόσοι, ἢ π[α]ρ[ὰ τὰς] φύσας [τὰς μετὰ] τ[ε]-
ριττωμ[άτ(ων)] ἢ παρὰ χολήν ἢ φλέγμα.

¹³ For instance in the Plato report (XVI, 24 ff.); cf. Diels, *Hermes*, loc. cit., and note 4 *supra*. That the simile given in the Hippocrates passage can be original (Pohlenz, p. 67) I do not deny (cf. *R.-M.*, Supplement VI [1936], 1323). The probability, however, is not increased by the observation that similes are added in other places.

therefore, has to be accepted as it stands; it cannot be reinterpreted as Pohlenz proposes to do. Hippocrates, according to Meno at least, has explained diseases by the air excreted from the remnants of food, and well he may; there is no reason either to assume that Meno was mistaken in his description of the Hippocratic dogma.¹⁴ For similar theories are known from other great physicians of Hippocrates' time; the importance of food for the development of diseases, the influence of digestion is stressed over and over again in the *Corpus Hippocraticum*. The doctrine that it is air, not a liquid which is excreted from the remnants of food (cf. e. g. Meno, V, 12 ff.) would be the specifically Hippocratic modification of a more common dogma.

As I cannot agree, then, with Pohlenz' interpretation of the Meno-Papyrus, I cannot follow him in his interpretation of the *Phaedrus* either. This second and most important testimony on Hippocrates Pohlenz takes to mean that, according to Plato, Hippocrates found it impossible to understand the nature of the body without the nature of the cosmos (*ἀνευ τῆς τοῦ ὅλου φύσεως* 270 C), and, consequently he ascribes to Hippocrates a thorough observation of the seasons, of the air, etc. (p. 78; cf. pp. 4-5). That in Plato as well as in other writers τὸ ὅλον may mean "cosmos" is certain; Pohlenz (p. 75, n. 1) gives additional proof for such a sense. It is equally certain, however, that the word, especially in the Platonic dialogues, signifies the whole, the logical or organic unity, a usage for which Pohlenz does not cite any parallel. The problem is not whether τὸ ὅλον can be understood only in the one way or in the other, it is rather which of the two meanings of the word is implied in the passage in question.¹⁵

¹⁴ This was, for instance, the belief of Diels, *loc. cit.*, pp. 424-434; cf. the introduction to the edition of Meno, p. xvi. That Meno had an adequate knowledge of ancient medicine seems now generally assumed. That his account of Hippocratic views is consistent (contrary to Pohlenz, p. 68) has been shown R.-E., *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ Already in antiquity the opinion of the interpreters was apparently divided; Galen (*Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*, V, 9, 1 [1914], p. 55, 16; cf. p. 53, 26) understands τὸ ὅλον as cosmos; Hermias (*In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia*, ed. P. Couvreur [1901], p. 245, 5) takes it to mean the whole body (cf. R.-E., *loc. cit.*, 1319). Of modern interpreters L. Robin (*Platon, Œuvres Complètes* [Collection Budé], IV, 3 [1933]) sides with Galen; cf. also Wilamowitz, *Platon* (1929)², p. 462, and W. H. S. Jones, *Hippocrates with an English Translation* (The Loeb Classical Library), I, p. xxxiii. Hermias' interpretation is upheld by B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato translated into English*, I² (1892), p. 479, but already proposed as the only satisfactory solution by W. H. Thompson, *The Phaedrus of Plato* (1868), p. 124. Cf. L. Edelstein, *Περὶ δέπου und die Sammlung der Hippokratischen Schriften, Problemata*, IV (1931), pp. 129-135; G. M. A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (1935), p. 213, n. 1. P. Shorey (*What Plato said* [1933], p. 205) refers to *Lysis* 214 B and *Charmides* 156 B ff.; he seems to understand τὸ ὅλον as cosmos and as the whole of the body; so does W. Nestle, *Hermes*, LXXIII (1938), p. 18.

Socrates claims that the procedure of medicine and that of rhetoric are identical; in both arts it is necessary to give a diaeresis of the object concerned (*διελέσθαι φύσιν* 270 B).¹⁶ He, then, asks whether it is possible to understand the nature of the soul, the object of rhetoric, without the nature of the whole (270 C). Phaedrus answers with a reference to Hippocrates who holds it impossible to acquire even medical knowledge without such a method (*ἀνευ τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης* *ibid.*). Whereupon Socrates, who is not satisfied with Hippocrates' authority before inquiring into the validity of the argument, tries to explain what kind of investigation Hippocrates and right reason demand concerning nature (*περὶ φύσεως* *ibid.*). They demand, he says, for the understanding of every nature (*περὶ ὅτουόν φύσεως* 270 D) two things: first an investigation as to whether the object is simple or multi-form, and then a division of the object into its parts together with a determination of the relation of these parts to each other and to the factors influencing them (*ibid.*). In other words, they demand definition and diaeresis; that these two processes are inseparable has been stressed even before (e. g. 265 D-266 B); each diaeresis involves a conception of the whole which is to be divided into its parts. The nature of the whole, then, which, as Socrates says, is presupposed by every right understanding, must be the comprehension of the particulars into one idea;¹⁷ the method which Hippocrates follows also in medicine must be the general definition of its object, the human body.

Socrates discusses the identity of the methods used in rhetoric and medicine so as to explain what he said before and what Phaedrus did not understand. Πᾶσαι ὅσαι μεγάλα τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως περί· τὸ γὰρ ὑψηλόγον τοῦτο καὶ πάντα τελεσιουργὸν εἰκεν ἐντεῦθεν ποθεῖν εἰσέναι (269 E-270 A), Socrates claimed and then exemplified his statement by the relation of Pericles to Anaxagoras. Does Socrates, by speaking of μετεωρολογία φύσεως περί, refer to "Meteorologie" or "Himmelsspekulation," that is astronomy and mathematics, and is the word chosen by Plato in order to indicate his agreement with Hippocrates who by the same term expressed the belief

¹⁶ I doubt that *Λαῖος* 946 B κλήρω διελόντας τὸν νικῶντα, the passage to which Pohlenz refers (p. 75, n. 1) has the same meaning as *διελέσθαι* in the *Phaedrus*. At any rate, the division of the soul has its analogy in medicine as Pohlenz himself, in spite of his qualifying interpretation of *διελέσθαι* in the notes (p. 75, n. 1), admits in his text (p. 76). For the identity of the dialectical procedure of the *Phaedrus* with that of the late dialogues, the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* cf. J. Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik von Sokrates zu Aristoteles* (1907), p. 62.

¹⁷ For this use of τὸ ὅλον cf. e. g. Stenzel, *op. cit.*, p. 60 and *R.-E.*, *loc. cit.*, 1318-1320. *Symposium* 205 B and D give a particularly good example of this sense of τὸ ὅλον and εἶδη (the whole and the parts of a concept) even in a context which is not strictly dialectical.

that astronomy is necessary for medicine (Pohlenz, p. 78)? In the *Republic* (529 A) Glaucon praises the study of astronomy because "it compels the soul to look upwards (*εἰς τὰ ἄνω ὄραν*) and leads it away from the things here to those higher things," but Socrates answers (529 A-530 C): "You seem to me in your thought to put a most liberal interpretation on the study of higher things (*τὴν περὶ τὰ ἄνω μάθησιν*); for apparently, if anyone with back-thrown head should learn something by staring at decorations on a ceiling, you would regard him as contemplating them with the higher reason (*νοήσει*) and not with the eyes. Perhaps you are right, and I am a simpleton. For I, for my part, am unable to suppose that any other study turns the soul's gaze upward (*ἄνω ποιοῦν ψυχὴν βλέπειν*) than that which deals with being and the invisible . . . It is by means of problems, then, . . . as in the study of geometry, that we will pursue astronomy, too, and we will let be the things in the heavens, if we are to have a part in the true science of astronomy and so convert to right use from uselessness that natural indwelling intelligence of the soul."¹⁸ It is, then, certainly not observation of the heavens, not even the usual form of astronomy which Socrates acknowledges as propaedeutics to higher knowledge. What he alludes to in demanding for all great arts *ἁδολεσχία καὶ μετεωρολογία φύσεως περὶ* can only be a study detached from the visible world, "discussion and high speculation about the truth of nature,"¹⁹ of the nature of the object (cf. *περὶ φύσεως* 270 C; *φύσις* 270 B-D), as he says here, of generalisation and diaeresis, as he states later on (270 B ff.). One can hardly conclude from this passage that Plato agreed with Hippocrates who held it necessary that the physician know the influence of the seasons on the development of diseases. The words, understood in their Platonic sense, only confirm that Hippocrates recommended definition and division of the object of medicine, of the human body.

Finally, Plato always regards it as the task of the good craftsman to apprehend the whole of his object, and in particular, as that of the physician, to study the whole of the body and not only its parts. So he says in the *Charmides* (156 C) as well as in the *Laws* (902 D-E; 903 C). Should the great Hippocrates, whom Plato admires, not fulfill the conditions set up by Plato for good craftsmanship? Should he, on the contrary, be inclined to speculations or studies of which Plato himself does not approve? Neither the procedure of diaeresis nor the terminology

¹⁸ Plato, *The Republic with an English Translation* by P. Shorey (The Loeb Classical Library), II, pp. 181-183; 187-189. For a more detailed interpretation of the passage cf. E. Hoffman, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* (1923-24), pp. 34 ff., and Shorey in the notes to his edition.

¹⁹ I am using Jowett's translation (*loc. cit.*, p. 478). That *μετεωρολογία* may have such a meaning is shown by Edelstein, *loc. cit.* The Platonic doctrine of the *ἄνω* and *κάτω* is outlined by G. Teichmüller, *Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe* (1874), p. 391.

used in it are inventions of Plato; they are known to earlier generations. There are no valid historical objections, then, to the assumption that Hippocrates actually demanded definition and division; because he did so, he need not be a Platonist, nor a believer in the Platonic idea (contrary to Pohlenz, p. 75, n. 1). On the other hand, Diocles, the follower of Hippocrates, maintained that it is the whole nature of the body which is responsible for diseases. Moreover the method of diaeresis, Galen says, was an integral part of later medical theories which depended on Hippocrates' system.²⁰

To be sure, if the testimonies of Meno and Plato are interpreted as I think they have to be, Hippocrates is not the founder of the *πνῦμα* theory (cf. Pohlenz, pp. 73 ff.; 92 ff.) but of scientific medicine in the Platonic sense of the word science (cf. *Philebus* 16 C). Moreover, there is no book among the so-called Hippocratic writings which can be ascribed to Hippocrates himself. That even from Pohlenz' point of view this could not be done, I believe, is certain.²¹ But I do not discuss this question, since I think that the interpretation on which Pohlenz relies in his attempt to establish the authenticity of certain books is not convincing. It is true that after a hundred years of research it is still impossible to claim that the genuine works of Hippocrates have been ascertained.²² But Hippocrates' method, his doctrine are known, though his books are lost. The writings of many great scientists and philosophers have been destroyed, only testimonies concerning their achievements are left. To acknowledge that is no verdict, no negativism; it is a statement of fact.

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. XLIX. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. 281.

The forty-ninth volume of the *Harvard Studies* opens with a full account by Professor Carl N. Jackson of the scholarly career of the late Professor Herbert Weir Smyth of Harvard University to whom the book is dedicated. The tribute to Professor Smyth

²⁰ Concerning the diaeresis before Plato cf. A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica* (1911), pp. 212-246; E. Hoffman, *Anhang zu Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 1 (1922), p. 1073. For Diocles (ἡ δλη φύσις) cf. Fragment 112 (p. 163, line 2 Wellmann and W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* [1938], p. 29). The Hippocratic diaeresis was taken over by Mnesitheus and Diocles, cf. Galen XI, p. 3 (Kühn) = Mnesitheus, Fragment 3 (H. Hohenstein, *Der Arzt Mnesitheos aus Athen*, Diss. Berlin [1935]).

²¹ Cf. L. Edelstein, "The Genuine Works of Hippocrates," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine*, VII (1939), pp. 236 ff.

²² Cf. W. Jaeger, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

is most appropriate and the detailed story of his achievements shows clearly how he traveled the road from distinguished technical studies in dialectology and the like to a consideration of the larger and more enduring values of classical literature. In this way he avoided the pitfall of allowing the linguistic and the technical to become ends in themselves but rather made them serve as indispensable means to the larger end, namely, the interpretation and appraisal of the masterpieces of Greek poetry.

The second essay by John H. Finley, Jr., "Euripides and Thucydides," undertakes to show that certain passages in the dramatist may be used as evidence that Thucydides when dealing with events early in the Peloponnesian War actually reflected not only ideas but also the rhetorical practice current in Athens around 431 B. C. In other words, Thucydides is not projecting back to the earlier period attitudes and practices which did not actually come into being in the Greek world until close to the end of the fifth century. The evidence which Finley adduces is more convincing for its cumulative effect than for the persuasiveness of any individual item. As a result instances which are commonplaces are sometimes cited without specific mention of their commonplace character. Similarly, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether a certain technique of argument appeared because the ancient writer was formally trained in rhetoric or whether he presented his case in just that way because he possessed common sense, sanity, and a modicum of innate logical power. Finley sometimes argues that Thucydides made a point in such and such a way because of his rhetorical training, whereas one can hardly see how Thucydides could possibly have said it in any other way and still have made sense. There is a certain lack of clarity and sharpness in Finley's writing which tends to obscure the points he wishes to make. His conclusions, however, seem sound enough and should prove to be useful in the general interpretation of Thucydides.

Charles T. Murphy has contributed a well-pointed and carefully wrought article on "Aristophanes and the Art of Rhetoric." After showing how and the extent to which Aristophanes satirized the art of rhetoric and in particular the new form which it had taken in the years in which he was presenting his plays, Murphy ingeniously demonstrates how Aristophanes actually is influenced by the rules of rhetoric when he is composing the more formal speeches in the comedies themselves. Murphy then submits a full rhetorical analysis of one such speech (*Acharnians*, 496-556) followed by shorter treatments of several others. He concludes, therefore, that Aristophanes' style was influenced by the fact that his youth was passed in Athens when Protagoras and the other sophists were active there, and that there is no reason why Aristophanes should not appear along "with Euripides and Thucydides as a student of and, in some degree, a contributor

to the art of rhetoric" (p. 113). As Murphy points out in a final footnote, his essay can profitably be read in conjunction with Finley's article, for the two together throw a good deal of light on the state of rhetoric in this epoch.

Mason Hammond begins his paper on "Pliny the Younger's Views on Government" with the somewhat apologetic remark that since Pliny was not a profound thinker, the forthcoming discussion cannot be dignified by giving it the title "the political philosophy of Pliny." Hammond characterizes Pliny as a singularly close approximation to the hypothetical average man, and indicates briefly the general social and political stratum from which Pliny derives. In developing Pliny's attitude towards political problems Hammond of course relies heavily upon the *Panegyricus* for evidence, and proceeds rather mechanically to describe *seriatim* Pliny's attitude towards the *princeps*, the senate, the relation between the individual and the state, imperialism, and the like. One cannot refrain from feeling that, if the philosophical implications of some of the passages quoted from Pliny by Hammond (e. g., pp. 124 and 138) had been more thoroughly explored, the conclusions would not have been so descriptive and unanalyzed as they appear to be. In his closing paragraph Hammond says, "Pliny, therefore, speaking for the cultivated opinion of his day, reflects to a larger degree the political ideas which are more thoughtfully expressed by philosophers of the second century." If Hammond had attacked his problem from the point of view of the philosophers, he might well have given us more valuable results. As it is, one finds little new in the paper; Pliny's views on government are just those that any intelligent reader immediately recognizes them to be.

The next article by Paul J. Alexander deals with the "Letters and Speeches of the Emperor Hadrian," in order that we may be "enabled to learn more about the man, the administrator, and the ruler." The writer proceeds carefully, if somewhat woodenly, through his sources and the accumulation of material presents us with an illuminated view of Hadrian. Particularly noteworthy is the way in which Alexander has emphasized (p. 149) Hadrian's competence in military matters and his ability to understand the psychology of the soldier, capacities which he indubitably possessed and which are too often overlooked by scholars. Separate sections of the paper treat the following topics: the emperor's attitude on constitutional problems, questions of legal technique, problems concerning municipalities, his interest in cultural questions, his social and economic policies, and finally his personal affairs. The whole collection and study is most valuable for its rounded delineation of Hadrian as a many-sided, talented, conscientious, wise, and just ruler and man.

Gerald F. Else in an essay entitled "Aristotle on the Beauty of Tragedy" undertakes to reinterpret the doctrine of catharsis in Aristotle's *Poetics*, and offers what he calls new evidence and

a new angle of approach, mainly based on material drawn from Plato's *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. The argument is involved and seems to be curiously infected by various misinterpretations of the sources. For example, on pp. 182-183, Else argues from *Philebus* 63e and 51d that the pure pleasures are those "which are intrinsic in the beautiful object and partake of its nature." It is difficult to see how "pleasure" in any sense of the term can be given the kind of objective status assigned to it by Else. Certainly such an interpretation would play havoc with the argument of the *Philebus*. Or again, the meaning which Else attaches to the very difficult Pythagorean doctrine of the four classes into which τὰ ὄντα can be divided may be open to question in certain respects. For example, to what extent does Plato wish the doctrine to throw light on the degree of reality present in any one of the existences so classified? Furthermore, one can by no means be convinced by Else's theory that Aristotle is alluding to the ζῶον of the *Timaeus* when he writes (*Poetics*, 1450 b 34); τὸ καλὸν καὶ ζῶον καὶ ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν κτλ. καὶ . . . καὶ here must mean, as Gudeman says, *cum . . . tum*. Aristotle hence seems to be referring simply to two classes of objects which may be beautiful, i. e., animate objects and "wholes made up of parts," *artefacta*. That this must be his essential meaning is indicated by his reference again to the two classes in the very next sentence (1451 a 3), ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζώων. It is hard to explain Aristotle's use here of the plural ζώων if he really has in mind "the meaning of ζῶον in the *Timaeus*." On page 193 when Else comes to consider the definition of tragedy, he argues on the basis of 1452 a 1 and 1452 a 38 that "the 'pity and fear' of the definition are—actions or happenings, πράξεις." Before examining the implications of this conclusion, he takes up Aristotle's theory of οἰκεία ἡδονή. Else, arguing on the evidence he has adduced from the *Philebus*, concludes that there is not one pleasure peculiar or proper to tragedy, and another proper to epic poetry, but οἰκεία ἡδονή is "one that is inherent in and proper to any serious literary work which has a pure and perfect form" (p. 194). Here he assigns to pleasure again this incomprehensible objective status. And he continues this confusion between objective and subjective by making pity and fear objective (i. e., πράξεις) and inherent in the "emotional material" out of which tragedy is constructed. How pity and fear can be objective in any sense is very difficult to understand. But with the argument taking this turn it is no wonder then that catharsis becomes objective; it is "primarily an artistic rather than a psychological process" which "takes place essentially in the tragedy when it is composed" (p. 199). In substance Else's theory amounts to this, if I have understood it correctly: 1) pleasure inheres in the object; 2) pity and fear inhere in the object; 3) Aristotle recommends that one should write a complete and perfect tragedy, which should resemble

the perfect "creature," the ζῷον of the *Timaeus*; 4) catharsis means the purification of the objective pity and fear according to criteria of completeness and perfection; and 5) if the catharsis is effective, there will inhere in the completed tragedy οἰκεία ἡδονή. At bottom the whole argument is completely vitiated by the failure to distinguish clearly between that which is subjective and that which is objective. Else's own summary statement of his theory amply reveals the confusion (p. 200): "they (i. e., pity and fear) are purified in the same moment they are aroused, by their incorporation into the beauty and measure of the perfect whole. In this purified state they are the basis—the indispensable basis—of the pure pleasure which a great tragedy calls forth in the soul." Else's article affords most stimulating reading and, though his conclusions are in my opinion completely untenable, no one can work through the essay without being forced to reconsider and reappraise the central and basic doctrines of the Aristotelian aesthetic.

Alan McN. G. Little's paper on "Plautus and Popular Drama" endeavors to point to those aspects of the Plautine plays which derive not from the tradition of Greek New Comedy but which owe much to the cruder and more transitory forms of popular entertainment. Little examines these several forms, but is of course handicapped by the paucity of evidence. He then turns to the comedies themselves and selects for more detailed treatment certain ones which he contends bear the most obvious signs of the influence of popular dramatic forms. These plays he divides into three categories: 1) the festival play, including the *Persa* and *Stichus*; 2) popularized New Comedy, including the *Casina* and *Mostellaria*; and 3) New Comedy farce, including the *Pseudolus*, *Asinaria*, *Bacchides*, *Miles Gloriosus*, and *Truculentus*. The article as a whole is interesting and throws light on the vexed problems of the literary ancestry of Plautus' plays.

The final article of the volume, "A Fragment of Juvenal in a Manuscript of Orléans," is contributed by Arthur P. McKinlay and Edward K. Rand. The authors tell a fascinating story of their discovery of impressed script on the front and back covers of a manuscript of Orléans. This script had been transferred from leaves once glued to the covers, and when read by the aid of a mirror proved to be a text of Juvenal, *Satire* II, 32-89 and *Satire* III, 35-93. The authors convincingly argue that the fragments derive from "one of the oldest and one of the best representatives of the text of Juvenal" (p. 244). The article is accompanied by a text of the fragments and several photographic plates.

One general observation may be made concerning the volume as a whole. A scholar can attack the most technical problem and at the same time give evidence that he has seen it in a wider perspective and has related it to a larger context. There may be some ground for urging that in several of these articles their

authors could have shown more adequately that they were motivated by the larger aims and goals of classical scholarship, those more humane and critical objectives, to which the dedicatory essay emphatically pointed as the guiding forces in the scholarly career of Professor Smyth.

WHITNEY J. OATES.

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

DAVID M. ROBINSON and J. WALTER GRAHAM. *Excavations at Olynthus, Part VIII: The Hellenic House*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1938. Pp. xxi + 370; 36 figs.; 110 plates. \$15.

The eighth volume of the *Excavations at Olynthus* by D. M. Robinson and J. W. Graham affords us the most important material for classical Greece: "a study of the houses found at Olynthus with a detailed account of those excavated in 1931 and 1934." There is in my opinion no doubt that the picture of a Greek town which this volume gives belongs in the main, as the authors contest, to classical times (before 348 B. C.). Though the sub-title "The Hellenic House" seems to me a little pretentious, the material presented in this volume is of the greatest interest in itself and also of outstanding value for everybody who desires thorough archaeological commentaries to our classical texts. In a careful, clear, and well-illustrated description the authors make the material available to both archaeologists and philologists. The chess-board planning of the town, its wall, the technique of its constructions of rubble and mud brick (the authors very successfully combine Vitruvius II, 8, 9 ff.; 16; 18 defending the adobe, pp. 227 ff.), the mural decoration, details of equipment and outfit of the houses, the shops and, above all, the main types of houses are reviewed and made easily accessible by good indices and most useful records. As to the houses, which attract a quite special interest, they are presented both in a description of the individual houses (part II) and in a general survey of plan, rooms, and construction (parts III and IV). In the latter are incorporated, according to the preface, the chief results of Dr. Graham's personal research on domestic architecture in classical Greece.

Thanks to the excavations at Olynthus we have come to know two closely connected types of classical Greek house, conveniently summarized as the *pastas* and *pastas and peristyle types*. They are indeed known also from other places (pp. 147 ff., 179 ff.), but Professor Robinson's work has in a way unified the material discovered for these types just as, for instance, the excavations at Pompeii have unified it for the *atrium* houses. The main characteristics may be summarized in the following way—as

illustrated also in Professor Robinson's valuable article "Haus" in the supplementary volume VII of Pauly-Wissowa's *Realencyclopädie*. Like the *megaron* (*oecus*) houses (Vitruvius, VI, 7), the houses of Olynthos as a rule face south. In obvious contrast to the *megaron* houses, however, these houses have their entrance on the southern long side, which faces the main street. The houses of Olynthos are thus oriented along the street (not with their central axis crossing the street as in the *megaron* houses). Inside these houses the most characteristic feature is a fairly wide room which runs longitudinally through the house like a corridor parallel with the front street (that is in an east-west direction). This "corridor" divides the house into a north and a south part. The north part, facing south, contains as a rule the main rooms and acts as a screen against the north. If the house had two storeys, the second storey was regularly added to this northern half, though it was also sometimes extended over the left and right parts of the southern half of the house. In the centre of the southern part of the house is a court directly accessible from the street by means of a *prothyron*. This vestibule is open to the street. There is no *thyron* of the kind described by Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1 behind it. The long room in the centre of the house—always felt to be a dividing corridor even if usually the ends are cut off and used as special rooms—is left open to the court with some three or four pillars in the wide opening. The present authors give convincing reasons for considering this room to be a typical *pastas* (pp. 161 f.) in contrast to a (colonnaded or uncolonnaded) porch of a house of the *megaron* (*oecus*) type. *Prostas* is obviously an appropriate name for the latter, though we must remember that Vitruvius could use the word *pastas* for the porch of a *megaron* house also (VI, 7, 1).

The difference between a *pastas* house and a *pastas* and *peristyle* house is that in the latter the court is transformed into a peristyle with porticoes on the south, east, and west sides in addition to the columns in the wide opening of the *pastas* on the north side. This form probably was influenced by the more elegant type of house described by Vitruvius, *loc. cit.* Among the most important features of the Olynthos houses may also be mentioned the elegant rooms with mosaic floor and antechamber, which were used by the men for their banquets. Robinson and Graham in their careful description (pp. 171 ff.) use the word *andron* for these rooms, while according to them the word *oecus*—as in Vitruvius (VI, 7, 2)—should be reserved for the hall of a house of *megaron* type. In this connection we must also remember the Greek *hibernacula*, described by Vitruvius, VII, 4, 4.

It is one of the most startling defects of Vitruvius' work that in his extreme classicism he concentrates upon what Robinson and Graham call the *prostas* type, that is the *megaron* (*oecus*)

type with its Homeric associations (Vitruvius, VI, 7, 2—Homer, *Od.*, VI, 305 f.) and its wide local distribution. Robinson and Graham (pp. 151; cf. the article "Haus" in *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, col. 266, 32), on the other hand, show some tendency to underrate its importance. It should not be forgotten that, in addition to what Priene shows us, we can see the influence of the *megaron* (*oecus*) house in widely separated quarters of the Greek world; e. g. in the tombs of Alexandria (Adriani, *La Nécropole de Moustafa Pacha*, pl. XXIX), in the third period of the Palace of Vouni (*The Swedish Cyprus Expedition*, III), in Nippur (*A. J. A.*, VIII [1904], pl. XIV—of course Hellenistic), in the Roman tenement houses discussed by Harsh in *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome*, XII (1935), pp. 9 f., etc. In my opinion the *pastas* and *peristyle* type of Olynthos—as I have just remarked—was also influenced by the *gynaeconitis* of the *megaron* (*oecus*) type, described by Vitruvius, *loc. cit.*¹ Both distribution and provenance do indeed make it understandable that Vitruvius could describe it as the Greek house *par préférence*. In addition, the type of house which the excavators at Olynthos have revealed to us no doubt represents a more humble standard than that shown by the developed *megaron* (*oecus*) houses. Robinson and Graham illustrate that: there is no *thyroron* (p. 153), no *mesauloi* and added apartments (p. 168), etc. That may help to explain the fact that Vitruvius could omit this.

As a matter of fact no contribution in the field of domestic architecture can be more welcome than a work which discloses how much Vitruvius has omitted. Luckhard (*Das Privathaus im Ptolemäischen und Römischen Ägypten*, Giessen, 1914) and also Schütz (*Der Typus des hellenistisch-ägyptischen Hauses*, Giessen, 1936, but cf. V. Müller, *A. J. A.*, XLII [1938], p. 319) have given us material from Alexandria. Still more fundamental, however, is the evidence which the eighth volume on Olynthos affords us. It puts it beyond every doubt that from classical times on two quite different types of house existed side by side in the Greek towns. Together with Vitruvius' *oecus* or *megaron* type with its *prostas* (= the Homeric *αἶθουσα*) appear Robinson and Graham's *pastas* houses from Olynthos. The distribution of this latter type outside Olynthos (pp. 147 ff.) excludes the possibility that the type may have been local and exceptional. That idea is indeed as shortsighted and dogmatic as would be the denial of the importance of the *megaron* (*oecus*) type in Hellenic times because of the liberating and new discovery at Olynthos. To summarize, we see clearly in the Greek

¹ Dr. Erik Holmberg's important "Excavations at Asca in Arcadia, 1936-38" (*Göteborgs Högskolas Årsskrift*, XLV [1939], pp. 24 ff.) now also gives us a Hellenistic *megaron* (*oecus*) house from the mainland of Greece.

development two parallel basic types, the *pastas* type and the *megaron* (*oecus*) type (*prostas* type, as Robinson and Graham call it), as well as the Hellenistic peristyles, which Vitruvius describes as added to the old Roman and the old Greek house (VI, 3, 7 = VI, 7, 3), and then variations and typical compromises such as the *pastas* and *peristyle* houses at Olynthos. Those are the main working, well-defined types. Whether the *pastas* and the *megaron* (*oecus*, *prostas*) types were originally related (cf. Schütz, *loc. cit.*, p. 12) is a quite different question. It should not confuse the actual situation in historic times. Personally I confess that I rather believe in different origins for both (as also for the *lautiora peristylia* and, of course, for the *atrium* houses).

When we turn to our texts and try to distinguish the types which occur in them, we meet with great difficulties. In my opinion Robinson and Graham have failed to bring that out quite sufficiently. The different types have many very decisive features in common, in spite of great differences in detail and orientation. Both the *megaron* houses and those at Olynthos followed the rule of facing south, *πρόσωλοι*—to use Aischylos' word for this common Greek orientation (cf. Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1). The idea of raising the northern part of the building, which faces the sun and offers protection against the north wind, is typical for Olynthos but belonged also to the peristyle architecture (Vitruvius, VI, 7, 3). Testimonies which only in a general way concern this feature cannot be claimed as clearly belonging to either of the types. The *pastas* and *peristyle* houses also have their peristyles. In a description like *Protagoras* 314 E-315 C it is impossible to say whether Plato speaks of a *megaron* (*oecus*) house or a *pastas* and *peristyle* house. I agree that Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, III, 8, 9, perhaps speaks about a house of the Olynthos type, but even there we have to remember the confusion between *pastas* and *prostas* revealed by Vitruvius, VI, 7, 1.

In short, despite the great difference between the houses, as we now know them archaeologically, they both have main features and also terminology in common in a way which allows the possibility of great confusion in a short and summary description. It seems clear, therefore, that the testimonies should be used with great critical care and attributed to the different types of house only when it is possible to point out some really distinctive feature. A brief preliminary examination has made it clear to me that the texts in many cases decidedly do *not* permit an identification, although in some it seems, of course, possible to trace one of the types.

This only emphasizes the great importance of the new discoveries. They make a new and thorough revision of all the testimonia about Greek houses necessary. The philologist must

be especially grateful for the new material, presented in such a clear and useful way. The present volume does not give us "The Hellenic House" but a most valuable and stimulating contribution to a great book which is badly wanted, a companion like Mau's *Pompeii* to follow when our texts touch Hellenic and Hellenistic architecture. To that critical unification of archaeological and philological research should belong also a well established terminology. There I would keep classical terms only where it can be proved that they really belong, and otherwise choose modern, neutral terms. For that work the present volume also furnishes many very precious contributions.

AXEL BOËTHIUS.

ROBERT J. BONNER and GERTRUDE SMITH. *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, Volume II.* Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. viii + 320.

In the first volume of this work, published in 1930, the authors traced the origin and development of legal processes among the Greeks and used this as a background for the discussion of the Athenian judicial system, treating in particular the machinery employed for administering justice. These chapters by no means exhausted the subject, and the authors promised to deal in the future with the topics omitted at that time. That promise is now fulfilled in the volume under review.

Chapter I (Introduction) discusses the difficulty of discovering the origin of the many suits brought before the Athenian courts. Chapter II (Litigants) deals largely with advocates, both the unpaid advocates of the Fifth and the professional advocates of the Fourth Century. There is an extended discussion of the services rendered by friends and club members in securing evidence and lending financial support. There were, of course, no permanent public prosecutors at Athens. In important cases of interest to assembly, boule, deme, or tribe advocates were selected *ad hoc*. Chapter III (Sycophants) discusses the abuses that arose from Solon's permission for any qualified citizen to prosecute wrong-doers. Attempts to control the sycophants by legislation had little success in Athens. Chapter IV (Special Pleas) explains the means by which the defendant might object to the admissibility of a suit. ἀντιγραφὴ was the earliest and fell into disuse early in the Fourth Century; διαμαρτυρία was used only in inheritance cases and γραφαί; παραγραφὴ, used originally only in suits brought in violation of the amnesty act of 403/2 B. C., was later extended to all δίκαι except inheritance cases. The authors hold that παραγραφὴ could be used in arbitration; this is a correction of the view of Lipsius. Chapter V (Arbitration)

discusses at some length the much debated question as to what cases were subject to arbitration, and decides that the only cases which could be arbitrated were those which came before the Forty directly or through the medium of the polemarch. Chapter VI (Witnesses) contains one of the best short statements of the difference between procedure in the Athenian and Anglo-American courts which this reviewer has ever seen: "In Athens the dicasts looked to the speaker for the law and facts and to the witnesses for corroboration; with us the jury looks to the witnesses for the facts and to the judge and counsel for the law and an integration of the results of examination and cross-examination of the witnesses. The litigants appear only as witnesses" (p. 123). Witnesses were of less importance at Athens than with us. They were not cross-examined. The state did not compel the witness to come to court, but a litigant might proceed against a recalcitrant witness by a *δίκη λεπομαρτυρίου*. There is a full treatment of the competence of women, children, and slaves. Chapter VII (Oaths) divides oaths into "promissory" (e. g. made by magistrates on entering office) and evidentiary. The latter are divided again into "wagers" and "confirmatory" oaths, which might be taken either by a litigant or a witness. It includes an extended account of "oath helpers"; of these there were two kinds, 1) those who swore to their confidence in the oath of the principal, 2) those who in conjunction with the principal swore to a fact. Chapter VIII (Homicide) deals only with disputed details, since the procedure in homicide trials was presented in the first volume. Punishment for murder was regarded as *πουνή*. The doctrine of pollution must have appeared very soon after the Homeric period. The authors hold, without positive conviction, that purification after *justifiable* homicide was a religious practice rather than a requirement of the law. In addition to action in the regular homicide courts it was possible to prosecute for murder by a *γραφὴ ἀσεβείας* and by *ἀπαγωγή*, and doubtless by other procedures. Slaves could not give evidence in murder trials. Chapter X (Appeals, Pardons and New Trials) discusses the meaning of *ἔφεσις*. It denotes 1) an appeal by the loser from one judicial body to another, 2) the compulsory reference of a case by a judicial officer to a dicastery. Solon's *ἔφεσις εἰς δικαστήριον* was a real appeal. Appeal to a dicastery was also permitted from the decision of arbitrators. That is if the arbitrator were unable to effect a compromise he rendered a judgment, becoming in so far a *δικαστής*. On the other hand, the *ἔφεσις* of the *βουλή* in cases which exceeded its competence was an instance of the meaning "compulsory reference." There was no appeal from a decision of the *βουλή* in a case which fell within its competence. *δοκιμασία* of the nine archons and members of the *βουλή* had to be referred to a dicastery. Here, too, *ἔφεσις* meant "compulsory reference." The same is true of *ἔφεσις* when used in connection with the Athenian Empire. Crimes punishable by death, banishment, and

disfranchisement had to be sent to Athens for trial. Pardons were granted at Athens by the *ecclesia*. The doctrine of *res judicata* prevailed at Athens in spite of some apparent exceptions. Little is heard of new trials as a result of the discovery of fresh evidence. A conviction for perjury might, in certain cases, open the way for a new trial. Finally, a case lost by default could on good and sufficient reasons be reopened within two months. Chapter X (Execution of judgments): Collection of damages after judgment was left to the litigant. Corporal punishments were inflicted by the state. Imprisonment was recognized as a form of punishment. In early times capital punishment took the form of throwing the criminal into the *barathron*. Later *apotympanismos* was used. This is considered by the authors to be a form of strangulation. Later still, drinking hemlock became the normal method of execution, although *apotympanismos* might be ordered by the court in certain cases. Chapter XI (Estimates of Athenian Justice) quotes opinions of Athenian justice from both ancients and moderns, and adds the authors' own judgment—in the main favorable.

The book, save for the last chapter, is highly technical; the subject is legal procedure, for which the evidence is frequently contradictory, and always scanty. Most of the chapters are, therefore, controversial rather than descriptive. This needs to be said, not as a criticism, but as a plain statement of fact. The work is not a textbook for beginners, nor a complete collection of all the facts about Athenian legal practice, but rather a detailed and complete investigation of some important problems. It will be of interest and use chiefly to those who already know the field thoroughly.

An exhaustive treatment of such a book would require an analysis of each chapter which would far exceed the limits of a review. In brief it may be said that for the most part the conclusions seem to be well supported by evidence, and to show a sound and discriminating judgment. Only one or two points may be selected at this time for special consideration.

In the discussion of Sycophants it seems to the reviewer that the authors fail to take into account that practically all the denunciation of sycophants at Athens comes from the wealthy and aristocratic opponents of democracy. Criticism from one source should always be suspected by the historian. It can hardly be disinterested. It was certainly not disinterested at Athens. As Bonner and Smith elsewhere point out, under the Athenian legal system practically the only way in which malefactors could be brought to justice was by private prosecution. If the Athenian democracy was to enforce its decrees, if contracts were to be honestly carried out and public moneys were to be spent for the purpose for which they were appropriated, volunteer prosecutors would have to bring "malefactors of great wealth" to account. This system of volunteer prosecution was probably more effective

in checking abuses than our system of public prosecutors. It is as unfair to accept the opinions of Aristophanes and the "Old Oligarch" about sycophants as it would be for a future historian of America to conclude that all Labor Unions are communistic because it is the fashion in some quarters to denounce Labor leaders as "Red." Certainly the examples of sycophancy from the Fifth Century do not show anything but an attempt to enforce the law: the sycophant in the *Acharnians* was merely enforcing the law against importation of Megarian goods: the sycophants whom Crito offered to "fix" would have only been enforcing the law if they had prosecuted Crito for assisting in the escape of Socrates. No doubt insistence by ill-mannered democrats that the upper classes should obey the law was unpleasant, but it may have been salutary. Unfortunately there was another side: the freedom of prosecution opened the door to unfounded suits brought by the kind of sycophant who was the ancient equivalent of our shyster lawyer with his ambulance-chasing and nuisance suits brought in the hope that the defendant will find it cheaper to settle out of court than to fight the case. That there was a good deal of this kind of sycophancy at Athens, there can be no doubt—human nature being what it is—but this should not blind us to the equally obvious fact that a good deal of what modern historians accept as heinous crime was really such only in the eyes of the aristocratic victims of democratic law-enforcement.

In the last chapter the authors have considered—with some misgiving, they say—the merits and demerits of the Athenian judicial system. They need have no misgivings; it is an excellent chapter. Their judgment on the whole is favorable, along the lines indicated in the last paragraph, and enunciated long ago by Grote, that the jury system with all its faults was well adapted to the purpose of Periclean democracy—to protect the humblest citizen in his rights. It must be said, however, that this was done at the price of stability; no one could feel secure in his property at Athens and very few could be secure in their persons.

In view of the inevitable comparison between Attic and modern systems of judicial procedure which the reader is led to make it might be well to add a few words to what the authors have said. Anglo-American procedure is the result of a long development of successive checks on the Crown which were devised in order to protect the individual from oppression. Our legal system throws every possible protection about the defendant in a criminal case, and gives him decisive advantages in civil suits. The Athenian system on the other hand made things hard for the defendant. In the first place, if Bonner and Smith are correct, there was, at least in the Fifth Century, no complete disclosure of the prosecution's evidence at the preliminary hearing or *ἀνάκρισις*. The first time that the defendant heard the case

against him in its entirety was in court, and he had to make his reply immediately. We need not wonder at the commonplace that the prosecution had had a long time to prepare the case, and the defendant but a short time. Furthermore the lack of any thorough cross-examination opened the door to a good deal of hard swearing, or at least to evidence which may not have been actually false, but was by clever wording designed to produce the effect of falsehood. When we add to this the shortness of time allowed for the trial, and the lack of appeal from the judgment of the dicastery, it is plain that the lot of a defendant caught by a clever prosecutor was hard indeed. A comparison of the results of the two systems can be made as follows—a few years ago Professor E. M. Borchard published a book entitled *Convicting the Innocent*, a telling indictment of the failure of our criminal law. Yet in all his search of records he found no case in the United States in which an innocent person had been executed. Could Athenian law show as good a record?

The reviewer feels inclined to protest against the use of such terms as "criminal and civil," "public and private" suits to describe *γραφαί* and *δίκαι*. Such terms have a certain sanction of custom in English but are out of place in a work as technical as this, and are confusing in any case. The distinction between criminal and civil in Anglo-American law corresponds only in part to the distinction between *γραφαί* and *δίκαι* at Athens. E. g. "theft" would be considered a criminal case under our law, but there was a *δίκη κλοπῆς* as well as a *γραφή*, and an action for murder was regularly a *δίκη*. "Public and private" is little better, for squandering one's patrimony (*κατεδηδοκέναι τὰ πατρῶα*) would be a ground for "private" action with us, but in Athens it was handled by a *γραφή*. Sound practice would seem to require the use of the Greek terms *γραφαί* and *δίκαι* exclusively when referring to suits.

A similar protest might be lodged against the anomalous *Archon Basileus* and *King Archon* which have become fixtures in our philological language. The authors use both but sometimes adopt the correct form *Basileus*.

The spelling of proper names is inconsistent as is frequently the case nowadays. Cleisthenes and Teisias get *ei* for *e*, but in other names the diphthong is transliterated by *i*.

On p. 82 there is a confused paragraph about the amnesty law of 403/2. It is stated that Andocides "is manifestly wrong when he says that Meletus, who assisted in the arrest of Leon of Salamis, was safe from a charge of homicide or *βούλευσις* at the hands of the sons of Leon *ὅτι τοῖς νόμοις δεῖ χρῆσθαι ἀπ' Εὐκλείδου ἀρχοντος*. His immunity depended upon the fact that only those who murdered *αὐτοχειρία* could be tried for murder." But could he not be tried for *βούλευσις*? One difficulty with this seeming contradiction is that Andocides has been misquoted.

What he says is that τὸν βουλεύσαντα has always been held liable to the same punishment as the actual doer of the deed. This is sound law in Greece or in America, and would have made Meletus liable to a charge of murder if the amnesty act had not given him immunity. Apparently Bonner and Smith have in mind the statement of Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.*, 39, 5) that murder αὐτοχειρία was not exempted in the amnesty act, implying that βούλευσις φόνου was, and that therefore at that time actions for βούλευσις φόνου were severed from those for murder αὐτοχειρία, and that murder trials were left with the Areopagus but βούλευσις φόνου assigned to the Palladium (*ibid.*, 57, 3). But there is something wrong with this statement of Aristotle's, because actions for βούλευσις φόνου were brought before the Areopagus after the amnesty act in 403/2. An example is Lysias, κατὰ Θεομνήστου A (x), 31, ἐπεξήλθον τοῖς τριάκοντα ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ. This action was for the execution of the speaker's father by the Thirty but must have been for βούλευσις φόνου. Cf. also Lysias, κατ' Εὐάνδρου (xxvi), 12 and Demosthenes, κατὰ Κόνωνος (liv), 25. The question is certainly open to more doubt than is expressed in the text.

Among minor inaccuracies may be noted:

P. 3: The action for κατάλυσις τοῦ δήμου is said to be a δίκη, but on p. 27 it is stated correctly as γραφή. P. 28: *Chaereus* should be *Chaereas*. P. 28: It is implied that Wilamowitz was the first to regard the Trial of the Dog in the *Wasps* as a burlesque of the trial of Laches. This idea really goes back to the Scholiast. P. 28: Cleon's deme was *Cydatheaeum*, not *Cydatheae*. P. 165: It was the battle of *Arginusae* not *Aegospotami* which was followed by the trial of the generals. P. 289: For *Socrates*, read *Strepsiades*.

HARRY M. HUBBELL.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

B. E. PERRY. *Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop. (Philological Monographs, VII.)* Haverford, Pa., American Philological Association, 1936. Pp. xvi + 240; 6 plates.

In this volume Professor Perry presents studies preliminary to an edition of the Life and Fables of Aesop on which he has been working for some time. In 1933 (*T. A. P. A.*, LXIV, pp. 198-244) he published an exhaustive study of the manuscripts that contain the so-called Westermann recension of the Life (W), and discussed briefly the relation of that version to the one contained in the lost manuscript Grottaferrata A. 33, which had recently been rediscovered as Cod. gr. 397 in the Pierpont Morgan Library. This new manuscript proved to be of such

importance that it has enabled Perry not only to throw much light on the transmission of the *Life*, but also to alter many of the existing views as to the transmission of the *Fables*.

The book falls into two main parts. In the first Perry describes in detail the Morgan manuscript of the *Life* which he refers to as *G*. Although we regret the lack of the texts which he proposes to publish, particularly since the Westermann edition is very rare, he has to a considerable extent compensated for this want by long quotations from *G*, and by a clear exposition of the relationship between the two recensions. He demonstrates that *W* is an abbreviated version of *G*, lacking many details that provide the motivation of incidents common to both, and that it is deprived of many interesting features of style through syncopation and paraphrasing.

Comparable to *G* are the other ancient versions found in the papyri, which represent different recensions varying from *W* as *G* varies from it. Perry has republished all the known papyrus fragments with restorations based on the fuller text available in *G*. The suggestion that the Berlin and Golenischeff papyri represent possible sources of the interpolations in the SBP group of manuscripts of the Westermann *Life* is particularly interesting, although the evidence is too scanty to furnish proof.

In the second part of the book, the author considers the manuscript tradition of the *Fables*. The history of the two texts, the *Life* and the *Fables*, follows the same line, and one can be studied in the light of the other. Nevertheless, in dealing with the *Fables*, the complications are greater both because of the lack of continuity in the subject matter, and because of the number of manuscripts involved. Perry has clarified the relationships between the different classes of manuscripts, and between the individual manuscripts within those classes, but his most important contributions lie in establishing beyond doubt the ancient origin of Class I (the *Augustana*), and in making known a new group of manuscripts containing a recension intermediate between Class I and Class II. Arguing against the views of Hausrath, he shows that the *Augustana* recension is neither Byzantine in origin nor rhetorical in style, and he points out that the Aphthonian preface, which is united to the *Fables* in most manuscripts of Class I, did not originally belong with this collection. The *Fables* in *G*, the earliest and most complete manuscript of Class I, are accompanied by the old *Life*, and there are definite indications that another representative of the same class, Parisinus suppl. 690, Chambry's *Pa*, although it has substituted the Aphthonian Preface, was copied from a manuscript that also contained the old *Life*.

From new manuscript evidence Perry has been able to show that Class II of the *Fable* manuscripts is identical with the SBP family of manuscripts of the Westermann *Life*. Just as

the SBP recension is not directly derived from G, so Class II is not derived directly from Class I, but is based on an intervening recension, represented chiefly by Monacensis 525 and to some extent also by Mosquensis 436.

The cogency of the arguments which Perry adduces for the Planudean authorship of both the Life and Fables of the Byzantine recension known as the Accursiana may not be universally admitted, since they depend mainly on a personal evaluation of style. More convincing is the evidence he brings forward that the collection was the work of one man, based on various sources, and containing originally at least one hundred and twenty-seven fables.

The book is a very clear and satisfying exposition of a complicated textual problem. Particularly commendable are the tables and diagrams, in which the points the author has discussed in the text are graphically exhibited, and the concise summary at the end, in which he has recapitulated the main outlines of the Aesopic tradition as he has developed it.

ELINOR M. HUSSELMAN.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

ZDZISŁAW ZMIGRYDER-KONOPKA. *Le Guerrier de Capestrano*. (*Hermaion*, Fasc. 3.) Lwów, Filomata, 1938. Pp. 26; 7 plates. Swiss Fr. 4.00.

Those who follow the progress of archaeological excavation in Italy know that since 1934 we have had a statue, large as life, of *il duce* (*antico*) *Abruzzese*, the so-called "warrior of Capestrano"; and, in fact, photographs of the face of the statue (see Plate III in Zmigryder-Konopka) do show a remarkable likeness to photographs of Il Duce himself—perhaps that is merely a coincidence. The "warrior of Capestrano" is already the subject of a considerable literature. We may add to the references given by Zmigryder-Konopka at least these two: G. Bendinelli in *Atti della R. Acc. d. Scienze di Torino*, Cl. d. Sc. Mor., Stor., e Filol., LXXI (1936), pp. 463-474, and G. Moretti in *Bull. di Paleontologia Ital.*, N. S. I (1936-37), pp. 94-112. Zmigryder-Konopka attacks the view, advanced by Moretti and in general accepted by others who have written on the subject, that the statue represents a native Italic warrior or hero. It was found within a necropolis at Capestrano (in the country of the Vestini), the character of which is beyond question Picene ("della civiltà sabellica-picena," Moretti). It is, with the fragment of another (female) statue found at the same place and time, far more important, viewed as an early attempt at Italic sculpture in the round, than the gigantic torso of Bel-

monte Piceno (see *PID*, II, p. 229); and it bears an "East Italic" inscription, the text of which I gave, without discussion, in *Classical Philology*, XXX (1936), p. 195 (*PID*, no. 355 bis). A long discussion of the inscription may be found in Moretti's official publication (*Opere d'Arte*, Fasc. VI [Rome, 1936], pp. 17-18, issued by the R. Istituto di Archeologia e Storia dell'Arte).

Briefly, Zmigryder-Konopka's thesis is that the person represented by the statue was not Italic at all, but Etruscan. He possessed the *imperium militiae*, as witness his axe—if only he had had the *fascies* too the fascisti might have claimed him for their own! And he was (pp. 25-26) "un chef étrusque qui, étant arrivé au pays des Vestins avec son équipe guerrière, comme cela avait été le cas de Caille Vipinas parvenu sur le territoire de la ville de Rome, subit lui-même l'influence du nouveau milieu quoiqu'il organisât l'armée en se basant sur le principe de l'*imperium* et sur celui des légions." He was, if not dictator, at any rate (p. 22) *dictator*. Zmigryder-Konopka supports his view with his "translation" of the inscription itself, with arguments drawn from the armament of the warrior, and with what support can be drawn from the little that is known of the most ancient political and military organization of the Italic tribes. In all this he shows much learning and power of argument. But the fatal flaw is the impossibility of believing that there was an Etruscan overlordship firmly established in the country of the Vestini in the seventh and sixth centuries B. C. And my own instinct for the present, in all that pertains to the statue, is to follow the counsel of Epicharmus: *νᾶφε καὶ μέμνασ' ἀπιστεῖν*.

J. WHATMOUGH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

JOACHIM SCHARF. Studien zur Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Rheinlande auf epigraphischer Grundlage. (Neue Deutsche Forschungen, Band 3.) Berlin, Junker und Dünhaupt, 1938. Pp. 174. RM 7.70.

Here is further evidence of the active work being done by German scholars on the history of the peoples who lived in the valley of the Rhine. In this monograph some 6,000 inscriptions from *C. I. L.* XIII are examined, and from them the author deduces the relative proportions of Celtic, Germanic, Italic, and other elements in the population of Gallia Belgica and Upper and Lower Germany during the first three centuries A. D.

Part A, the introduction, defines the problem and outlines the method. Part B discusses the dating of inscriptions; apart

from criteria generally applicable in Latin epigraphy, a number that are of particular utility for the Rhine area are given. Part C deals mainly with criteria for determining whether a name is Celtic or Germanic. This determination is sometimes difficult on linguistic grounds in regions where Celts and Germans had lived side by side for some time. When reliable linguistic determination is impossible, membership in a known Celtic or Germanic military unit, or dedication to an identifiable deity, is often helpful.

Part D applies the method. The author is rightly cautious in distinguishing between Gallic and Italian Julii. The Lingones are shown to have been Celtic, and Scharf would therefore settle an old question by assigning them to Gallia Belgica and not Upper Germany (p. 34). The Treveri were predominantly Celtic (pp. 62-3). Among much other interesting data, one notes that in the first century the racial proportions in the territory of the Ubii were 23.2% Celtic, 35.4% Italian, 13.3% German, but that in the third century the German element had risen to 83.3%. As Scharf points out, these figures reflect the presence of Italian soldiery in the first century, and the increasing Romanization and attendant literacy of the natives (pp. 145-6).

Part E, the conclusion, is a brief general history of the *Bevölkerung* of the Rhine valley. On the basis of Scharf's evidence, the movements which resulted in the formation of the Belgae—a fusion of Celtic and Germanic elements apparently none too sharply distinguished—can hardly have occurred later than the third century B. C. This will shed additional doubt on the Hawkes-Dunning theory (*Archaeological Journal*, LXXXVII [1930], pp. 150-335) that the movement took place at about the middle of the second century B. C. This final section could have been made much more graphic by the inclusion of a map, even a rough one.

As Scharf admits (pp. 8-9), his epigraphical material represents only a cross-section of the society in question, and the top section at that; we must assume that what is true of the top is also true of the whole society. This is an assumption that may trouble the reader who is concerned with the statistics of epigraphy. Leaving the assumption aside, however, the method is acceptable; and even if Scharf's conclusions give information only about the epigraphical stratum, so to speak, they will be useful to students of the period and the area in which the history of western Europe was so largely predetermined.

NORMAN J. DEWITT.

WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY.

WILLIAM H. P. HATCH. *The Principal Uncial Manuscripts of the New Testament.* University of Chicago Press, 1938. Pp. xiv + 34; 76 plates. \$10.

This book makes its chief appeal to New Testament students, but the author ventures the hope that the general reader interested in the history of Greek handwriting and in the transmission of the New Testament will also find much of value. I feel sure that he will not be disappointed. Seventy-six different samples of Greek uncial writing reproduced in magnificently legible plates are a contribution that can be neglected by no scholar interested in Greek writing. This is a first step only, but a great one, toward the desired end, which should bring us similar collections of facsimiles of Old Testament uncials and of non-Biblical manuscripts of the same type. Such a collection will serve as the natural extension into earlier centuries of *Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the Year 1200*, by K. Lake.

The book begins with a brief bibliography, but sufficient for beginners, which is followed by a brief and well written introduction in the main abbreviated from the standard works on palaeography. In this are included such subjects as papyrus, vellum, paper, roll and codex, writing utensils, ink, columns, quires, and styles of writing. This concise treatise is enriched by many valuable and interesting notes. Each plate is preceded by a brief description and the most essential bibliographical notices. The addition of a transcript of the text would in many cases be helpful to the beginner.

I trust that the mention of a few points in which I differ from the author will not be considered as in any way condemnatory of the work as a whole.

On p. 7, ll. 27 ff. the impression is given that early parchments were in roll form; the evidence is strongly for the codex form; see *Michigan Quarterly Review*, 1938, pp. 99 ff.

The statement on p. 12, l. 11, that there was an intermediate period between the papyrus roll and the parchment codex, in which the papyrus codex was much used, especially by Christians, applies only to Egypt; see article just cited.

On p. 18, note 2, it is a little surprising to see Gregory's old explanation of *ῥησά* and *ῥερασά* revived.

In the description of Plate X reference to *Jour. of Bib. Lit.*, LIII, pp. 371 ff., would help explain the character of the text and Hoskier, *Codex B and its Allies*, I, xi, should be mentioned for Plate XI.

In the description of Plate XIV, Codex Vaticanus, I miss the statement that the entire manuscript was reinked by a late hand.

Plates XX and XXXI should be brought nearer together, as both belong to the same school of writing and are not widely separated in time.

For the date of Codex Bezae, Plate XXII, Lowe should be

cited. For manuscripts in America I miss a reference to K. W. Clark, *Catalogue of New Testament Manuscripts in America*, Chicago, 1937. For this work it is more helpful than De Ricci's *Census of Mediaeval Manuscripts*.

The author is to be commended for inserting two plates of the Sinaiticus and three of the Alexandrinus so as to show the writing of the different scribes, though contemporary. A second plate to show the writing of the first quire of John in the Freer Gospels is even more necessary, for this he dates seventh or eighth century. A comparison with the other plates of this date might be helpful.

H. A. SANDERS.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

G. F. BENDER. *Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides*. Würzburg, Konrad Triltsch Verlag, 1938. Pp. 114.

This diligent monograph devotes more than a hundred pages to analyzing Pericles' well-known definition of the statesman (*γινῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰυτα, φιλόπολις καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων*, II, 60, 5) and to proving the somewhat obvious thesis that, of the four qualities there designated, Nicias possessed the last two, Alcibiades the first two, and Hermocrates all. The problem of political leadership undoubtedly concerned Thucydides greatly, being to his mind the fundamental factor in Athens' defeat (II, 65). One may doubt, however, how much light is cast upon his total thought by any such attempt to isolate a single part of it. Thus the author, in his absorption with the idea of leadership, wholly neglects the fundamental contrast between Athens and Sparta and nowhere suggests that those qualities of vigor and self-reliance by which Athens achieved her position derived not merely from her leadership but, as the Funeral Oration shows, from her institutions. Again, Thucydides remarks that Athens failed at Syracuse not only through lack of the right leader (II, 65) but also because there for the first time she opposed a democratic city as energetic and resourceful as herself (VII, 55, 2; VIII, 96, 5). In short, when the author speaks of "jene lebendige Einheit von Führer und Volk, für die auch unsere Zeit wieder hellhörig geworden ist" (p. 24) and then in his interest in the *Führer* forgets the qualities of the *Volk*, he seems hardly just to the thought of Thucydides. In addition, he fails to note any connection between Thucydides' ideal of political oratory (*ἐρμηνεύσαι τὰυτα*, II, 60, 5) and the more realistic analysis of personal and political motives which became widespread with the sophistic movement. Perhaps his most useful contribution is the parallels which he quotes from Solon to the definition of the statesman.

JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

HEINRICH DÖRRIE. *Passio SS. Machabaeorum*. Die antike lateinische Übersetzung des IV Makkabäerbuches. (*Abh. der Gesell. der Wissen. zu Göttingen*, Dritte Folge, Nr. 22.) Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1938. Pp. viii + 147. RM. 10.

This is a small masterpiece. Dörrie has investigated the extensive manuscript tradition of this text, proved the existence of two main types, one full, one shortened, and traced the various sub-types. The argument includes material of general interest: we see how a Carolingian copy of the longer text was rediscovered in the eleventh century (which is what almost certainly happened to [Apul.] *Ascl.*) and how in and after that century some copyists emended boldly. (Was this particularly liable to happen in a newly discovered text, like the unabridged *Passio*, and [Apul.] *Ascl.*?)

Dörrie proceeds to date the translation and by several converging lines of reasoning—including the resemblances which (without dependence on either side) exist between the *Passio* and Ambrose *De Jacob et vita beata*—places it at the end of the fourth century. This seems to me conclusive. (Incidentally, in the course of his discussion he has many illuminating remarks on the modifications made by the translator, in particular “eine Steigerung des Inhalts” [p. 28], which can be a coarsening [p. 41] and again affords a parallel for the *Asclepius*.) The text follows, with an apparatus the fulness of which makes it useful for the study of the development of variants under the conditions in question, and then we have a *sermo in natale Machabaeorum* (probably of the eighth century), a descriptive list of the MSS of the *Passio*, and an *index verborum*.

ARTHUR DARBY NOCK.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

RUDOLPH PFEIFFER. *Die Netzfischer des Aischylos und der Inachos des Sophokles*. Munich, Beck, 1938. Pp. 63.

This monograph is a painstaking treatment of the text, metre, meaning, and dramatic technique of two papyrus fragments from the tragic masters. The *Inachos* was previously known as a satyr-play; the *Dictyoulkoi* is so classified by Pfeiffer on the ground that its metre is too free for tragedy. On the other hand, the fragment exhibits a call for help which, as Pfeiffer points out, is surely the cue for the chorus' entrance; but those summoned are all human neighbors, and if satyrs then appeared, it must have been surprising. In the *Ichneutai*, Apollo mentions

the satyrs in issuing a similar call. One wonders if the metre should be regarded as decisive.

With this possible exception, Pfeiffer's work is admirably sound and thorough. The fragments do not yield much of interest, except that the bit of the *Dictyoulkoi* is clearly part of the prologue, and that there is stichomythy here; Pfeiffer points out that prologue-stichomythy used to be regarded as a dubious peculiarity of the *Prometheus* (possibly also found in the *Phrygians*), as far as Aeschylus is concerned. Every student of tragedy will find Pfeiffer's work of value in piecing out our knowledge of Greek drama.

ALFRED CARY SCHLESINGER.

OBERLIN COLLEGE.

CARL CLEMEN. Lukians Schrift über die syrische Göttin. (*Der Alte Orient*, XXXVII, Heft 3-4.) Leipzig, J. C. Hinrichs, 1938. Pp. 57. RM. 2.10.

Clemen presents here a German translation of the famous tract and a valuable commentary. The commentary is not in the usual form of a series of disjointed notes on passages *seriatim*, but, much more useful, is a group of five essays: 1. The Phoenician Sanctuaries; 2. The Stories of the Origin of the Temple in Hierapolis; 3. The Site and Appointments of the Temple in Hierapolis; 4. The Cult in the Temple in Hierapolis; 5. Other Usages Customary in Hierapolis. These are brief, but excellent to introduce a student to the religion, and for the scholar of great value since so much recent archaeological evidence is used in discussing Lucian's statements. New contributions are matters of detail rather than of general reconstruction, but no one working in the field can afford to neglect the book.

ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

MARIE DELCOURT. Stérilités mystérieuses et naissances maléfiques dans l'antiquité classique. (Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, Fasc. LXXXIII.) Liège, 1938. Pp. 112.

The writer discusses the belief in the god-sent character of the failure of the crops, both of grain and of living creatures, and in the portentous, ill-omened significance of monstrous births. Chapter I (pp. 9-28) is devoted to the "scourge" with special attention to the Sophoclean *Oedipus Rex*; chapter II (pp. 29-65)

discusses the monstrous births; chapter III (pp. 66-76) remedies for the scourge; chapter IV (pp. 77-82) its origin; and chapter V (pp. 83-90) the Sicilian scourge at the time of Empedocles. Five appendices (pp. 94-112) are given respectively to the Theban version of the scourge, ill-omened twinbirths, Philoctetes and the taboo of the ill, the occurrences of similar beliefs among non-Greek and Roman peoples, and the connection of the names Labdakos and Labda.

Miss Delcourt herself sums up her work (pp. 91-93) and states that the Greeks feared the extinction of the human race and were terrified by any abnormality in the young of both animals and human beings. In contrast to the Babylonians, Greeks and Romans considered such abnormalities as always unlucky—exceptions are ascribed to the fawning of an interpreter on the mighty. There is this difference between Greek and Latin that the former avoided (from superstitious fear) speaking of such occurrences, while the Latins rather dwelt on them. The significance always extends to the whole country or city where it occurs.

While there is really little in this thesis that is new, we ought to be grateful to the author for having brought together in easily accessible form the pertinent material. Her book will form a welcome pendant, particularly from the Greek side, to the forthcoming treatment of the *prodigium* by St. Weinstock in the Wissowa-Kroll *Encyclopädie*.

From another angle, though, Miss Delcourt's treatment contains a great deal of controversial matter. She is greatly concerned in trying to prove that *loimos* has not the meaning of pestilence or plague which is usually given to it. I am surprised that in discussing Herodotus, III, 65 she has passed over that part of the narrative which would most strongly support her, namely that Cambyzes died without leaving any offspring whatever. Herodotus, VI, 139, on the other hand, is not germane to the question; the fact that no plague appears here is due to the thought that the punishment must fit the crime; hence only famine and sterility ensue. We should also reject, I think, her interpretation of Aeschylus, *Persae*, 715, where she states that *loimos* is identical with famine. Similarly, her explanation of Aeschylus, *Supplices*, 630-680 should be denied: no *loimos*, so the prayer runs, shall empty the state of men (659) nor shall there be slaughter in civil war (I accept Weil's *στάσις*; *δόρυ* is a mere unfounded guess of Mazon's—war had been mentioned in 630-638 and would be repetitious here—; *θυμέλαι* is not "salle," but altar). Just as in 674 ff. crops and births are tied together (*τε-τε*) so in 680 *λοιγός*, "epidemic" and *νόσος* "ordinary illness" are parallel (*μηδέ-δέ*). The mention of Apollo Lykeios is natural because he is the chief god of Argos. That Thucydides, as Miss Delcourt well observes, avoids the word *loimos* in his description of the great plague is significant for his style; but

it is without bearing on the meaning of the word, for its use in II, 47, 3 emphatically refers to the epidemic (τοσοῦτος) character of the plague (cf. also Steup's note on the passage). Plato, *Symposium* 188 B distinctly classes *loimos* as an illness (ἀλλὰ . . . νοσήματα) and the word is identified with νόσος in 201 D. Miss Delcourt is correct in saying that *Leges* 906 C contrasts the two words, but that means no more than a restriction of *loimos* to major diseases, as becomes plain from a comparison of ὄρως ἐπὶ καὶ ἐνανθρώπῳ with *Symposium* 188 B. Δοιμώδης νόσος, finally, seems to me merely to identify illnesses of an epidemic character.

Our author's chief concern is with the passage of Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex*, II, 25-30 and the choral passage 151-188; this is indeed the starting point of her investigation. I can see here no "sterility" but only "illness." The ears of grain have already begun to form, when they drop off, and cattle and women become pregnant, but their offspring are born dead or die soon afterwards. Lines 27-29 are not a mere summary of the preceding line but refer to an epidemic illness. Similarly, I cannot accept her interpretation of the choral passage. There is a *double entendre* in πρόπας στόλος νοσεί: the whole people is either ill or affected by grief and care. ἄλλος ἄλλῳ must refer to the dying who enter on their westward journey and includes all who are victims of the *loimos*, not infants and *puerperae* only, as the author wants to take it. The very fact that both wives and gray-haired mothers are mentioned proves that husbands and grown sons are among the victims. Of course, I do not mean to say that sterility is excluded from the affliction; it belongs to every *loimos* and pestilence: see e.g. *Revel.*, VI, 5-8. The argument (p. 22) about the advisability of speedy burial during a plague is refuted by a careful perusal of Thucydides, II, 47-52, of which Miss Delcourt has quoted only ch. 50; but see 51, 5, where τὰς δολοφύρσεις . . . οἱ οἰκεῖοι ἀνέκαμον must be compared with the νηλέα and ἀνοίκτως of the *Oedipus Rex* 180-181. In that case γένεθλα need not be taken as "children." The emphasis on νηλέα ἀνοίκτως proves to me that we deal with corpses and not with monstrous births exposed alive. For in this case wailing would not be permitted.

I have dwelt on these lines so extensively because here is the kernel of Miss Delcourt's new and startling conception of the punishment inflicted on the Thebans by the irate gods. There are other controversial points in the discussion, such as the interpretation of Homer, *Il.*, I, 43, 53, where I think it important to notice that Apollo had the epithet *Loimios* (*RE*, II, 16, 58; XIII, s. v.). Also the use of the imperfect tense in line 52 seems to me to point to a plague. If the author (23) stresses the point that the deaths ensue immediately, we may answer that e.g. during a cholera epidemic;—and I remember vividly that of 1892—, the suddenness of the fatal outcome was one of its most

terrifying characteristics. Of course, there are also many good and appealing observations. Here I would count the emendation of Cicero, *Leg.*, III, 19: *delatus* for *legatus* (*defero* is used of the transport of the bag in which a parricide is sewed up).

In conclusion I want to say that the book, in spite of its brevity, will deservedly call forth much comment by other scholars. The author has done signal service in raising her point, even if ultimately the decision should be against her.

ERNST RIESS.

SCARSDALE, N. Y.

WILHELM NESTLE. Der Friedensgedanke in der antiken Welt.
(*Philologus*, Supplementband XXXI, Heft 1 [1938].) Pp.
79. RM. 7.25.

The author asks whether it is true that the ancient world, contrary to the modern, regarded war as the normal state of international relations. He has transferred a statement found in a discussion of international law to the field of idealistic philosophy and poetic imagination, and pursues his point by collecting, apparently quite thoroughly, the passages in ancient philosophy and literature, but not in history, that praise peace and condemn war as folly and a perversion of nature. The conclusion is that the ancient world was no less pacific than the modern. This may be the truth, but the present treatise is too superficial to be an important contribution on the subject. An adequate discussion would have to include historical actuality and also *Kriegsgedanke* in its survey.

The most interesting aspect of the work is its relation to present political tendencies, especially in the authoritarian states. The views cited and quoted from ancient authors are plainly at odds with the propaganda that issues from the ministries of Germany and Italy. The author abstains from appreciation or interpretation of his material as well as from references to contemporary affairs, until the very end, where he suddenly belittles post-war pacificism and exalts the "tragisch-heroische Auffassung des Lebens": *εἰς οἰωνὸς ἀπιστος, ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης*.

AUBREY DILLER.

INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL,
but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions
sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Brodeur (Arthur G.). *Arthur, Dux Bellorum*. Berkeley, *Univ. of California Press*, 1939. Pp. 237-283. (*Univ. of California Publ. in English*, III, No. 7.)

Burriess (Eli E.) and Casson (Lionel). *Latin and Greek in Current Use*. New York, *Prentice-Hall*, 1939. Pp. xvi + 286. \$2.50.

Colwell (Ernest Cadman) and Mantey (Julius R.). *A Hellenistic Greek Reader*. Selections from the Koine of the New Testament Period. Chicago, *Univ. of Chicago Press*, 1939. Pp. xv + 229. \$2.

Cooper (Lane). *Aristotelian Papers*. Revised and Reprinted. Ithaca, *Cornell Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xii + 237. \$2.50.

Densmore (Frances). *Nootka and Quileute Music*. Washington, D. C., *U. S. Gov't. Printing Office*, 1939. Pp. xxvi + 358; 24 plates; 7 text figures. (*Smithsonian Inst. Bureau of Ethnology*, Bull. 124.)

Dialect Notes, VI, Part XVIII. New Haven, *American Dialect Society*, July 1939. Pp. 709-742.

Fairbanks (Sydney). *The Old West Frisian Skeltana Riucht*, with an Introduction, Translation, and Notes. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xii + 176.

Geerebaert (A.). *Selections from the Greek Lyric Poets*. English edition. Liege, *H. Dessain*; distributed by *Fordham Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. 72. Vocabulary and Notes (English adaptation by Francis J. McCool, S. J.). Pp. x + 153. \$1 the set.

Gray (Louis H.). *Foundations of Language*. New York, *Macmillan*, 1939. Pp. xv + 530. \$7.50.

Greene (William Chase). *Scholia Platonica*. Haverford, *Am. Philological Association*, 1938. Pp. xlii + 569. (*Philological Monographs* publ. by the American Philological Association, VIII.)

Jones (William). *Ethnography of the Fox Indians*. Edited by Margaret Welpley Fisher. Washington, D. C., *Gov't. Printing Office*, 1939. Pp. ix + 156. (*Smithsonian Inst. Bureau of Ethnology*, Bull. 125.)

Junge (Julius). *Saka-Studien*. Der Ferne Nordosten im Weltbild der Antike. Leipzig, *Dieterich*, 1939. Pp. 115; 2 plates. (*Klio*, Beiheft 28.)

Knudsen (Trygve) and Sommerfelt (Alf). *Norsk Riksmåls-Ordbok*, Hefte 25 (Binde II, Hefte 6). Oslo, *H. Aschehoug & Co.*, 1939. Pp. 898-1151.

Levy (Harry L.). *A Latin Reader for Colleges*. New York, *Prentice-Hall*, 1939. Pp. x + 264. \$2.25.

Meier (Theodor). *Das Wesen der Spartanischen Staatsordnung*. Leipzig, *Dieterich*, 1939. Pp. vi + 102. (*Klio*, Beiheft 29.)

Meine (Franklin J.). *Mark Twain's [Date, 1601] Conversation as it was by the Social Fireside in the Time of the Tudors*. Embellished with an Illuminating Introduction, Facetious Footnotes and a Bibliography. Privately printed for the Mark Twain Society of Chicago, 1939. Pp. 80. \$6.

Messerschmidt (Franz). *Italische Gräberkunde von Friedrich von Duhn*; Zweiter Teil. Heidelberg, *Winter*, 1939. Pp. xv + 383; 6 text figures; 40 plates; 5 maps. RM. 28.

Müller (Siegfried). *Das Verhältnis von Apuleius De Mundo zu seiner Vorlage*. Leipzig, *Dieterich*, 1939. Pp. 178. (*Philologus*, Supplementbd. XXXII, Heft 2.)

Nairn (J. A.). *Classical Hand-List*. Edited by B. H. Blackwell, Ltd. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Pp. 266. 4s. 6d.

Owen (A. S.). *The Plays of Euripides: Ion*. Edited with introduction and commentary. Oxford, *Clarendon Press*, 1939. Pp. xlv + 196. \$2.75.

Preiswerk (Andreae). *Das Einzelne bei Platon und Aristoteles*. Leipzig, *Dieterich*, 1939. Pp. ix + 196. (*Philologus*, Supplementbd. XXXII, Heft 1.)

Rolfe (J. C.). *Ammianus Marcellinus, III*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. ix + 602; frontispiece; 2 maps. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Ryder (Arthur William). *Original Poems together with Translations from the Sanskrit*. With an introduction by George Rapall Noyes. *Univ. of California Press*, 1939. Pp. xxxix + 186. \$2.50.

Sage (Evan T.) and Schlesinger (A. C.). *Livy, Vol. XII (Books XL-XLII)*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1938. Pp. ix + 521. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Schaeffer (Claude F. A.). *The Cuneiform Texts of Ras Shamra-Ugarit*. London, Publ. for the British Academy by *Humphrey Milford, Oxford Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xvi + 100; 39 plates; 15 text figures. \$3.25. (*The Schweich Lectures on Biblical Archaeology*, 1936.)

Schmitz-Kahlmann (Gisela). *Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isokrates*. Leipzig, *Dieterich*, 1939. Pp. xii + 130. (*Philologus*, Supplementbd. XXXI, Heft 4.)

Siebert (Hans K.). *Die Syntax der Tempora und Modi der Ältesten lateinischen Inschriften (bis zum Tode Caesars)*. Würzburg, *Karl J. Tritsch* 1939. Pp. x + 72.

Speiser (E. A.). *Studies in Hurrian Grammar*. *Publ. of the American Oriental Society*, Offprint series, No. 10 (1939). Pp. 289-324. \$.50.

Stanford (W. Bedell). *Ambiguity in Greek Literature*. Oxford, *Blackwell*, 1939. Pp. xi + 185. 10s. 6d.

Steidle (Wolf). *Studien zur Ars poetica des Horaz. Interpretation des auf Dichtkunst und Gedicht bezüglichen Hauptteiles (Verse 1-294)*. Würzburg, *Konrad Tritsch*, 1939. Pp. 147. RM. 4.50.

Tanzer (Helen H.). *The Common People of Pompeii*. Baltimore, *Johns Hopkins Press*, 1939. Pp. xii + 113. \$3.00. (*Johns Hopkins Stud. in Archaeology*, 29.)

Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, LXIX (1938). Pp. vi + 574 + cxix. Publ. by the Association through its Editor, George Depue Hadzsis.

Turner (Eric G.). *Catalogue of Greek and Latin Papyri and Ostraca in the Possession of the University of Aberdeen*. Aberdeen, *University Press*, 1939. Pp. xix + 116; 5 plates. 8s. 6d.

Vogt (Joseph). *Kaiser Julian und das Judentum. Studien zum Weltanschauungskampf der Spätantike*. Leipzig, *Hirrich*, 1939. Pp. iv + 16. (*Morgenland*, Heft 30.)

Walzer (R.). *Eraclito. Raccolta dei frammenti e traduzione italiana*. Firenze, *Sansoni*, 1939. Pp. viii + 156. 30 L. (*Testi della scuola normale superiore di Pisa*, IV.)

Warmington (E. H.). *Remains of Old Latin, III: Lucilius, Laws of the XII Tables*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1938. Pp. xxxiii + 550. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Wolff (Hans Julius). *Written and Unwritten Marriages in Hellenistic and Postclassical Roman Law*. Haverford, *Am. Philological Association*, 1939. Pp. vii + 128. (*Philological Monographs* publ. by the American Philological Association, IX.)

Yale Classical Studies, VI. New Haven, *Yale Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. 167. \$2.



AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXI, 3

WHOLE No. 243

THE DIVINE ENTOURAGE IN HOMER.

The clearest formulation I have seen of a very important truth lies tucked away in a casual observation of Adolf Roemer, toward the close of his essay "Einige Probleme der Göttermaschine bei Homer," where he correctly refers the intervention of Athena in the death of Hector to the principle "dass grosse und bedeutungsvolle Aktionen, wo Helden ersten Ranges auf dem Platze bleiben, sich nicht ohne Eingreifen der höheren Mächte bei dem Dichter abspielen."¹ Or, as I have phrased it, "a major character must be attended by gods, and great events in his career must be marked by supernatural manifestations. . . . The hero may be helped by a god, or opposed by a god, or both, but there must be gods as part of his pomp and panoply."² For convenience we may call this the principle of the divine entourage.³ Obvious as it may seem to the reader of the poems, it is too often neglected in criticism and interpretation of the text.⁴

¹ *Homerische Aufsätze* (Leipzig, 1914), p. 203.

² "Homer's Gods: Prolegomena," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVIII (1937), pp. 14 f.

³ The term is sufficiently descriptive and not too dogmatic; it is not entirely inappropriate to the general *mêlée*, where the divine apparatus is in large measure a conflation of the celestial attendance upon the several heroes.

⁴ To discuss all passages which may be referred to this general principle would be in effect to retell the familiar stories of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Since we have to do with a work of poetic imagination, an attempt at hard and fast classification is inadvisable (cf. "Prolegomena," pp. 22 ff.). Hence I shall try merely to illustrate, very briefly but with adequate documentation, the ways in which divine manifestations are related to the chief personages, the crucial moments, and the narratives of battle.

In the *Iliad*, the divine entourage of Achilles is of course more impressive than that of any other hero, and most of the greater Olympian scenes are directly connected with his actions or with his spiritual and emotional crises.⁵ This connection is made more vivid and more reasonable by the twofold rôle of Thetis, at once a goddess and the mother of our human hero,⁶ and by Zeus' preoccupation with the fortunes of Achilles.⁷ In the final battle, in which Hector at last is slain, divine intervention is so expanded and elaborated that the boundary between earth and heaven seems to fade, and the hearer can scarcely say whether the scene is Olympus or the Trojan plain.

The other major champions are attended by gods when they take part in notable events, and particularly when they step forward successively to take the place for a time of the greater hero. Menelaus, Diomedes, Ajax, Agamemnon, each has his moment as protagonist on the Achæan side, and each, as he moves to the center of the stage, is picked out by the gleam of the Olympian spotlight.⁸ In the case of Agamemnon, the divine

⁵ Cf. A 188-222, 357-430, 493-B 40; Σ *passim*; T 1-39, 340-418; T and Φ *passim*; X 1-20, 131-297; Ψ 192-230; Ω 22-188, 314-321, 331-469, 677-694.

⁶ When Thetis first appears, we think of her primarily as *dramatis persona*. Yet the fact remains that she is a goddess, and her intervention at critical moments, even though it be required by the action, is an important element in the divine entourage of Achilles. Her abode in the sea, whence she rises like a mist, her train of Nereids, and her participation in several of the most brilliant Olympian scenes, enhance the effect of celestial dignity.

⁷ E.g., B 1-4; O 72-77. Since Zeus never appears in person in earthly scenes (in O 694 f., regarded as an exception by some critics, we have metaphor, as Leaf rightly notes), the effect of II 220-252 is comparable to that elsewhere created by the direct intervention of other divinities; we are left with the feeling that Achilles' fortune is the supreme concern of Zeus. This is reinforced by the concern with which Zeus sees Hector don the arms of Achilles (P 198-208), by his pity for the divine horses of Achilles (P 426-456), and his tone of admiration and deference in T 26-30, Ω 110 f.

⁸ Cf. Γ 369-382; Δ 1-140; Ε *passim*; Η 17-61; Α 1-83; minor interventions throughout these books contribute to the general effect. As all have noted, the divine entourage of Diomedes in Ε is more elaborate and more brilliantly handled than anywhere else in the *Iliad* except in the Apaté and the scenes connected with the crucial moments of Achilles' career.

entourage of the individual soon merges with that of the long battle in which the Achaeans are driven back, step by step, until Hector stands by the ship of Protesilaus and the stage is set for Patroclus.⁹ The *aristeia* of Patroclus, his death, and the battle over his body involve some of the most impressive instances of celestial intervention,¹⁰ but at the end, when the lifeless body is borne toward the camp and Achilles steps forward, clothed by Athena in unearthly majesty, to strike the Trojans with panic, the divine entourage of Patroclus fades into the greater glory of Achilles.

On the Trojan side, Hector is most often attended by gods, especially when he is serving as the mortal instrument of Zeus,¹¹ but Aeneas, Paris, Sarpedon, and Glaucus are accorded this distinction when they come forward to hold the center of the stage.¹²

These instances will suffice to make clear the general outlines of the poet's technique. Each major character, when he plays a leading part, has his divine entourage. At times it is provided directly by an Olympian scene, at other times the intervention of a god upon earth may lead into an Olympian scene. Celestial participation may be as slight as *βέλος δ' ἔθηκεν Ἀθήνη* (E 290) or as elaborate as the wounding of Ares with its grandiose movement from heaven to earth and back again. The divine entourage of one hero at times blends with that of another, at times is merged in that of the general mêlée. So the divine

⁹ For the details, cf. *infra* pp. 262 f.

¹⁰ II 249-252 (cf. *supra* n. 7), 431-461, 508-531, 567 f., 644-683, 693, 700-857; P 71-82, 118, 198-209, 268-273, 319-334, 400 f., 441-456, 498 f., 544-596, 645-650. In the death of Sarpedon, the divine entourage creates a twofold effect; primarily it glorifies Sarpedon in the moment of his death, but it also sheds glory upon the slayer of so mighty a champion, very son of Zeus, and enhances the greatness of Patroclus' achievement. The manner of Patroclus' death, distasteful as it is to modern readers, is the poet's paramount tribute to his prowess; fighting against heaven, blasted from the battlements of Troy by the hand of Apollo, called by the gods to death (II 693), he is invincible and irresistible until he is smitten by the invisible might of the archer god.

¹¹ E.g., A 163-210; M 252-255, 437 f., 450; O 4-15, 59-62, 220-270, 306-366, 610-614, 694 f. (cf. *supra* n. 7); P 71-82, 198-209, 582-596; T 375-380, 438-454; X 166-305; Ψ 185-191; Ω 18-188.

¹² E.g., E 311-459, 512-514; P 322-341; T 79-143, 288-352; Γ 373-425; II 431-461, 508-531, 644-683.

attendance upon Patroclus is inextricably involved with the manifestations which mark the death of Sarpedon and also with the brilliant entourage of the greater hero Achilles; in the struggle over his body it takes a form appropriate to the long, bitterly contested general engagement. As a rule, the determining factors are the importance of the person and the importance of the action, and the divine entourage tends to become a function of these two variables.

Those episodes in which the greater heroes meet in single combat, either by prearrangement or by the chance of battle, give to the *Iliad* much of its brilliance and much of its distinctive character. They also constitute a very difficult artistic problem, because the greater heroes, Achæan and Trojan alike, may not be slain except at the times and places appointed by tradition.¹³ The close of the duel between Ajax and Hector in H is most effective, but a succession of indecisive combats would soon weary an audience, especially an audience which evidently likes to hear of Achæans triumphant over the champions of Troy.¹⁴ Nor is this audience going to be satisfied merely by continual slaying of unknown foemen, names only, without substance; this too will soon become tedious. Precisely here the divine entourage adds to its ornamental values an element of practical utility; it resolves the poet's dilemma and becomes indispensable in the economy of the *Iliad*. To take an obvious instance, when Paris is saved narrowly from death by the miraculous intervention of Aphrodite (Γ 369-382), several ends are served. An important episode is made more impressive by the intervention of a goddess, the prowess of Menelaus is glorified, the narrative is adorned in the grand style, and finally, what is perhaps most important, the poet is enabled to give his Achæan protagonist a decisive victory over a foeman who cannot be slain. So, again,

¹³ This is well brought out by Scott in so far as it affects the Achæan heroes; cf. *The Unity of Homer* (Berkeley, 1921), pp. 224 f. It applies equally to those Trojan heroes who, like Aeneas, had their places in the traditional saga.

¹⁴ "The poem is manifestly written from the point of view of the Greeks" (Scott, *loc. cit.*; cf. p. 206). In a recent study, "Il canto XXII dell' Iliade e il patriottismo del poeta," *Il Mondo Classico*, VIII (1938), pp. 274-301, Beniamino Stumpo makes this propensity the starting point in a highly speculative attempt to reconstruct "le rapsodie primitive" and in the eternal quest for interpolations.

Achilles and Hector can be brought together in a lively passage of arms before the last, fatal encounter (Y 443 ff.). Had there not been gods ever at hand to whisk away vanquished champions, the great Achaean heroes could have had no glorious victories in single combat except at the few points where tradition and plot permitted a Trojan of note to be killed. Sarpedon may be slain, or Pandarus, but Aeneas, if he is not to skulk always in the background, must be saved miraculously more than once.¹⁵

In the descriptions of general engagements, the divine entourage is again equally useful, though the artistic problems are somewhat different. These problems critics are prone to overlook. In the first place, the account of an important battle should have an impressive introduction. Then, if it is to be upon a scale commensurate with the other episodes, with the whole poem in fact, it must be prolonged; if it is to be prolonged, the fortunes of war must turn at frequent intervals and the tide of battle roll back, for otherwise the Achaeans will capture the city, or the Trojans the camp, *καὶ ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἴσαν* (P 321). Furthermore, if it is to be prolonged without becoming monotonous, it must be enlivened and diversified by every means at the poet's command. Divine intervention, often involving elaborate Olympian scenes, serves all purposes admirably. It dignifies the start of the battle, it motivates conveniently the necessary turns of fortune, and it serves to adorn and diversify the long series of encounters which otherwise might become tedious. A good example is the *κόλος μάχη*, with the introductory

¹⁵ E. g., E 311 ff., 432 ff., 512 ff.; T 290 ff. Almost as useful as the miraculous rescue is the miraculous revival or healing of a major hero who has been knocked senseless or wounded; here again there can be decisive combats and the defeated champion can speedily reappear upon the scene, as Hector in O 236-270, or Aeneas in E 512 ff., where both devices are combined in a single episode. The resemblance of this technique to the *deus ex machina* of tragedy has been noticed from ancient times; there are, however, important differences. In tragedy the gods do not ordinarily mingle with mortals upon the scene and are more likely to be brought in only when they are needed to untie the knot; in the Homeric poems they are conveniently on hand in the more important episodes and their services are merely a part of their attendance upon the principal characters. The epic technique seems to be a natural development from the supernatural element in popular tale; cf. my "Homer's Gods—Myth and Märchen," *A. J. P.*, LX (1939), p. 25.

scene on Olympus, the repeated interventions of Zeus, the abortive sally of Hera and Athena, and other lesser instances of divine participation.¹⁶ Because Θ is commonly regarded as "late" and therefore bad, the divine apparatus here is stigmatized as weak and inartistic; it is, however, precisely the technique used elsewhere in the *Iliad* in similar situations; it is the technique of Ε, of Α, and notably of Ρ. The interminable battle which begins with the arming of Agamemnon at the start of Α and closes with the rescue of Patroclus' body in Σ exhibits this technique raised as it were to the second degree. The operations fall naturally into several clearly defined phases, (1) the fighting on the plain, (2) the assault on the wall, (3) the battle at the ships, (4) the attack by Patroclus, his death, and the rescue of his body.¹⁷ The first is introduced by the arming of Agamemnon, with the divine manifestations of Α 1-83; the second by the account of the ultimate destruction of the wall by the gods;¹⁸ the third by the coming of Poseidon; the last by the

¹⁶ Cf. Θ 1-77, 130-171, 198-211, 215-252, 309-315, 335-483; on the authenticity of lines 69-74, cf. "Myth and Märchen," p. 6, n. 18.

¹⁷ We must remember that the book divisions between II, Ρ, and Σ do not necessarily coincide with the episodes; evidently the poet thought of the narrative II 130-Σ 242 as a continuum.

¹⁸ M 1-33. Ordinarily the Olympian scenes set forth what the gods are saying or doing at the time of the action, but these lines constitute an interesting variation; like other passages which depart from the mechanical uniformity so dear to the heart of the Homeric critic, this has been suspected or actually rejected by many commentators. If we note (1) that a new phase of the battle is apt to be ushered in by a divine episode, and (2) that Zeus' prohibition in Θ 1-27 and the consequent dispersal of the gods (Α 75-83; the athetesis 78-83, naively based on *παύει* and endorsed by most higher critics, should be mentioned for its antiquarian interest; cf. M 179 f.) make it difficult to compose an Olympian scene of the usual type and on the usual scale, we may reasonably believe that the poet is following his habitual practice, with such departures as the situation he has conceived demands. Nor am I impressed by the argument based on *ἡμιθεῶν γένος ἀνδρῶν* (cf. Leaf's introduction to M and note to line 23), which assumes that the word here must have the specialized connotations it has acquired in Hesiod and in later authors, and so brands it as "unhomeric." This is to disregard the obvious consideration that *ἡμιθεός*, before it became a theological term, must have been used simply to mean a person who was half-god. If the poet could speak of *ἡμιτοιοί* without any implication of Mendelianism, why may he not speak also of *ἡμιθεοί* without com-

arming of Patroclus, the muster of the Myrmidons, and Achilles' prayer to Zeus. Superimposed upon all this, about midway, is the Apate, which introduces even while it retards the final step in the Trojan advance, the firing of Protesilaus' ship, which is the turning point in the action of the *Iliad*.

In a way the divine entourage includes all the appearances of the gods in all their various aspects, for it attracts and draws into its train all the incidental manifestations of divinity. When once an Olympian scene or a notable instance of celestial intervention has made us feel that the gods are concerned in the action and has put the narrative upon that elevated plane in which gods and heroes stand side by side, then every appearance of a god, whatever may be its immediate purpose, however slight it be or casual, contributes to the general effect of grandeur. And so the gods as actors, as impulses, as impersonal agency, or in the mere performance of their normal functions, are assimilated to the prevailing tone and become part of the divine pageantry, although this was perhaps not the poet's primary intent.¹⁹

It is important to distinguish between habitual, almost unconscious, references to the gods, which often are no more than the epic way of speaking, and instances in which gods are deliberately introduced to enhance the grandeur of the style; failure so to distinguish accounts for a good many of the fancied contradictions on which theories of composition have been founded.²⁰ If casual references which have become an integral part of the epic style be left out of account, it will be seen that the working of Zeus' prohibition (© 5 ff.) is followed out very consistently from © to Υ. We have a clear narrative of Hera's increasing anger and discontent, coming to a climax in the Apate, after which no attempt is made to interfere with the

mitting himself to Hesiod's Ages of Man? Were he any but Homer, this privilege would be allowed him freely.

¹⁹ Cf. "Prolegomena," pp. 22-25.

²⁰ Thus when Ares enters into Hector and he is filled with martial ardor (P 210), we have mere personification, despite the epithets; the absence of Ares from the battle has twice been emphasized (N 521-525; O 113-142). In N 783, *φόνον δ' ἤμυνε Κρονίων* is merely the epic way of saying "but they were not killed." For other examples, cf. "Prolegomena," pp. 20 f.

purposes of Zeus.²¹ Poseidon's activities in N are consistently related to the prohibition, unless we misread or mutilate the text with Finsler.²² Eris and Iris are merely agents of Zeus, and Apollo is twice sent to carry out the Father's designs (O 220 ff.; II 666 ff.); after the second mission, he seems to remain on the scene with *carte blanche* to aid the Trojans, as in II 700 ff., 715 ff., 729 f., 788 ff.; P 71 ff., 322 ff., 582 ff.; the last words of Patroclus imply that Apollo was acting as Zeus' agent when he caused his death (II 844-846).²³ In the same way, at P 544, Athena is sent by Zeus to encourage the Achaeans, and she apparently remains on the scene to clothe Achilles in glory and join her cry to his at Σ 203 ff. There remain these instances: Athena saves Odysseus from death (Λ 437 f.) and Apollo Polydamas (O 521 f.); Apollo in response to Glaucus' prayer heals and inspires him (II 527 ff.); Hera, having failed in her attempt to arouse Poseidon, inspires Agamemnon to rally the Achaeans (Θ 318 f.); Hera and Athena salute Agamemnon with a peal of thunder (Λ 45 f.); Athena dispels the mists from the eyes of the Achaeans (O 668-673); after the rescue of Patroclus' body Hera sends the sun to rest (Σ 239 f.); Athena takes away the wits of the Trojans in their assembly after the battle (Σ 311). Nothing here really violates the prohibition of Zeus, *ἐλθέντ' ἢ Τρώεσσιν ἀρηγέμεν ἢ Δαναοῖσι* (Θ 11), which contemplates interference on a grander scale, such for example as Poseidon's in NΞ, and not the occasional slight interventions which are part and parcel of the normal functions of divinity in the epic and an inseparable feature of the epic style.²⁴ It will

²¹ Hera first appeals, unsuccessfully, to Poseidon (Θ 198-211) and then induces Athena to join in the abortive sally of 350-484. Her chance comes at Σ 453, when she sees Poseidon, unknown to Zeus, aiding the Achaeans, and here the *Apote* begins. After her failure, she is inactive, except at Σ 165 ff., when secretly she sends Iris to rouse Achilles. If Θ is a late insertion by a bungler, as Wilamowitz and others of the higher critics believe, it is rather remarkable that Hera's situation is so nicely portrayed.

²² Cf. my "Higher Criticism on Olympus," *A.J.P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 259-262.

²³ We get the impression that Zeus' prohibition applies in its utmost stringency only until the firing of Protesilaus' ship (cf. O 596-600), which takes place at II 122.

²⁴ Note Athena's interpretation of the command, *πολέμου μὲν ἀφεζόμεθ'*

be very near the truth to say that the prohibition applies to the gods as *dramatis personae* only, and not in their more general aspects. In order to dispense with these references to traditional epic functions of the gods, the poet would have had to revolutionize the whole conception in which he had been trained, and would have had to invent a new epic style conformable to the new conception, either substituting Zeus for other gods, or replacing familiar formulas by new, impersonal expressions. He did not of course analyze the problem, for he was not aware of it. He merely kept his divine actors, his *dramatis personae*, from violating the prohibition, and then went on using the old familiar formulas, ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκε Ἀγαμέμνονι πότνια Ἥρη (Θ 218), οὐδ' ἔτ' ἔασε / Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη (Δ 437 f.), οὐ γὰρ Ἀπόλλων / εἶα (Ο 521 f.), without even being conscious that they had anything to do with his Olympian plot. Only a higher critic on the lookout for criteria could erect them into contradictions or see in them traces of an early stratum expressing an early state of religion.²⁵

Despite the more involved structure of the *Odyssey*, its scenes and the presentation of the action are relatively simple as compared with the *Iliad* and offer fewer occasions for the grand style. When allowance is made for these differences,²⁶ we find

ὥς σὺν κελεύεις· βουλὴν δ' Ἀργείοις ὑποθησόμεθ', ἥ τις δνῆσει, κτλ. (Θ 35-37, repeated by Hera 466-468).

²⁵ Neglect of this important distinction vitiates the major premise in Finsler's theory of composition, proposed in *Die Olympischen Szenen der Ilias* (Bern, 1906) and elaborated in *Homer* (Erster Teil, ed. 3, Leipzig, 1924); cf. "The Higher Criticism on Olympus," pp. 259 ff. The problem calls for a more complete study than has yet been made of formulas relating to the gods and of gods as expressions of impersonal agency; cf. "Prolegomena," pp. 20 f.

²⁶ Besides this general difference of scale between the pomp and panoply of the Achaean host and scenes in which relatively few characters appear, the *Odyssey* does not present the two problems for which the divine entourage offered an effective solution in the *Iliad*; the hero is not required to duel with opponents who may not be slain and there are no general engagements which need to be prolonged and varied. The nearest approach to the second problem is the fight with the wooers; here divine intervention in behalf of the wooers would scarcely suit, since Poseidon has given up his pursuit of Odysseus and the other gods all favor the hero, so the poet resorts to the purely human episode of Melanthius and the arms, which makes possible a truly formidable

that the divine entourage serves the same purposes in much the same way in both poems.

The human characters of first importance in the *Odyssey* are three only, Odysseus, Telemachus, and Penelope, and they are commonly attended in their comings and goings by Athena. There is no place here for a multiplicity of gods as in the *Iliad*. The three persons belong to a single family and have a single aim; Athena is the patron goddess and the protector of Odysseus and hence of his wife and son, whose fortunes are bound up with his; it is she who charges herself with the working out of his return and restoration; she represents the will of Zeus and of the other gods, and divine epiphany is almost always in her person. The division in heaven is not complicated as it is in the *Iliad* by the wrath and the promise to Thetis; we have simply the straightforward opposition of Poseidon as far as the return to Ithaca, and the momentary episode of Helius to motivate and introduce the fate of Odysseus' comrades.

On Penelope's first appearance she is not attended by the goddess, for obvious reasons. Athena has just departed, miraculously, after holding the center of the stage in a brilliant scene of over two hundred lines, and her immediate return would have been inartistic to say the least. And it is more effective to present Penelope upon the human plane when the song of Phemius strikes the note of grief and loneliness in her breast. But when the scene in the hall is ended and she returns to her chamber and cries herself to sleep, weeping for Odysseus, it is Athena who sheds sweet slumber upon her lids.²⁷

The first appearance of Telemachus is bound up with one of assault by the wooers and for a time seems to make the outcome uncertain (χ 139-296). The final encounter with the Ithacans is clearly planned to center in a single episode, the slaying of Eupithes by Laertes (ω 516-525).

²⁷ α 328-364; the recurrence of this motif (π 449-451; τ 602-604; φ 356-358) assures us that Penelope is continually the object of divine care and protection; cf. also δ 795-841; σ 158-196. It is Athena who prompts the queen to bring out the bow of Odysseus (φ 1-4); here the goddess may be little more than personification of the impulse to action, since Penelope had spoken of her intention the night before, and Odysseus had urged her not to delay the trial (τ 572-587), but it is an impulse that comes precisely at the right moment and the lines undoubtedly make it more impressive by connecting it with the plans of Athena.

the most striking instances of divine intervention in Homer, the visit of Athena to Ithaca, for which the first Olympian scene provides a brilliant introduction and the miraculous departure of the goddess a notable conclusion (α 26-324). Throughout the first three books Telemachus is the central figure, and Athena attends upon his every step.²⁸ In the fourth he is left to his own devices, for reasons which will appear later,²⁹ and with his return to Ithaca his divine entourage merges in that of Odysseus.³⁰

Athena first appears in person to Odysseus in Scheria on the day following his escape from the waves, but she has previously aided him at crucial moments and twice has spoken eloquently before the gods on Olympus of the man and his sufferings. The first of these Olympian scenes, in which the return of Odysseus is ordained by Zeus, constitutes the opening of the poem, and leads directly into the scene in Ithaca in which Athena speaks with Telemachus of the absent hero. The second, with its sequel, the visit of Hermes to Calypso, serves as prelude to the first appearance of Odysseus upon the scene.³¹ Throughout the remainder of α the divine entourage is ample and varied—Calypso and her enchanted grotto, Poseidon (282-296, 365-381), Leucothea and the magic wimple (333-353, 458-462), and the river-god (445-453). Although Athena does not appear in person, she stills the wind and wave after Poseidon has gone (382-387), and the presence of mind which saves Odysseus from being dashed to pieces upon the rocks is the effect of her immediate inspiration (427-429, 437-440). From this point on, virtually everything that takes place is brought about by the direct intervention of the goddess,³² until, at the very last, in the likeness of Mentor, she makes peace between the Ithacans and their king.³³

²⁸ E. g., β 12 f., 260-295, 382-421; γ 12-62, 229-238, 330-385.

²⁹ *Infra* p. 275.

³⁰ Cf. ν 439 f.; ο 1-43.

³¹ The Odysseus whom we meet at ε 151 is very human, but we are reminded of the celestial prelude to his appearance when he sits in the chair from which Hermes has lately risen (ε 195 f.).

³² Cf. J. A. Scott, "The First Book of the *Odyssey*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVII (1936), pp. 5 f.

³³ E. g., ζ 1-47, 112-117, 139 f., 229-235; η 14-81, 139-145; θ 1-23, 193-200; ι 187-440; κ 155-176, 454-459; ρ 360-363; σ 69 f., 346-348; τ 2 = 52, 33-43, 478 f.; υ 30-55; φ 1-4; χ 205-240, 297-309; ψ 156-163, 242-246, 344-

In sharp contrast to these incessant interventions, Athena does not once appear in all the tale of wanderings, and the poet takes the trouble of noting the fact and explaining it in advance.⁸⁴ The situation is in some respects parallel to that brought about by the prohibition of Zeus in the *Iliad*.⁸⁵ We might say that the arrival of Odysseus in Ithaca, which is the formal termination of Poseidon's attempts at revenge, parallels the formal revocation of Zeus' prohibition in Y, while the landing in Scheria, like the firing of Protesilaus' ship, marks the real crisis, after which there is a greater measure of divine intervention. In working out the Olympian elements in the two plots, the poet had in each case to solve the problem, no easy one at best, of presenting irresistible forces in conflict in the persons of major divinities; to carry out Zeus' promise to Thetis, the Olympian opposition had to be dealt with either by the thunder-bolt and Tartarus, or, as it was in fact dealt with, by moral restraint—reinforced, it is true, by threats of violence; to allow Poseidon to seek his revenge, without a spectacle of actual conflict between the Earth-shaker and Athena, the goddess had to be kept from the scene, and so, as the poet tells us, she yielded to moral restraint, her αἰδώς for her father's brother. The habitual, unconscious references to the gods inseparable from epic poetry, retained as we saw in Θ-Y, have in a way their counterpart in the tale of wanderings in the numerous references to minor divinities, Calypso, Circe, the nymphs, or to θεός τις or δαίμων.⁸⁶ Yet these analogies do not get quite to the bottom of the problem. Athena's absence

348, 371 f.; ω 182-185, 367-374, 444-449, 472-548. The portents vouchsafed by Zeus (ν 102-121; φ 413-415) and his intervention in the closing episode (ω 472-488, 539 f.) add to the effect. In three passages (σ 346-348 = ν 284-286; cf. ν 345-362) Athena is represented as inciting the wooers to brutal and senseless behavior; the purpose here is to make their subsequent slaughter less revolting to the audience, as I have elsewhere explained ("Télémaque et le plan de l'*Odyssée*," *R. E. G.*, XLVII [1934], p. 161, n. 1).

⁸⁴ Cf. § 324-331 and *infra* p. 274. ⁸⁵ Cf. *supra* pp. 263 ff.

⁸⁶ On these indefinite references to gods, commonly used by one of the characters in direct speech, cf. "Prolegomena," pp. 20 f., especially n. 21, and the study of Ove Jørgensen cited below. For an exhaustive study of the instances, cf. Erik Hedén, *Homerische Götterstudien* (Upsala, 1912), pp. 63-96. M. P. Nilsson makes some important observations on this usage in "Götter und Psychologie bei Homer," *Arch. Rel.-Wiss.*, XXII (1924), pp. 376 ff.

in the tale of wandering is not exactly coincident with the wrath of Poseidon; the goddess fails to aid Odysseus in his adventures prior to the blinding of Polyphemus, when she would not have offended Poseidon by so doing, and she does aid him, unobtrusively to be sure, in ε, though at the end of ζ she will not yet appear to him in person. Scott, with his usual acumen, observes that Athena may not intervene until it is the will of the gods that Odysseus be brought safely home.³⁷ This abundantly explains the plot, as it lies before us, but we still should like to know—if there be any possibility of knowing—why the poet chose so to construct his plot. Perhaps it is foolhardy to ask this question, but the absence of Athena in every part of Odysseus' narrative, and only in that narrative, suggests that there may be some reason for the choice inherent in the matter of the narrative or in the form of the narration.

The most satisfactory explanation that has been advanced hitherto would find the reason solely in the form, in a striking difference of technique between the poet's own narration and narrative put in the mouths of the characters, in which the first person is used instead of the third. In a very acute study, "Das Auftreten der Götter in den Büchern ι-μ der Odyssee," *Hermes*, XXXIX (1904), pp. 357-382, Ove Jørgensen has shown conclusively that references to the gods without names, in such terms as *θεοί*, *θεός*, *δαίμων*, or by letting Zeus stand for the gods in general, are rare in the poet's own narration, but abundant in passages in which characters speak in the first person. On the face of it this would seem to be a sufficient answer to our question; the poet does not introduce Athena into the tale because Odysseus is himself the narrator and the technique of the first person precludes reference to divinities by name. Closer examination of this technique, however, shows that it is somewhat flexible as regards the use of names and cannot well be the sole reason for excluding Athena. Jørgensen himself is struck by the fact that Odysseus does not even once address the goddess in prayer, although, as he observes (p. 379), "Derartige Erwähnungen von Athene würden zwar die Stilisierung für die erste Person nicht wesentlich beeinträchtigen, denn sie finden sich ab und zu in den Gedichten."

³⁷ "The First Book of the Odyssey," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVII (1936), pp. 5 f.

Instances in which gods are named by characters speaking in the first person are in fact more numerous than appears from Jörgensen's study.³⁸ Many of them, however, are entirely consistent with the general technique and may be disregarded.³⁹ We are concerned only with those in which a speaker names a god who has participated in some experience of his own that he is narrating.⁴⁰ Since narratives of this sort are relatively few and most of them brief, instances of the kind we are seeking are not numerous; they are, however, undeniable departures from the technique observed by Jörgensen.

When Nestor tells how Agamemnon wished to defer the sailing from Troy and offer hecatombs,

ὥς τὸν Ἀθηναίης δεινὸν χόλον ἐξακέσαστο,
 ἡγήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ ἦδ' ὃ οὐ πείσεσθαι ἔμελλεν.
 οὐ γάρ τ' αἶψα θεῶν τρέπεται νόος αἰὲν ὄντων [γ 145-147],

we have more than the mere reference to a god as recipient of

³⁸ Jörgensen is naturally more concerned with the indefinite references than with those in which names are used; these are treated very briefly on p. 368 of his study, where his list of passages should be compared with the instances which I discuss below.

³⁹ These are (1) references to minor divinities, such as Proteus and Eidothea in δ 364 ff., and Circe, Calypso, or Aeolus in the tale of wanderings; (2) references to major divinities in the performance of functions so closely identified with their names that the notion of personal intervention is practically lost, as when Apollo and Artemis are named as the authors of sudden death (e.g., γ 279 f.; ο 410 f., 478; Z 205, 428; cf. Hedén, pp. 19 f.); (3) nearly all instances in which Zeus is named, since those which do not fall in the preceding category can usually be taken as metonymy for the gods in general (cf. "Prolegomena," p. 21); (4) references to major divinities in a story in which the speaker is not involved (e.g., Δ 390; Z 130 ff., 198 ff., 203; I 533, 559 f.); (5) major divinities casually named as recipients of sacrifice and prayer or in some similar connection which does not concern the speaker; (6) direct address to the gods in prayer, including mere exclamatory formulas; (7) gods named in speeches by other gods. There are other instances which do not fall into any of these classifications but might be allowed under Jörgensen's rule; one who has noted all instances in which gods are named by characters speaking in the first person will feel that the poet exercises a very considerable discretion.

⁴⁰ "Unter den in direkter Rede vorgetragenen Erzählungen sind aber die wirklichen Sagen von den Berichten zu unterscheiden, die jemand von seinen eigenen Erlebnissen gibt" (Hedén, p. 17).

sacrifice (cf. γ 178 f.); the whole story of Athena's wrath against the Achaeans is implied. When the disguised Odysseus describes the warlike spirit of his young manhood, it is noteworthy that he says ἡ μὲν δὲ θάρσος μοι Ἄρης τ' ἔδωσαν καὶ Ἀθήνη / καὶ βροχηνόριν (ξ 216 f.). These two instances are perhaps on the border line and may not be too much stressed, though they may properly be taken to show that the technique is somewhat flexible. But when Helen, recalling experiences at Troy, tells how she deplored her infatuation, αἶτην δὲ μετέστενον, ἦν Ἀφροδίτη / δῶχ' ὅτε μ' ἤγαγε κείσε φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος αἵης (δ 261 f.), the case is clearer. Aphrodite is certainly no mere personification of passion, nor is she named only because it is her function to inspire love; what we have is a brief, but effective, review of Helen's own experience when she left her home to come to Troy. Menelaus, in his reply, speaking of Helen's attempt to induce the Achaean chieftains in the wooden horse to betray their presence, tells how Odysseus held his hand over the mouth of Anticlus, and ends up τόφρα δ' ἔχ' ὄφρα σε νόσφιν ἀπήγαγε Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη (δ 289). Here again is divine intervention briefly narrated by one of the persons concerned.⁴¹ However these instances may be interpreted, they indicate that a rigid adherence to the technique would demand a logical discrimination more precise than is usually found in poetry.

Turning to the *Iliad*, we find in Nestor's story of the wars between the Pylians and the Eleians a complete abandonment of the usual technique. Athena comes from Olympus with word of the invasion and gathers the Pylian folk for battle (Α 714-716; cf. 721). Poseidon miraculously saves the twins Actorion from death by Nestor's conquering spear (750-752). The Pylians pursue the fleeing foe until Athena turns them back (752). Then all utter prayers of thanksgiving, to Zeus among the gods and among men to Nestor (761). Here, on the lips of Nestor, is the divine entourage in all the profusion of the poet's own narration.

⁴¹ Although Helen's departure is attributed to the agency of Athena, her coming was at the prompting of a divinity (*δαίμων*) who favored the Trojans (δ 275). This immediate juxtaposition of the two modes of reference shows the poet's discretion in the circumstances; in the one case Menelaus was not sure of the god's identity, but he was confident that the power who averted disaster was Athena.

Finally, over and above these instances, there are two notable cases of intervention by named gods in the tale of wanderings, when Hermes appears to Odysseus and gives him the moly,⁴² and when Zeus destroys Odysseus' ship to punish his comrades for the slaughter of Helius' cattle.⁴³

These exceptions do not invalidate Jørgensen's general conclusion that there was a definite technique of the first person in accordance with which references to the gods in direct quotations are usually without names. But they do show very clearly that this technique cannot be treated as an invariable rule of composition. Apparently the poet had his reasons for observing it strictly at times and for neglecting it at other times, or modifying it. Jørgensen finds the chief reason for its observance in the obvious fact that the poet is supposed to know what particular god acts on each occasion, while his characters do not (p. 364). This is true, but there are perhaps other factors also. The appearance of gods among men is thought of as something belonging to the olden time, while the speeches of characters, though strictly they do not relate to contemporary matters, create at least an illusion of contemporaneity; in this connection we note that the speech which has the divine entourage in all its splendor is one in which the aged Nestor portrays the prowess of an earlier generation that knew the hero Heracles. There is also the undoubted fact that the constant intervention of named divinities in behalf of this or that hero,

⁴² Cf. κ 275-308. It is hard to say just why Hermes is chosen to rescue Odysseus; there may be some connection with the magic of the moly. It is at least possible that Hermes here is substituting for Athena because the poet wishes to be consistent and to keep the goddess entirely out of the tale (cf. *infra* pp. 274 f.).

⁴³ Cf. μ 403-425. The authenticity of the Lampetia passage is not here in question (μ 374-390); even should we reject it, we should have to assume that Zeus, when he destroys the ship, is more than a personification of the storm (as he might well be in the parallel passage, ε 300 ff., or in η 249 f.) or representative of the gods in general; otherwise we have no connection between the offense against Helius and the punishment that overtakes the guilty men. Zeus is the storm and the lightning, but he is more; he is the god who unlooses these natural forces and the avenger of the wrong done Helius. For illustrations of the way in which the diverse aspects of divinity are blended and fused in the poet's mind, cf. "Prolegomena," pp. 22-25. On the authenticity of the Lampetia passage, cf. "Myth and Märchen," p. 22, n. 47.

while it contributes to an effect of dignity and grandeur in the poet's own narration, lends a tone of bombast to a story told in the first person; this again is seen in Nestor's tale. Furthermore, the intervention of the gods is naturally most frequent in episodes which are developed at length and in elaborate detail, whereas most of the episodes narrated in the first person are treated with extreme brevity and simplicity.

Jørgensen's technique is not by itself a sufficient explanation of Athena's absence; if the poet may introduce Hermes, he might equally well have introduced Athena had he so desired. We must ask what other reasons conceivably may have influenced him. One very cogent reason is to be found, not in the form, but in the matter of the narrative; despite its evident importance it has been strangely neglected. Put briefly, it is the fact that the tale of wanderings is made up almost entirely of episodes from folk and fairy tale,⁴⁴ each already provided with a supernatural element so closely interwoven into its design as to make the introduction of an Olympian divinity unnecessary, or awkward, or actually impossible. This is most obvious, perhaps, in the encounter with Polyphemus; an Odysseus accompanied and protected by Athena could not have had the adventures there narrated. For that matter, the wise Odysseus of the epic tradition by himself could not, and in this episode the hero has to be remodeled along the lines of folk story.⁴⁵ The tale of Aeolus and the bag of winds likewise could not be told of a hero always aided and protected by an all-wise and all-powerful goddess. In the episodes of Circe and Calypso the introduction of a second goddess must have given rise to awkward situations. Circe supplies the supernatural, not only for what takes place in her enchanted castle, but also for the journey to Hades and the minor adventures that follow, where, being already on the scene, she is given a rôle that might under other circumstances have fallen to Athena. In the grotto of Calypso, the virgin goddess would certainly have found herself *de trop* long before the seven years were out.

Throughout the narrative of Odysseus the poet is adapting

⁴⁴ Cf. "Myth and Märchen," pp. 12 f., 19; and, for an exhaustive discussion with many parallels, L. Radermacher, "Die Erzählungen der Odyssee," *Sitzungsber. Wien. Akad.*, CLXXVIII. 1 (1915).

⁴⁵ Cf. "Myth and Märchen," p. 12, n. 27.

to the epic a group of tales of the sort which enter into the composition of the *voyage imaginaire*. This is a definite genre, distinct from heroic epic; in it the hero usually is not accompanied throughout by one protecting divinity, but meets his difficulties partly by native cleverness, partly by the aid of divers friendly powers met in the course of his wanderings. The tales of Odysseus and Menelaus show that it was amply developed in the times when the *Odyssey* was composed. Other parts of the poem are based on epic conceptions and in them Athena is duly given her epic rôle, as in the *Iliad*, but there is no place for her in fairyland.⁴⁶

After our study of Θ-Y, we might expect that the goddess would appear now and then, when the situation permitted, brought in merely from habit or unconsciously in a familiar formula. As a matter of fact there is only one such instance, and that too slight to be a real intrusion.⁴⁷ On the other hand, in ζ 325-331, unless we join the majority of higher critics in branding the passage as interpolation, we have seemingly definite evidence that the poet has become aware of the problem and is meeting it consciously. Jörgensen regards these lines, and of necessity also ν 314 ff., as the inept interpolation of a later poet, who did not understand the technique of the first person and was puzzled by the absence of Athena (pp. 370 f.). The conjecture is of course entirely possible, but it is conjecture only and there is no proof; it rests on the arbitrary assumption that the original poet was incapable of perceiving what a later poet, himself an assumption of the critic, would discern immediately. I cannot myself see why the original author may not have thought it desirable to motivate Athena's absence from so long a series of adventures.

It seems reasonable to believe that the poet had two or three valid reasons for omitting Athena from the tale of wanderings. The nature of the material made it inconvenient to introduce the goddess in a majority of the episodes, and she could not be popping in and out like a jack-in-the-box. Consequently it

⁴⁶ So the journey of Telemachus admits the constant intervention of Athena, not only because it is in the third person, but also because it is based upon the normal epic conceptions; the fairy tales and folk motifs are kept to the stories of Menelaus.

⁴⁷ Cf. ζ 317, εἰ πως τισαμένη, δολὴ δέ μοι εὖχος Ἀθήνη.

seemed better to leave her out entirely in this portion of the poem.⁴⁸ The form of the narration lent itself to this solution of the difficulty, since gods are seldom named in passages in which the first person is used. Had the poet chosen to disregard this second consideration, the result might well have been a tone of bombast, suitable enough in one of Nestor's glorifications of the heroic past, but hardly consistent with the character of Odysseus as he is portrayed elsewhere in the poems. In § 325-331 and in γ 314-323, 339-343, the absence of the goddess, which actually was the result of artistic and technical requirements, is motivated by an explanation intended to relate it to the plot. There are other instances of this in the poems. For example, it should be fairly clear to any intelligent reader that Athena is absent from the scenes in the palace of Menelaus chiefly because her intervention could have led only to a virtual duplication of the scenes in Pylos. Such duplication would have been entirely acceptable in a naïve, primitive type of poetry, and would not have been avoided. But our artist is far beyond that stage. He has ample material for adornment of the meeting with Menelaus and Helen in the story of Menelaus' return and in the reminiscences of Troy, which not only are interesting in themselves and useful for characterization but also offer an element of pleasing variety. Accordingly he dispenses with Athena, and motivates her absence by the elaborate excuse for her departure and by her parting instructions to Nestor regarding Telemachus' journey to Lacedaemon (γ 359-370). We see the same technique, on a much grander scale, in the *Iliad*. A naïve, primitive poem on this theme would probably have introduced desultory combats of gods fighting on one side or another throughout the entire course of the action. This would have tended to dwarf the figures of the mortal champions and would have detracted from the grand effect of the final conflict, when Achilles returns to the field and both gods and men join in the battle. Accordingly, after the brilliant scenes of E, the poet decides to keep the gods out of the fighting until he is ready for his final sonorous prelude to the death of Hector. Here

⁴⁸ This answers Jørgensen's query (p. 379; cf. *supra* p. 289), why Odysseus does not even once pray to Athena; since the goddess may not appear or intervene, the hero may not be permitted to pray to her for help which she cannot give.

again the absence of the gods is dictated by artistic considerations, but it is brought into connection with the plot by the two assemblies on Olympus, by the prohibition in © and its formal revocation in Y.

To sum up, in both poems the artist is evidently following an epic convention of long standing when he consistently provides a divine entourage for his principal characters and for crucial episodes, or as introductions to major divisions of the narrative. We may expect to find important crises introduced and adorned by divine participation, and prominent personages commonly attended by gods when the action brings them to the center of the stage. The peculiar convenience of miraculous rescues in single combats and of celestial intervention in prolonged general engagements, too often ignored in theories of composition, is the key to much in the *Iliad* that has been sadly misunderstood by critics. Since the poet is too wise to nullify his effects by an uninterrupted succession of supernatural manifestations, it is to be expected that some episodes of importance will be without the divine entourage; ordinarily conspicuous instances of celestial activity are followed by stretches of narrative in which the action is on the human plane. We must be grateful for the genius which kept the supernatural out of such scenes as the parting of Hector and Andromache, the Embassy, the interview of Priam with Achilles, the recognition of Odysseus by Penelope. Iris summons Helen to the wall to watch the duel, and Aphrodite escorts her back to the chamber of Paris, but when Hector falls, Andromache must follow the promptings of her anguished spirit. I call this genius because I believe it is unconscious rather than intentional. In these scenes the poet was so absorbed in his human characters, he identified himself with them so completely, that he forgot the gods and recreated life as he lived it and as he knew it in the hearts of men.⁴⁹

When the divine entourage is fully understood, and due allowance is made for the purely ornamental functions of the gods,

⁴⁹ See the admirable statement of Nilsson in his recent essay, "Der homerische Dichter in der homerischen Welt," *Die Antike*, XIV (1938), p. 33: "In der Menschenschilderung liegt die bleibende Macht und der unvergängliche Zauber der homerischen Gedichte. Sie ist die eigenste Schöpfung des homerischen Dichters, die entscheidende Neubelebung und Krönung der Epik. Der homerische Dichter hat die Recken des Mythos zu fühlenden und leidenden Menschen umgeprägt."

many fancied difficulties and blemishes disappear. We need not be troubled with the ancients because Athena carries a light for Odysseus or Aphrodite sets a stool for Helen. Nor need we strive, with Gilbert Murray, to "think away" Athena's cruel deceit on Hector. For the poet and for his audiences, the intervention of the goddess enhanced the glory of the slayer and also of the slain. So also Apollo's attack on Patroclus, dastardly as it seems from the purely human point of view, emphasized the greatness of the hero who was victim and glorified the victor by the attendance and aid of a great divinity.

The divine entourage, being primarily a sort of adornment, can be fully understood only in relation to other sorts of adornment which accompany it and blend into it—stories, dialogues, similes and descriptions, the arming of heroes and the marshaling of hosts. It cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula. The perfection of classic beauty, as we see it in Homer and in later manifestations of the Greek genius, involves definite patterns, but freely wrought and with infinite variety.

GEORGE M. CALHOUN.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

THE MIND OF LUCRETIVS.¹

It is obvious that for the full comprehension of a work of literature, whether in verse or prose, we need to understand the way in which the writer's mind works. This is specially true in the study of the writers of antiquity, because their methods of thought are often very different from ours. In some of them, in Pindar, for instance, this difference is at once apparent and we do not set about interpreting him on the assumption that his sequence of thought was like ours. But Lucretius, writing in an orderly manner on a philosophic and scientific theme, has a superficial affinity to modern logical methods of approach to such a subject. What I want to show is that this resemblance is to some extent deceptive, that the workings of his mind were more those of the poet than those of the philosopher and that this consideration has an important bearing on the constitution of the text.

There are three main ways in which one can come to know the workings of a writer's mind. In the first place he may be a "subjective," or perhaps it would be better to say a "personal" writer, who openly lays his mind before us, showing its progress from step to step. Many philosophical writers—one might almost say most—would come under this head, and certain also of the poets; we can, for instance, trace the mental progress of Wordsworth or Browning from what they tell us themselves. And if the writer is "impersonal" and keeps himself and his processes of thought in the background, we may yet learn something from the circumstances of his life and the time in which he lived. Milton is an example, Virgil to some extent, even so impersonal a poet as Shakespeare. And the third method is the careful and patient study of the works themselves, the endeavour to understand what it is that the writer says and why he says it as he does.

In the case of Lucretius the first two sources of information are sadly lacking. Almost nothing is known of his life or his social position. Of the strange story of the love-potion and the suicide, recorded by Jerome, it is sufficient here to say that on

¹ The substance of this article was given as the Samuel Dill Memorial Lecture to the University of Belfast on Dec. 13, 1938.

the one hand no drug can have been so potent as to enable him to write the *De Rerum Natura* in the "lucid intervals" between its onsets, and on the other that there is no reason to doubt the recorded fact. We may admit that Lucretius was probably of a naturally melancholy disposition, which had some influence on the shaping of the poem, and that at the end a drug may have led to suicide. But he was not a Coleridge or a De Quincey; his mind was sane. The only certain facts of his life are that he lived in the first half of the last century B. C., when Rome was torn by civil dissension and political strife, from which as a true Epicurean he held aloof, and that he was the friend, or it may be the dependent, of C. Memmius, an aristocrat of dubious character and checkered political career, the patron of Catullus and Cinna and the writer of amatory verses.

Nor again is Lucretius a "personal" poet and, except on rare occasions, he keeps himself in the background. He tells us twice² that he "plants his feet firmly in Epicurus' footsteps," he boasts³ that "he is the first to endeavour to set forth the nature of the world in his native tongue," but also complains⁴ that it is "hard to illustrate the obscure discoveries of the Greeks in Latin verse," and more than once⁵ laments the "poverty of his native language." We can infer from this that Lucretius found his task difficult, as much perhaps because he was writing in verse as because he was writing in Latin, but was justly proud of his achievement. Once in a precious passage twice repeated⁶ he has given us his own view of his mission. He has been smitten, he tells us, with the sharp spur of fame and with love of the Muses and is traversing their distant haunts, never yet trodden by the foot of man. He will gather a glorious coronal for his head "first because"—and these are the important words—"first because I teach about great things and hasten to free the mind from the close bondage of religion, then because on a dark theme I trace verses so full of light, touching all with the Muses' charm." Here we have his own view of himself; he is primarily the teacher and prophet of the emancipation of man's spirit, and his verse, for all his love of the Muses, is but an ornament to attract. When the question is raised whether

² III, 4, V, 55.

³ V, 336.

⁴ I, 136.

⁵ I, 832, III, 260, cf. I, 139.

⁶ I, 921-934, IV, 1-9.

Lucretius is first of all philosopher or poet, there can be no doubt as to his own answer, even if posterity has been inclined to reverse the verdict. Yet even here we get little light on the character or processes of his mind and we are driven back on the examination of the poem itself.

What then can we discover from the poem itself as to the character and processes of its author's mind? Three modern scholars have greatly assisted towards the solution of this problem, first Giussani, who in the essays and notes in his edition has done more than anyone else to think out the implications of the atomism of Epicurus and Lucretius, though he is too apt to read modern ideas into their philosophy and to demand a rigid logic from them; and secondly two German scholars in recently-published treatises, Regenbogen⁷ and Büchner,⁸ who in a reaction against the thought of Giussani's generation have studied afresh Lucretius' mind and its procedure. I owe much to all these three, but I do not wish to make them responsible for anything that I propose to say.

The key to the understanding of Lucretius' mind seems to me to be that it was visual rather than logical, that concrete images appealed to him rather than abstract arguments, in short that he was poet rather than philosopher. In thinking by means of images he would be carrying out his master's precepts, for to Epicurus the whole process of thought, as far as we can gather, consisted in the combination with one another of those general concepts—"anticipations," *πρόληψεις*, as he called them, which were the "composite photographs" resulting from the concentration in the mind of a number of successive sense-impressions. But there is much more than a loyal obedience to his master's precepts. Think of some of the great passages in which he deals with the widest general principles of the system and note how the argument instinctively translates itself into vision. He is arguing, for instance, towards the end of Book I (1021-37) for the infinite number of the atoms and maintaining that the formation of our world was not due to design, but arose out of the clash of infinite atoms in infinite space. As we read the lines we see how argument passes almost at once into the image

⁷ O. Regenbogen, *Lukrez; seine Gestalt in seinem Gedicht*, 1932.

⁸ K. Büchner, *Beobachtungen über Vers und Gedankgang bei Lukrez*, 1936.

of the movements and collisions of the atoms, and then the idea of the world suggests its component parts, earth, sea, and sky, visualized and expressed in the artist's picture. Take a very different passage; towards the end of the great series of arguments for the mortality of the soul in Book III Lucretius in a sarcastic vein (776-783) maintains that it cannot be that pre-existent souls wait for the birth of living creatures and then enter into them. Here too his argument is transformed at once into a most vivid picture of the wrangling souls at the side of the new-born baby, which is again an artist's vision.

This point must be pressed further. There are many passages in the poem in which the argument is double; an abstract *a priori* reason is followed up by a concrete *a posteriori* argument drawn from the experience or sometimes from the analogy of sense-perception. Such a passage occurs in Book II, 338 ff. when Lucretius is arguing that there are differences of shape among the atoms. The *a priori* reason comes first and is expressed—rather feebly—in four lines: “since there is so great a store of atoms that, as I have shown, there is no end or sum, they must sure enough not one and all be marked by an equal bulk and like shape, one with another.” Rather curt this and not very good reasoning, but then follows the *a posteriori* argument that among the species of created things individuals differ and their differences are due to the variety of atomic shapes: “moreover the race of men, and the mute swimming shoals of the scaly tribes and the blithe herds and wild beasts and the different birds which haunt the gladdening watering spots about river-banks and springs and pools, and those which flit about and throng the pathless woods; go and take any one you like in any one kind, and you will yet find that they differ in their shapes, every one from every other.” Here the poet is at home again and we feel that the concrete picture has more weight with him than the less attractive argument. Take a more famous passage, where Lucretius is setting out to prove the infinity of the universe (I, 958-976). First the *a priori* proof: “the whole universe then is bounded in no direction of its ways; for then it would be bound to have an extreme edge, unless there is something beyond to bound it, so that there is seen to be a spot further than which the nature of our sense cannot follow it.” Frigid enough this, but now turn to the *a posteriori* proof,

this time not derived from actual experience, but from an imaginary experiment; a sense of freedom seems to come over the poet at once: "suppose now that all space were created finite, if one were to run to the end, to its furthest coasts, and throw a flying dart, would you have it that that dart, hurled with might and main, goes on whither it is sped and flies afar, or do you think that something can check and bar its way? For one or other you must needs admit and choose. Yet both shut off your escape and constrain you to grant that the universe spreads out free from limit." So, we might almost say, does the poet.

There is another test by which we can judge Lucretius' mind, namely the relation of his exposition to his master's. It was a cardinal point in the Epicurean tradition that no item in the system must be changed. Lucretius, "treading," as he tells us, "in his master's footsteps," has scrupulously followed his thought and his arguments. But what a change in their form! It is probable that the work of Epicurus which Lucretius used was that known as the "Greater Epitome." This unfortunately has not come down to us, but we possess what is in effect a "Lesser Epitome" in the Letters and to these Lucretius' argument is often very close—very close, but very different. Take an astronomical point. "The size of sun and moon and other stars" Epicurus tells Pythocles in a paradoxical passage,⁹ "is for us what it appears to be; and in reality it is either slightly greater or slightly less or the same size; for so too fires on earth when looked at from a distance seem to the senses." Now see how closely this is followed, yet how it is transformed by Lucretius (V, 564-574) as he looks on his mental picture:

nec nimio solis maior rota nec minor ardor
esse potest nostris quam sensibus esse videtur.
nam quibus e spatiis cumque ignes lumina possunt
adiciere et calidum membris adflare vaporem,
nil illa his intervallis de corpore libant
flammarum, nil ad speciem est contractior ignis.
proinde, calor quoniam solis lunaeque profusum
perveniunt nostros ad sensus et loca mulcent,
forma quoque hinc solis debent flumque videri
nil adeo ut possis plus aut minus addere vere.

Or if we want an example on a larger scale, compare Epicurus'

⁹ *Ep. ad Pyth.*, 91.

and Lucretius' accounts of the motion of the atoms. Epicurus¹⁰ says briefly: "the atoms move continuously for all time, some of them separating to a long distance from one another, while others recoil less far, whenever they chance to be deflected by the interlacing with others or else shut in by the atoms interlaced around them." This in Lucretius (II, 80-141) becomes a long passage of sixty-two lines in which he describes minutely the motion of the free atoms in space, and the formation of compound bodies by those which recoil at greater or lesser intervals, and he ends with the illuminating comparison with the motes in a sunbeam, which are in fact, as he shows, not only an illustration but an example of the working of the atomic motions.

I hope I have said enough to show what I mean by the "visual" character of Lucretius mind. It may well be asked, is there any practical outcome of this conclusion? Does it lead to a better understanding of the poet's mind? Has it any bearing on the interpretation or the text of the poem? I think it has a great deal. The nineteenth century critics, acting on the undoubted fact that the poem was left unfinished by the poet, and inspired too with the belief that the MS tradition of the text was by no means satisfactory, tried to reconstruct the poem by an evergrowing use of transposition of lines and of lacunae, and by the assumption of passages written by the poet, but not fitted to their context—interpolations, in fact, by Lucretius himself. The climax is reached in the editions of Brieger (1894), whose motto was "when in doubt play a lacuna," and of Giusani whose transpositions are so frequent and so drastic that it is often difficult in his text to discover a line that you may be looking for. Now of course any reconstruction of the text must involve the use of all these remedies. There are places¹¹ where single lines or two or even three lines, clearly out of position, can be with certainty restored—their misplacement was due to scribal mistakes. There are others¹² where a line or two—or even a longer passage¹³—must have been lost; in more than one such instance the MSS themselves indicate losses. In other

¹⁰ *Ep. ad Hdt.*, 43.

¹¹ E. g. I, 155, II, 680, 923, III, 955, IV, 250, 260, 542 ff., 991, V, 437-9, 573, 594, 975, 1131, VI, 990, 1178, 1245.

¹² E. g. I, 860, 1013, II, 748, III, 97, IV, 144, V, 1012.

¹³ I, 1093, II, 163, IV, 125, VI, 839.

places¹⁴ too it looks as if Lucretius had not quite made his junctures and would have smoothed them out in revision; this is especially true of some of the longer passages,¹⁵ which he repeats more than once in the poem, for it is generally possible to see in which context he wrote them first, and why he proposed to add them in another and when, if so, he left them without a *callida iunctura*. But the great error of these critics of the "nineties," which made them run riot with their nostrums and their panaceas, seems to me to have been that they did not understand the working of the poet's mind. They demanded of him a strict sequence of thought, such as you might find in a nineteenth century scientific treatise. This must be illustrated by a few examples.

Take first a simple example where Lucretius has given us a signpost for the comprehension of his own method. In Book VI, 879-905 he discusses the phenomenon of a cold spring on which floating bits of tow or torches will catch fire, and he explains that there must be in the spring "seeds of fire" which rise up from the earth through the spring and pass into the air, "yet not so many that the spring itself becomes hot." He then in five lines (890-4) compares this process with that by which in the sea there are occasionally found jets of fresh water. Returning to the theme he says (895-8).

sic igitur per eum possunt erumpere fontem
et scatere illa foras in stuppam semina; quae cum
conveniunt aut in taedae corpore adhaerent,
ardescunt facile extemplo.

The main picture of the cold spring has been in Lucretius' mind all through the digression, and he helps his reader here to reconstitute it by the signals *per eum fontem* and *illa semina*. Some editors have made a mess of the passage by punctuating 896 so as to separate *illa* from *semina*. But there can be no doubt as to Lucretius' intention. The same process of thought occurs in many other passages, but without the assistance given to us here.

Now turn to a longer and more complicated example, which Büchner¹⁶ has discussed. In the second Book Lucretius, after

¹⁴ E. g. IV, 26 ff.

¹⁵ I, 926-950, IV, 1-25, III, 784-797, V, 127-143, III, 806-818, V, 358-363.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6.

establishing the variety of shapes in the atoms, has one of those passages (589-660) in which he tries, as he frequently does, to reconcile scientific theory with common parlance, and tells us that the earth, which contains in it the seeds of all things, is justly called the Great Mother. This leads him to a magnificent digression of over forty lines, in which he describes the worship of the Phrygian Earth goddess, and explains its features allegorically. He pulls himself up and adds that all this worship is unreal, for in fact the gods live apart and care nothing for human affairs. Applying his caution he reminds us that the earth has no feelings and only produces all things because it contains their seeds. His thought then wanders to other gods and he suggests that if men like to call the sea Neptune, corn Ceres and so on, they are at liberty also to speak of the earth as the Mother, provided that they are not corrupted by any superstitious ideas. And then he goes on to say "and so (*itaque*) cows, horses, and sheep, grazing in the same field, preserve their species." This connexion, *itaque*, has caused great difficulty to the editors, for it is obvious that the new idea does not follow from what immediately precedes it. To obtain a logical sequence we should get this line immediately after the penultimate section of the last paragraph (652-4), in which Lucretius said that it was because the earth possessed the seeds of all things that it produced all things. Accordingly Munro transposed these three lines to the end of the paragraph, and Giussani bracketed the six lines which actually stand last as a "poet's interpolation." But now think of Lucretius not as a logician, but as a poet with a vision. The idea of the Earth Mother brings to his mind the vision of the wild procession of the worshippers of Cybele, which he must often have seen in Rome, and so on through the paragraph he passes from one thought to another as they occur to him. But all the while there has been "suspended," as it were, in his mind the great vision of Earth with the seeds of all things in it, and to this he recurs when he says "and so." There is no need for transposition or "poet's interpolation." It is the persistence of the vision in the poet's mind which justifies his apparent want of logic.

Take a less complicated instance of this "suspension of vision" in Lucretius' mind. In the opening of the fifth Book (91-109) he tells us that he intends to prove that the whole of

our world, earth, sea, and sky, will one day perish. Instead of proceeding to do so, he has a great passage of 125 lines in which he adduces many proofs to show that the world was not divinely created; and at last (235) comes back to his argument and says quite cheerfully "first of all (*principio*) since all these things have a beginning, they must have an end." Here again the editors are distressed at the illogicality. Lachmann bracketed the whole 125 lines as a passage written by Lucretius, but not intended for this place, and he was followed by Bernays and Munro. But this is not the only place in the poem where Lucretius suddenly interrupts his argument by an anti-theological tirade; he does it again in a shorter passage in Book II (167-183) and again towards the end of the same Book (1090-1104) after he has proved the existence of the many worlds.¹⁷ In both these places Lachmann and his followers introduce their brackets. To bracket these outbursts is to misconceive one of the fundamentals in the poem and its author. The *De rerum Natura* is not a mere scientific treatise; its whole purpose, as Lucretius declares clearly at the outset (I, 62-135), is to free men's minds from terror by showing that the gods have no part in the working of the world; at certain danger-points, like that just noticed in the description of the worship of Cybele, this central thought breaks out. In the passages in Book II he explains how the creation of all things is due to the movements and combinations of the atoms—don't think the gods do it—and again that nature by its own workings has produced the many worlds—don't introduce divine agency—and so here in Book V he is embarking on the proof of the mortality of the world, and inserts his passionate caution: "don't think I am being impious, for no divine beings created it." It is just as in the first argumentative words of the whole poem (I, 149-50), when he introduces the principle that nothing is created out of nothing, he adds the characteristic word *divinitus*, "by divine agency." And yet through the long digression the thought of his main argument is with him all the time, and at the end he can start with the simple introduction "first of all."

Büchner argues that not only do thoughts and pictures already expressed influence Lucretius' language, but that sometimes he seems to have a reference in anticipation to what he is going to

¹⁷ Cf. also VI, 379-422.

say. The ground here is much less safe, but attention may be drawn to one instance, in which Büchner¹⁸ may have found the right solution of a long-standing difficulty. In the passage already quoted (II, 112-141), in which Lucretius illustrates the movements of the atoms by that of the motes in a sunbeam, he introduces the comparison with the strange words:

culius, *uti memoro*, rei simulacrum et imago
ante oculos semper nobis versatur et instat:

"of this fact we have an illustration always before our eyes." But what does *uti memoro* mean? It can only be the equivalent of *ut dico*, "as I say," used idiomatically by Lucretius in IV, 1208, as *quod dico* is in II, 870, to mean, like the corresponding phrases in many languages, "as I have said." But he has not said so, and the editors go through all manner of contortions to get out of the difficulty. May it not be, as Büchner suggests, that the illustration of the motes in the sunbeam has been so constantly in the poet's mind all through the previous description of the atomic movements that he thinks he has expressed it? It is not an explanation we could apply to a logical thinker, but it is possible for a poet and above all for a poet whose mind works in pictures.

I wish finally to apply this notion of a "visual suspension of thought" to one of the most famous textual difficulties in the poem. In the proem to the first Book after the picture of Mars and Venus and the poet's petition to Venus to ask Mars to lay aside his arms and give Memmius peace for the study of the Epicurean philosophy, follow in the MSS the six famous lines (44-49) describing the tranquil life of the gods, which we have already considered in II, 646-651. For generations the lines have been excluded from the text. Marullus rejected them as unsuitable, Isaac Vossius maintained that they were placed here by a commentator, "interpolator irrisor," as Harder called him, who wished to call attention to Lucretius' inconsistency, and subsequent editors, including myself, followed with a sheepish obedience.

Recently, however, there has been a reaction. Giussani first suggested that the lines might have been placed there by Lucre-

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 26.

tius himself (*un richiamo marginale* he calls them), but he rejected the suggestion on the ground of the hopeless inconsistency of the verses with what precedes. Lately arguments for the restoration of the lines have been advanced by Bignone,¹⁹ Friedländer,²⁰ and Regenbogen.²¹ Diels and Martin both restore them to the text, though the former brackets them. I believe the restoration is right.

As against the traditional view the arguments, put briefly, are: 1. there is no other instance of a learned interpolation in Lucretius; 2. an addition by an *interpolator irrisor* is unparalleled and highly improbable; 3. quotations from these verses are made by Lactantius, the scholiast on Statius, Servius, and Nonius, and the last expressly cites the lines from Book I; 4. The lines are preceded in the MSS by the *capitulum* τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἀφθαρτον; an interpolator could hardly have added a heading to his own interpolation; 5. Lucretius frequently repeats passages in more than one context; 6. in several other places (e. g. V, 405-6, IV, 590-4) Lucretius having cited ancient legends or rites corrects himself with a kind of palinode.

But the restorers take different views of the connexion. Both Bignone and Regenbogen suppose a lacuna before the lines, though they differ as to what it contained. I believe Friedländer to be right in inserting no lacuna and taking the general sense to be: "pray Mars to give Memmius peace, for peace is the possession of the gods." The real difficulty here is that this does not follow well on 43, though it would fit well, if it came directly after 40. Need we for this reason juggle with the text? No, for here we have one more "suspension of thought." The idea of peace is so occupying Lucretius' mind that in spite of these intervening lines he goes right back to *placidam . . . pacem* in 40 and can begin *omnis enim per se divom natura necessest immortalī aevo summa cum pace fruatur*. Suspension plays a small part here, but it is a link in the justification of a revolutionary view.

Many more passages might be adduced in which it is the picture rather than the argument which guides Lucretius' exposition of his theme, and it is my belief that the understanding of his mind on these lines will prove more and more valuable in

¹⁹ *Riv. di fil.*, XLVII (1919), pp. 423 ff.

²⁰ *Hermes*, LXVII (1932), p. 434.

²¹ *Lukrez* (1932), pp. 71 ff.

settling textual difficulties and leading to a greater trust in our MSS as representing what Lucretius wrote, though not, what the nineteenth century critics were striving after, what he ought to have written. But I should like in conclusion to leave these more technical considerations and to make an attempt on broader lines to picture Lucretius' mind, as it reveals itself in the poem.

Lucretius is a philosopher in the sense that he is the faithful disciple of a philosopher with a firm and clear grasp of a great world-system, which he expounds with a marvellous vividness and completeness. In the broader sense the sequence of his argument is systematic and logical. Each Book has its own subject or combination of subjects, and paragraph follows on paragraph in a natural order of thought, derived almost certainly from the treatise of Epicurus which he was following. He shows implicit obedience to his master's principles of procedure—*Canonica*, as he called them, for Epicurus scorned the "logic" or "dialectic" of the Platonists and Aristotelians. Thus Epicurus had laid it down that in considering the causes of "things celestial" (*τὰ μετέωρα*), all explanations not contradicted by phenomena must be accepted as equally true. In the astronomical section of Book V Lucretius obeys that precept with results that to our mind seem pitiable and ludicrous; the most puerile explanations of eclipses or of the phases of the moon are placed side by side with the right theory as equally worthy of acceptance—though it may be noticed that Lucretius usually places the right explanation first. The wider structure of the poem is thus philosophic, but the inner development is pictorial; the poet, not only in his analogies, but in actual exposition, is always prone to escape from abstract argument to concrete visualization.

Nor has Lucretius the true calm of the philosophical temperament; he does not weigh and balance different possibilities, but dogmatically asserts—and often passionately—his own point of view. This may be seen conspicuously in his treatment of previous Greek thinkers in Book I. He does not take the theories of Heraclitus, Empedocles, and Anaxagoras for what they are worth and estimate their merits. He brushes them aside and points out where they fall short of the true doctrine of atomism: "poor fool, he did not admit the existence of empty space and he believed in infinite division; that is enough to condemn him." And there are in his system unresolved antinomies, as Regen-

bogen²² has pointed out. He wavers between the conceptions of fate and chance; things happen, he tells us in Book VI, 31, *seu casu seu vi*, and in two successive paragraphs of Book II (1048-1066, 1067-1076) he argues first that the atoms fall into the shape of a world "by chance" (*forte*), and then that it was "fate" (*vis*) which constrained them. So too in a world, which by all logical inference should be determinist, he struggles (II, 251-293) by means of the curious device of the "swerve" (*clinamen*) of the atoms to secure free-will. On these two counts he must perhaps be acquitted of personal indecision, for the antinomies came down to him from Epicurus.

But there is a greater antinomy which is all his own, an antinomy which Patin called the "Anti-Lucrèce chez Lucrèce"; I mean that of philosophy and religion. He is striving to oust the old religion from men's minds, yet again and again he uses phrases such as: "by the holy power of the gods" (II, 434), "though he escape the notice of gods and men" (V, 1156), which show that he is still under the influence of the old modes of thought. He will too describe the ceremonies of the old religion with an almost loving minuteness, as has been seen in the picture of Cybele's procession, and as it is met again in a remarkable passage in Book V (1198-1202). And once in language that reminds us of Kant, he admits his scruple (V, 1204-1210):

nam cum suspicimus magni caelestia mundi
templa super stellisque micantibus aethera fixum,
et venit in mentem solis lunaeque viarum,
tunc allis oppressa malis in pectora cura
illa quoque expergefactum caput erigere infit,
nequae forte deum nobis immensa potestas
sit, vario motu quae candida sidera verset.

In Lucretius' own mind the snake of religion is "scotched, not killed," and for all his vehemence there is still a struggle and a doubt—the doubt of the poet in him rather than of the philosopher.

Yet in spite of these traces of personal struggle—"what wonder if a poet now and then amid the many workings of his mind" felt the power of that which he had intellectually abandoned—the keynote of the whole poem is the passionate desire to convince the reader of the truth of Epicureanism as the salva-

²² *Op. cit.*, pp. 80, 81.

tion from the superstitions of religion. It never leaves him; it becomes explicit in the anti-theological sections and in many of the introductory proems to the several Books, and it is there all through, urging him on through the sometimes arid argument which is to demonstrate the material and mechanical nature of the world. It was one of the features of religious thought in the later Republic and the early Empire that men were looking for a "Saviour" from the hardships and miseries of life. The common mind desired salvation from physical and economic ills and found it later in the conception of the God-Emperor. For Lucretius it was for the ills of the soul that he needed a saviour and that saviour was Epicurus who to him was god: "*deus ille fuit, deus*" (V, 8).

And having himself found salvation, he yearns to pass it on to others, to the half-hearted Memmius and to any who will read him. To this end he consecrates all the resources of his poetic art. He is not so much the philosopher who has comprehended a system, as the prophet who has seen a vision and would proclaim it on the house-tops. And so in the end we come back to the old question: is Lucretius philosopher or poet? No doubt he felt himself that he had blended the two, but it was a true instinct in his contemporaries and immediate successors which led them to pay but little attention to his philosophy, but to greet him as a poet of the first rank and to pay him the constant compliment of imitation. In our own time the atomic system has come into its own. It is the foundation of modern physical and chemical investigation—the split atom is only a pushing of analysis one step further—and again and again in Lucretius we recognize notable anticipations of modern thought. Yet even so he is still to us primarily the poet, not because his philosophy is to be despised or neglected, but because his mind is that of the seer of visions. The dry bones of atomism are transmuted in his verse into the living picture of the artist. It has all passed through his mind and has come out not as it went in, but as the expression of the vision which he has seen. This is no new criticism, but what I have tried to show is that it has a larger part to play than has hitherto been supposed in the correct understanding of the poem and even in the determination of the text.

CYRIL BAILEY.

ON "TWOFOOLD STATEMENTS."

The piece of sophistical literature which Diels from its opening words called "Twofold Statements" (Δισσοὶ λόγοι) and Stephanus entitled "Dialexeis" was written in Dóric by an unknown author. As the dialect has not been more exactly determined there is uncertainty about the author's residence. The date of composition must be soon after 404, because the author mentions as a recent fact a Spartan victory that took place in that year.¹ That the work is connected with Protagoras is generally recognized; but the limits of this connection, the relation of the work to the teaching of other sophists, and the process of composition are still matters of debate.

The essay, which breaks off in the middle of a sentence in chapter nine, presents at first sight an antilogical form; but the subjects of the different chapters are not treated uniformly. The first four chapters have a confessedly antinomic character; the fifth and sixth, though contrasting thesis with antithesis, do not speak of δισσοὶ λόγοι. The seventh controverts a proposition, while the eighth and ninth defend certain theses. Various interpretations of these differences in treatment have been suggested, and therewith is connected the question of the structure and purpose of this work. For H. Gomperz the differences are the result of the growing haste of the author who belongs to the sophistic current but this haste must not blind us to the antilogical structure of the whole work.² He does not decide whether it is (as Diels thinks) a transcript of school lectures,³ the result of classroom work carried on hurriedly and finally interrupted, or the mere draft of a lecture or book which the author might have developed differently or even abandoned.⁴ M. Pohlenz considers it a compilation, made with increasing haste, of excerpts from a sophist's course of lectures; but he rejects Gomperz's thesis that it was to have an antilogical form throughout,

¹ See H. Diels in Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, II, p. 405 and note to line 1. The quotations are from this edition. The passage from which the date is inferred is in § 1, 8. The work is No. 90 in Diels-Kranz and No. 83 in Diels'.

² *Sophistik und Rhetorik* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1912), pp. 186-187.

³ Diels-Kranz, II, p. 405, note to line 1.

⁴ H. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

because chapters seven to nine, unlike those that go before, cannot be reduced to that scheme. As the chapters are unconnected with one another, he holds it evident that the work was not intended for publication.⁶ It is considered a compilation of extracts from various sophists by Zeller⁷ and Nestle, and the latter speaks of the antilogical schemes only in relation to the first four chapters.⁸ W. Kranz, rejecting Gomperz's theory more decidedly than Pohlenz had, affirms that the title *Dissoi Logoi* given to the work by Diels holds good only for the first four chapters, because the fifth, sixth, and seventh contain the refutation of a *logos* mentioned at the beginning, and the eighth and ninth embody the positive demonstration of a proposition. He also rejects the assertion made by Diels⁹ and others that the work towards the end has more and more the character of an extract. Though it contains three different parts, it is, nevertheless, possible to see a link connecting them both in form and in substance. Kranz maintains that the first four chapters constitute a whole; the treatment of the conceptions of *true* and *false* coheres well with that of *σοφία* (*σωφροσύνη*) and *ἀμαθία* (*μωρία*) in the fifth. The transition to the conception of *being* and *non-being* corresponds to a passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (1009 A 7 ff.). The transition from the existence to the teachability of *σοφία* presents no break; and the connection established between *σοφία* and *ἀρετή* is in keeping with the mentality of the time. For the ancients the political subjects treated in chapters seven and eight did not differ so much from those discussed previously as might appear today; the *areté* which becomes a fact only in the life of the *polis* is teachable (chapter six), and so the sortition of the *ἀρχοντες* is nonsensical (chapter seven); not far afield is the representation of the ideal political orator (chapter eight), whose eloquence particularly requires *μνήμη* which is praised in chapter nine. The train of thought, then, has connecting links, even if these are not strong and absolute.⁹ The author appears to be under the influence of the sophists and of Socrates in the same degree.¹⁰ Taylor, who

⁶ *Aus Platons Werdezeit* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 72-74.

⁷ *Philosophie der Griechen*, I, 2^o (Leipzig, 1920), p. 1333, n. 1.

⁸ Zeller, *ibid.* (on p. 1334). ⁹ Diels-Kranz, II, p. 405, note to line 1.

⁹ W. Kranz, "Vorsokratisches IV," *Hermes*, LXXII (1937), pp. 225-226.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-232.

thinks that the beginning of the work probably is lost, asserts that we do not know what the principal thesis was and how closely connected with it was the statement that two *logoi* can be presented about everything.¹¹ To him the work is an essay of the old eristics deriving from Eleaticism; he perceives in it traces of this origin and of considerable Socratic influence¹² and suggests that the author (who clearly belonged to that class of semi-Eleatic thinkers represented in the Socratic circle by Euclides and his Megarian friends) has constructed his antinomies in order to support the Eleatic doctrine that the *πολλά*, the contents of sensible experience, cannot be known and that respecting them one belief holds as much as that which contradicts it.¹³

All these attempts to explain the compositional differences of the text and to determine its structure introduce into it elements which it does not contain; it does not present the complete antilogical form reconstructed by Gomperz, the connection of thought proposed by Kranz, or the Eleatic theory conjectured by Taylor, which, moreover, assumes for the whole work the method that appears clearly only in the first four chapters and implicitly in the two following. Taylor's hypothesis is hard to accept not only because its only foundation is the supposition (of which more later) that the work expresses the attitude of old eristics with an Eleatic origin; it is controverted by the author's obvious preference of some propositions to their contradictories and by the fact that those which he prefers imply that manifold reality of sensible existence which was denied by Eleaticism. Kranz's hypothesis is unsuccessful because the transitional links which he imposes are merely superficial and external and so leave the text essentially an ununified combination of heterogeneous elements; and, since the last three chapters at least will not fit into the structural unity posited by Gomperz, it is better to admit with Diels, Pohlenz, and Nestle that the work is a conglomeration of unconnected parts: the first six chapters in which a thesis and an antithesis are contrasted¹⁴

¹¹ *Varia Socratica* (Edinburgh, 1908), p. 122.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁴ It may be that the fifth and sixth also were at least meant to present a strictly antilogical form, although for reasons which cannot certainly be determined they do not now do so.

are succeeded by three more lacking this structure and unconnected with the preceding chapters and with one another.

Taylor's theory, already mentioned, that the work is a representative of Neo-Eleaticism raises the difficult question of the origin of its thought and method. He sees here an example of that eristic method of antinomies which, though ordinarily attributed to the Megarians and Cynics, he rightly traces back to the late followers of the Eleatic school.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the true followers of eristic (e. g. Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in Plato's *Euthydemus*) used a method entirely different from that of the *Dissoi Logoi*; they asked short questions in ambiguous form and required their interlocutors to answer *yes* or *no* without distinction or limitation, in order to reduce to absurdity whatever they might say, while the first chapters of this work contain both thesis and antithesis rather extensively developed.¹⁶ Their antilogical structure has to some scholars suggested Protagoras (the author, according to ancient sources, of *Ἀντιλογίαι*¹⁷ and *Τέχνη ἐριστική*¹⁸), who affirmed that concerning anything two *logoi*¹⁹ are possible and taught how to make the weaker statement the stronger.²⁰ To him Gomperz traces the antilogical method that he finds everywhere in this essay and its eristic employment of sophisms based on word-play, similar to those attributed to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in the *Euthydemus*, which dialogue in Gomperz's opinion comes from the same paralogistic tradition.²¹ Nestle thinks that the antilogical scheme of the first four chapters agrees with the example set by Protagoras,²² and Kranz considers those chapters imitations of the *Antilogies* and of the *Eristic Art* of the Abderite.²³ Now these assertions contain certain inaccuracies. In the *Dissoi Logoi* eristic appears only in those word-plays of which Gom-

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 93 ff.

¹⁶ We shall speak later of some properly eristic elements in the *Dissoi Logoi*.

¹⁷ Diogenes Laertius, IX, 55 (Diels-Kranz, 80 A, 1). Cf. IX, 37 and 57 (*ibid.*, B, 5).

¹⁸ Diogenes Laertius, IX, 55 (*ibid.*). Cf. IX, 52 (*ibid.*).

¹⁹ Diogenes Laertius, IX, 51 (*ibid.*, A, 1 and B, 6a); Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.*, VI, 65 (*ibid.*, A, 20); Seneca, *Epist.* 88, 43 (*ibid.*).

²⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1402 A 23-27 (*ibid.*, A, 21 and B, 6b).

²¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 162; pp. 168-171.

²² In Zeller, *op. cit.*, note on p. 1334.

²³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 227-228.

perz speaks and which are used at length in the *Euthydemus*; but Taylor has rightly maintained that the eristic method, taken generally, must be derived from Eleaticism, so that this, and not Protagoras, is the source of the passages in question as well as of the Platonic dialogue.²⁴ Ancient sources²⁵ show that the *Eristic Art* attributed to Protagoras must have contained rhetorical commonplaces, that is to say long discourses stating the *pros* and *cons* on certain subjects. The same rhetorical character must be recognized in the antilogies which he used, in the thesis about the two *logoi* for every subject, and in his capacity for making the weaker statement stronger. As Protagoras in the myth and *logos* of the Platonic dialogue that bears his name maintains the existence of absolute and universal moral values, it is evident that he could not apply to social and ethical subjects the procedure that he used for purely formal rhetoric.²⁶ The *Dissoi Logoi*, on the other hand, present the *pros* and *cons* concerning good and bad, fair and foul, right and wrong (1-3). This difference with Protagoras in method does not, however, exclude agreement in substance, for, although the author in the first four chapters says that he accepts the antithesis identifying good and bad, etc., he afterwards demolishes it. Not only does the development of the thesis occupy the last place, thus forcing itself on the mind of the reader, but the author tries first to refute the antitheses in general and then to diminish the strength of the arguments used for their demonstration.²⁷ Here too he

²⁴ H. Maier has exhaustively shown that Protagoras cannot be considered a teacher of eristics (*Sokrates* [Tübingen, 1913], pp. 200-204).

²⁵ Cicero, *Brutus*, 12, 46; Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* III, 1, 12 (Diels-Kranz, 80 B, 6).

²⁶ Completely arbitrary is the assertion of Kranz (*op. cit.*, p. 228) that Protagoras must have applied the antilogical method to the concepts of good and bad, etc. treated in the first four chapters of the *Dissoi Logoi*.

²⁷ H. Gomperz with minute analysis has shown that the author prefers the theses to the antitheses and considers the former more soundly established than the latter (*op. cit.*, pp. 185 ff.; 191); but he wrongly affirms that for the author they are all equally true and that the writer prefers the theses because he sees a greater force in them than in the antitheses (p. 191). If the one set is more soundly established than the other, however, they cannot be equally true; and to maintain his assertion Gomperz must attribute to Protagoras and to the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* a metaphysics with an Anaxagorean basis which is not justified

diverges from Protagoras, trying not to make the weaker statement the stronger but to make the theses triumphant, although the theses, representing common opinions, have greater force than the antitheses which, being paradoxes, must go against the opinion of the reader. Although the author disagrees with Protagoras at many points, he is, nevertheless, at one with him on an essential question: concerning ethical and social life, he, like Protagoras, supports the traditional beliefs of common conscience, defending them against those who, rejecting every difference between moral values and non-values, appear to destroy the very foundations of that life.

The relation between Protagoras and the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* in method has raised the question of the relation of their thought, and in this respect we observe first that the fourth chapter (on the true and the false) in spite of the similarity does not agree with the thought of the Abderite. It is maintained in the antithesis that the true statement and the false are identical because they consist of the same words, and differ only in that the former corresponds to facts and the latter does not:²³ thus truth is considered in its verbal expression and almost as an object in itself, whereas Protagoras thinks that it consists in the fact that any opinion is related to what appears to someone; and, while for the *Dissoi Logoi* the difference between the true and the false is given by facts conceived as independent of the subject, for the Abderite facts are such as they appear to the subject. There is a great gulf between the objectivism, both verbal and real, of the *Dissoi Logoi* and the subjectivism of Protagoras, which for the natural world excludes the possibility of the false, as it holds all opinions true, while for the antithesis of the *Dissoi Logoi* the false exists as well as the true, though they are both identical. It may also be observed that the thesis uses an argument similar to that (called

by the texts and especially by the one under consideration. In any case, by his destructive criticism the author clearly shows that he considers the antitheses false.

²³ Diels (in Diels-Kranz, II, p. 411, note to line 23) compares *Euthydemus* 283 ff.; but Gomperz (*op. cit.*, p. 186) rightly denies that a direct relation exists between the two texts, for they maintain that there is no difference between the true and the false, but in a different way and with different arguments. He does not, however, point out the divergences.

περιτροπή by Sextus Empiricus) which Democritus had used against the Abderite. The Atomist said that if all opinions are true, that which asserts that not every opinion is true is also true;²⁰ according to our unknown author, if it is false that the true and the false are identical, true and false are not identical and, if it is true, then that assertion is also false. We may therefore assume with Gomperz²⁰ that this criticism also derives from Democritus, that is from an anti-Protagorean source. At any rate it is clear that the thesis of the fourth chapter, which contrasts absolutely the true and the false, goes against the doctrine of Protagoras. Furthermore, all the antitheses of the first five chapters affirm in different ways the identity of opposites, which is more clearly formulated in the fifth; now, if the theses that reject those doctrines form an anti-Heraclitean attack, it is noteworthy that their principal weapon is the non-contradiction principle (not expressly stated, but used all the time), which is incompatible with the epistemological doctrines of Protagoras. On the other hand, there are undoubtedly remarkable affinities between Protagoras and the opinions preferred by the author of the *Dissoi Logoi*. Zeller²¹ had already established a relation between the sixth chapter on the teachability of *areté* and Plato's *Protagoras* (319 a ff.); the comparison has been developed at length by H. Gomperz, who has thrown light on the affinity of the arguments that the two works use in favor of teachability and against it.²² The dependence of both works on the sophist's

²⁰ Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, VII, 389 (Diels-Kranz, 80 A, 15).

²⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 150, n. 318.

²¹ "Platos Mittheilungen über frühere und gleichzeitige Philosophen," in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, V (1892), pp. 177-178.

²² For these comparisons see Gomperz, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-162; 172-177; Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-119. Gomperz (p. 177, n. 363) remarks that some arguments given in the *Dissoi Logoi* to show that truth is not teachable cannot be related either positively or negatively to the thought of the sophist. Taylor, who considers both the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*, comes to the conclusion that the two dialogues contain all the objections (except the first) that in the *Dissoi Logoi* serve to prove that *areté* is not teachable; and that the dialogues differ from the *Dissoi Logoi* because they use examples founded on special characteristics of life in Athens and on references to specific facts of its history, which are wanting in the *Dissoi Logoi* (*op. cit.*, p. 115); but these coincidences do not exclude the fact that all these works may use thoughts widely spread in intellectual Athenian circles (pp. 117-119).

thought, however, can be said to concern only the arguments in favor of the thesis in question, because, as Taylor had already remarked, the objections raised against it in the *Protagoras* (and also in the *Meno* 89 d, 93 b-96 c) can be considered as the reproduction of thoughts and statements current in the philosophical circles of the Periclean age.⁸³ Besides, Diels has brought together the text of the *Protagoras* (in which the sophist with numerous examples shows that the concept of the useful is relative⁸⁴) and the development of the thesis in the first chapter (with its many instances in support of the statement that what is good for one man is bad for another); Gomperz, wrongly availing himself of this to show that the first chapter is conceived in the spirit of Protagorean relativism,⁸⁵ thus sought to substantiate his contention that the *Dissoi Logoi* derive chiefly from Protagoras. In the *Protagoras*, however, the sophist defends a cause that is not his own but that of the πολλοί, so that we have no reason to look there for the expression of his own thought.⁸⁶ We can therefore reject the consequence that Gomperz inferred

There is no reason, however, to say the same for the arguments designed to prove that virtue is teachable, because Protagoras (who had been the first to proclaim himself a teacher of it: *Protagoras* 316 d-317 c; cf. 348 e-349 a) must certainly have endeavored to justify a thesis that formed the necessary premise of his work in the field of education. In any case it is clear that the part of the *Protagoras* which discusses the problem in question contains the expression of the sophist's thought. That text shows also that he had not treated the question in antilogical form, but had stated his convictions dogmatically; there is no reason to admit the two alternatives as Gomperz does (p. 175). He thinks that the sixth chapter of the *Dissoi Logoi* and the passage of the *Protagoras* derive from a common source, the Μέγας λόγος of Protagoras (Gomperz, *op. cit.*, p. 175). The same opinion is held by Nestle (in Zeller, *op. cit.*, note on p. 1334), Kranz (*op. cit.*, p. 228), and Pohlenz (*op. cit.*, pp. 91-92) who, however, does not speak of the Μέγας λόγος and only affirms that the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* and Plato reproduce Protagoras' thoughts. Wilamowitz (*Platon*² [Berlin, 1920], p. 431) has about the same idea. This opinion, less detailed than the one previously expressed, seems preferable.

⁸³ *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁸⁴ *Protagoras*, 333 d-334 c (Diels in Diels-Kranz, 80 A, 22). This text is mentioned by Diels in Diels-Kranz, II, p. 405, note to line 2.

⁸⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

⁸⁶ In this connection it is enough to recall the absolute character that Protagoras ascribes to ethical and social fundamental values.

from the comparison of the texts; we can also reject the suggestion that Protagoras is the source of the passage of the second chapter in which the author tries to prove the identity of the fair and the foul by the argument that different cities and different people, among the Greeks and the barbarians, accept opposite evaluations of the same things; and we can furthermore reject the notion that this is also the source for the text of Herodotus³⁷ (III, 38; VII, 152) quoted here by Diels.³⁸ We shall see that there is no foundation for Gomperz's claim that the conception of *καρπός*, of *ἐν τῷ δέοντι*, and the like, all designating the fit time for action, used in the second and fifth chapters (and also in the third), derives from the relativism of Protagoras, to whom, and not to Gorgias as is customary, he thinks the *καρπός* theory should be ascribed.³⁹ In any case it is certain that, concerning both method and contents, our essay is to a large extent under the influence of Protagoras and owes more to him than to other sophists to whom it may be related. Among these Hippias takes first place, though he cannot be the chief inspirer of this work, as Pohlenz has asserted with manifest exaggeration.⁴⁰ The essay is connected with his teaching when it deals with the *ἀρμονία* (stress) of syllables, their length, and the displacement of letters⁴¹ (ch. 5, 11-12), when it extols the value and importance of mnemonics (ch. 9), an art which was considered a personal discovery of Hippias,⁴² when it affirms that the good orator must know everything; and in particular the nature of all things (*ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων εἰδώς*) (ch. 8). Hippias claimed encyclopedic knowledge; and, contrary to the practice of other sophists and especially of Protagoras, his teaching was also naturalistic.⁴³ As he professed to teach an encyclo-

³⁷ H. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164. The same is affirmed by Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

³⁸ Diels-Kranz, II, p. 409, note to line 2.

³⁹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 165-167.

⁴⁰ According to Pohlenz (*op. cit.*, p. 77) the author is one of Hippias' pupils or Hippias himself.

⁴¹ Cf. Plato, *Hippias Major* 285 b; *Hippias Minor* 368 d (Diels-Kranz 86 A, 11-12).

⁴² Xenophon, *Symp.* 4, 62; Plato, *Hippias Major* 285 e; *Hippias Minor* 368 d (Diels-Kranz 86 A, 5a, 11-12).

⁴³ Plato, *Hippias Major* 285 b; *Hippias Minor* 367 e (Diels-Kranz 86 A, 11 and 12). Diels has brought together *ὁ περὶ φύσιος τῶν ἀπάντων*

pedic culture with ethical finality, the *Dissoi Logoi* suggest that he had in mind the education of statesmen rather than of private individuals. Moreover, our essay (ch. 8) and the corresponding passage of the *Protagoras* (337 d) show that the encyclopedic education of Hippias was to be founded on naturalistic studies understood as a knowledge of the nature of the universe, that is to say as a general philosophic conception; and this justifies the assertion that Hippias anticipated the Platonic doctrine that, in the perfect state, government is entrusted to the philosophers, that is to the truly wise.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, while Hippias, though recognizing that all peoples have unwritten laws universally valid, belittles actual enactments, changeable with place and time, and considers them human conventions,⁴⁵ the eighth chapter of the *Dissoi Logoi* admits that written laws are based on the objective nature of the right.⁴⁶ Thus, in a certain sense it agrees with Protagoras but diverges from him in its objectivism: the *φύσις* of justice depends not upon dispositions inseparable from human nature, as he taught,⁴⁷ but upon the objective structure of things.

There are, moreover, generally recognized relations between certain points of the work and some doctrines of Gorgias. We shall postpone consideration of the *καίριος* passages; but his influence is unmistakable in the assertion that in painting and tragedy those excel who most deceive by creating what resembles

εἰδώς (ch. 8) with *Protagoras* 337 d: τὴν . . . φύσιν τῶν πραγμάτων εἰδέναι (Diels-Kranz, *ibid.*, C, 1) in a note to ch. 8 of the *Dissoi Logoi* (Diels-Kranz, II, p. 416, note to line 19). For all these comparisons see Pohlenz, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77; Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 229. (The latter compares with less reason ch. 8 with other sophists and especially Protagoras.) Hippias is connected with the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* by other scholars also (Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 127 and note for ch. 8 and 9; Gomperz, *op. cit.*, pp. 172 and 179 for ch. 5 and 9; Nestle in Zeller, *op. cit.*, note on p. 1334, for ch. 9. The last mentioned connects also ch. 5 with Hippias on account of the allusion to the customs of barbaric peoples, usually made to depend on Herodotus).

⁴⁴ Cf. Gomperz, *op. cit.*, pp. 166 and 180; Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 229. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 127, who does not mention Hippias, thinks that in the *Dissoi Logoi* there are evident indications of Socratic influence.

⁴⁵ Xenophon, *Mem.* IV, 4, 14; Plato, *Protagoras* 337 c-d; Diels-Kranz, 86 C, 1 contains the second text.

⁴⁶ Cf. A. E. Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 126, n. 2.

⁴⁷ *Protagoras* 320 c-328 b.

real things (ch. 3, 10).⁴⁸ Altogether, then, the author places side by side, without connecting them organically, elements borrowed from different sophists, among whom Protagoras is pre-eminent both as to thought and as to the methods employed.

But the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* is under the influence not only of the sophists but also of Socratic thought, a point which Taylor and Kranz⁴⁹ have particularly stressed (and sometimes exaggerated). So the conclusion of the first chapter on bad and good⁵⁰ can be compared with Socrates' attitude in many Platonic dialogues.⁵¹ The author speaks in a clearly Socratic vein also when at the end of the second (2, 28) and third chapters (3, 17) he says that the evidence of the poets in support of the antitheses is worthless, because their aim is delight (*ἡδονή*) and not truth.⁵² The relations with Socraticism raise difficulties in other cases. The arguments used in the third chapter (2 ff.) to show that right and wrong are identified have been repeatedly compared with those attributed for the same purpose to Socrates in the *Memorabilia* (IV, 2, 14-18).⁵³ Taylor⁵⁴ has added to this a text of the *Republic* (I, 331 ff.), observing that Socrates' purpose in both cases is to prove that the distinction

⁴⁸ According to Plutarch, *De glor. Ath.* 5, 348 O (Diels-Kranz, 82 B, 23) Gorgias called tragedy a deception, in which "one who deceives is more right than one who does not, and one who is deceived is wiser than one who is not." Cf. Gomperz, pp. 167-168; Pohlenz, p. 76; Nestle in Zeller, *op. cit.*, note on p. 1334; Kranz, p. 228.

⁴⁹ Gomperz, pp. 160-169, did not succeed in contradicting the thesis of A. Rustow, *Der Lügner* (Leipzig, 1910 [I am not directly acquainted with this work]) that there are relations between the *Dissoi Logoi* and Socraticism. As we shall see, this thesis has been subsequently resumed and developed.

⁵⁰ Diels, II, p. 407, 15-16: καὶ οὐ λέγω, τί ἐστὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο πειρώμαι διδάσκειν, ὥς οὐ τῶντῶν εἴη τὸ κακὸν καὶ τ'ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' <ἕλλο> ἑκάτερον.

⁵¹ Cf. Taylor, p. 101; Kranz, p. 230. On the other hand, I cannot accept the latter's assertion that the conclusion of the sixth chapter is worthy of Socrates and, moreover, that it characterizes Socrates' attitude in the *Protagoras*, when he inverts it into the proposition: "I do not say that virtue and wisdom are teachable, but that the demonstrations given to the contrary are not satisfactory." The difference between the two cases is very great.

⁵² See Kranz, *ibid.*, who mentions the *Gorgias* 501 e, 502 a.

⁵³ See Trieber, "Die Διαλέξεις," *Hermes*, XXVII (1892), p. 218; Diels in Diels-Kranz, II, p. 410, note to line 5.

⁵⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

between right and wrong conduct does not depend upon whether an enemy or a friend is the object of the action because sometimes it is right to behave in the same way towards both. Gomperz too has compared the third chapter of our essay with these texts of Xenophon and Plato and also with a passage of the pseudo-Platonic *Περὶ δικάίου* (374 c-375 c); but he has added that in this case, as in others where there is a correspondence between the thoughts of the *Dissoi Logoi* and those of the Socratics, there is a deep difference in intention, because what in the latter is a serious problem is in the former a means of defending paradoxes. The purpose of the Socratic texts is to determine exactly the conceptions of right and wrong and, accordingly, examples are given to show that their characteristics cannot be discovered in the external aspects of actions but only in the depth of inward life; in the *Dissoi Logoi* thoughts and examples serve only to substantiate the paradox that identifies these two concepts. So in the fifth chapter too, debating the question whether the sane and the insane, the learned and the ignorant do and say the same things, the author affirms that the sane and learned act and speak seasonably and the others unseasonably. Now, this proposition is genuinely Socratic in form, if not in substance; the author does not even think of examining its value seriously, however, but simply uses it dialectically to contradict those who maintain that there is no difference between those words and actions.⁵⁵ Examining these texts from another point of view, Gomperz thinks he can trace them back to Protagorean sources. The dialogue *On the Right* uses the expressions *ἐν τῷ δέοντι*, *ἐν κατῷ*, which the *Dissoi Logoi* uses together with similar forms in ch. 2 (19-20), 3 (12), and 5 (3-10). Since the two works connect the *κατὸς* theory with the assertion that deceit and lies, according to circumstances, can be now right, now wrong, he takes it for granted that both works drew upon the same source in which those conceptions were also found together. From this he infers that the authors of the *Dissoi Logoi* and of the dialogue depend on Protagoras and, moreover, that, since the relativism of the former derives from him, the same must be true for the relativistic interpretation of the concept of the right. This makes it likely that the theory belongs rather to the Abderite than to Gorgias, to whom it is usually attributed.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Gomperz, pp. 152-154.

⁵⁶ Cf. Nestle in Zeller, *op. cit.*, note on p. 1334.

on the basis of the ancient evidence⁵⁷ that Gorgias was the first to write on the art of *καπός*. The compiler of the *Dissoi Logoi*, however, does not use this conception in the same way as does the author of the dialogue *On the Right*; the former presents it in order to contradict it in the sequel and attributes to it only the meaning of a paradox, while the latter earnestly accepts the Protagorean notion and works it out in a Socratic sense, relying on the observation that it is knowledge alone which makes possible the distinction between *καπός* and *ἀκαπλά*.⁵⁸ So the complication of the problem increases. First of all, since there is no reason to attribute to Protagoras a relativistic ethics, we must reject the suggestion that he is the source of the interpretation of the right which Gomperz attributes to him and of which he finds derivations in the *Dissoi Logoi* and in the works of the Socratics. In our essay the treatment in the second and third chapters must be distinguished from that in the fifth. In the second and third chapters the author presents, in order later to criticize them in favor of the two contrary theses which he evidently prefers, two paradoxical propositions, the identity of fair and foul and of right and wrong, which are merely particular aspects of the Heraclitean principle of the identity of opposites⁵⁹ connected in its supporter's thought with relativistic conceptions. We have, therefore, no reason to look to Protagoras for the origin of the relativism in those chapters, because it is found in the thought of Heraclitus. This does not exclude the possibility that the author, to support those doctrines, uses arguments employed by Socraticism for quite different purposes, namely in order to emphasize the weakness of moral opinions adopted uncritically by common conscience. As to *καπός* and *ἐν τῷ δέοντι*, etc. nothing proves that they belong to Protagoras rather than to Gorgias; but, while the latter had treated them from a rhetorical point of view, the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* uses them to support ethical doctrines which he subsequently refutes. The fifth chapter is quite a different matter. There he uses the conception of the *ἐν τῷ δέοντι* to demolish doctrines originally Heraclitean but presented with arguments drawn from Socratic discussions. In this case too that conception, taken from Gorgias, has an ethical and not a rhetorical function.

⁵⁷ In Diels-Kranz, 82 B, 13.

⁵⁸ Gomperz, pp. 165-167.

⁵⁹ We must recollect that for Heraclitus also good and bad are identical (Diels-Kranz, 22 B, 58).

We have previously⁶⁰ recorded the affinities existing between the arguments against the teachability of *areté* used in the sixth chapter of the *Dissoi Logoi* and those on the same subject given to Socrates in the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*; and we have said that it is impossible to accept Taylor's suggestion that in *both* cases the objections expressed are those which were familiar to the intellectual circles of the age of Pericles. Consequently we cannot speak with any certainty of Socratic influence on the work in question. Relations, unquestionable and frequently investigated, exist between the arguments used in the *Dissoi Logoi* against the sortition of public officials (7, 1 ff.) and those which Xenophon (*Mem.* I, 2, 9) and Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 1393 B 4) attribute to Socrates.⁶¹ Here, too, however, the influence of Socraticism is doubtful. As Taylor has observed, the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* condemns the method because it does not permit true experts to be chosen and also because it is antidemocratic, since by it someone hostile to the *Demos* can be designated (7, 10); now, the latter argument (entirely unconnected with the thought of Socrates who was not an admirer of the pre-eminence of the *Demos* in Athens) is found also in Isocrates (*Areopagiticus*, 23), and therefore we can assume that all these criticisms of Athenian democratic proceedings derive from the same source, that they represent the opinion prevailing among the Athenian intellectuals who did not belong to the party of violent reactionaries.⁶²

Other reasons for assuming Socratic influence seem even more disputable. So there is no reason to say with Kranz that some propositions of the fourth chapter⁶³ (ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὲν αὐτῷ παρῇ τὸ ψεῦδος, ψεύστας ἐστίν, ὅταν δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθής [5] and ᾧ μὲν τὸ ψεῦδος ἀναμέμικται, ψεύστας, ᾧ δὲ τὸ ἀλαθές, ἀλαθής [9]) would never have been possible without the Socratic research of

⁶⁰ See pp. 298 ff. *supra*. It appears impossible to accept Taylor's suggestion that the author of the *Dissoi Logoi* has taken from the Platonic dialogues the arguments in favor of the teachability of *areté* and against it.

⁶¹ For this see Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-124. Kranz, *op. cit.*, p. 230, finds in this chapter the expression of the Socratic conception that in all practical affairs only the expert is to decide.

⁶² Taylor, *ibid.*

⁶³ For the relations which Gomperz sees between this chapter and *Protagoras* see p. 297, note 28.

the earliest Platonism;⁶⁴ and none either to maintain with Taylor that the expression *παρῇ* implies the theory of the *παρουσία* of an *εἶδος* in the subject of a *logos*, which he ascribes, with the theory of Ideas generally, not to Plato but to Socrates.⁶⁵ Nor can I follow the latter in thinking the assumption of genuinely Socratic doctrine as a source for the *Dissoi Logoi* justified by the correspondence between the example used in the latter to explain the difference between true and false (ch. 4, 8) and that used in the *Theaetetus* (201 b-c) to distinguish scientific knowledge from right opinion (the case of judges who have not witnessed the facts on which they give judgment);⁶⁶ and I must say the same of his assertion that in the end of the fifth chapter there is already a hint of the distinction which Plato's *Sophist* makes between absolute and relative negation.⁶⁷ Kranz's thesis of a Socratic origin for the proposition that one who knows what is right must also know what is wrong (8, 9) is questionable;⁶⁸ and even more disputable is his assertion that it is the typical method of the Platonic Socrates which is constantly used in the *Dissoi Logoi* to refute the identification of opposites (good and evil, etc.), namely that one who defends it must contradict himself.⁶⁹ That method had been previously used by Democritus, as Kranz himself recognizes; besides, Socratic influence need not be thought of here, since there is the precedent of Zeno's dialectical method which is often and clearly reflected in the *Dissoi Logoi* that owes a considerable part of its significance to its intermediate position between the Socratic and sophistic attitudes.⁷⁰ Perhaps still more remarkable is the fact that, when the author of this essay relies on the sophists and especially on Protagoras, far from evincing the boldly negative and corrosive tendencies that are usually attributed to their thought, he tries in general to uphold the theses welcomed by common conscience and to this end employs the methods that the Abderite had used only in the sphere of formal rhetoric.

ADOLFO LEVI.

TODI (PERUGIA).

⁶⁴ Kranz, pp. 230-231 (he quotes, as an example, *Euthydemus* 301 a).

⁶⁵ Taylor, pp. 109-110.

⁶⁷ Taylor, pp. 113-114.

⁶⁶ Taylor, pp. 110-111.

⁶⁸ Kranz, p. 230.

⁶⁹ Kranz, p. 231.

⁷⁰ K. Prächter, in Überweg-Prächter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums* (Berlin, 1926), p. 128, calls the *Dissoi Logoi* a bridge from the philosophy of the sophists to Socraticism.

OBSERVATIONS ON CHRONOLOGY IN SOUND-CHANGES IN THE ITALIC DIALECTS.

There is ample material in the Italic dialects for the philologist using the historical method in examining their phonetic development. The data, however, come to us in the text-books arranged according to the nature of the sound concerned, classified under the headings of the vowels and consonants, and so on. No other method of presentation, indeed, would work. The resultant picture of the languages may be compared to the skeleton of a man in a laboratory, of which the bones have been divided up and re-grouped in order to make a neat pattern. The bones do not then reveal their inter-relation in the body.

Like these bones, the different items of phonetic change lie before us in a phonetic hand-book, with but little co-ordination apparent. The simile is imperfect, because the bones are each conditioned by the shape and size of other bones, whereas the sound-changes are chiefly independent phenomena. There is no causal connection between rhotacism and the changes of medial aspirates in Latin. One connection, however, there must be, and that is a temporal one.

We know for certain that some Latin sound-changes occurred during the historical period, because we see the evidence for it. Of the original diphthongs, which were so well preserved in Oscan, many became monophthongs in Latin. Early inscriptions preserve such forms as *deicerent* (later *dicerent*), *oino* (*unum*), *loucom* (*lucum*). These changes then are comparatively late, occurring in the life of Latin of which we have direct evidence. Contrast the diphthong *eu*, which changed into *ou* in all the three dialects, Latin, Oscan, and Umbrian, so early that original *eu* in none of them remains on inscriptions. This change is placed in the so-called Italic period, the time when the language, which was later to split into the Italic dialects, was one. At that time any change in the language affected the whole of it; when changes took place which did not so affect it, by definition this Italic period had been succeeded by the dialectal period, in which Latin and Faliscan separated from the other dialects. Later still Oscan and Umbrian separated from each other. In what follows, by "Italic change" I shall mean a change in that

first period; and similarly by "in Italic," in the language of that first period.

Changes in phonology took place in each of the periods mentioned. The object of a study of the chronology of these changes is to arrange them in their relative time-order, so far as is possible. If this work could be completed, it would be possible to reconstruct with certainty not only the history of individual sounds, but also of all words whose etymology is known, without having anachronistic forms side by side; and this would be a most valuable check on the truth of rival etymologies.

In practice exceedingly little chronological work of this kind has been done. In phonetic hand-books, for example in Sommer and more especially in Stolz-Leumann on Latin, or in Buck on Oscan and Umbrian, we find isolated chronological hints. These need to be collected and viewed together before they can be fully appreciated. Albrecht Götze¹ made the attempt in a valuable paper. But he relies too much on observation of Syncope, whose history is not, and probably never will be, fully explained, while, as Leumann points out, his etymologies are not all above suspicion. Pisani² in 1931 made interesting and independent use of the methods of Götze in the wider field of Indo-European. His conclusions for Italic I cannot accept, since he appears to use a process of induction in order to substantiate his ideas of what were the features of Indo-European, at the expense of the evidence itself. For example, compare the case of Oscan-Umbrian labio-velars (Chapter 4), in U. fiktū, O. fruktatiuf, U. ninctū, U. anstintu. Pisani tries to believe that there are no former labio-velars here, in order to support his theory that Oscan-Umbrian had labials for these gutturals everywhere except before -i- and -u-. Compare Walde (*Gesch. d. idg. Sprachwiss.*, 180, quoted by Buck), who also proceeds from the assumption of an early labialisation.³ But it is only by the use of deduction that advance can be made, and if a theory is not sufficiently supported by evidence, so much the worse for the theory.

¹ "Relative Chronologie von Lauterscheinungen im Italischen," *I. F.*, XLI, p. 78. Cf. mention in Stolz-Leumann, *Lat. Gramm.*⁵, pp. 55, 95, *et saep.*

² "Studi sulla preistoria d. lingue indeuropee," *Memorie, Accad. d. Lincei*, ser. 6, IV (1931-33), pp. 549 ff.

³ Cf. Walde, *Lat. Et. Wb.*³, on *figo*, *fruo*; and *id.*³ on *linguo*.

How are we to proceed to find chronological data? It is not safe to observe a phenomenon existing in all the dialects, and from that to assume that it is Italic. Yet this is done in the case of the change -tt- to -ss-, which is generally assumed to be Italic, but which I hope to show is dialectal. Further, the yet more familiar change of labio-velars in both Oscan and Umbrian to labials (q^u to p, etc.) is generally attributed to O.-U. I hope to show that it is separate in these two dialects. Meillet, in his *Esquisse d'une histoire de la langue latine*,³ utters a caution on this point. "Sans doute toutes les concordances (i. e. between Latin and O.-U.) ne datent pas nécessairement de la période de communauté." This obvious fact has been overlooked, and no need for evidence felt.

One may briefly sum up the possibilities of change in the Italic phonetic system as coming under one of three headings. (a) Italic common change. The definition of Italic necessitates such change being common, or universal through the language. (b) Dialectal differential change. Here the change, occurring in the post-Italic period, is such as to separate the dialects from one another. (c) Dialectal common change. This change is the same in two or more dialects, but occurs independently. The difficult task is to separate class (a) from class (c).

Evidence is obtained in the following manner. A sound-law is observed, such as that of Rhotacism in Latin. O. L. esed became erit. In L. Falernus -r- is no longer intervocalic because of syncope; but the earlier stages were *Falesinos (cf. Faliscus), *Falerinos. From these facts we deduce that rhotacism took place before syncope in this word. We may conveniently express the relation by the formula 1. Rhotacism, 2. Syncope (in this word). By this I mean that rhotacism was first carried through in all its stages, and only then did syncope here take place. If syncope had not occurred second, we should have had *Falesnos, leading to *Falenos.

Caution is needed in the production of such a formula. For sound-changes are not phenomena comparable to chemical changes, as has often been pointed out. Similar combinations of sounds produce different results at different times, just as they may produce the same result. The change of -tl- to -kl- occurs in L., O., and U. But U. katlu shows that secondary -tl-, resulting from syncope, was preserved in U., thereby giving the

formula 1. -tl- to -kl- in U. (probably in IT.), 2. Syncope of *katelo-, new -tl- preserved. Contrast with this Late L. *veclus* from *vetulus*, from which comes Italian *vecchio*. L. *veclus* shows that the change -tl- to -kl- persisted, or re-appeared, in Latin centuries after its first application.

The following danger therefore arises. Sound-changes may extend over a long period, affecting all the sounds concerned during that time. Alternatively, they cease to have effect, and leave untouched subsequent sounds which appear to be the same as those originally changed. From L. *Falernus* above we deduced 1. Rhotacism, 2. Syncope. It is clear that syncope did not exercise itself in this word before rhotacism, but nothing internal stopped it from doing so. So we may say that syncope did not occur in words of this class before rhotacism. In contrast, take O. *Kerri*, derived from **Keresi*. This word suggests the formula 1. Syncope (**Keresi* to **Kersi*), 2. -rs- to -rr-. It is true that in this word the change of -rs- to -rr- only occurred after syncope. But in this word the change of -rs- to -rr- had no chance of taking place until syncope provided the combination -rs-, and thus O. *Kerri* provides no evidence that the change did not occur earlier in other words. In fact, O. *teerum* shows that original -rs- had previously changed to -rr-, with a further development to -r-.

In my examples I shall avoid giving formulae similar to that produced from O. *Kerri* above, since their value is so restricted.

I propose first to examine any data, useful in giving chronological evidence, under sixteen sections of important sound-changes in the dialects. At the conclusion of this I shall try to correlate the more important results obtained. To avoid the use of different script for the native and the Latin alphabets of Oscan and Umbrian, I mark the native Oscan alphabet as O¹, and the Latin Oscan alphabet as O²; similarly with U¹, U².

1. Loss of intervocalic -i-.

This takes place in all the dialects. I have found no evidence to contradict the common view that this is an Italic common change.

2. -eu- to -ou- (and -eū- to -oū-).

The same remark applies as in Section 1.

(1) L. *levis*, from *legħu-*.

The change of -eŭ- did not take place here: this leads to:—

1. -eŭ- to -oŭ-. 2. -ghŭ- to L. -ŭ-.

However, since L. -ŭ- for -ghŭ- is an independent L. change, this gives no support to the Italic dating of -eŭ- to -oŭ-, though it does give a *terminus ante quem*.

3. -tl- to -kl-.

Again the remark in Section 1 applies.

- (1) U¹. katlu, from *katelo-. This leads to:—

1. -tl- to -kl-. 2. Syncope of *katelo- in U.

Unfortunately, in spite of Götze's attempt, hardly any cases of syncope can be dated; though I make an exception of syncope of imperatives in O.-U. (see Section 14). This example, then, does not help much to date -tl- to -kl-.

4. -tt- to -ss-.

At first it appears that this agrees with the first three sections. But from the history of the combinations of -ns- (Section 9) and -rs- (Section 12) it appears wrong to take -ss- as the stage reached in Italic, despite general opinion: cf. Buck* (-ss- is "doubtless Italic") and Leumann* (-tt- to -t*- in I.-Eur., and to -ss- in Italic). See the sections quoted below.

5. Mediae Aspiratae.

The general position is that initially med. asp. became f- in all the dialects, excepting gh- which became h-; medially, as a rule, -f- is found in O. and U., with -h- for -gh-. The Latin position is more complicated, as we have -b- (for -bh- and -dh-), -d-, -h- and -g- for -ġh-, and -ŭ- and -gu- for -ghŭ-.

(1) -gh- to -h- intervocalically in all the dialects: cf. L. veho, O¹. feŭhúss. This -h- is generally thought Italic: e. g. Leumann, *op. cit.*, p. 136, says that -h- is very likely Italic (uritalisch).

But cf. U¹. -veitu, from *ŭeġhetōd, *ŭeŭetōd, *ŭektōd. In the development of this word *ŭeŭetōd did not change to *ŭahetōd, which would never have given U¹. -veitu. This leads to:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U. (or in O.-U., see Section 14, 9).
2. -ŭ- to -h-.

* C. D. Buck, *Grammar of Oscan and Umbrian**, 1928, p. 86.

* Stolz-Leumann, *Lat. Gramm.*⁵, p. 152.

The syncope of Imperative did not take place in L., and so the appearance of -h- was independent in L. and not an Italic change.

(2) -dh- to -þ-, and further to -f- in O. and U., to -d- and -b- in L. *λίτρα* in Greek, originally Sicilian, appears borrowed from *liprā in an Italic dialect, which can hardly be other than Oscan or one of its southern offshoots. This gives us:—

1. *liprā borrowed to form *λίτρα*.

2. -þ- to -f- in O.

As Buck (*op. cit.*, p. 98) points out, this makes an Italic -f- impossible in this position. I should add, it makes an O.-U. -f- impossible here.

The use of the word *λίτρα* by Epicharmus puts its loan back to about 500 B. C. as the latest date permissible; on the other hand, the loan must be after the spreading of Oscan to the south of Italy. It seems certain that, when the Sabellian invaders had come far enough south for this word to be borrowed from them, the Umbrian and the Oscan speakers were separated, at least as regards linguistic unity; or alternatively, such separation had occurred by the time when Oscan had been introduced in the central highlands, and had subsequently been adopted by its southern neighbours of another race. It follows, that if -f- from -dh- appeared in O. after the loan of this word, then O. and U. made the change to -f- separately.

(Ernout-Meillet, *Dict. Etym. d. l. lang. lat.*, take *λίτρα* as by origin a pre-Indo-European word; Walde, *Et. Wb.*³, thinks it may be a Mediterranean word, but quotes Schulze [*K. Z.*, XXXIII, p. 223] in support of an Indo-European origin. J. Whatmough, *The Foundations of Roman Italy*, pp. 366, 364, 355, doubts that it is borrowed from the Italic family. It is necessary to beware of Whatmough's mention of it [on p. 366] as being Sicel; that is only an assumption. In my opinion, the fact that *λίτρα* is not the only commercial word in Sicilian Greek with affinities with Latin supports the view of a loan from Oscan or an allied dialect. However, since authorities conflict, we must not regard the formula produced from *λίτρα* as certain.)

(3) There is an exception to the rule that Med. Asp. became -f- in U. (with -h- for -gh-). After nasals U. shows Mediae. So

U³. ambretuto, from *ambhi-: O¹. amfret.

U². cringatro, from *krengh- (cf. Buck, p. 98).

This development corresponds to L., where -g- (L. *fin*gō) and -gu- (L. *ninguit*) are kept after the nasal. The supposed development of L. *fin*gō will be: **fin*gh-o, **fin*χ-o,⁶ **fin*ʒ-o, L. *fin*gō. Similarly, **ning*h^u-, **nin*χ^u-, **ni*ʒ^u-, L. *ningu-it*. And in the same way in Umbrian, **kren*gh-, **kren*χ-, **kren*ʒ-, U². *cringat*ro.

The usual view of the development of medial Med. Asp. is that they had reached the stage of -f-, -p-, -χ-, -χ^u- respectively in Italic. Thus Leumann (*op. cit.*, p. 137), Buck (*ibid.*). Buck further adds that any changes of this situation probably took place in each branch separately, i. e. in Oscan-Umbrian and in Latin. But the treatment of U. nasals + Med. Asp. as given above enables us to add that any change of the situation given is separate even in Oscan and Umbrian, and that the stage -f-, -p-, -χ-, -χ^u- is the latest shared by these two dialects. For in the development of -gh- (palatal or velar), the stage reached after -χ- is regularly -h-. U². *cringat*ro has -g- for -gh-, and after the nasal the sound -χ- therefore can never have passed to -h-. Oscan does not possess at all Mediae for Med. Asp. after nasals. It follows that the latest stage in O.-U. is the guttural spirant -χ- for -gh-.

The example of U². *ambretuto* is of value in confirming this passage of Med. Asp. to Mediae in U. and distinguishing O. from U., but not otherwise. For -bh- passed to -f- in Italic, and remained so in O., while in U. -mf- changed to -mb-.

U². *preuendu*, *ninctu* certainly contain -dh-, -gh^u-, but with Buck (*op. cit.*, p. 98) can be regarded as preserving -d-, -c- owing to the effects of syncope.

To sum up the deduction from U². *cringat*ro:—

1. Separation of O. and U.
2. -gh- to -h- in O. and U., -ngh- to -ng- in U.

(4) Further time-relations concerning the Med. Asp. are seen in Section 6, 5 and in 14, 7.

6. Labio-velar gutturals.

The labialisation of these velars appears, apart from Greek, in Brythonic Celtic as well as in Oscan and Umbrian. It is a most useful means of separating O. and U. from L., because of

⁶ -χ- is the spirant surd guttural, from -gh- and -gh-; -ʒ- is the corresponding spirant sonant.

the ease with which it is recognized. Those who accept the assumption of a limited Italo-Celtic unity, conclude that the change of -qʷ- to -p-, etc. was worked out in common by O. and U. with Brythonic Celtic. Those who reject this assumption nevertheless take the change as a feature of O.-U. When did the labialising change occur in O. and U.?

The evidence here is not extensive, but sound. It consists of U¹. fiktʷ, anstintʷ, puntʷ, vufʷ, vufetʷ, and U². ninctʷ; isolated U¹. umtʷ; and O¹. fruktatiuf, púntiis. Walde attempts (see p. 308 *supra*) to overthrow the idea of original -gʷ- in fiktʷ (and L. figo), ninctʷ and fruktatiuf (and L. fruor). But this seems to me to be flying in the face of the evidence, with the possible exception of fruktatiuf (and L. fruor) which may have had *frūg-(ʷ)-; this single word is not of great importance. I take Buck's etymologies as correct.

(1) ʷ, the labial element of labio-velar gutturals, is lost before a consonant in L., O., and U. So, L. coctus, participle of coquo; L. nix, from *snighʷ-s; O¹. fruktatiuf (after Buck) from *frūgʷ-; U¹. fiktʷ, from *figʷetōd by Syncope. All these examples need not of course be contemporary. But the O. and U. examples justify the following formula:—

1. ʷ lost before consonant.
2. -qʷ- to -p-, etc. in O. and U.

If the reverse had held, and -qʷ- to -p- were earlier, there would have been no labio-velar gutturals left in O. and U. to be affected by the loss of ʷ.

(2) U¹. fiktʷ, from *figʷetōd, *fikʷtōd.

This leads to:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U.
2. Lab.-velar -qʷ- to -p- in U.

A further conclusion must for the present be regarded with caution: it is, 1. Syncope of Imperative in U. 2. ʷ lost before consonant in U. Though this is true in the history of the word U¹. fiktʷ, it may not be generally true; for in this word ʷ became liable to loss only when Syncope brought it next to -t-. ʷ may have been lost earlier in the case of original ʷ + consonant.

(3) Original -kt- in O. and U. passed to -ht- (cf. O¹. ehtrād, U¹. rehte), and secondary -kt- resulting from Syncope of the Imperative passed to U. -it- (cf. U¹. aitu) while remaining in

O. (cf. O². actud). Clearly U¹. fiktū needs to be distinguished from both these differing treatments of -kt-. See *infra*, Section 14, 4-6.

(4) O¹. púntiis, U¹. púntes: from *ponqut-.

These support the conclusion of (1) *supra*. Further, note that original -nkt- passed to -ht- in O. and U., as in O¹. sahtúm, U¹. sahta. The two treatments are discussed in Section 9, 4 *infra*.

(5) U¹. vufru, vufetes, from *ueghv-.

In both these examples -ghv-, -χv- pursued the normal development into -f-. U¹. vufru leads to:—

1. -χv- to -f- in O.-U.
2. v lost before consonant.

If v had been lost before the change to -f-, the resultant -χ- would not have produced U. -f-. Note that, since -χv- to -f- is a change in O.-U. only, it follows that the loss of v is not Italic.

It is possible to explain U¹. vufru otherwise, by assuming that v is not lost before -r- as before other consonants (so Walde, on O². brateis). This view would be supported by the supposed change of L. -ghvr- to -fr-, -br-, as seen in Praen. nefrones, Lanuv. nebrundines. But is this Latin change correct? L. muger: mufrius shows -g- in this position. We are told that the presence of -r- accounts for the unusual treatment of -ghv-: but in L. tergus, from *sterghwos (cf. Gk. στέρφος), a preceding -r- has no such influence. Contrast the case of the other Med. Asp. -dh-, which shows a special change to -b- both before and after -r-, in L. combretum, verbum. If we suppose -ghvr- passed to -gr- in L., then Lan. nebrundines, etc. are dialectal; L. febris has -bh-. However, it will be well not to put too much weight on the evidence of U. vufru alone.

(6) O.-U. *pompe, as seen in O¹. púmperiaís, U¹. pumpeías, etc. The original form was *penqve. The assimilation of p- to qv- because of the following -qv- occurs not only in L. as well as O.-U., but in Celtic. There is nothing to stop us calling this change of p- Italic (if not earlier). Cf. L. coquo, from *peqwo.

Leumann, *op. cit.*, p. 129, says that O.-U. *pompe and L. popīna (borrowed from O.) do not necessitate the change of p- to qv- by assimilation in O. and U. But they do. It is only so that the -o- vowel in the first syllable of each word can be explained. The development for both was original pe- to qve-, qwo-, and finally po-. Cf. (?) *infra*.

(7) The change of *q^{ue}-* to *q^{uo}-* cannot be common to L. and O.-U., because of this word **penq^{ue}*. L. *quinque* shows that the modification must be post-Italic.

Further, compare L. **quenque*, *quinque*: but **quequo*, **quoquo*, *coquo*, and again **k^{ue}ndhro-*, **quembro-*, **quombro-*, *combrom* in L. *combretum* (Lit. *szvendrai*). Why did not **quenque* change to **quonque* in L.?

Admittedly the rules governing this change of **que-* in L. are not quite clear: we have unchanged L. *quercus*. As regards *quercus*, I suggest the following. Before the group *-re-* we find the tendency, in rustic Latin (Praeneste) and possibly also in dialectal Italic (cf. Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 32), to change *-e-* to *-i-*. In the case of L. *quercus* perhaps this tendency was strong enough to counteract the opposite movement in the direction of *-o-*.

Quite apart from *quercus*, there seems at first little reason why **quenque* should not have the same development as **quembro-* (L. *combretum*), in which there may very possibly have been a dental nasal at the time of the change to **quo-*, i. e. **quenpro-*, **quonpro-*. In this situation a chronological formula provides the solution.

L. *-e-* passed to *-i-* before a guttural nasal (see Section 9, 6 *infra*). Assume this formula:—

1. L. *-e-* to *-i-* before guttural nasal.
2. L. *q^{ue}-* to *q^{uo}-*.

L. *quinque*, *coquo*, *combretum* all now become clear.

(8) The change of *-e-* to *-i-* just mentioned is not Italic (see Section 9, 6 *infra*). Uniting the results of (6) and (7), we have:—

1. *p-* to *q^u-* by assimilation, in Italic.
2. *-e-* to *-i-* before guttural nasal in L.
3. *q^{ue}-* to *q^{uo}-* in L.

(9) As we saw in (6) *supra*, the development of **pompe* in O. and U. is Italic **quenque* to O.-U. **quonque*, **pompe*. Because of the *-o-* vowel, this leads to:—

1. *p-* to *q^u-* by assimilation in Italic.
2. *q^{ue}-* to *q^{uo}-* in O. and U.
3. *-q^u-* to *-p-* in O. and U.

Whether stage 2 here is separate or not in O. and U., it is hard

to say. The change of *sqe-* to *so-* is found in U. (U². *sonitu*) but not in O. (O¹. *sverrunef*), but this change in U. need not of course be contemporary with the change of *q^{ue}-*.

7. Final -ā in O.-U.

Final -ā changed in the direction of -o in the O.-U. dialects, but can provide no useful evidence for my purpose.

8. -nd- in O.-U. changed to -nn-.

(1) O¹. *úpsannam* (showing -and-), U². *pihaner*, etc. But, in the imperatives, U. has such forms as U². *ostendu*, *endendu*, etc. The development here is **ostenditōd*, **ostennitōd*, **ostentōd*: the new -nt- changed to -nd-, *ostendu*, but there it remained. So this leads to:—

1. -nd- to -nn- in O. and U.

2. Syncope of Imperative in U.: secondary -nd- kept.

9. -ns-, -nf-, -nct-, with lengthening of preceding vowel.

Medial -ns-, original and secondary, was preserved in L. with lengthening of the preceding vowel, and weakening of -n-, eventually to be quite lost. In O.-U. the treatment differs. Original -ns- passed to -nts- in O. and U., clearly then in a post-Italic period; while for non-original -ns- from -ntt- U. has -f-, O. has no example. For a useful conspectus of the O.-U. development of both -ns- and -ns, see the table in Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

L. has vowel-lengthening before -ns- and also before -nf-, -nct-. With this O.-U. shows agreement, O¹. *keenzstur*, L. *cēnsor*. Is this an Italic change?

(1) L. *inferus* must be considered here. See Leumann, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Götze, *I. F.*, XLI, 109; Walde, *Et. Wb.*²

L. *inferus*, *infimus*, *infra*: Skt. *adhara-*, *adhama-*: from **ndheros*, **ndhemos*. There are two difficulties, (1) the existence of L. *i-*, (2) L. -f- in a medial position. With the first I am not much concerned here; cf. Leumann, p. 58. Whatever caused L. *i-* here, it is a phenomenon seen in other words, e. g. *inter*, *indu-*, etc.

As regards -f-, Meillet¹ (*B. S. L.*, XXII, p. 23) sees dialectal influence: but from what dialect? O.-U. generally has *an-* for *n-* (cf. Walde, quoted by Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 356, concerning his

¹ So too in Ernout-Meillet, *Diet. Etym.*, s. v.

paragraph 98). Admittedly U. has en- beside an-; but also in U. -dh- after -n- almost certainly changed to -d-, not -f-. (Buck, *op. cit.*, p. 98). With Leumann I reject the dialectal suggestion for this -f- of *īnferus*, etc.

Sommer, Leumann, and Walde suggest that in- was regarded as a preposition, and so medial -dh- received the same treatment as initial dh-, changing to -f- in L. Against this view is L. *condo*, in which the prepositional prefix is not only genuine, but more apparent than in *īnferus*.

Götze (*loc. cit.*) is on better lines. **ndheros* changed to **enþeros*, and in the normal way would have gone on to **enderos*, **inderus*. But there existed the adverbial form **enþerā*, which passed by Syncope to **enþrā*, and then regularly to **enfrā*, *īnfrā*. But vowel-lengthening occurred in front of -nf-, giving *īnfrā*. No further development to **imbrā* took place, because the presence of -nf- was felt necessary to justify the long vowel before it. *īnfrā* then remained; on the analogy of its change **enþeros* changed -þ- to -f- and became *īnferus*, and *īnfinus* followed it.

Taking this last view of *īnferus* as right, we have:—

1. Vowel-lengthening before -nf-.
2. -f- (for -dh-) to L. -b- before -r-.

(2) L. *anēlo*. From **an-anslā-* (so Sommer, *Hb*², p. 120; Walde³, s. v.; Leumann, *op. cit.*, p. 82—but on p. 159 he prefers Thurneysen's **ana-slo-*). Cf. also, L. *ascēnsus*; *scando* (Leumann, p. 104). Unfortunately, the force of analogy may have caused *ascēnsus* instead of **ascānsus*, because of regularly weakened *ascendo*, *ascendi*, etc.

However, if the interpretation of either *anēlo* or *ascēnsus* is favourable, we have:—

1. Apophony of short vowel -a-, changed to -e- in closed syllable (which is purely L., unknown in O.-U.).
2. Vowel-lengthening before -ns-.

The lengthening would appear then to be a dialectal common change.

(3) Assuming that the lengthening before -ns- and -nf- are contemporary, and uniting the results of (1) and (2), we have:—

1. L. apophony in medial syllables.
2. L. vowel-lengthening before -ns- and -nf-.
3. -þ- to L. -f-, and further -b-, before -r-.

N.b. The lateness of this change of -þ- confirms, and is confirmed by, *λίτρα* (see Section 5, 2 *supra*). Perhaps also cf. L. *lodere* (?); see Whatmough, *op. cit.*, p. 279 n.

(4) Lengthening before -nct-.

L. *sānctus*, etc. O¹. *saahtúm*, U¹. *sahta*, U². *sahatam*, *sihitu*. But, on the other hand, O¹. *púntiis*, with -ð-.

The conclusion follows:—

1. O. original -nct- develops vowel-lengthening, and -n- is lost (for the resultant -kt- to -ht-, see Section 15).
2. Loss of *ʷ* before consonant, new -nct- to -nt-.

(5) L. *quīnque*, with -ī-, from Italic **quenque*. The long -ī- is taken by analogy from **quīnct-*, earlier **quenct-*. This gives us:—

1. L. -e- to -i- before nasal guttural (cf. L. *tinguo*, O¹. *Tintiriis*, U². *cringatro*).
2. L. vowel-lengthening before -nct-.

Otherwise we should have had L. **quēnctius*.

So far we have had parallels for both this change of -e- and the lengthening before -nct- in L. and O.-U. But see (6).

(6) The change of -e- to -i- before nasal guttural is not Italic. Cf. L. *quīnque*: O.-U. **pomp-*. The Italic stage was **quenque*, with no further development; an alteration of -e- to -i- at that stage would have given O.-U. **pimp-*. Cf. v. *Planta*, *Gramm. Osk.-Umb.*, I, p. 86. It follows then from (5) that the vowel-lengthening before -nct- is separate in L. and O.-U.

(7) -ns- from original -ntt-.

Original -ns- changed to O.-U. -nts-; O¹. *keenzstur*, U¹. *anzeriatu*. But -ns- from -ntt- appears as -f- in U., with no evidence for O. Cf. U². *spefa* (**spend-to-*, **spens-so-*: L. *spōnsus*), U¹. *mefa* — L. *mēnsam* (formed by analogy, according to Buck, p. 72).

The accepted view of -tt- (see Section 4 *supra*) is that it changed to -ss- in Italic. Because of the different treatment in L., the change of -ns- to -nts- is post-Italic. We would be brought by this opinion to the following:—1. -tt- to -ss- in Italic: -ntt- to -nss-. The group -nss- was then maintained through the rest of the Italic period; then in the following O.-U. period, 2. original -ns- changed to -nts-, and finally when that had ceased, 3. -nss- (from -ntt-) passed to U. -f-.

The conservation of the group -nss- for such a long period is improbable. On purely phonetic grounds the double spirant is difficult to keep when following another consonant. Hence the mistaken spelling -nss- in L. menssis, mensses (Leumann, p. 171; adduced by Sommer, *Hb.*, p. 245 for a different reason which Leumann rejects, p. 122), where it is not even etymologically justified. The pronunciation of mensis was not sufficiently unlike menssis to make the latter ridiculous. We have then:—

1. Original -ns- to -nts- in O. and U.
2. Original -tt- to -ss-.
3. Secondary -ns- (from -ntt-, -nss-) to U. -f-.

It is better to take, as the stage reached by -tt- in Italic, -t^t- and no more. There is no indication here whether or not this stage -t^t- was developed in common by O. and U., but see further on this subject Section 12 *infra*, on -rs-.

10. -k- before -e- and -i- changes to -ç- in U. only.

(1) U¹. tiçlu, struhçla show that:—

1. -k- to U. -ç- before -e-.
2. Syncope (of -elo- suffix).

(2) U¹. teitu, feitu: these are developed from *deiketöd, *fēketöd, by way of *dēktöd (or *deiktöd), *fēktöd. From this we have:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U.
2. -k- to U. -ç- before -e-.

11. -d- intervocalically to -ř- (-rs-) in U. only.

(1) U¹. etuřstamu: but U². tuder, tuderato. The stem is *tudes, and it appears (cf. Buck, p. 82) that the change of -d- to -rs- was prevented by a neighbouring -r-. In U¹. etuřstamu the usual change of -d- occurred, since the final -s of the root was preserved; in tuder, tuderato, the -r- sufficed to keep the -d-. It follows that:—

1. -s- intervoc. to -r- in U. (and also final -s to -r).
2. -d- intervoc. to -rs- in U.

(2) U². dirstu. This is an imperative form from *dido, a reduplicated present stem of 3rd conjugation (i. e. thematic vowel conj.), attested in O. and also in Vest. (didet) and in Pael. (dida). U². dirstu appears to lead us to:—

1. -d- intervoc. to -rs- (*didetöd to *dirsetöd).
2. Syncope of Imperative (U². dirstu).

This would necessarily make the Imperative Syncope a separate occurrence in O. and U. To this conclusion Buck objects: he therefore explains U². dirstu (p. 83) as constructed from the analogy of U¹. teřa, etc., where -ř- is justified. He sees the true phonetic development of *didetöd, *dirtöd in U². ditu.

This explanation seems cumbersome. I have found no proof of either interpretation, but consider the question again *infra*, Section 14, especially (9).

12. -rs-.

The treatment of this combination is individual in each of the three great dialects: it will be mentioned in the examples as they occur.

(1) O. original intervoc. -rs- changed to -r- (with vowel-lengthening); -rs- by syncope to -rr-; -rs- from -rtt-, etc. remained. So we have:—

1. -rs- to O. -r-; O¹. terúm.
2. -rs- from syncope to O. -rr-; O¹. Kerrí.
3. -rtt- to -rss- to -rs-; O. *ρερσρπει*. (Also, -tt- to -ss-.)

Part 3 of this formula appears to me to justify putting alongside it -tt- to -ss- (and therefore after Parts 1 and 2).

For this I rely on the hypothesis that -rss- is not such a stable combination as would possibly remain distinct from -rs- from the Italic period down to a time in O. when changes 1. and 2. had taken place. Yet this is what the normal view of original -tt- leads us to; for it is supposed to become -ss- in Italic, whereas the first stage even of the change of -rs- (to -rr-, -r-) is post-Italic, because of the divergence of Umbrian (see the similar argument above in Section 9, 7 on -ns-).

However, doubt may be cast on the evidence of O. *ρερσρπει* as representative of -rtt-, because it contains a verbal stem in which -s- may have been retained, contrary to normal phonetic development, on the analogy of other verb-stems in -so-. But fortunately both L. and U. give better examples: see (2) and (3) *infra*, and summing-up in (4).

(2) L. -rs- changed to -rr-: -rtt- to -rs-, which was kept, or perhaps further developed, but did not at any rate become -rr-. We have then:—

1. -rs- to L. -rr-: L. verres.

2. -rdt-, -rtt- to -rss-, -rs-: hence also, -tt- to -ss-.

As example of the development in 2., L. versus is not satisfactory, being open to the same objection of analogy as O. *φεροποι* in (1).

L. *svāsum* is an independent case, and so more valuable: *sward-to-. Admittedly the L. treatment is not very clear (cf. Leumann, p. 162), since there is in the evidence a wavering between -rs- and -s-, as in L. *controvēsias*, *sūsum*, *rūsus*, etc. against corresponding -rs- forms, where -r- may have been restored analogically; while *dorsum*, *dossum* (*drt-som, *dorssom?) also have to be explained. But no matter what interpretation is accepted for these variations, it should be noted that in none is the -s- of -rs- altered to -r-, so that all the forms have a development later than that in 1., -rs- to -rr-.

I would suggest that the variation in spelling points to a reduced value of -r- in the combination -rss-; and further, that this group -rss- (from -rtt-) had only just come into existence before the start of the historical period of L., by the completion of the passage of original -tt- to -ss-; and that this new and unstable group phonetically passed to -ss- with weakening of -r-, but that analogy preserved -r- and so produced -rs- in many instances. On this view *dossum* is the regular form, while *dorsum* is made analogically, to copy the parallelism of -ss-, -rs- noted in such cases as *rūs(s)us*, *rursus*; or even influenced by the "volksetymologisch" *deorsum* with the verbal stem -vors- (cf. Walde⁸, s. v., who rejects *deorsum* as the source of *dorsum*).

(3) U. original -rs- to -rs- (with a weakly sounded -r-), -s-: while -rs-, both by syncope and from -rtt-, changed to -rf-. So we have:—

1. -rs- to U. -rs-, -s-: U³. *farsio*, *fasio*.

2. -rs- by syncope to -rf-: U¹. *Gerfe*, and also -rs- (from -rtt-, etc.) to -rf-: U². *trahuorfi*. Hence also -tt- to -ss-.

Though U². *-uorfi* is the form parallel to L. *versus*, O. *φερο-*, the same objections of analogy-working do not apply to it. For in U. -rs- of Part 2 of the formula, the -r- by its influence altered -s- to -f-; but in participles from other stems -tt- gave -ss-, -s-, as in U². *frosetom*, and so this -s- of other participles cannot have influenced U². *-uorfi*.

(4) To sum up the results of examples (1) to (3) *supra*. They show that the full development of -tt- into -ss- is after

- (a) O. -rs- (produced by syncope) to -rr-.
- (b) L. original -rs- to -rr-.
- (c) U. original -rs- to (weakened) -rs-, -s-.

In other words, the stage -ss- is a late, dialectal common change.

Above, in Section 9, 7, I gave the example of the mistaken spelling *menssis*. Here can be given L. *verssa*, *Urssi*, *Marssi* (see Leumann, p. 171), which show a "reversed" spelling that was possible when it is realised that a group such as -rss- can be pronounced with a double spirant only with the greatest effort at clarity. Such an effort is incredible in a primitive people at the stage of civilization of the prehistoric speakers of Italic, who were presumably without even an alphabet.

It may finally be argued that -tt- did not change to -ss- in Italic in certain combinations, i. e. after -n-, before -r- (-ttr- changed to L. -str-, as in L. *rostrum*), and after -r-; but that it did become -ss- in Italic elsewhere. Against this view I could adduce nothing in the way of proof, just as nothing conclusive supports it. But as there is this proof with regard to -tt- in the combinations mentioned, I prefer to stand by these findings, and generalise them for -tt- everywhere.

13. Sonant liquids.

(1) For Italic -r- arising in medial syllables by Syncope, both O. and L. have -er-: so, O¹. *Aderl.*, *Abellanús*; L. *agellus*, diminutive of **agros*, *sacerdos*.

But O. shows a change of surd -t- to sonant -d- before -r-, and of -p- to -b- likewise (though the changes are not completely uniform). Both changes require that -r- was in contact with the surd and had not developed a preceding vowel at the time they occurred. So we have:—

- 1. O. -tr- to -dr- : -pr- to -br-.
- 2. O. -r- by Syncope to -er-.

The agreement of O. and L. is therefore accidental.

(2) Further, -ro- in a final syllable gave -r-, -er in L. and U., cf. L. *ager*, U². *ager*. But L. *sakros* shows the earlier stage still preserved. So we have:—

1. Separation of L. and U.
2. -ro- to -er as above.

14. Syncope.

The extent of the data is very large, but the conditions governing the appearance of syncope either in L. (see Leumann, p. 94) or in O.-U. are not everywhere clear. Despite the attempts of Götze and others, Leumann (p. 95) rightly concludes that syncope as a whole is most unsuitable to provide the frame-work of a scheme of chronology. This is the more unfortunate, because the new sound combinations so produced are otherwise good material.

But we need not therefore put syncope aside altogether. There is in O. and U., but not in L., a distinctive occurrence of syncope in the imperatives of the third conjugation, 2nd and 3rd persons singular. Forms of this part of the verb are relatively common, especially in U. (examples from over thirty verbs). The only exception to this syncope is when the verb-stem ends in -n-: so U¹. *kanetu*.

It appears highly probable that syncope was simultaneous within the narrow limits of this single phenomenon, and so I assume. I examine below in (9) the question, whether it occurred in O.-U. together, or separately in the two dialects.

(1) From example 8, 1 *supra*, we have seen:—

1. -nd- to -nn-.
2. Syncope of Imperative in U.

(2) In O. and U. the groups -kt-, -nkt- are variously treated, according to their origin. Original -kt- became -ht- in O. and U.: secondary -kt- by syncope became -it- in U. (with -i- forming a diphthong with the preceding vowel), and remained -kt- in O.

O¹. *ehtrad*: U¹. *rehte*. But, O². *factud*, U². *feitu*, etc.

Hence we have:—

1. Original -kt- to -ht- in O. and U.
2. Syncope of Imperative in O. and U.: new -kt- to U. -it-, O. -kt-.

(3) Similarly, original -nkt- became O.-U. -ht- with vowel lengthening (cf. 9, 4 *supra*): but -nqʷt- by syncope of imperative gave -nt-, just as -nqʷt- without syncope.

O¹. *saahtúm*, U¹. *sahta*, with original -nkt-.

U¹. anstintu, with -nqʷt- by Syncope of Imperative (*stingʷ-).

O¹. púntiis, U¹. púntes, with -nqʷt- without syncope.

From this we have:—

1. Original -nkt- to -ht-: O¹. saah^htúm, etc.

2. Syncope of Imp., new -nkt- to -nt-: U¹. anstintu.

But U¹. anstintu also shows loss of ʷ before a consonant: for the timing of this loss of ʷ see next examples, (4) and (5). Because O¹. púntiis, U¹. púntes also contain ʷ, I do not at present insert in the formula any conclusion from them.

U. also has U². ninctu, *ninghʷetōd. In view of U¹. anstintu, and also of U¹. púntes, it is best to regard -c- of ninctu as a graphic variant, perhaps pointing to the guttural quality of -n-: or else, as restored by analogy from other forms of the verb (so Buck, p. 92: though otherwise on p. 358, less satisfactorily).

(4) -kt- from -qʷt-, both original and secondary.

Original -qʷt- occurs in O¹. fruktatiuf, *frūgʷ-tātīōn-.

Secondary -qʷt- occurs in U¹. fīktu, *figʷetōd.

From O¹. fruktatiuf we have:—

1. Original -kt- to -ht- in O.

2. ʷ lost before consonant in O.

3. Labio-velar gutturals to labials.

(5) From U¹. fīktu, contrasted with U¹. aitu, etc., we have:—

1. Syncope of Imp. in U., new -kt- to -it-.

2. ʷ lost before consonant, new -kt- kept.

3. Labio-velar gutturals to labials.

The conclusion in 2. here answers the doubt expressed above, in 6, 2, as to whether the loss of ʷ is a later occurrence than Syncope of Imperative. When syncope of *figʷetōd occurred, the rule of the loss of ʷ was not yet in force, and so *fīkʷtu was kept distinct from *aktu, etc.

(6) Now to combine the results of examples (2) to (5).

From (2) and (3) we saw that both -kt- and -nkt- passed to -ht- in O. and U. before Syncope of Imperative. It is reasonable to take the passage to -ht- as parallel in the two examples. We have then the following:—

1. Original -kt-, -nkt- to -ht- in O. and U.

cf. O¹. eh^htrad, U¹. rehte, O¹. saah^htúm, U¹. sahta.

2. Syncope of Imperative in O. and U.
 new -kt- (1) kept in O². factud, actud.
 (2) to U. -it-, U¹. feitu, aitu.
3. Loss of *u* before consonant in O. and U.
 new -kt- kept (1) without syncope, O¹. fruktatiuf.
 (2) with syncope, U¹. fktu.
 new -nkt- to -nt- (1) without syncope, O¹. púntiis,
 U¹. puntes.
 (2) with syncope, U¹. anstintu.

(7) U¹.-veitu, from **ueghetōd*, **uextōd*.

As -veitu cannot come from **uehetōd*, we have:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U.
2. -gh- to -h- (so Buck, p. 98).

(8) U¹. teitu, feitu from **deiketōd*, *fēketōd*. But in U. -k- changed to -g- before front vowels -e- and -i-: U¹. tiġit, and faġia (with consonantal -ġ-). Hence we have:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U.
2. -k- to -g- before -e-, -i- in U.

(9) Is the Syncope of the Imperative a development made in common by O. and U.? The sound-changes given in (1) and (6) as previous to this syncope are all common to O. and U., and so lead to no conclusion on this question. But there is the form U². *dirstu* to account for.

The natural explanation of *dirstu* is from **didetōd*, with the U. change of -d- to -rs- intervocalically. This would give us:—

1. U. -d- to -rs- intervoc.
2. Syncope of Imperative.

Hence the syncope would be necessarily separate in O. and U.

The alternative explanation of *dirstu* as dependent on analogy (see Buck, p. 83) is not attractive. Unfortunately there is no other sure example of an imperative form from a verb with a stem-final -d-, U¹. *titu* being capable of connection with U². *dia*.

I prefer to regard U². *dirstu* as regular, and the syncope as independent in O. and U.

15. -p- and -k- before -t- in O. and U.

See Section 14, 2-6 *supra*.

16. *u* of I.-Eur. labio-velars lost before a consonant.

This occurs in all the dialects.

(1) The very existence of the change leads to:—

1. υ lost before consonant.
2. Labio-velars to labials in O. and U.

(2) In 14, 5 *supra* we saw that:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U.
2. υ lost before consonant in U.

The loss is then post-Italic.

(3) In 6, 5 *supra*, on U¹. *vufu*, we saw that:—

1. $-\chi^{\upsilon}$ to $-f$ in O.-U.
2. υ lost before consonant in U.

This, though not a certain example, supports the view of the loss of υ as post-Italic.

(4) In 14, 6 we saw that:—

1. Syncope of Imperative in U.
2. υ lost before consonant in U.

But the new $-kt-$ produced by the syncope had different treatment in O. and U.: O². *actud*, U¹. *aitu*. On the other hand, $-kt-$ caused by loss of υ remained $-kt-$ in O. and U.: U¹. *fiktu*. It is necessary, then, that when U¹. *fiktu* was produced, U. **aktu* had already changed; and so U¹. *fiktu* was produced in the separate life of U., and the loss of υ is separate in O. and U.

This is supported by the tentative evidence of 14, 9, which made the syncope itself so separate, and so the loss of υ also separate *a fortiori*.

This completes my presentation of the data, and I now proceed to see what further and larger conclusions can be drawn from it.

Stated briefly, the general conclusion as regards phonology is that the development of all the dialects was more slow than has previously been assumed. The error arose because of the misleading evidence of dialectal common changes. Note particularly the following cases:—

Mediae Aspiratae (5 *supra*). Ex. 1 showed that $-gh-$ to $-h-$ between vowels was after Syncope of Imperative in U., which itself I incline to view (14, 9) as after period of O.-U. unity; this is supported by ex. 3, where again the same $-gh-$ to $-h-$ is shown later than O.-U. unity. Ex. 2 gave $-dh-$ to $-f-$ as also

after O.-U. unity. Admittedly, Section 6, ex. 5 gives O.-U. -f- from -ghv- as earlier than the loss of v before consonant: but the loss of v is itself late, and after Syncope of Imperative in U., from Section 14, ex. 5. From all this we see that the stage of development reached by Med. Asp. in O.-U. was -xv-, -x-, -p-, -f- (where I take -xv- and -f- for granted on the strength of the example of the other two, and in the absence of contradictory evidence). Further changes are after the O.-U. period of unity.

Labio-velar gutturals (6 *supra*). Especially noteworthy is the evidence for regarding the labialisation as separate in O. and U., which is contained in exx. 1 and 2, with Section 14, exx. 6 and 9 and with Section 16, ex. 4. The vowel-modification of que- to quo- is distinct in L. and O.-U. (ex. 7). On the other hand, the assimilation of p- to qu- remains Italic (ex. 6).

-ns-, etc. (9 *supra*). Neither the vowel lengthening before -ns- (ex. 2) nor that before -nct- (ex. 6) is Italic; but it may be surmised that lengthening was not a late change in the life of L., if the lengthening before -nf- in L. was contemporary, since this latter is earlier than the passage of original -dh- to L. -b- before -r- (ex. 1). Of greater interest, here first arises the problem of -tt-, whose complete change to -ss- I place as separate in L., O., and U. (ex. 7; and taken further in Section 12, exx. 1-4, on -rs-): the Italic stage I leave at -t^ht-.

Syncope of Imperative in O. and U. (14 *supra*). From this we had very useful light on the history of -kt- and -nkt- (summed up in ex. 6). The treatment of original -kt- and -nkt-, changed to -ht-, is probably a common development of O. and U., but all later agreements concerning -kt- between O. and U. are products of independent change. Since the loss of v, and change of -qv- to -p-, are after the syncope both in O. and U., they are therefore without question shown to be later than that treatment of original -kt-, -nkt-.

Finally, it is necessary to ask what light this view of some points of the phonology of L., O., and U. throws upon their general history. The light is, if there is such a thing, a negative one. The people who brought O. and U. into Italy did not develop the labialisation of the labio-velars along with the Brythonic branch of the Celtic-speaking people; and I can add

here the change of -tt- to -ss-, found in the Italic dialects and also in Celtic and Germanic. This view is a disappointment to those who plead for that Italo-Celtic unity.

I hesitate to go further out of my province. But Last, in *C. A. H.*, VII, pp. 333 ff., gives a view that I do not find controverted, when he says that cremating Villanovans arrived in Latium at the start of the Iron Age, and that their presence in Rome and the Alban Hills is not later than the twelfth century B. C. Further, these people are now regarded as those who introduced Latin to these parts. As to the Oscan and Umbrian speeches, Whatmough,⁸ taking the view of Randall-MacIver, holds that cremating "Italici" introduced them to Italy, and that Oscan was then adopted by an inhuming people who submerged the original speakers of it, if they did indeed settle among them. We cannot think of a linguistic unity between O. and U. after this submergence. Thus, even Latin, of which we have the oldest remains in the Praenestine fibula, had a space of five centuries of independent existence before we have our first view of it; and we unfortunately do not know Latin to any material extent until after yet several centuries more. The time was ample to allow for the independent changes in phonology that have been noted.

A. C. MOORHOUSE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
SWANSEA.

⁸ *Foundations of Roman Italy*, p. 193 and pp. 243 ff.

FRAGMENTS OF A LATIN GRAMMAR FROM EGYPT.

In his *Catalogue of the Literary Papyri in the British Museum*,¹ A. J. Milne published, with facsimile, a fragment of a grammatical treatise, comprising portions of two columns of text from the verso of a papyrus roll, whose recto had been occupied by a military document. The University of Michigan's expedition excavating at Karanis in the season of 1925-26 discovered another fragment originally belonging to the same roll, and now designated as P. Mich. 4649, on the verso of which is preserved a considerable portion of an additional column of the same treatise. I have transcribed the text of the Michigan fragment, repeatedly examining it with a microscope at every point where the reading seemed doubtful, and have attempted to restore some of the missing portions. Thus reconstructed, the text of the fragment is as follows:

- cal[i] ut puta si prae[ponas]
 ·x· liſſerae i faciat [i tam]
 mehercule quam ·ū[et a faci-]
 at ·uā· simili rati[one si]
 5 iunx[e]r[is] vocali<s>·ā et [u faci-]
 at aū item ·ā et ·ē· fac[iat ai]
 nam non debere hanc [syl-]
 labam a et e scribi man[i]
 feſtūm eſt m[u]ltis ex reb[us pri-]
 10 mum max[imu]mq[ue] quod [Grae-]
 ci a q[ui]b[us] nos uſum li[tte-]
 [r]arū accepimus per [a et i]
 ſcribunt hanc ſy[ll]ab[am]
 deinde poetae ma[ximi] eam ob]
 15 hoc efficiunt a e[t i ut ſic]
 cum [met]aplasm[o partian-]
 tur h[er]c[ul]e ſy[ll]abam unam]
 in dua[s u]t M[ar]o noster pro]
 dives [pict]ae a[it dives pic-]
 20 [tai] γ[est]is et au[ri]
 [.....]oc no[
 [.....]nisi h[
 [.....]

¹ London, 1927, No. 184 (pp. 153 f. and Plate XI).

[illegible]

VNF
NBN
SINE

TO
IN
NE
SILAN
OCHO
MISCE

The papyrus is irregular in shape, with a maximum height and breadth of 21 cm. and 9.5 cm. respectively. The initial letters of nearly all of the lines have been preserved intact, but the ends of the lines have been broken away at the right, and the text is fragmentary at the bottom. Portions of twenty-two lines are legible, and the lowest extremity of the papyrus shows distinct traces of ink, so the column must have contained no fewer than twenty-three lines. The writing is in very good rustic capitals of an average height of approximately 3.5 mm. A horizontal line appears over the technical term *metaplasmo* (line 16) and also over the words of a passage from the *Aeneid* quoted for the purpose of illustration (lines 19, 20).² Single letters of the alphabet and diphthongs, when used as nouns, are generally marked by a horizontal line above the characters and by a dot in the medial position at either side. In line 2, the letter *i*, so used, is marked by an apex. Line 10 contains a ligature of *um* and the familiar abbreviation *q.* for *que*. Punctuation in the usual sense of the word is entirely absent.

Although no line is present intact, the missing portions of lines 7, 8, 10, 11 may be restored with certainty, and thus the approximate width of the column may be determined. Three of the lines consist of 19 letters, one of 21. Great regularity is not to be expected, however, for the letters are more crowded in some places than they are in others, and some lines probably extended farther to the right than others, as in the British Museum fragment.³

In general, the text presented by the fragment is quite intelligible, except for the statement at the beginning concerning the combination of the letters *x* and *i*, for which the works of the Latin grammarians offer no parallel. It is apparent that the author is comparing, at this point, the result of combining the letters mentioned in line 2 with the combination *ua* (which can result only from the union of *u* and *a*). This obviously implies a logical analogy. That he is thinking of *ua* as a combination of vowel sounds seems to be indicated by his statement, in the

² In line 20 the overscoring seems to extend but slightly beyond the word *pīotai*, for which the quotation was introduced.

³ Fully restored lines of col. 1 of BM frag. vary from 16-22 letters with an average of 19½; in col. 2 lines range from 15-20 letters and average a little over 17½.

next sentence, that *for like reasons* *a* and *u* will produce *au*, and *a* and *e* will produce *ai*. In short, he seems to be discussing diphthongs. Obviously there is no place for the letter *x* in such a discussion, and since *x* is undeniably present in the papyrus it is reasonable to conclude that it is the result of a scribal error.

The second element of the diphthong mentioned in line 2 is *i*, and of that named in lines 3 and 4 it is *u*. The analogy between the two combinations would be very tenuous if they did not have a common component in their first element. It is permissible, therefore, to assume that the *x* of line 2 represents an original *u*. Such a supposition would imply recognition of *ui* as a diphthong. This is contrary to the opinion of almost all later grammarians,⁴ but since the author of the fragment seems to have regarded *ua* also as a diphthong,⁵ it is clear that his views do not conform, in all respects, to the accepted grammatical theory of the later writers. In earlier days, however, he may have been considered orthodox, for Charisius preserves a passage in which *ua* is treated as a diphthong, if not so named.⁶ I accordingly amend line 2 to read:

u litterae i faciat ui, tam.

The grammatical structure of line 5 is not altogether clear. The last two letters of the line are unquestionably *et*, and it is most natural to assume, as I have, that they constitute a conjunction connecting two letters of the alphabet, as in line 6. We should then read *si iunxeris vocali*<*s*> *a et u faciat au*. Unfortunately the *s* of *vocalis* has to be supplied, for the papyrus almost certainly has *uocali*, and there is not sufficient space at the end of the word for an additional letter. The other alternative is to regard *uocali* as dative, and read *si iunxeris* <*u*> *uocali a et. . faciat*, but this is unsatisfactory, for it not only leaves *et. .* unexplained; it also gives rise to the question why *a* should be modified by *uocali*, when it is never anything but a vowel, while *u*, which is often a consonant, is unmodified.

⁴ Audax, *GL.*, VII, 329, 4 f. is the only grammarian to maintain that *ui* is a diphthong, and his argument is based on a false hypothesis.

⁵ Cf. line 4.

⁶ *GL.*, I, 11, 17. *Syllabas natura longae, cum singulae vocales litterae producantur, ut a aut e, aut cum duae, ut ua*. This passage is derived from the school grammars, according to K. Barwick, *Remmius Palaemon und die römische Ars Grammatica*, Leipzig, 1922, p. 46. Cf. also Dositheus, *GL.*, VII, 387, 2 f.

Beyond line 14 the restoration becomes increasingly conjectural. *Unam* may be supplied with some assurance in line 17, since it regularly appears in the definition of diaeresis, one of the types of metaplasm.⁷ The statement about *postae maximi*, beginning in line 14, is followed in line 19 by the familiar illustration drawn from the *Aeneid*, IX, 26. Line 18 should therefore contain some word to introduce the quotation, and a mention of the poet's name. *Ut* is most naturally suggested by the position of the letter *t*, which has been preserved. The character which follows is either *a* or the first two strokes of *m*. I have restored it as the initial letter of *Maro*, although it was not the custom of grammarians to employ this cognomen. Support for this reading may be found, however, in a passage from the work of Martianus Capella. This author regularly, and no fewer than twelve times, refers to Virgil by his gentile name; but on one occasion, which is the more significant because he is discussing the substitution of *ai* for the usual *ae*, he uses the word *pictai* for illustration, and refers to the poet as *noster Maro*.⁸ It is quite possible that the statements of Martianus Capella and the papyrus fragment both echo the *locus classicus* for the use of *ai*.

The relative positions originally occupied by the Michigan and British Museum fragments can be stated with some certainty. The two pieces were not adjacent, one to another, for the spacing of the text of the military document which appears on the recto of the papyrus refutes this supposition. In all probability the Michigan fragment preceded that of the British Museum, for its discussion of diphthongs identifies it as a portion of the introductory section of the treatise, whereas the British Museum fragment deals with the parts of speech, which constituted the major and middle section of the traditional works on Latin grammar.⁹

In considering the authorship of the Michigan fragment, it is

⁷ Cf. Charisius, *GL.*, I, 279, 4 f.: *Diaeresis est cum una syllaba in duas dididitur, ut 'pictai vestis' pro 'pictae.'* Similarly *GL.*, I, 442, 11 f.; V, 297, 28 f.; 389, 13 f.

⁸ *De nuptiis philologiae et Mercurii*, III, 266: *Luilius in dativo casu A et E coniungit dicens 'huic Terentiae, Orbiliae' [Licinius] <in generativo> A et I et Lucretius orebro et noster Maro aulai pictai.*

⁹ Cf. Barwick, *op. cit.*, p. 145. Diphthongs are regularly treated by the Roman grammarians in the discussion of syllables.

of course necessary to employ the evidence offered by the fragment in the British Museum. Its text follows, as given by Milne,¹⁰ except that I have taken the liberty of substituting my own reading of lines 31-34, which I consider almost certain. It was made from the published facsimile,¹¹ for I have not had the opportunity of examining the papyrus.

Col. I

[...]çoqu[.]o[.]
 [...]illud quod nihil[
 [...]at declinat[i]one[m]
 [...] to ergo ita definit[
 5 [uel]ut diceretur dictio q-
 [ris] uox figuram habens
 [sign]ificantium uocum ;
 [na]m [e]iusmodi uox potest
 [di]ci, intellegi non po-
 10 [test] ; itaque ea dictio quae
 [ha]bet significationem
 [in]tellectumque oratio.
 [...]utem oratio quasi o-
 [ris] ratio cuius partes
 15 [qu]idam grammatici
 [u]sq(ue) multiplicauerunt
 ut turba praeceptorum

Col. II

[...] nom[en pronomen]
 [ue]rbum [p]a[rticipium]
 20 [ad]uerbium con[iunc-]
 tio praepos[i]tio [inter-]
 iectio. nomen e[st uel-]

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, Plate XI. Milne thought the lines might be corrupt. He read them as follows:

ta[m] a uo[ce] hac n[on] o[mn]i-
 ni[s] nota protinus [spe-]
 cies rei in hac re t[em]p[or]e
 mo huius autem fin[is]

- ut notamen quo u[nam]
 quamque rem [uo]cāb[ulo]
 25 notantes [c]ogno[cimus];
 est enim p[er]ut not[a quae-]
 dā rei nam [t]um d[um]
 libet etiam si prae[sen-]
 tem non in[ue]neris [uo-]
 30 cabuli huius mater[iam]
 tamen aū[ut] [it]a hac n[on] [omi-]
 nis nōta protinus [spe-]
 cies rei inhaeret [ani-]
 mo. huius autem fin[...]

In his discussion of the British Museum fragment, Milne made the following statement (p. 153): "The mention of the interjection among the parts of speech perhaps points to the authorship of Q. Remmius Palaemon, the introducer of this classification according to Quintilian his contemporary (*Inst. Or.*, I, 4, 20)." Quintilian's actual words are these: *noster sermo articulos non desiderat ideoque in alias partes orationis sparguntur, sed accedit superioribus interiectio. alii tamen ex idoneis dumtaxat auctoribus octo partes secuti sunt, ut Aristarchus et aetate nostra Palaemon, qui vocabulum sive appellationem nomini subiecerunt tamquam speciem eius, at ii, qui aliud nomen, aliud vocabulum faciunt, novem.* He mentions Aristarchus among the Greeks and Palaemon among contemporary Romans solely as outstanding representatives of that school of grammatical thought which maintained that the common noun (*vocabulum sive appellationem*) was not a separate part of speech, but only a variety of the noun (*nomen*), and which, accordingly, recognized not nine, but only eight, parts of speech. As for the interjection, the supposition that Palaemon was the first to isolate it, far from being supported, seems to me to be contradicted, by implication, by Quintilian's silence regarding the matter in a passage where the words *interiectio* and *Palaemon* almost shoulder one another.

The question of authorship has been more recently treated by Jean Collart.¹² By disregarding a portion of the passage

¹² "Palaemon et l'ars grammatica," *Revue de Philologie*, XII (1938), pp. 228 ff.

from Quintilian, and by violating implicitly the order of what remains, he endeavors¹³ to extort from his words the meaning which Milne read into them. He then seeks to confirm his argument by the unfounded assumption that the author of the British Museum fragment must have written during the first century of our era.¹⁴ Such is the evidence which has hitherto been presented regarding the authorship of the newly discovered texts. It is clear that the question merits further consideration.

At the very outset it must be recognized that the identity of the author of a grammatical fragment is more difficult to determine than that of authors of most other writings. Latin grammar was not only the concern of older men of literary tastes, it was also a very important part of every school boy's education, and school books for the teaching of Latin grammar were in use as early as the second century B. C.¹⁵ In their general features these books became traditional, both as to form and as to content. Their authorship was composite, and since neither copyright nor expense, such as is incidental to the publication of a new edition in modern times, stood in the way of revision, it is hardly to be questioned that many school teachers introduced minor modifications in the traditional treatment. The school book thus became a mosaic of elements both old and new, of sentences and paragraphs by unknown hands, and others copied more or less literally from the great scholarly works on grammar. It existed in slightly varying form throughout the ancient world, wherever Latin was taught, in far more numerous copies than any other kind of grammatical treatise. Mere mathematical probability would incline us to suppose that our fragments are its relics—the relics of a book that had no single author.

Similar conditions obtained, though to a less degree, with reference to the scholarly grammatical treatises. The subject had been delimited at an early date, the order of its presentation was standardized, and each scholar felt free to quote or adapt, with or without acknowledgment, the works of his predecessors. The scholarly treatment was more complete, somewhat less conservative, and bore more distinctly the evidence of single authorship than the school book, but this evidence might be very slight or entirely misleading in a short fragment. Moreover,

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

¹⁵ Barwick, *op. cit.*, p. 110

there were undoubtedly many contributors to grammatical literature whose names have not been preserved, as well as those others who are only names to us, and a caprice of chance might put in our possession a fragment of one of their works, which would be entirely unrecognizable. Under such circumstances as these, a prudent investigator will hesitate to assign the two small fragments in our possession to any author, and will rest content when he has traced the similarities and dissimilarities which exist between them and the known representatives of the Latin grammatical tradition.

It will be interesting to determine, if possible, whether the work represented by the two fragments which are under discussion was a school book or a scholar's grammar. Some of its features seem to indicate that it was a book of the former type. There are two instances of the use of verbs in the second person in the brief remnants of text in our possession, and it is possible to restore a third with reasonable certainty. This may be taken as evidence of a didactic purpose. In two places the first person plural is employed, and this also is suggestive of a school teacher's style. Unquestionably there is a sharp contrast between the new text and those passages of the Latin grammarians which are written in scholarly detachment, with the use of the less dramatic third person, frequently in the passive.¹⁶ The words *quidam grammatici* and *turba praeceptorum* of the British Museum fragment (lines 15-17) betray too much occupation with pedagogical dissensions and practices to have been written by anyone not of the profession. They would certainly seem to be out of place in a work addressed to the general reader. These indications, together with the fact already referred to, that probability greatly favors the preservation of a school book, seem to place the character of the papyrus text beyond reasonable doubt.

The date of the grammatical fragments cannot be accurately determined. On the recto of the papyrus, as has previously been stated, is a military record, one entry of which can be positively dated as late as 163 A. D. How many years subsequent to this were embraced in the document is unknown; probably not many. The record, however, would not have been discarded immediately after the final entry was made, but would have been kept in the

¹⁶ Cf. e. g. Charisius, *GL.*, I, pp. 11 ff.

archives, like any other official paper, until all likelihood that it would be needed for reference had passed. It is the opinion of Schubart¹⁷ that a period of 50 to 100 years may be assumed to have elapsed between the composition of a document and the use for a second time of the papyrus on which it was written. Accepting this view, we may assign the transcription of the grammar to the first half of the third century. Because the value of a grammar, as of any book on a technical subject, depended upon its being abreast of the accepted teaching of its day, it may be taken for granted that each new edition was based upon the latest approved edition which was available. Accordingly, the fragments now being considered represent the current grammatical teaching of their own time and locality. The scribe who wrote them was therefore not copying directly from Palaemon or any writer of the first century or, in all probability, of the first three-quarters of the second century. We may assign his model, tentatively to be sure, to the half-century following 175 A. D.

Although no sensible man would copy an outmoded grammatical work, if one more recent were available, many of the definitions contained in the editions which were considered most modern, at the beginning of the third century, had been satisfactorily formulated long before, and then repeated verbatim for each successive generation of school boys. For this reason, the contents of the papyrus fragments naturally show similarities to statements found in other grammatical writings; but there are also differences.

The Michigan fragment, as has already been noted, begins in the midst of the section on syllables, when consideration is being given to diphthongs. The author apparently regards *ui* and *ua* as diphthongs, contrary to the views of most other grammatical writers. Only in a single statement, transcribed from their common source by Charisius¹⁸ and Dositheus,¹⁹ is there a positive indication that *ua* was so regarded in earlier times. In line 6 is begun a discussion of the correct spelling of the diphthong which the Romans commonly write *ae*. It is a trite topic, handled, in one connection or another, by nearly every writer

¹⁷ *Einführung in die Papyruskunde*, pp. 62 f.

¹⁸ *GL.*, I, 11, 17 f.

¹⁹ *GL.*, VII, 387, 2 f.

on grammar from Lucilius²⁰ and Nigidius Figulus²¹ to Marius Victorinus²² and the later compilers, and, as here, it is very commonly illustrated by a more or less complete quotation of Virgil, *Aeneid*, IX, 26.²³ In this fragment, however, the author appears to imply that the common diphthong *ae* should regularly be written *ai*. No other writer whose works are extant concurs in this opinion, though several of them mention it.²⁴

It is surprising to discover *ui* and *ua* treated as diphthongs, and the spelling *ai* preferred to *ae* so late as the beginning of the third century. Grammatical dogma, however, was strangely persistent even in the face of contrary practice, and the writer of the fragments could himself pen the words *praeponas*, *litterae*, *poetae*, *praeceptum*, *praepositio*, *praesentem*, and *inhaeret*, without being deterred thereby from copying the statement that the combination of the letters *a* and *e* ought to be written *ai*. In a very similar way, Terentianus Maurus supports the use of the diphthong *ei* in *eitur* and in the plural forms *oveis* and *omneis*,²⁵ but actually employs the form *ire*²⁶ and the accusative form *omnes*²⁷ if the manuscripts may be trusted. He anticipates discrepancy between precept and practice in others, also, for he frankly states:

*haec putavi colligenda; tu sequere quod voles.*²⁸

On turning now to the British Museum fragment we find that the meaning of the first two lines is not clear, but with the third line the text becomes more intelligible. The discussion concerns *dictio*, which is here defined as *oris vox figuram habens significantium vocum*. There is no verbal reminiscence of this definition in any of the grammatical writers with the exception of Marius Victorinus. In a passage of his work which has been very poorly preserved are the words *dictio figura significantium vocum*.²⁹ There can be little doubt of the original identity of these two

²⁰ Quint., *Inst. Or.*, I, 7; 18.

²¹ Funaioli, *Grammaticae Romanae Fragmenta*, frag. 11.

²² *GL.*, VI, 14, 1 ff.

²³ Cf. *GL.*, VII, p. 661 (*Index Scriptorum*).

²⁴ Cf. Quint., *Inst. Or.*, I, 7, 18; Marius Victorinus, *GL.*, VI, 14, 1 f.; Velius Longus, *GL.*, VII, 57, 20 ff.

²⁵ *GL.*, VI, 339, 466 ff.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 347, 755.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 350, 848.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 348, 777.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 5, 2.

statements, or that the papyrus fragment preserves the definition in much the better form. Since the later grammarians show little concern for the philosophical implications of their study, this definition is probably of early origin, an inference supported by the use of the word *figura* in a different sense from that which it eventually attained in grammatical terminology, where it regularly referred to the structura of a word as simple or compound.³⁰

If I correctly understand this portion of the text, its author states that speech (*dictio*) is a vocal utterance (*oris vox*) which has a pattern resulting in meaningful sounds—he is thinking primarily of words, perhaps—and it is called speech because it is capable of being spoken. Yet such an utterance may convey no rational thought. In fact, for clarity of definition it is apparently assumed that it does not. If speech not only has meaning (*significatio*) in its several parts, but also can be rationally understood (has *intellectus*) as a whole, it is *oratio*. The word *oratio* indeed implies this since by derivation, the writer seems to suggest, it means “rationality of utterance” (*oris ratio*).³¹

Verbally there is nothing in the grammarians which is very similar to this. The statements of Charisius,³² Diomedes,³³ and Dositheus³⁴ make *significatio* an essential element of *dictio*, but their definitions of *oratio*³⁵ include no reference to *intellectus*.³⁶ They are concerned less with the essential characteristic of *oratio* than with the form which is its concomitant. Thus, in the four definitions of *oratio* given by Diomedes³⁷ it is referred to as *structura verborum*, *compositio dictionum*, *ordinata pronuntiatio*, *sermo contextus*. The later writers are thus more practical, or at least their words betray minds of less philosophical temper than do those of the papyrus fragment.

³⁰ Cf. Diomedes, *GL.*, I, 301, 23 ff.

³¹ The allusion to the supposed etymology of *oratio*, as being derived from *oris* and *ratio*, is to be traced to Terentius Scaurus, according to Barwick, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

³² *GL.*, I, 16, 28.

³³ *GL.*, I, 436, 9 ff.

³⁴ *GL.*, VII, 388, 17.

³⁵ *GL.*, I, 152, 10 ff.; I, 300, 17 ff.; VII, 389, 8 ff.; cf. *Exo. Bobbiensia*, *GL.*, I, 533, 1 ff.

³⁶ Priscian uses *intellectus* in the sense in which other writers use *significatio*. Cf. *GL.*, II, 53, 14: *dictio dicendum, hoc est intellegendum, aliquid habet*. Cf. also *GL.*, III, 108, 19 ff.

³⁷ *GL.*, I, 300, 17 ff. Cf. Priscian, *GL.*, II, 53, 27 f.

At the top of the second column of the British Museum papyrus there has been preserved, in fragmentary condition, a list of the parts of speech. It can easily be restored as *nomen, pronomen, verbum, participium, adverbium, coniunctio, praepositio, interiectio*. This is not the order followed by Palaemon,³⁸ but is that in which the parts of speech are listed by Diomedes³⁹ and the order in which they are treated by Charisius⁴⁰ and by Maximus Victorinus.⁴¹ Next follows a definition of the term *nomen*, obviously developed through a false etymology, and suggesting by its nature the philosophical occupation of the earlier grammarians rather than the objective treatment of later scholars.⁴² The definition runs as follows: *nomen est velut notamen, quo unam quamque rem vocabulo notantes cognoscimus*. The same thought in very similar words is echoed by most of those grammarians⁴³ who were in accord with the author of the fragment with regard to *oratio*. More interesting is the elaboration of the definition, which is appended to it. *Est enim velut nota quaedam rei, nam tum dum libet, etiam si praesentem non inveneris vocabuli huius materiam, tamen audita hac nominis nota, protinus species rei inhaeret animo*. How neatly this explanation is worded becomes more apparent when it is contrasted with the efforts of Pompeius⁴⁴ and of Sergius,⁴⁵ whose labored attempts to convey the same idea in their respective commentaries on the grammar of Donatus can be pardoned only because they were endeavoring to write for quite immature students. Their statements contain such slight similarities to the phraseology of the British Museum papyrus that little significance can be attached to the likeness.

Certain of the Latin grammarians occasionally betray their identity by their fondness for peculiar words or phrases. Rem-

³⁸ Cf. Barwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 144 f.

³⁹ *GL.*, I, 300, 26 f.

⁴⁰ *GL.*, I, pp. 152 ff. Where Charisius lists the parts of speech together (p. 152, 14 ff.) he employs a different order.

⁴¹ *GL.*, VI, 197 ff.

⁴² Typical of the later style is Dositheus, *GL.*, VII, 389, 13 f.: *Nomen est pars orationis cum casu sine tempore corporalem aut incorporalem significans proprie communiterve*.

⁴³ Cf. *Excerpta Bobbiensia*, *GL.*, I, 533, 9 f.; Diomedes, *GL.*, I, 320, 25 ff.; Dositheus, *GL.*, VII, 390, 1 f.

⁴⁴ *GL.*, V, 96, 22 ff.

⁴⁵ *GL.*, IV, 488, 3 f.

mius Palaemon, for example, has been recognized by his frequent use of the conjunction *velut*.⁴⁶ This word can be read with some assurance in line 26 of the British Museum fragment, and Milne restored it in lines 5 and 23-24 by supplying the letters *vel* in each instance. Corroborative evidence is needed, however, to establish Palaemon's authorship of these lines. Probably little importance should be given to the use of *quasi* in line 13 of the same fragment, though it is suggested by Barwick⁴⁷ that the word may be characteristic of the compiler whose work Charisius copied. Charisius himself is credited with having introduced an occasional *ut puta* into his work,⁴⁸ and there is an instance of its use in line 1 of the Michigan fragment. *Tam mehercule quam* in lines 2 and 3 of this fragment is probably the most arresting conjunction of all. I can find it nowhere else, but there are two instances in Velius Longus of the use of *tam hercule quam*.⁴⁹ The similarity is much too close to be entirely accidental, but its precise significance cannot be determined. Finally I may note that the name Maro, which I have supplied in line 8 of the Michigan papyrus, is used only by Romanus of the Roman grammarians,⁵⁰ so far as is known.

In these small bits of an early Latin grammar have been detected possible reminiscences of Remmius Palaemon, of Terentius Scaurus, Velius Longus, and even of Julius Romanus, whose citation of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius places his work near the close of the second century. There have also been observed certain similarities to the writings of the later authors, Marius Victorinus, Charisius, Diomedes, Dositheus, and even to Sergius and Pompeius, the commentators on Donatus. Thus, the author of the fragments, which are themselves of apparently composite origin, stood between the great compilers of the fourth and subsequent centuries and their first and second century sources, and his work partakes of the character of both. Considering the nature of grammatical writings, this is exactly what we should expect.

The roll from which the fragments came was copied in Egypt, as the Romano-Egyptian military register on the recto of the

⁴⁶ Schanz-Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, II Teil, p. 729, and Barwick, *op. cit.*, pp. 112 f.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 130. ⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 129 f. ⁴⁹ *GL.*, VII, 71, 2; 79, 15.

⁵⁰ Cf. Christ, *Philologus*, XVIII (1862), p. 121.

papyrus unquestionably proves. Moreover, it was written by a scribe who was experienced in writing the Latin book hand. Such persons must have been comparatively few in Egypt, and have been attached almost exclusively to the governmental bureaus. It is therefore probable that this grammar was copied in an army office by a scribe who had access to old files from which useless documents could be extracted.

The purpose for which the grammar was copied is obscure. Since the language of the intellectual classes in Egypt was Greek, formal instruction in Latin cannot have been prevalent. Effective administration of the province, however, must have necessitated the employment of many scribes and interpreters through whom communication could be maintained within the organization and also between Roman officialdom and the provincials, both those who used Greek and those who spoke only the Egyptian tongue. Opportunity for preferment in the civil service and the pride of belonging to the military aristocracy, or of being associated with it, must have attracted the sons of clerks and soldiers to the study of the Latin language. It is quite possible that there existed, in the shadow of the barracks at Karanis, a school for the instruction of these young men, and that, because of its official patronage, one of the professional scribes of the commandant's staff was instructed to prepare for the use of its master or of his pupils the grammar-book represented by the Michigan and British Museum fragments.

Whatever may have been the specific occasion for which the book was produced, its existence indicates an interest in Latin grammar in Egypt. Since Greek and Egyptian were the only languages very extensively used by the provincials, Latin could have had little practical value except in the army and certain central administrative offices. Carelessness in its use might have been condoned; the language of official documents might have become as debased as that of certain private letters in Latin which have come from Egypt; but the military bureaus appear to have been punctilious in their adherence to the standards of correct usage. In the second century these standards could be determined in no other city than Rome. Naturally, therefore, we would assume that the grammar studied by scribes and clerks was that of the capital, and the fragments we have been examining merely offer objective corroboration of this assumption.

They contain nothing out of harmony with the Roman tradition, but, quite the contrary, are so similar in word, phrase, and general treatment to the writings of the great Latin grammarians that no one can doubt their essential identity. The Roman army in Egypt appears to have been meeting its responsibility in the endeavor to make the cultural frontier of the empire coextensive with its political boundaries.

JAMES E. DUNLAP.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

NEW DATINGS FOR SOME ATTIC HONORARY DECREES.*

It is being realized more and more that the use of Ionic letters in an Athenian decree is not sufficient reason for assigning to it a date after the archonship of Eukleides in 403 B. C. In fact many decrees now published in the *editio minor* of the *Corpus* as belonging to the last decade of the fifth century have Ionic letters and several inscriptions once published as of the fourth century have now been dated back into the fifth.

An inscription recording honors voted to some men of Halikarnassos was published by Kirchner as *I. G.*, II², 142 and dated near the middle of the fourth century, because it was written in large Ionic letters seemingly characteristic of that time. The name of the archon of the year 410/09 B. C., Γλαύκιππος, is preserved on the stone in line 4, as well as the name of the prytanizing tribe Ἐρεχ[θῆς ἐπρυτάνευε] in line 2. Kirchner explained the occurrence of the name of a fifth century archon in a decree of the fourth century by suggesting that the old decree, passed in the ninth prytany¹ of 410/09 B. C., was re-inscribed at some time before the middle of the fourth century. Hiller von Gaertringen, following Wilhelm's suggestion, republished this inscription as *I. G.*, I², 110a, placing it correctly among the other decrees passed in the archonship of Glaukippos. He notes that the Ionic letters are similar to those of *I. G.*, I², 118, dated by the archon, Euktemon, in 408/7 B. C.

Wilhelm has proved beyond a doubt that *I. G.*, II², 12, lines 1-28, should also be dated on the basis of content in the fifth century.² The inscription concerned Pythophanes of Karystos, about whom Hippomenes made the motion beginning in line 8. The first two lines, which are fragmentary, contained the end of an older decree; Wilhelm restores line 2: [γνώμ]ῃ ἣν Τε[ισαμενὸς εἶπεν]. Then follows Hippomenes' motion in lines 3-15 and 26-28 (see page 357 below). Since five proedroi are mentioned (lines 5-7), this decree was passed in 411/0 B. C.,

* I wish to express my thanks to Professor B. D. Meritt for his suggestions and valuable help in preparing this paper.

¹ Cf. *I. G.*, I², 304, line 30.

² *Jahreshefte*, XXI (1922), pp. 147-152; cf. *I. G.*, I², p. 297.

between the fall of the Four Hundred in the autumn of 411 B. C. and the restoration of the democracy after the fall of Kyzikos in the spring of 410 B. C. Hippomenes quotes an older decree (lines 16-26) which was passed before 411/0 B. C. Therefore, the decree ending in line 2, Hippomenes' motion in lines 3-15 and 26-28, and the decree quoted in lines 16-26, all belong in the fifth century; only lines 29-32 belong in the fourth century, though the whole inscription must have been cut on stone at the later date. It should be noted particularly that the formulae used in lines 1-28 are those characteristic of the fifth century. Of special interest is the phrase in line 17 . . . ἀλλοθί πο ὦν Ἀθηναῖοι κ[ρατῶσιν . . .] and the similar phrase in line 22 . . . ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι [κρατῶσι . . .]. The Athenians were not "ruling" after the fall of the Empire in 404 B. C., and inscriptions which contain phrases of the sort here mentioned were not passed in the fourth century.

West has recently shown good reason why *I. G.*, II², 8 should be dated in the fifth century.³ Neokleides presided over the council which passed this decree, and a man of the same name was secretary of the council in *I. G.*, I², 25 and *I. G.*, I², 87 when the tribe Aigeis held the prytany.⁴ The embassy mentioned in the decree probably negotiated the treaty with the Great King in 424/3 B. C., the same year in which *I. G.*, I², 25 and *I. G.*, I², 87 may now be dated. The same Neokleides appears in all three inscriptions, and Thucydides, who moved the rider beginning in line 12 of *I. G.*, II², 8, may be identified with the head of the treasurers of Athena in 424/3 B. C. Again the formula restored in lines 20-21 [ὦν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσιν] should be noted as characteristic of the fifth century date.

Still other inscriptions have been moved back from the fourth to the fifth century. I note especially that *I. G.*, II², 27 must now be given a date in the same prytany with *I. G.*, I², 144, possibly in the year 415 B. C.⁵

In view of the fact that so many inscriptions written in Ionic letters may now be dated in the fifth century on the basis of their content and formulae, I wish to suggest that three other inscriptions now published in *I. G.*, II² have been wrongly attributed to the fourth century.

³ *A. J. P.*, LVI (1935), pp. 72-76. ⁴ *A. J. P.*, LVI (1935), pp. 65-71.

⁵ *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), no. 22, p. 68.

I. *I. G.*, II², 71 + 38.

I. G., II², 71, a fragment of Pentelic marble said to have been found on the island of Salamis, was first edited by Pittakys, 'Εφ. 'Αρχ., 1852, no. 1099, and later by Rangabé, *Antiquités Helléniques*, II (1855), no. 658 (merely a copy of Pittakys' text). The inscription is written stoichedon in Ionic letters. Pittakys' reading is as follows:

Δ Ο Ξ Ε Θ Η Β Ο Λ
Ο Π Ι Ξ Ε Π Ρ Υ Τ Α
Μ Α Τ Ε Υ Ε Γ
Ν Ο Ξ Ε Ι Τ Ε
Α Ι Τ Ο Ξ
Ο Ν Κ

Kirchner accepts this reading except that he omits the last letter of line 3, and he restores a line of 27 letters, suggesting [Σρέφα]vos as a possible name for the orator in line 4.

This fragment, which has been lost for some time, has now been rediscovered in the American excavations of the Agora in Athens, where it bears the inventory number I 5020. I give the following reading taken from a squeeze of the inscription:⁶

Δ Ο Ξ Ε Ν Θ Η Β Ο Λ
Ο Π Ι Ξ Ε Π Ρ Υ Τ Α
Μ Α Τ Ε Υ Ε Υ Γ
Υ Μ Ο Ξ Ε Ι Τ Ε
Κ Α Ι Τ Ο Ξ
Ο Ν Κ

There are several notable differences between this and the previous readings. There is an unmistakable Ν in line 1 which Pittakys omitted, and ΥΓ are the last letters in line 3, while ΥΜΟΞ is read instead of ΝΟΞ at the beginning of line 4 and Κ is added in line 5.

⁶ I wish to express my thanks to Professor B. D. Meritt and to Professor T. Leslie Shear, Director of the American excavations, for permission to publish this inscription here. Eugene Schweigert has very kindly supplied me with a squeeze and has communicated to me his identification of the Agora piece with *I. G.*, II², 71 and his association of it with *I. G.*, II², 38.

Part of the left edge of the stone is preserved, although in no case is the first letter in any line legible. There is an unscripted space approximately 0.10 m. high above the inscription. The surface of the stone is quite rough. The letters are neatly and carefully cut, 0.01 m. in height. The most characteristic form is the N whose third hasta extends 0.002 m. above the top of the other letters, and is a corresponding distance above the base line. The type of N grew out of the archaic, slanting Λ whose development can be traced down through the fifth century.

The fragment *I. G.*, II², 38 evidently is part of the same inscription. Although it does not make a direct join, it has the same rough surface and neatly cut letters arranged stoichedon. Measurements show that they are 0.01 m. high and spaced about the same as on *I. G.*, II², 71, three letters occupying about 0.04 m. *I. G.*, II², 38 has the same characteristic N with high hasta and the other letters are similar to those in *I. G.*, II², 71; the cross-bars of the E are all the same length, the second vertical stroke of Γ is half as long as the first, etc. *I. G.*, II², 38 seems to be part of an honorary decree prescribing the penalty for anyone who murders the man in whose honor the decree was passed. Since the last two lines of *I. G.*, II², 71 can be restored with the characteristic fifth century formula of the beginning of an honorary decree, the two can be placed together on grounds of content as well as form.

Kirchner publishes no. 38 with a restored line of 28 letters, while according to Rangabé's restoration, no. 71 had only 27 letters per line. This seeming discrepancy is cleared up when we remember that the latter omitted the N in the first line. By adding this, one may restore both fragments as stoichedon 28. As noted above, no. 71 retains all but the first letter of the left hand side, while no. 38 is broken on all sides, so that its position in the stèle is uncertain. The lateral position here shown is that assigned tentatively by Kirchner; it is impossible to tell the number of lines which intervene between the two fragments. I suggest the following restoration:

426/5 B. C.

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 28

[ε]δοξεν τῇ βολ[ῃ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ· Κεκ] *I. G.*, II², 71

[ρ]οπὶς ἐπρυτά[νευε, Πολέμαρχος ἐγρ]

[αμ]μάτευε, Ὑγ[ιάνων ἐπεστάτε, Κλεώ]

- [ν]υμος εἶπε· [ἐπαινέσαι¹⁰. . . .]
 5 [.] καὶ τὸς [παῖδας καὶ ἀναγράψαι πρ]
 [όξεν]ον κ[αὶ εὐεργέτην Ἀθηναίων . .]

lacuna

- 10 [Ἀθηναῖ]οι κρατ[ῶσιν¹². . . .] *I. G.*, II², 38
 [. . . . δ]φέλλεν Ἀθ[ηναίος· ἐὰν δέ τις]
 [αὐτῶν ἀπ]οθάνῃ τ[ὴν τιμωρίαν εἶνα]
 [ι αὐτῷ κα]θάπερ ἐ[άν τις Ἀθηναίων ἐ]
 [ν τῇ ὑπερ]ορίαι β[ιαιῶι θανάτῳ ἀπ]
 15 [οθάνῃ· φεύγε]ν δ[ὲ τὴν πόλιν]

The restorations of the name of the secretary in line 2 and of the name of the orator in lines 3-4 depend upon each other. The name of the statesman Kleonymos suggests itself for lines 3-4. He was the orator of the second Methonaeon decree (*I. G.*, I², 57, line 34) which is dated in 426/5 B. C. by its secretary, Megakleides, who was first secretary of the council in the year of Euthynos' archonship.⁷ This Methonaeon decree was passed in the first prytany of 426/5 B. C. and gave orders, in lines 51-54, that certain business concerning the other cities in the Empire was to be discussed in the second prytany of the year. Kekropis was the second prytany of 426/5 B. C.,⁸ and we have in *I. G.*, I², 65, the decree which prescribes the proposed regulations, passed during the prytany of Kekropis, and moved by Kleonymos.⁹

According to *I. G.*, I², 65, line 4, Polemarchos was secretary of the council during the prytany of Kekropis in 426/5 B. C. Polemarchos' name may now be restored as secretary in line 2 of our fragment, since Kekropis was the prytanizing tribe (lines 1-2). This is rendered more probable by the restoration of the name [Κλεών]υμος for the orator in lines 3-4. These restorations satisfy the stoichedon arrangement of the inscription and confirm the date in prytany II of 426/5 B. C.

⁷ *I. G.*, I², 324, line 5.

⁸ *Ibid.*, line 6.

⁹ See Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, I, pp. 163, 166, and 213.

In line 3 the restoration should be Ὑγ[αίων], which is the only name beginning with ΥΓ found in Kirchner's *Prosopographia Attica*. Kirchner gives four men by this name (13898-13901) and two of them may be of interest for our restoration. The word occurs as a καλός-name on four polychrome white-ground lekythoi of the first half of the fifth century.¹⁰ If Hygiainon were a youth between fifteen and twenty-five years old at some time not too long before 450 B. C., he may be identical with Kirchner's no. 13899. This man contested a lawsuit with Euripides about a liturgy¹¹ shortly after the *Hippolytus* was first performed in 428 B. C.¹² He must have been prominent in his deme at the time. It is entirely possible that he was a member of the council in 426/5 B. C., and that he may have presided at the meeting in which our decree was passed.

The name Ὑγαιών would occupy a space of eight letters in the heading of the decree, six letters being restored in line 3. This leaves twelve letters more in line 3 and one letter in line 4, before the last four letters -νμος of the orator's name. Such a space of thirteen letters is exactly filled by the restorations ἐπεστάτε and Κλεων-, which are needed to complete the name of the orator, Kleonymos. Since Hygiainon is apparently the only possible name for the epistates, it gives added confirmation for the restoration of Kleonymos as the name of the orator and allows us to restore the name Polemarchos, which is closely associated with the name Kleonymos elsewhere, in line 2. The heading is then complete and all three of the men mentioned in it are known from other sources to have been prominent about 426/5 B. C.

In lines 5-6, the reading suggests the beginning of the usual fifth century formula honoring a man and his sons, and is restored accordingly. A space of twelve letters is left for his name in lines 4-5. The possibilities for restoration in this space are so numerous that it does not seem wise to attempt to put in a definite name. The name of the man in whose favor the decree was passed might be restored alone as in *I. G.*, I², 56, line 13, although single names of twelve letters are unusual. It might also be filled by the name of the man and the city from which he came as is the case in *I. G.*, I², 82, line 8.

¹⁰ Klein, *Die griechischen Vasen mit Lieblingsinschriften* (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 167-8.

¹¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, III, 15, 8.

¹² Kirchner, *P. A.*, no. 5953, p. 387, line 3.

Lines 10-15 are kept for the most part as published by Kirchner. In lines 11-12 the phrase *ἐὰν δέ τις αὐτῶν* seems necessary with the verb *ἀποθάνῃ* (cf. *I. G.*, II², 37, *Add.*, line 11). The restoration of *αὐτῶι* in line 13 completes the thought by relating the person who is to be punished to the preceding clause (cf. *I. G.*, II², 32, line 13).¹³

Since these latter lines were originally restored and published as of the fourth century, it is necessary to note that the formulae used in them actually agree better with the new dating in 426/5 B. C. The most striking phrase occurs in line 10: --- *Ἀθηναῖοι* *κρατῶσιν* ---. After the final defeat of Athens at Aigospotamoi (405 B. C.), her power was broken, the Empire was no more in existence, and the phrase *Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσιν* was no longer appropriate; but until then, during the last half of the fifth century, it was the perfect phrase, the keynote of her imperial power.

I. G., I², 56, which honors Leonidas of Halikarnassos and is dated sometime in the Peloponnesian War (probably in the early years), has the best parallels not only for *Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσιν* but also for the other formulae in this inscription:

lines 1-2: *ἐὰν ἀδικῆν μέτ[ε Ἀ]θ[ῆ]ν[ε]ς[ν]εσ] [μέτ]
ε ἡδὺς Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι ---*

lines 5-7: *ἐν δὲ τῇσι ἄλλεσι πόλεσι ἡ-
λίτινες Ἀθηναίων ἀρχοσι ἐν τ-
ῇ ὑπερορίᾳ ---*

lines 14-17: *ἐὰν τις ἀποκτένει ἐν τῶν πόλ-
εον ἢδὲ Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι, τὲ-
ν τιμορίαν ἔναι καθάπερ ἐὰν
τις Ἀθηναίων ἀποθάνει ---*

It is interesting to find *Ἀθηναῖοι κρατῶσι* used twice in one inscription and also to find it in conjunction with several other striking phrases. Granted that the wording of the penalty *τὴν τιμορίαν ἔναι καθάπερ ἐὰν τις Ἀθηναίων ἀποθάνει* occurs many times, the phrase *ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ* is seldom used. Aristotle,¹⁴ speaking of the seven hundred officials maintained "abroad" by the Athenians at the height of the Empire, uses the word *ὑπερόριοι*, and the

¹³ Lines 6-25 of *I. G.*, II², 32 belong to a fifth century decree reinscribed in 385/4 B. C.

¹⁴ *Ath. Pol.*, XXIV, 3.

Pseudo-Xenophon¹⁵ uses the same word for Athenian possessions held "abroad." It is a term which belonged to the Athenian Empire and was not likely to be used after its fall.

I. G., I², 93 is another fifth century inscription in which the phrase *Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι* occurs. Lines 14-16 read: --- *χορήματα ἐσάγεν ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι* ---. It also has in lines 7-8 a formula similar to that in lines 5-6 of our present text: *ἀναγραφάτω πρόξενον καὶ εὐεργέτην Ἀθηναίων*---. This inscription is now dated in 419/8 or 413/2 B. C.¹⁶

I. G., I², 72, a proxeny decree for an Illyrian dating about 423/2 B. C., is restored as follows:

lines 9-11: --- *ἐὰν δέ τίς τινα αὐ[τῶν ἀπο]*
[κτένει βιαίοι θανάτοι ἐν τῶν πό]λεόν πο ὁ[σον Ἀθεν]
[αἰοὶ ἄρχουσιν, ἔναι τὲν τιμορίαν] καθάπερ ---

The usual formula is retained with the exception of the word *ἄρχουσιν* which is substituted for *κρατοῦσι*. In view of the fact that *κρατοῦσι* is the form much used during the Empire, and since this inscription is dated in that period, I suggest that line 11 should be restored:

[αἰοὶ κρατοῦσι, ἔναι τὲν τιμορίαν] καθάπερ ---

instead of as it is given by Kirchner.

I. G., I², 28 belongs in the earlier years of the Athenian Empire, sometime before 446 B. C., but the formula is still similar. Lines 7-11 read:

ἐὰν δέ τις ἀπο[κτένει ἐ Ἀχελουόδορον ἐ τ]
ὄν παῖδον τυ[ὰ ἐν τῶν πόλεον καὶ τῆς χώρα]
ς ὃν Ἀθηναῖο[ι κρατοῦσι, τὲν τιμορίαν ἔναι π]
έντε τάλαντα [ἐκάστο, καθάπερ ἐὰν Ἀθηναί]
ον τις ἀποθά[ναι] ---

This has not only the familiar *Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι* but also the formula for the penalty which is like that in our inscription. It proves that the formula was in use continuously during the long period of the Empire.

In direct contrast to the phrase *ᾧν* or *ὅσης Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσι* which we have found typical of the last half of the fifth century,

¹⁵ *Ath. Pol.*, I, 19.

¹⁶ *S. I. G.*, 92, note.

is the phrase --- δ[περ] Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ σύμμαχοι κρατοῦσι[ν ---] of *I. G.*, II², 43, lines 60-61. This is the decree establishing the second Athenian Confederacy (378/7 B. C.), and exhibits a marked change in the deference shown to the allies in the fourth century.

Line 15: I read the second hasta of a N under the A in line 14. It extends above the line as in all examples of N in this inscription and it is too far to the right to be read as any other letter. There is also a trace of the top of a letter centered under the I above, which I restore as Δ. With these two additional readings, I restore after Kirchner's ἀποθάνη at the beginning of line 15: φεύγε] γ δ[ε τὴν πόλιν ---]. For a parallel to this see Kirchner's restoration in line 10 of *I. G.*, II², 73 which I will show later (III) to be a fifth century decree.

II. *I. G.*, II², 174.

I. G., II², 174 consists of two fragments of Pentelic marble which were joined by Koehler. Fragment *a*, which has a sculptural relief at the top,¹⁷ has the first five letters of a name inscribed on the cornice in letters 0.02 m. high. Below on the main part of the stele, the title is written in large letters 0.023 m. high and is followed by the first two lines of the heading in normal Ionic letters 0.009 m. high. Part of the left side of the stele is preserved, but the others are entirely broken away. Fragment *b* also preserves part of the left side, thus making it possible to place the two fragments in relation to one another. The inscription is written stoichedon after the first two lines. The most characteristic letters are the K with short, oblique strokes and the Y with irregular short strokes. E has all the horizontal strokes the same length, the short stroke of the Γ is less than half as long as the other stroke, and N and H are quite wide. The text may be found in the *Corpus* and is not repeated here.

I believe from my study of the lettering that the inscription should be dated *ca.* 412 B. C. as Wilhelm urges in note to *I. G.*, II², 174 and *S. E. G.*, III, 80, and that it is not a late reinscribing of an early decree. It is possible to find close parallels for the

¹⁷ Illustrated in J. N. Svoronos, *Das Athener Nationalmuseum*, Athens, Pl. CCVI, 2.

letters in inscriptions of the last part of the fifth century. For example, compare the K with short oblique strokes not touching the top or bottom of the line with those of *I. G.*, I², 118 which dates in 408/7 B. C.;¹⁸ and ξ M with all strokes oblique, and wide N not quite touching the line, with those in *I. G.*, II², 1 inscribed in 403 B. C.¹⁹ The same Y with arms forming a broad, shallow V occurs on a fragmentary later fifth century inscription, *I. G.*, I³, 145, written in Attic letters. The even E and characteristic K and M with slanting strokes also are found here.²⁰

Some additional evidence as to the date of the inscription may be gained from a brief study of the anaglyph at the top of the stele. At the left stands a man wearing a himation which falls in heavy, parallel folds under his right arm and is held over his left arm. It reaches to his ankles and is stretched taut over the thigh and knee of his right leg which is forward. The sharp ridges of the drapery fall straight at the back and curve around the ankle in a manner reminiscent of the sculpture of the Nike balustrade. The other figure, whose garment hangs in the heavy, parallel, column-like folds seen on female statues of the late fifth century, is too fragmentary to be of much use. The relief probably was carved in a commercial workshop by an inferior sculptor, for the figure is clumsy, the position of the leg awkward, and the anatomy not quite correct. Judging from its style, it should probably be placed in the last quarter of the fifth century.

III. *I. G.*, II², 73.

I. G., II², 73 is a fragment of Hymettian marble broken on all sides. It contains part of an honorary decree written stoichedon in neat, small Ionic letters 0.009 m. high, similar in some respects to those of *I. G.*, II², 174. The top strokes of the Y form a very broad, shallow V; the middle bar of the E is not quite so long as the others; and the right hasta of the N extends slightly above the line. Kirchner restores it with 27 letters per line, while Wilhelm²¹ allows 29 letters.

¹⁸ Kirchner, *Imagines*, pl. 18.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pl. 19.

²⁰ Svoronos, *op. cit.*, pl. CCVII, 2.

²¹ *I. G.*, II², p. 657.

I. G., II², 73.

Kirchner's restoration

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 27

- [.⁹ K] αλλικ[.¹²]
 [. ἐγραμμά] τευε· Θεόφ[.¹¹]
 [. . . εἴπε]· προσγράψα[ι εἰς τὸ ψήφισ]
 [μα τὸ] ἐν τῇ στήλῃ γ[εγραμμένον τὸ]
 5 [ν γ]ραμματεῖα τῆς βολ[ῆς τὸ ψήφισμα]
 [T]εισαμενοῦ· εἰάν τις [.⁹ ἀπ]
 [ο]κτείνῃ βιαίωι [θ]α[νάτωι ἢ δῆσῃ]
 [ἢ ἄγῃ]ι ἐν τῶν πόλεων [ὅσων Ἀθηναῖο]
 [ι κρατῶσιν], ἔναι αὐτὸ [ν πολέμον, φ]
 10 [εὐγεν δὲ Ἀθη]ναίω[ν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τ]
 [ὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ὅσαι Ἀθηναίων ἐσὶ]
 [ν σύμμαχοι].

Wilhelm's restoration

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 29

- [. . . εἴπε]· προσγράψα[ι τοῖς πρότ]
 [ερόν] ἐν τῇ στήλῃ γ[εγραμμένοις τὸ]
 5 [ν γ]ραμματεῖα τῆς βολ[ῆς τὸ ψήφισμα τὸ]
 [T]εισαμενοῦ· εἰάν τις [.¹¹ ἀπ]
 [ο]κτείνῃ βιαίωι [θ]α[νάτωι ἢ δῆσῃ ἢ ε]
 [ἰρξῇ]ι ἐν τῶν πόλεων π[ο ὅσων Ἀθηναῖο]
 [ι κρατῶσιν], ἔναι αὐτὸ [ν πολέμον τοῦ]
 10 [δήμου τῷ Ἀθη]ναίων -----

Wilhelm reads two letters which Kirchner omits: a doubtful Γ after the final N of πόλεων in line 8 and the final N of [Ἀθη]ναίων in line 10 which Kirchner restores. I correct here an apparent misprint in *I. G.*, II², p. 657 in reading βολῆς for βολ[ῆς] in line 5. The hasta in line 8 is clearly discernible on the squeeze and, since it is close to the N and has no cutting on the other side below the break at the top, Γ and Γ are the only possible letters. In line 3 both restorations have [. . . εἴπε]· προσγράψα[ι . . .]. There are on the squeeze, however, traces of Α! before Γ, and they require some other restoration than [εἴπε].

In lines 1-2 the secretary must have been named with his demotic; we now know that in line 2 the name of the orator appeared without demotic (as was normal). I suggest that

Kirchner's line of 27 letters be retained and that lines 2-6 should be read as follows:

[. ἐγραμμά]τενε· Θεοφ[.... εἶπε· ἐξε]
 [ἶναι κ]αὶ προσγράψα[ι εἰς τὰ ἄλλα ᾶ]
 [ἐστι] ἐν τῇ στήλῃ γ[εγραμμένα τὸ]
 [ν γ]ραμματέα τῆς βολ[ῆς τὸ ψήφισμα]
 [Τ]εισαμενοῦ· -----

Wilhelm's restoration seems unacceptable for several reasons. I can find no good parallel for the restoration of εἶρη]ι in lines 7-8; Kirchner's [ἀγγ]ι in line 8 has good parallels and is more in accord with the usual fifth century formula. In lines 9-10 Wilhelm restores --- τοῦ δήμου τῷ Ἀθηναίων ---. Even though he has both βολ[ῆς] and [Τ]εισαμενοῦ above (lines 5 and 6), it does not seem consistent to restore τοῦ δήμου τῷ just in order to fit the space. Therefore, I prefer Kirchner's restoration except in line 3, and in lines 8-9 which must be continued --- ἐν τῶν πόλεων π[ο ὧν Ἀθηναῖοι κρατοῦσιν] ----.

Lines 5-6: [τὸ ψήφισμα Τ]εισαμενοῦ. Andocides (I, 83) quotes a decree concerning Solon's laws of weights and measures which began ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ· Τεισαμενὸς εἶπε.²² Andocides does not help to ascertain the subject or occasion of Teisamenos' decree referred to in *I. G.*, II², 73, but the occurrence of Teisamenos' name in *I. G.*, II², 12 may be more helpful. Wilhelm has restored lines 1-2 of this inscription [τ]ῇ γνώμ]ῃ ἣν Τε[ισαμενὸς εἶπεν],²³

²² The Teisamenos who was head of the board of tamiae of Athena in 414/3 B. C. came from Paiania and had a patronymic of five letters (cf. Meritt, *A. F. D.*, p. 88). Consequently he cannot be the same as Teisamenos mentioned by Lysias (*κατὰ Νικομάχου*, 28), whose father was Mechanion and who is more probably to be identified with the Teisamenos of Andocides and of *I. G.*, II², 12 and 73. The matter is uncertain, for the possibility remains that Teisamenos who was treasurer may be he of *I. G.*, II², 12 and 73 and not identical with the Teisamenos named by Lysias. I cannot tell why Schwahn (*R. H.*, s. v. "Teisamenos," no. 5) thinks the father's name was Mnesanion.

²³ *S. H. G.*, III, 71 gives the reading [τ]ῇ γνώμ]ῃ ἣν e. g. Τε[ισαμενὸς εἶπε,⁹....]...⁴... κρ]άτης. I note a misprint of nine dots after εἶπε where there should be only six. It seems to me better, however, not to attempt to restore any name at the end of line 2 after εἶπε or εἶπεν, but following the restoration in *I. G.*, I², p. 297 [... γνώμ]ῃ ἣν Τε[ισαμενὸς εἶπεν]. *vacat*, to leave the space blank before the heading of the new decree beginning in line 3. Note that this was evidently the procedure followed in line 15.

and has shown that the decree to which it refers must belong before Hippomenes' decree which is dated in 411/0 B. C. Since Hippomenes' motion is in honor of Pythophanes of Karystos, who is mentioned there as already being a proxenos and benefactor of the Athenians, the decree referred to above as Teisamenos' decree may be the one which awarded him the honor of proxenos and benefactor. Line 6 of *I. G.*, II², 73 also speaks of Teisamenos' decree and, if the interpretation is correct, quotes a part of it beginning *ἐάν τις* in which someone whose name is missing is given protection by the Athenians. Since the space left in line 6 for the name requires nine letters, I suggest that the name of Pythophanes (*Πυθοφάνην*) be restored, and that this inscription may then be added to those decrees honoring Pythophanes of Karystos and be dated before 411/0 B. C., probably in 415 B. C.

In any case the decree of Teisamenos quoted in *I. G.*, II², 73 must belong during the period of the Empire. It is possible that *I. G.*, II², 73 itself may also be as early as the fifth century, though this is not made necessary by the formulae quoted.

ELEANOR WESTON.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

FIMARE IN ISIDORE.

To the restoration by A. S. Pease (*A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], p. 80) of a Latin verb *fimare* "stercorare" in an Isidore passage (the god Stercutus . . . primusque agros fimavit) support can be given by a student in Romance. Meyer-Lübke in his *REW*², no. 3307, under the heading *FĪMĀRE "misten" (notice the asterisk!) lists Provençal and Catalanian *femar* and explains: "Da die gallorum. Formen des Subst. *femus, *femita sind, müssen die fim- voraussetzenden Abl. lat. sein": in fact, Latin *fimus* -i, masc., has become under the influence of the synonym *stercus* -oris, a neuter in Vulg. Lat.: *fimus -oris, of which OFr. *fiens*, OProv. *femps*, Catalan. *fems* (beside *fem*) with -s preserved (cf. *tempus* > *tems*) and derivatives of *fimora or *fimita in Romance languages bear witness; thus the formation of Romance *fimare* must have preceded the metaplasm *fimus* -oris. von Wartburg, *FEW*, III, p. 548, mentions as the oldest testi-

mony for a Vulg. Lat. *fimare*, postulated by OFr. *femer* (Mod. Fr. *fumer*), OProv. and Catalon. *femar*, a Carolingian capitulary of 813 A. D. The emended Isidore passage allows us to cancel the asterisk in Romance etymological dictionaries, and the Romance forms in turn add strength to the proposed emendation.

LEO SPITZER.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

THE ATHENIAN SECRETARY PHAIROS OF CHOLLEIDAI.

In 1926 Kirchner republished a small fragmentary inscription in an article entitled *Ein Wiedergewonnenes Psephisma* (*Ath. Mitt.*, LI [1926], p. 157). This text had been intentionally omitted from the *Editio Minor* as suspect, but the subsequent discovery of a squeeze of it has established its authenticity beyond doubt. It was restored by Kirchner and dated in the year 339/8 B. C. I wish to connect with it a text which I published in *Hesperia* (VII [1938], p. 291), dated by the demotic of the secretary in the year 339/8. His demotic is Cholleides and is to be restored in the text of Kirchner as follows:

339/8 B. C.

ΣΤΟΙΧ. 33

[Ἐπὶ Λυσιστρατίδου] ἀρχοντος ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀκαμα
[ντίδος δευτέρας] πρυτανείας ἡ Φαῖδρος
[Χολλείδης ἐγράμ]ματέων· βοηδρομιῶνος
[ὀγδόῃ ἐπὶ δέκα· τ]ῶν προέδρων ἐπεψήφισε
5 [ν¹¹..... Ἀρ]ιστίππου· ἔδοξεν τῇ βο
[υλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ]· ἐπειδὴ οἱ πρυτάνεις ο
[i -----]

Likewise in the text which I published in *Hesperia* the name Phaidros is to be restored in line 1.

I wish to point out that the words ἐπειδὴ οἱ πρυτάνεις ο[i-----] show this to be a prytany-decree, and that it is the earliest preserved text of its kind (cf. Dow, *Hesperia*, Suppl. I, p. 2).

EUGENE SCHWEIGERT.

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

REVIEWS.

ALISTER CAMERON. *The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of Recollection.* (Columbia Univ. Dissertation.) Menasha, Wisconsin, George Banta, 1938. Pp. 101.

It is Cameron's thesis that Plato in his account of anamnesis acknowledges fifth century Pythagoreanism as his inspiration and the legendary prophet of number as his spiritual and intellectual forebear. The demonstration of this thesis consists of two parts. First Cameron tries to show that according to fifth century Pythagoreanism the exercise of memory throughout the transmigrations is the means whereby the soul regains the divine truth of number, lost to it upon its incarnation, and thus wins release from the cycle of rebirth. Then he contends that Plato regularly states the theory of recollection as a deduction from the idea of transmigration and consistently approaches recollection and transmigration from a mathematical point of view; this combination of elements, he maintains, is characteristically Pythagorean.

It seems to me that neither part of the case has been established. Grant that fifth century Pythagoreanism held both the doctrines of a fixed cycle of rebirth and of liberation from the cycle;¹ it remains to show that this liberation was connected with the soul's recovery of a pre-experiential knowledge of number. The fragment of Empedocles (129) does not support such a notion; Pythagoras, if he be the subject, is not said to have envisaged number, or a truth outside of experience, or even "all things that are," that is, the physical world" (Cameron, p. 21) but simply everything that happened in ten and twenty generations of men. So in Heraclides' story of Hermes and Pythagoras the latter remembers his experience in all his incar-

¹ Of the passages earlier than Heraclides cited by Cameron not one connects Pythagoras or Pythagoreans *by name* with the doctrine of transmigration, not even Aristotle, *De Anima* 407 B 21 ff. (on which cf. my *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy*, p. 325, n. 130); this may be accidental in one way or another in the case of Ion (frag. 4), Xenophanes (frag. 7), Empedocles (frag. 129), and Herodotus (II, 123). As regards the last of these, however, the connection of transmigration with Pythagoras cannot be proved, as Cameron and others suppose, from the story of Salmoxis (IV, 95), for the Getae believe that they "go to Salmoxis" (IV, 94), who taught that he and his companions "would go to that place where *οἱ περὶ πάντας ἔχουσιν τὰ πάντα ἀγαθὰ*" and who persuaded them by reappearing *in his own form* (IV, 95); neither here nor in Plato's *Charmides* (156 D-157 C) is there any doctrine of transmigration.

Of a Pythagorean doctrine of liberation there is still less direct evidence. Cameron says that "we must believe" that such a contradiction belonged to fifth century Pythagoreanism because it belonged to Empedocles, Pindar, and Plato.

nations; he also remembers what happened to his soul in Hades, but there is nothing here about number or the "gradual recovery of the omniscience the divine soul once had before its human experience began" or a release from the cycle in consequence of such a recovery. Neither does the story of Hippasus show that Pythagoras' wisdom of numbers was the recovery in the course of many lives of what his soul had lost on first being bound to the body. Cameron argues (pp. 24-25) that Hippasus must have split with orthodox Pythagoreans on a vital issue, that this must have been the doctrine of number, and that, since the travesty which he published was called *μυστικός λόγος*, the doctrine was a mystic *lógos* of number, the Pythagorean mystery religion. Even if the premises here were certain,² the legitimate conclusion would still be far from that which Cameron draws from them. The same must be said of the material taken from Heraclides: the "three lives" story affords even less evidence than that of Hermes and Pythagoras for a doctrine of pre-experiential knowledge which, recovered by the exercise of memory, frees the soul from the wheel of birth.³ Of number, recollection, and transmigration there is nothing in Alcmaeon; according to Cameron that is because he was not a *bona fide* initiate, in spite of which, however, he reflects the Pythagorean concept of *θεωρία* and his reference to astral motion in explanation of the soul's immortality indicates how the Pythagoreans found in astronomy a pattern of the wheel of birth. Cameron fails to notice Alcmaeon's distinction between man and the other animals (frag. 1a); that looks very much like a direct denial of metempsychosis in the Pythagorean sense, in which case his explanation of immortality could not be a Pythagorean "pattern of transmigration."⁴ Whatever his con-

² The evidence concerning Hippasus is very weak. Heraclides Lembus ascribed the *μυστικός λόγος* to him (D. L., VIII, 7), but Demetrius denied that he left any writing (D. L., VIII, 84). Aristotle does not call him a Pythagorean or imply that "he turned from number to the Heraclitean principle," and neither apparently did Theophrastus.

³ Cameron makes much (pp. 36 and 80) of a passage of Clement (*Strom.*, II, xxi, 130) according to which Heraclides said that Pythagoras taught *τὴν ἐπιστήμην τῆς τελευτῆτος τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι*. *ἀριθμῶν*, however, is an emendation of *ἀρετῶν*, made on the basis of Theodoret's *τὴν τελευτάτην ἀριθμῶν ἐπιστήμην ἔσχατον ὑπελάμβανεν ἀγαθόν*, which indicates that, if *ἀριθμῶν* be read, *τῆς ψυχῆς* does not depend upon it, as Cameron supposes, but that the meaning would be: "the soul's happiness is the knowledge of the perfection of numbers."

Zeller (*Phil. Griech.*, I^o, p. 569, n. 1) expressly rejected the passage as valueless for early Pythagoreanism. In any case, Cameron's defense of Heraclides as a witness for fifth century Pythagoreanism overlooks the fact that sometimes at least Heraclides certainly put into the mouth of Pythagoras what was Platonic in origin (e. g. frag. 36, Voss; it is of no moment whether the fragment comes directly or indirectly from Heraclides).

⁴ Cf. L. A. Stella, "Importanza di Alcmeone," *R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, CCOXXXVI (1939), S. VI, Vol. VIII, pp. 255 and 275 ff.

ception of the soul, however, his first fragment is certainly not to be interpreted in Cameron's fashion. In the first place, to say that gods have clear knowledge whereas for men there is *τεκμαίρεσθαι* is surely not an attempt "to annihilate the gap between human and divine"; in the second place, *περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων τεκμαίρεσθαι* is not a principle which can be shown to be specifically Pythagorean.⁵

In order to eliminate any break in fifth century Pythagorean doctrine Cameron contends that, contrary to the usual opinion, the *Phaedo* shows Philolaus to have thought the *ψυχῇ-ἁρμονία* theory an argument *in favor* of immortality, and in the Philolaic fragments he tries to find support for a conception of *ἁρμονία* which would be compatible with immortality, i. e. "a Harmonia which preceded the synthesized elements." Now it is true that Philolaus, if he opposed suicide (*Phaedo* 61 D-E), most probably believed in immortality and also that there is no good reason for taking the theory of Simmias (*Phaedo* 85 E ff.) to be Pythagorean; but Cameron is mistaken in thinking that *Phaedo* 88 D proves Echecrates—and so the Philolaic Pythagoreans—to have held that the theory of the soul as *ἁρμονία* is an assurance of its immortality. When Echecrates says *καὶ πάντῃ δέομαι πάλιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄλλου τινὸς λόγου ὃς με πείσει κτλ.*, he does not mean an argument other than that the soul is *ἁρμονία τις* but one other than that of Socrates which had previously convinced him but had then been shaken by the objections of Simmias and Cebes (cf. 88 D 1-3). That not until Simmias had spoken was Echecrates reminded of his own predilection for the notion *τὸ ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἡμῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν* and the vague *τινά* itself would both indicate that he had never seriously connected this opinion with the belief in immortality.⁶

The evidence fails to show that the Pythagoreans connected the belief in transmigration with the doctrine that "all things are number" or that they had any notion at all of pre-experiential knowledge; in the case of Plato it shows positively that Cameron's thesis is mistaken. The first proof of the *Phaedo*

⁵ Cf. the saying ascribed to Solon: *τὰ ἀφανῆ τοῖς φανεροῖς τεκμαίρου* (Diels-Kranz, I, p. 63, 22); Herodotus, I, 57; II, 33, 2; Hippocrates, *περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἰητρικῆς*, chap. 22. Capelle (*Die Vorsokratiker*, p. 112, n. 1) calls the fragment a recognition of the limitation of all human knowledge; and Miss Stella interprets it as a polemical admonition to the Pythagorean friends of Alemaeon (*loc. cit.*, pp. 239-243).

⁶ The Philolaic fragments, as Cameron admits, say nothing about transmigration; but frag. 10, moreover, to which he does not refer, says expressly that *ἁρμονία* is a synthesis of opposites. Since Cameron does not support with arguments his belief that these fragments "or their source are older than Plato or Aristotle," I shall not go into the question of their authenticity except to say that, since he seems to admit that they contain "definite anachronisms," it would appear that only those elements could be confidently accepted as early which could be proved by independent evidence to be so.

(70 C ff.), Cameron argues, must be Pythagorean because it makes the real nature of generation depend upon the principle of the mean. The analogy of waking and sleeping which Plato here uses for the cycle of life and death would remind any reader of Heraclitus (frags. 88 and 62; cf. also Melissus, frag. 8 [I, p. 274, 3-7]); and Cameron's contention that Heraclitus cannot be the source because he was "not particularly interested in the mean" has no weight, for the geometrical mean has been shown to have been a basic pattern of Heraclitus' thought (cf. H. Fränkel, *A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], pp. 309-337). At 103 A it is an interlocutor whose anonymity is particularly stressed who refers to the basis of the first proof as inconsistent with Socrates' later argument. Moreover, Socrates does not "abandon this earlier proof"; he denies the inconsistency, saying that the earlier doctrine is true of τὰ ἐναντία πράγματα but not of αὐτὰ τὰ ἐναντία (103 B)⁷ and thus making the same distinction between the sensible and intelligible which at the end of the *Cratylus* (439 D) introduces the argument against the doctrine of Heraclitus. Whether or not Plato got from Heraclitus the notion of an equilibrium in change, the formulation of the argument is his own. Against Cameron's attempt to reduce it to "the principle of the mean" and so to make it correspond with the ἀρμονία of the Philolaic fragments it is enough to observe that the whole point of the argument is that there must be not one but *two* processes between each pair of contraries; the analogy of the harmonic mean could never suggest this argument, which is not mathematical anyway,—even in expression.⁸

Meno 81 A-85 D is the other passage on which the second part of Cameron's demonstration chiefly rests. Here, he says, "mathematics is shown to be the prenatal divine knowledge of the soul

*It is worth observing that Cebes is made expressly to deny that any such confusion had troubled him (103 C). This itself should have made Cameron hesitate to jump to the conclusion that, since the Pythagorean numbers were πράγματα, Plato must have these numbers in mind when he refers to πράγματα in 103 B. The examples given in 70 D-71 A which he now calls πράγματα were fair and foul, greater and less, stronger and weaker, swifter and slower, better and worse, just and unjust; and there is no suggestion that he is thinking of number at all.

*Plato does not speak of a "mean" or a "proportion" but of "processes between contraries." Cameron does not consider Aristotle's references to this argument (n. b. especially *De Generatione* 338 B 8-19 and 318 A 13-26; cf. *Metaphysics* 994 A 25-B 6, [*De Mixt.*] 975 A 21-32), in none of which is there any indication of a mathematical analogy or a connection with Pythagoreanism. A mathematical "analogy" of circular motion—and a Pythagorean one at that—does exist; it is ascribed to Archytas ([Aristotle], *Problemata* 915 A 25-32), but it is not applied to generation and destruction and, what is most significant, it does *not* reckon with a "mean," for it makes the formula of the motion that returns on itself ἡ τοῦ ἴσου ἀναλογία. Cameron's treatment of ἀρμονία in the Philolaic fragments is quite confused; his notion (p. 65, n. 32) that Ueberweg-Praechter considers the argument "on opposites" to be Pythagorean arises from misconstruction of the German.

through which man can win back all knowledge"; that in "bringing a geometrical proof to the theory of recollected divine knowledge" Plato follows a recognized Pythagorean practice; and that; since the single thing by recollection of which all other things can be sought out is a mathematical proof, the whole truth of kindred nature is to be understood as the mathematical scheme of all life. Now *Meno* 81 C (περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων) shows that Plato does not give mathematical objects any such special place in the doctrine of reminiscence; and *Phaedrus* 249 E-250 D alone would refute Cameron's frequently repeated assertion that "recollection and transmigration are consistently approached from a mathematical point of view."⁹ Luckily, however, Plato himself indicates his reason for choosing a "geometrical proof" in the *Meno*; he needed as an example something about which Meno himself would be satisfied that the slave could not have had previous instruction (85 E). What is the clearest proof of a theory (cf. *Phaedo* 73 A7-B2 [n. b. ἐνταῦθα σαφέστατα κατηγορεῖ]) is not for that reason the most important content of the theory thus demonstrated.¹⁰ There is no reason, then, to suppose that "the kinship of nature" in the *Meno* is meant to be a "number-pattern."¹¹ At any rate in the *Phaedo* the

⁹ In his Conclusion Cameron adduces *Timaeus* 41 A ff. and the myth of Er to show that number consistently reappears in "even the most mystical of Plato's accounts of recollection." The myth of Er is Pythagorean, apparently because "there is only one way in which the soul can be 'saved by wisdom,' . . . the way of recollection by pursuit of number." This, however, is not what Plato says; it is a construction based upon a statement of Olympiodorus on the *Phaedo*. There is no "pursuit of number" in the myth of Er, and the studies which will save at the time of the great test are not mathematics (cf. 618 B-619 A, 619 C-E). As for the *Timaeus*, Cameron's mistranslation of συνεπισπόμενος in 42 C (which he seems to mistake for a form of ἐποιμαι) vitiates his interpretation of the passage; it means that there is no release from transmigration until the rational part of the soul gains mastery over the passions and the body. The "nature of the universe" shown the souls before birth is the world of ideas; there is no more indication here than in the passage of similar purport in the *Phaedrus* (cf. 247 D ff.) that this is "mathematical."

¹⁰ Mathematics was also important in Plato's eyes as a propaedeutic. This, as *Republic* 524 D-528 C shows, is the meaning of 522 C where the reference to number makes Cameron think that Plato in 521 C is writing "with his eye on the Pythagorean idea that immortality (!) is won by a knowledge of number through a transmigratory life." In 533 D dialectic uses mathematics to draw up the eye of the soul from the barbaric slime; since Plato there is certainly using Heraclitean language and Orphic "mythology" (cf. Fränkel, *loc. cit.*, pp. 311-312 and n. 32), it is clearly wrong to see in the former praise of mathematical studies a necessary or even probable reference to Pythagoreanism.

¹¹ *Phaedo* 70 D does not state the kinship of nature, as Cameron says that it does, stopping his quotation short of καὶ ἐν ἀλλήβδην ὅσα περ ἔχει γένεσιν in which Socrates includes τὸ καλόν, τὸ δίκαιον, etc. It states the universality of the law that "anything that has an opposite can come to be only from that opposite." Similarly in 75 C after τὸ ἴσον

soul strives for no such "number-pattern" but for the ideas; these, however, are according to Cameron just the Pythagorean numbers "taken out of nature" to provide for the "element of falling short" which was so apparent to Plato in the world of nature. Such an account, it seems to me, makes nonsense of the theory of ideas as a considered answer to the fundamental problem of knowledge, the problem which makes the most serious trouble for Aristotle when he denies the "separation of the form." Moreover, it is self-contradictory, for the "falling short" of phenomena could not occur to anyone who had not already conceived the necessity for qualitative absolutes. That "embodied numbers" fall short of "numbers" is a notion which can arise only after the real is seen to be qualitatively absolute. Number, as the *Cratylus* says (432 A-C) is not the best but the worst, i. e. the most difficult, example by which to explain the likeness which falls short of the original. At first sight it would seem to be an exception to that relationship, which can be seen to apply to number as it does to other things only after the real numbers are recognized to be each "incomparable units." Had Plato started by "seeking out number in nature" he would never have seen the necessity of "separating the ideas."¹³ Neither does Plato state the theory of recollection as a "deduction from the idea of transmigration." On the contrary, the pre-existence of the soul is deduced as a necessary consequence of anamnesis (cf. *Phaedo* 72 E and 92 C), while anamnesis is presented as a necessary deduction from the nature of knowledge and "learning" (cf. *Phaedo* 73 B-77 A; *Meno* 85 D-86 B). Plato's theory of recollection could not be deduced from transmigration, and any "recollection" following merely from this would not answer Meno's question but would only postpone the answer to it. Socrates' remark at *Meno* 86 B shows how in-

is used to prove that knowledge is prior to corporeal existence, the proof is said to concern τὸ ἴσον no more than ἀπαντα οἱς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τὸ αὐτὸ δ ἔστι."

¹³ The attempt to bring together *Phaedo* 74 A (. . . συμβαίνει τὴν ἀνάμνησιν εἶναι μὲν ἀφ' ὁμοίων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνομοίων) with the sixth Philolaic fragment (τὰ μὲν ὡς ὁμοία καὶ ὁμόφωνα ἀρμονίας οὐδὲν ἐπεδέοντο, τὰ δὲ ἀνόμοια μὴδὲ ὁμόφωνα μὴδὲ ἰσοταγὴ ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀρμονία συγκεκλείσθαι) is a failure. I cannot see that any sense is made for either passage by Cameron's statement: "the Harmonia, like Recollection in the *Phaedo*, is thus recognized by the likenesses in things." The *Phaedo* passage serves as the basis for Socrates' proof that since sensible objects remind us of what they are not, i. e. of those absolutes toward which they tend but of which they fall short, we must have had knowledge of those absolutes before our birth (74 D-75 C). The Philolaic passage has no hint of recollection, no indication that the harmony by which the unlike principles of the cosmos are bound together has any rôle in a theory of knowledge. (It is quite unjustifiable to use [Iamblichus], *Theol. Arith.*, p. 79, 5-8, De Falco, in this connection, for the ultimate source of the notion there expressed is Speusippus' own brand of Platonism [frag. 4, 13-17, p. 64, Lang, = *Theol. Arith.*, p. 83, 1-6].)

complete and tentative Plato thinks the relationship between the "proof" and the "myth" which introduces it. What is used as an introduction to an exposition obviously need not be that from which Plato's theory is "derived" either historically or logically.¹³

HAROLD CHERNISS.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

HANS RÆDER. *Platons Epinomis*. (*Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabskabernes Selskab. Historisk-filologiske Meddelelser.*, XXVI, 1). København, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1938. Pp. 64. Kr. 2.75.

It must be conceded that by the criteria of vocabulary, of clausulae, of avoidance of hiatus, the *Epinomis* cannot be proved unplatonic; there remains the question of style, or more specifically "Satztekonik." Yet research has not progressed far enough on this interesting subject to admit the sort of proof that would carry conviction even with scholars insensible to the niceties of style, when not driven home by statistics; in the meantime, opinion is divided, and Ræder, in this paper, comes to support his early belief in the authenticity¹ by a careful examination of the latest arguments against it, and a short summary of the dialogue itself.

His paper is divided into five sections. In the first the problem of the authenticity is presented, with a short list of defenders and attackers of the dialogue's Platonic origin among modern scholars,² and a brief account of evidence and arguments from Diogenes Laertius and Proclus down to the abbé Sallier, Zeller, and Stallbaum.

In the second part, Ræder answers the linguistic objections. He does not counter all the arguments adduced by Friedrich Müller³ and W. Theiler,⁴ but selects "einige typische Beispiele."

¹³ The argument from opposites in the *Phaedo* is not "derived from" the *παλαιὸς λόγος*, but is presented as a proof of what that *λόγος* implies and itself introduces the proof from reminiscence because remembering and forgetting are also two processes intermediate between two opposites (cf. Robin, *Phédon*² [Budé edition], pp. xxvii f. and n.b. *Theaetetus* 188 A).

¹ Hans Ræder, *Platons philosophische Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1905), p. 413.

² It is unfortunate that Ræder is not acquainted with my article ("Aristotle's Protrepticus and the Structure of the *Epinomis*," *T. A. P. A.*, LXVII [1936], pp. 261-285), where an (incomplete) topical analysis is attempted; his remarks might have been illuminating.

³ *Stilistische Untersuchung der Epinomis des Philippos von Opus* (Berlin dissertation, 1927).

⁴ Review of F. Müller and of A. E. Taylor's *Plato and the Authorship of the Epinomis* (London, 1929) in *Gnomon*, VII (1931), pp. 337-355.

One could wish he had gone further, as these discussions about style have an interest that is not confined to the immediate object, the determination of the authenticity or spuriousness of the *Epinomis*, but throw light on such larger problems as the development of ideas (in Plato, if the dialogue is genuine, or in passing from Plato to a disciple, if not), the modification of language, and especially the mechanics and devices of artistic prose. Among the traits pointed out by Müller as indicating the spuriousness of the dialogue, and here discussed by Ræder, are the "Intensivierung des Ausdrucks," avoidance of technical expressions, periphrases with the neuter article (as τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας), μὲν solitarium, and hyperbaton; it is shown that the greater intensity of expression in the *Epinomis* is not so considerable, in Ræder's opinion, as to make it impossible for the author of the *Laws* to have composed it; that the technical term στοιχεῖα, which the *Epinomis* avoids, is rejected by Plato himself (*Timaeus* 48b8); and that examples of the other traits can be found in the *Laws*. Ræder grants that the style of the *Epinomis* is even more "schwerfällig" and "verwickelt" than that of the *Laws*, but attributes the increase of these qualities to Plato's own development. He holds (pp. 20 f.) the conclusion generally drawn from this observation to be psychologically impossible: that a forger, to make his imitation plausible, had made a thorough study of Plato's later writings, but in carrying out his forgery had worked so clumsily as to misunderstand Plato's intentions and therefore exaggerated and distorted Plato's peculiar style. This hypothetical "forger" appears clearly wrong; the dialogue can be called spurious without displaying animus against its author. We can, after all, know nothing of his intentions unless we take his dialogue as a whole, discover its purpose, its genre, and the audience it addresses; and there is nothing to show that the author, supposing he was not Plato, was trying to present himself in that disguise; in other words, the author may not have been a "Fälscher" at all, but merely a member of the Academy who wished to supplement Plato's thought on certain points in Plato's own style (cf. Ræder in this paper, p. 36, n. 2) and modestly withheld his name from the publication. In such a case, there is nothing "psychologisch unmöglich" or even humanly improbable; and the inevitable disharmony of one man's thoughts expressed in another's language comes out in the structure of the sentences and the course of the argument.

In the third section Ræder discusses locutions and passages suspect not only on linguistic or stylistic grounds, but also because they run counter to the foundations of Platonic doctrine. Here Ræder treats of the parallels between the *Epinomis* on the one hand and the *Laws* and *Timaeus* on the other pointed out by J. Pavlu in a useful paper.⁶ Pavlu argues for imitation on

⁶ "Zur pseudoplatonischen *Epinomis*" (*Commentationes Vindobonenses*, II [1936], pp. 29-55).

the part of the author of the *Epinomis*, who keeps to the sense, but tries to disguise it by using different words (in German: . . . den Sinn festhält, ihn aber durch andere Worte unkenntlich machen will).⁶

In the fourth section Ræder analyzes the *Epinomis* and shows the "Verbindungslinien" with the other dialogues. He does not go far into the problem of the logical connection of the parts of the dialogue, but treats each part more or less separately. In one interesting case, at least, this procedure leads to a tangible inaccuracy. It is not quite correct to say (p. 51): "Dass nicht nur Träume und Weissagungen, sondern auch der Anblick des Sternenhimmels, des regelmässigen Laufs der Gestirne, Ursache des Götterglaubens sind, darin ist die *Epinomis* sowohl mit den *Gesetzen* (966 D-E) als mit Aristoteles in Übereinstimmung." The *Epinomis* starts from the received divinity of the sun, the moon, and the sky (Uranos),⁷ and passes from it to the divinity of the five remaining heavenly bodies (986b3-c5); in the passage of the *Laws* referred to, Plato bases belief in the Gods on the regular motion of the stars, as does Aristotle (frag. 10, Rose). Again, the attitude toward barbarians in the *Epinomis* is worthy of note: it is admitted that they first discovered the five planets (986e8 f., 987b3 f., where Mercury and Venus are spoken of, but it is clear that the same applies to the remaining three). The author, as remarked above, lays great stress on the point that the five planets must be considered divine equally with Uranus, the sun, and the moon; but it appears as if he anticipated a certain reluctance on the part of his audience to accept such barbarian wisdom. To overcome this reluctance he resorts to the following considerations: first, the clearness of the night sky in "Syria" and Egypt explains the age-long observation of the heavens there and the priority of their inhabitants in the discovery of the planets (986e9-987a6). But to offset any unfavorable impression this concession may have produced, he praises the climate of Greece, and its fostering of ἀρετή, in terms reminiscent of Hippocrates and Plato (*Timaeus* 24c5-7). He then clinches his point by adding that whatever Greeks take over from barbarians they ultimately improve (987d9-e1). Ræder's short summary of the argument (p. 53) fails to note the author's purpose in using the passage of the *Timaeus*. This failure is characteristic of this part of his paper: he notes the sources in Plato of many of the λόγοι, but often omits to account for their use, fails then in really penetrating the mind of the author and the sequence of thought of the dialogue.

In the fifth and last section Ræder sums up: the dialogue is full of Platonic ideas, and is most closely connected with the *Laws*, less so with the *Timaeus*. The very fact that the dialogue

⁶ Pavlu, *loc. cit.*, p. 46; Ræder, p. 25.

⁷ Cf. Plato, *Apology* 26d1-3 for divinity of the sun and moon.

is so rich in Platonic thoughts is used by the abbé Sallier, for example, to demonstrate its spuriousness; Ræder on the other hand thinks that the fact that these thoughts are almost never reproduced *verbatim* is the best proof that it is authentic. To this I can only say that another pupil of Plato, Aristotle, is even more replete with Platonic thought than the *Epinomis*, and that he likewise does not often quote *verbatim*,⁸ but rather uses the Platonic notions as premises or topics. For one who knows Plato the change of significance in the thoughts as they occur in Plato and as they occur, torn from their context, in Aristotle, is very real. In Plato they arise naturally in the course of the argument, they come from the character of Socrates or the Athenian stranger, from the society and life of Athens; in Aristotle, and to a certain extent in the *Epinomis*, the life from which the thought arose has disappeared, and in the alien context of the pupil the ideas of the master resemble rows of butterflies, killed, dried, and pinned on trays. To abandon this image, the fragments of Plato are handled as topics; and although many older men tend to handle the ideas of their youth in this way, we have no evidence of such behavior on the part of Plato, where the conversational form and the change of interlocutors from dialogue to dialogue serve to prevent such fossilization of thought. Ræder, on the other hand, proceeds to deal with such notions of his opponents as "ein treuer Schüler" and "gegen den Meister zu polemisieren," with which he makes short work. The kind of milieu which suggests such notions is all too evident. But Plato's school was not Epicurus', and there are more things that distinguish pupil from master than the deportment and conformity of the pupil, and this fundamental difference in the premises of thought is one: the "pupil" takes his master's premises and conclusions and operates with them, often in forgetfulness or ignorance of the master's reason for using such and such a premise or reaching such and such a conclusion; while the master, in ways mysterious to us, produces his ideas far more immediately from his own experience and thought.

The paper closes with some sober generalizations on the course of Platonic studies in the nineteenth century, on Ast's and Zeller's "Platonbild," both now shattered, but living on in certain mistaken views. Ræder's position is that (p. 63) "Die einzige gesunde Methode besteht . . . darin, dass wir unser Platonbild nach den vorliegenden Schriften, deren Unechtheit sich nicht mit entscheidenden Gründen beweisen lässt, ausformen; sollte dann das Bild Widersprüche aufweisen, müssen

⁸ Cf. the analysis of Aristotle, *E. N. init.*, in P. Shorey, "The Idea of Good in Plato's 'Republic': A Study in the Logic of Speculative Ethics" (*The University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, I, 1895), p. 209, n. 1.

wir bedenken, dass darin bei einer fünfzigjährigen schriftstellerischen Tätigkeit gar nichts auffallendes liegt." These remarks are persuasive, but apart from the various constructions that may be put on the nature of "decisive reasons," they do not do full justice to the importance of the problem. If the dialogue is authentic, we have a senile Plato misusing *τόποι*, and writing with an old man's arrogance a collection of second-hand and half-misunderstood remarks which cannot be paralleled in the admittedly genuine works; if it is spurious, the dialogue is, with what remains of the early Aristotle, our best source for the philosophy of the older Academy at the close of Plato's life or shortly after his death; and, as such, of supreme importance for tracing the development of Aristotle. If, as we may assume, the writings of Plato were accepted in the Academy as basic doctrine, a kind of thesaurus of unquestioned *τόποι* and ideas, and the work of the Academics contained amplifications of those ideas and *τόποι*, or their application to new problems and new fields, these more or less derivative writings competed with each other, but not with Plato, and are therefore to be understood by being compared with each other. It is by examining the *Epinomis* in this light that its authenticity will be determined or refuted, if it is ever refuted or determined to general satisfaction.⁹

BENEDIOT EINARSON.

CHICAGO, ILL.

E. ZELLER-R. MONDOLFO. *La Filosofia dei Greci nel suo Sviluppo Storico. Parte I. I Presocratici. Testo della Va edizione tedesca con nuovi aggiornamenti. Vol. II. Ionici e Pitagorici.* Firenze, "La Nuova Italia," 1938. Pp. 719.

This second volume of Professor Mondolfo's revision of Zeller's 5th edition deals with the Ionians and the Pythagoreans. A general review of Pre-Socratic philosophy in its first period is followed by two hundred pages on the Ionians whereas, following Zeller, the author devotes some four hundred pages to the study of Pythagoreanism.

A brief résumé of the introductory section, "Carattere e pro-

⁹ There is little fault to be found with Ræder's interpretation of the actual text of the *Epinomis*, except that it does not go deep enough. On p. 24, n. 2, however, he counters Jaeger's remark (*Aristoteles*, p. 26, n. 1) about the *προαίμα* Critias and Megillus have received (*Epinomis* 980d4 f.), "Hier ist man plötzlich mitten im Kolleg," with a reference to *θεῖον* in *Critias* 108b4, d8—surely not similar enough to imply a "Kolleg." *θεῖον* is part of the image of the speaker as *ποιητής* (108b5). The *Critias* further supposes but four persons present, as does the *Timaeus*, not a numerous enough gathering, one would suppose, to constitute a non-metaphorical *θεῖον*.

cesso di sviluppo della filosofia nel primo periodo" (pp. 1-98), will indicate the nature and extent of Mondolfo's additions to the original. First (pp. 1-6), there is a long bibliographical note including a) source material, b) a review of bibliographical hand-books and indices, c) works on the Pre-Socratics usefully classed by general and specific subjects. Zeller's notes are frequently expanded but the author's main contribution is made in the form of a long note (pp. 27-98) where, starting with Zeller's thesis, he makes a critical review of the study, bringing it down to the present time, and concluding with a statement of his own views. Finally (pp. 89-98), there is a supplementary bibliography of works upon various aspects of the development of Pre-Socratic philosophy. This method of expansion of Zeller's work is carried through for each of the Ionians and for the Pythagoreans. We have as a result an exhaustive study of sufficient importance to stand in its own right, apart from Zeller, as a new work on the subject concerned. It is a huge and complex piece of work and one for which the reviewer can only suggest some of the main points with occasional reference to details of the argument.

Mondolfo's is a unitarian's point of view; a view which finds a fundamental unity of scientific inquiry, both naturalistic and mathematical, on the one hand, and, on the other, "concezioni generali, suggerite sia dalla speculazione mistica sia dalla riflessione sui problemi umani" (p. 45). Thus Zeller is criticized (pp. 50, 57, 71) for failure to take full account of ethical elements in the beginnings of Greek thought. Others are criticized for refusing to reckon with the unified religio-philosophical character (p. 682) of the Pythagorean tradition. The author's own interpretation which attempts to trace the intricate relation of these apparently disparate elements is one which owes much to the work of such scholars as Joël, Tannery, Burnet, Heidel, Rey. From each of these, taking his departure from Zeller, Mondolfo has preserved something for the formulation of his own conclusions. Jaeger's *Paideia*, though it appeared too late for the author to consider it in forming his own conclusions, is discussed in an appendix (pp. 80 ff.). It is a book which in its conception of the unity of Greek thought has much in common with this one. However, important points of disagreement, along with many of agreement, are listed. For example, Mondolfo divides with Jaeger in holding that the Greeks passed from consideration of the human world to the physical universe rather than the reverse (p. 87). His argument is enforced with an interpretation of ἀδύνα in the all-important Anaximander fragment (*Frag. d. Vors.* 2A, 9), which he sees as the final stage of the projection of "le nozione dell'ordine giuridico" (p. 89) from the human sphere to the vaster cosmic sphere.

The author's unitarianism has free rein in his discussion of the Pythagoreans. Indeed the synthesis of religion, philosophy,

science, and politics is so basic here that we may perhaps look to his study of this school (pp. 288-688) as providing the model for his interpretation of the others. A review of Pythagorean studies and Mondolfo's own contribution show how widely their scope has been and can be extended. Parmenides, Pindar, Aeschylus, Epicharmus and Democritus, among others, are added to illuminate the few classic references from Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Alcmaeon, Herodotus, and the hotly debated testimony of Plato and Aristotle. The author's careful consideration of this material is a convincing demonstration of the wide diffusion of Pythagorean ideas and influences, a diffusion which the sceptics have steadily refused to admit as a historical fact, but which when properly realized provides, as this work shows, a main approach to the whole study of Pre-Socratic philosophy. An illustration of the importance of understanding this diffusion is to be found in the author's analysis of Parmenides' poem as evidence of his close relation to Pythagoreanism (pp. 326 f., 646, 651 f.). Mondolfo holds (p. 651) that the poem is the new truth which has come to the convert from error, i. e. from Pythagoreanism, which last in turn is described in the *doxa*. It is surprising to find no reference in the detailed discussion to the excellent work of Professor Cornford in this field.

Mondolfo believes in an unbroken development (p. 642) of a Pythagorean religious philosophy (p. 472) from early times. Hence concepts such as *ἁρμονία*, *λόγος μέγας* (p. 669) belong to a pre-Heraclitean stage. Cosmic respiration (pp. 649 f., 670) is at least as old as Xenophanes. Philolaus' *ὥσπερ ἐν φρουρῇ* (*Frag. d. Vors.* B 15) (p. 472) has both cosmological and an ethico-religious significance. It is related, we are told, to Anaximander's *τὸ θεῖον* (cf. pp. 139 ff.) *περιέχειν ἅπαντα καὶ πάντα κυβερνᾶν* (Aristotle, *Phys.* III, 4, 203 B), and to Aeschylus, *frag.* 70 (Nauck). A full discussion of the Philolaic fragments is given (pp. 367-382) where the author differs from Burnet, Frank, and others in holding that these writings were known to Plato.

With the outlines and with many details of this study of Pythagoreanism the reviewer finds himself in close agreement. It does seem, however, that before we can retain confidently within the framework of early Pythagoreanism all that Mondolfo would have us retain we sometimes need a more convincing exposition of the historical relation of one theory to another. For example, in the case of theories of the soul four are listed (p. 562): 1) the self-moving soul, 2) respiration as a principle of life, attributed equally to the soul and to the universe, 3) the transmigratory soul, 4) the soul as number, harmony, or combination of opposites. The last, if we are to use the *Phaedo* (85e-86) as a commentary, cannot stand with a belief in immortality. Mondolfo's solution, following Rostagni, that the somatic and daemonic division of the soul is an early Pythagorean idea leads to a confusion. In fact it leads to the confusion which

Zeller tried to dispel and which Mondolfo himself deplores elsewhere (p. 660), namely, the habit of seeing in Pythagoreanism with Burnet a distinction between matter and form. Moreover, if such a somatic-daemonic theory, inherent in Plato's myth of Er, had been also Philolaus' theory of immortality, why is it not mentioned in the *Phaedo* where the criticism is made that the fundamental Pythagorean concept *ἀφθονία*, no matter how you look at it, does not logically support a belief in immortality? The true relation seems to me to be, 1) Mondolfo is right in placing *ψυχή-ἀφθονία* and immortality in the Pythagorean tradition; 2) he is wrong in supposing that the Pythagoreans were so acutely aware of a contradiction as to produce the essentially Platonic solution of somatic and daemonic divisions. Plato realized the contradiction, not the Pythagoreans.

Finally, the reviewer feels that Pythagoreanism as described here may be placed too quickly in the full current of Pre-Socratic debate, or at least on evidence which is unfortunately doubtful. For example, Mondolfo sees (pp. 314 ff.) in the belief attributed to Xenophanes (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 19) that the substance (*οὐσία*) of God does not breathe (*μὴ μέντοι ἀναπνεῖν*) not a simple declaration against anthropomorphism but a reference to the Pythagorean theory of cosmic respiration (Aristotle, *Phys.* 213 B). Pindar, *Nem.* VI, 1 ff. is used by Mondolfo to substantiate this interpretation of early Pythagoreanism. This the Pindar passage can do only on a very technical rendering of *πνέομεν*. The author goes on then to speak of a Pythagorean dualism of cosmos and pneuma. He calls it (p. 316) a full dualism as opposed to a Heracleitean demand for unity. Surely we are proceeding here on questionable evidence to a formulation of ideology for early Pythagoreanism which is contrary to the obvious absence of integration frequently noted by Mondolfo himself.

Such criticisms as these do not affect the reviewer's estimate of the value of this book. It deserves a place on the reference shelf of every scholar who needs to inform himself upon the literature of the subject and who wants to know where the debate now stands on the multitude of problems which have arisen in this complex field. One is impelled to question the wisdom of Professor Mondolfo's decision (cf. vol. I, pp. 11-14) to publish his work as a revision of Zeller. No doubt the continuity and development of modern scholarship in the field is thus emphasized. Moreover, the book's value as a reference book is perhaps in this way enhanced. But as far as Mondolfo's own conclusions are concerned, they are frequently so remote from Zeller's, whatever the latter's intuitions may have been (p. 595), that I believe they would have benefited from a separate and, therefore, less voluminous statement.

ALISTER CAMERON.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

OTTO KERN. *Die Religion der Griechen. Dritter Band: Von Platon bis Kaiser Julian.* Berlin, Weidmann, 1938. Pp. 352.

The first volume of Kern's history of Greek religion, "*Von den Anfängen bis Hesiod*," appeared in 1926; the second, "*Die Hochblüte bis zum Ausgange des fünften Jahrhunderts*," in 1935. The third volume brings the work to a close with a grand total of nearly a thousand pages. Since the first volumes have been available for some years, scholars will already have become aware of their merits and their usefulness. In the last volume they will find the same qualities, the same form and style, and the same procedure.

In the last chapter of all the author reviews, in a summary way, the explorations which have been made in the field of Greek religion from ancient times to the present day. The efforts of the investigators through all these centuries, he tells us, though they have yielded much that is significant, have largely been vitiated by misconception and misdirection. In particular, much harm has been done by confusing religion and mythology and treating them as if they were one and the same thing. Within the past few decades, however, Kern maintains, the true purpose and the true method have been discerned: the historical development of Hellenic religion must be traced by tracing the development, in conception and cult, of every individual divinity. This is the straightforward path. It is toilsome, he admits, and it is beset with will-o'-the-wisps by which the explorer may be diverted; but if it is followed with single-minded persistence, it will lead successfully to the goal.

Without denying the truth of this, one may still recognize its daring assurance. Scholars in the past have often enough been certain that they were on the right track and have found in the end that it led them only deeper into the jungle. And there may be more than one right way of studying Greek religion. Still, however this may be, one must acknowledge that notable results have been obtained by the new method in recent years, and Kern in the present book pauses to take account of stock and to report on what has been accomplished. He gives a wise and temperate summing-up of what is known, displaying his great erudition both in regard to the ancient sources of knowledge and in regard to the writings of modern scholars. There is little controversy in the book. Concerning matters which are ill understood he indicates how much can be certainly known; and if there are rival views, he adopts one as sound, without arguing the case, or frankly leaves the issue undetermined. It is impossible to undertake a criticism of his opinions on the infinite number of matters which he discusses. It is enough to say that they are on the whole sound and conservative, not wild or erratic. The style is lucid, unmarred by verbosity and obscurantism. One can

open the book anywhere and read with satisfaction and profit. Continuous reading, however, through the book, is not so easy, because, as a matter of fact, it is practically an encyclopedia of short articles on multitudinous special topics. Its chief value is, perhaps, as a reference book, in which one can learn the present state of knowledge on particular subjects and discover the names of the scholars who have dealt with them most effectively. There is no cause for censure in the fact that a book whose subject is professedly "Greek religion" should treat its subject in such a way that its true title should be "the manifestations of religion in the Greek world." Religious ideas and practices were so bound up with all departments of Greek life that it is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate and describe an entity that one might call Greek religion. Indeed, a Greek religion in the sense of a structure with organic unity and solidarity never existed. Religion in the Greek world can be known only as the sum of its miscellaneous manifestations. These manifestations may exhibit on the whole national characteristics which distinguish them from the manifestations among other peoples, but these characteristics can be brought to light only by philosophical speculation on the actual religious data and by comparison with the other religions of the world. This particular task Kern has not undertaken. Indeed, it is a task which would be more readily undertaken by one who had only a limited and superficial knowledge of the subject than by a scholar like Kern who is so well aware of the infinite diversity of religion in Greece.

Since the book's greatest usefulness is for reference, it is not unfair to point out certain matters of form which somewhat lessen its value in this respect. Though students will go eagerly to it for information, they will be greatly impeded in their search by the fact that it is printed in a manner suitable for continuous reading but not for reference. It is divided into chapters with titles, but more than half of the titles give little indication of the contents. "Die griechischen Götter in Italien" (Chapter I), "Der Glaube Alexanders des Grossen" (Chapter III), "Gottmenschtum und Herrscherkult" (Chapter V), "Allgottheiten" (Chapter VI) are titles of essays which tell the reader just what he may expect. On the other hand, he gets little help from such titles as "Die hohe Zeit der Philosophie und der Volksreligion" (Chapter II), "Einbruch und Umbruch" (Chapter IV), "Vorbereitung des Synkretismus" (Chapter VII), "Alte und neue Heiligtümer und Feste" (Chapter VIII), "Alte und neue Mysterien" (Chapter IX), "Magie" (Chapter X), "Ausklang" (Chapter XI). Every chapter is composed of a series of brief articles on special topics, but one does not know what they are or where to look for them. The only guides are spaces between paragraphs and sometimes key-names in capital letters. There is no analytical table of contents, there are no sub-titles for parts



of chapters, there are no descriptive page-headings, the index (there is only one) is altogether deficient. This is regrettable, because the value of a book of this kind, sober, reliable, encyclopedic, is immeasurably increased if it can be consulted readily and quickly.

The twelfth and last chapter, of which something has already been said, bears the title "Von Aristoteles zu Wilamowitz." It has a special interest of its own. Since the names of many scholars are cited, with brief indication of the character of their work, it is useful as a catalogue for reference besides being a readable survey of progress. Unfortunately not all the names that are mentioned are to be found in the Index. Here as elsewhere the author insists that you read his whole book. The ancient writers for whom he finds a place, besides Aristotle, are Apollodorus (*Περὶ Θεῶν*), Philodemus, Cornutus, and Porphyry. Following these, two pages are given to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thereafter the remainder of the chapter (28 pages out of a total of 39) is devoted to Germans, with the exception of two or three Scandinavians and two Englishmen (Andrew Lang and Herbert Spencer). The course of history, one gathers, has followed an almost straight line from Stagira to Berlin. Among the Germans the most space is given to the three great pupils of Usener, Hermann Diels, Carl Robert, and Wilamowitz-Moellendorff. The chapter closes with a twelve-page panegyric of Wilamowitz. Though Kern does not always agree with the opinions of Wilamowitz, he speaks of him in superlative terms of admiration. Indeed, the praise which he lavishes on his hero is perhaps greater than he is aware. He seems to be unconscious that his own scholarly temperament is strikingly different from that of Wilamowitz. Whereas Wilamowitz is brilliant, speculative, audacious, impatient, Kern is sober, cautious, industrious, critical. What one misses in "Der Glaube der Hellenen" one finds in "Die Religion der Griechen," and *vice versa*. Kern's book is the result of patient research whose purpose is to discover the facts and is not much illuminated by imagination; Wilamowitz seeks "eine Offenbarung des Göttlichen." The successive sentences in Kern's writing impart bits of information, like beads on a string; lightnings play in the sentences of Wilamowitz, with rapid flashes of insight. Neither book could well be spared.

IVAN M. LINFORTH.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

AUGUST SCHMEKEL. *Die Positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Erster Band. Forschungen zur Philosophie des Hellenismus.* Berlin, Weidmann, 1938. Pp. viii + 677.

In 1914 A. Schmekel published the second volume of a projected history of "positive philosophy." He did not publish the first volume at that time; and because of various delays he was never able to complete it. After his death in 1934 his son, J. Schmekel, prepared the manuscript of the first volume for publication. Although many sections of the published text were apparently put in final form by A. Schmekel before his death, the work as a whole is not complete. It suffers especially from the absence of any introduction or conclusion, and from the lack of adequate transitions between the various chapters.

The title, *Die Positive Philosophie*, is somewhat misleading. Schmekel does not examine systematically the movements in ancient thought which anticipate modern positivism. He has almost entirely neglected, for instance, the contribution of the ancient empirical sciences to the development of a positivistic point of view. He is interested, rather, in the relation of philosophy to mathematics, and his most significant contribution in this volume is his study of the development of ancient mathematical logic.

The work contains three sections: 1. *Das astronomisch-metaphysische Weltbild*, chaps. 1-14; 2. *Untersuchungen zu Sextus Empiricus*, chaps. 15-28; 3. *Forschungen zur Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*, chaps. 29-38. In the first section Schmekel traces a mathematical tradition in metaphysics from Plato through Euclid, Archimedes, and Eratosthenes to Posidonius. He also argues that ancient astronomical theories presuppose a mathematical metaphysics. Although he overemphasizes considerably the importance of metaphysics in the ancient mathematical sciences, his portrayal of the development and spread of mathematical method is quite significant. The first section closes with an appendix on Stoic metaphysics.

In the second section Schmekel analyzes the works of Sextus, assigning almost all of the material in Sextus to one of two sources, either Carneades or Aenesidemus. His argument here is based on several very questionable assumptions; for instance, that Sextus' work is merely a compilation of earlier material, that almost all of it is derived from Carneades and Aenesidemus, and that the identity of the sources may be determined by the application of more or less mechanical tests. He then examines the differences between the views of Carneades and Aenesidemus, as he has formulated them; and from these differences he reconstructs the answers which the dogmatists, especially the Stoics, had made to the attacks of Carneades, and which in their turn were attacked by Aenesidemus.

This second section prepares the way for the third, in which Schmekel reconstructs the logic developed by the Stoics in the interval between Carneades and Aenesidemus. Combining evidence from Sextus with the evidence of other later writers on logic, such as Galen, Apuleius, Martianus Capella, and Clement of Alexandria, he maintains that the "younger" Stoic, Antipater, made a basic change in Stoic logic by applying to it mathematical methods, thus making it more abstract and formal than it had previously been. The arguments by which Schmekel reconstructs Antipater's philosophy are sometimes unconvincing; but his collection of material and his general conclusions about the nature of Stoic logic are well worth while.

From this brief sketch it will be seen that Schmekel discusses many problems of tremendous importance for the history of the relations between mathematics and philosophy in ancient times. Yet it is very disappointing to find that throughout the volume the focus of attention seems to be not on the importance of the ideas that are being discussed, but on the identity of the philosophers who propounded or transmitted these ideas—that is, on the problem of sources. Furthermore, Schmekel uses the same methods for identifying sources that he had used in 1892 in his *Philosophie der Mittleren Stoa*. These methods have long since been discredited; but Schmekel, who seldom mentions any publication this side of 1900, seems to have taken no cognizance of the criticisms of his earlier work. However, it must be recognized that if he had lived to complete his work, he might have included some defense of the methods that he uses. Schmekel's work can hardly be considered definitive; yet it presents many suggestive ideas which should stimulate the further study of Stoic logic.

PHILLIP HOWARD DE LACY.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY.

GRACE LUCILLE BEEDE. *Vergil and Aratus, a Study in the Art of Translation*. Chicago, 1936. Pp. 90. (Diss.)

As the title of Dr. Beede's dissertation indicates, she has undertaken to study Virgil as translator. The main subjects of her investigation are *Georgics* 356-465 and *Phaenomena* 773-1036, and these passages are comparatively analysed under the three heads of "Paragraph Structure," "Sentence Structure," and "Words and Phrases." The principles which she believes Virgil to have followed in "translating and adapting the work of Aratus" are compendiously set forth in a *Synthesis* (pp. 48-58), and a *Supplement* (pp. 69-90), in the form of notes on various details of the main analysis, contains a large number of analogous passages, in which Virgil's use of Varro, Theophrastus,

and Aristotle exhibits principles similar to those deduced from his adaptation of Aratus.¹ Detailed and thorough, yet always clear and orderly, Dr. Beede's comparison of the Virgilian and Aratean passages is an exemplary bit of stylistic analysis, so far as the presentation and the arrangement of the facts are concerned. She thus gives us the materials for a measurably deeper and clearer appreciation of the poetics of both Virgil and Aratus than has hitherto been readily available. For this everyone who consults her dissertation will surely be grateful.

The collection of facts is one thing, their evaluation quite another, and it is in this latter department that Dr. Beede's work is disappointing. She seems to be one of those persons for whom Virgil can do no wrong and Aratus but little right. Her interpretation of almost every detail in her comparison of the meteorological section of the *Georgics* with the *Diosemeia* is coloured by her steadfast conviction that the former is a very wonderful poem, the latter at best hardly more than an indifferent one. This almost mediaeval prejudice consistently and irritatingly deprives her otherwise excellent analysis of many of the values which it richly deserved and might easily have had, if only she could have approached her materials with a bit more objectivity.

Here Dr. Beede's work suffers from her having made up her mind in advance; sometimes, however, she errs in the opposite direction. In order to pass adequate aesthetic judgment on the *Georgics* one must decide beforehand what Virgil attempted to do in the poem. If his purpose was to impart information, then he must be censured whenever he misinforms, regardless of the beauty of the language in which he does so. If, on the other hand, he did not intend his poem to be truly didactic, but was concerned principally to make pretty verses, regardless of the correctness of the information which they contained, he must be judged by purely poetic standards. In the former case we may apply the same criteria to both *Georgics* and *Phaenomena*; in the latter we may not. Dr. Beede fails to make plain which view of the *Georgics* she takes, and is thus clearly open to one of two objections: either she wrongly evaluates the misinformation in the *Georgics*,² or else she has elaborately compared two texts

¹ The Bibliography (pp. 59-63) is reasonably full, but careless in some details. Pages 64-68 contain a reproduction of the relevant sections of the Loeb texts of Virgil and Aratus, usefully arranged in parallel columns, the Virgilian material being so spaced that each line of the Latin is set opposite its Greek original. These texts are preceded by a list of variations from the editions of Jahn and Maass. The dissertation as a whole contains but few misprints, and is well written, except for a somewhat too frequent use of inversion.

² Full discussion of this point is impossible here; the reader should examine, e.g.: pp. 7 and 32 (on *Georgics* 424 f.), p. 8 (on 370 f.), p. 12 (on 382), p. 29 (on 393-400), p. 33 (on 441 ff.), p. 42 (on 452).

which do not admit of comparison according to the criteria she employs. One cannot help feeling that if she had made up her mind in advance concerning Virgil's purpose in the *Georgics* she would not have got herself into this ambiguous position.

A similar situation arises in connexion with the problematic figure of Varro of Atax. Dr. Beede admits (p. 28) that Varro, not Aratus, was the direct source of *Georgics* 375-89, but she disregards the implications of this, along with the other similar cases cited by Servius. She would have done better to have had it out with the Varro question once and for all. The relation of Virgil to Varro is one of those tantalizing problems in which, although almost nothing definite can be proved, far-reaching possibilities are suggested which may not be wholly ignored or lightly dismissed. If Varro is demonstrably the real source for some of the weather-signs in the *Georgics*, it is surely not unreasonable to suspect that if his whole work were extant we might find it to have been the source for many others. Where enough of Varro has been preserved to show his selection from the Aratean material, we find it identical with that of Virgil, and this may be significant. It suggests that the selection in *Georgics* 356-465 may not have been Virgil's at all, but Varro's, and nothing can positively exclude the final possibility that Aratus was not the direct source for any of Virgil's weather-signs. One cannot too strongly emphasize that these are only possibilities, but that they are certainly not impossibilities remains a fact as important as it is stubborn. By not facing this fact Dr. Beede exposes herself to the charge of having prepared a "Study in the Art of Translation" by comparing two texts of which it is by no means certain that the later is translated from the earlier.

It is unfortunate that the raising of objections takes so many more words than the approval of the unobjectionable. I should like, therefore, to insist that the weaknesses with respect to larger issues pointed out in Dr. Beede's dissertation do not to any serious extent diminish the value of her comparative stylistic analysis, which is after all the real meat of her work.

EUGENE O'NEILL, JR.

YALE UNIVERSITY.

BENJAMIN D. MERRITT, H. T. WADE-GERRY and MALCOLM F. MCGREGOR. *The Athenian Tribute Lists, Volume I.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1939. Pp. xxxii + 605; 192 text figures; 25 plates; 1 map. \$15.

The primary intention of the authors, whose long familiarity with the material and competence to handle it require no comment, was to make available under one cover the documents

related to the tribute of the Athenian empire, and this they have done with extraordinary thoroughness and care. The tribute lists are represented not only by the restored texts but by legible photographs of every extant fragment and by drawings to indicate the position of recorded pieces and the extent of lacunae. A complete bibliography is given for each fragment, and if either a photograph or a drawing accompanied an earlier publication, it is so stated in the reference. Of *I. G.*, I², 65 and 66 the beautiful drawings which appeared in Meritt's preliminary study *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (1937), are here reproduced among others. The authors have included, in a valuable section "Testimonia," from ancient literature and from ancient inscriptions and papyri all other references to the tribute arrangements. Commentary, indexes, and cross references make the whole work lucid and easy to use. The typography is excellent, and the proof reading was done conscientiously.

For the general student of Greek history in the fifth century the most welcome contribution of this work will be the Register, where the reader can see at a glance the full and documented record of payment and non-payment, as far as it is known, for any member of the empire throughout the latter's history. This fills a crying need, because with new accretions and revisions the material had become too scattered and inaccessible for easy use, and for half a century no one had pretended to offer any systematic tables of reference.

A map of the Athenian empire is contained in a folder at the end of the volume. All locatable tributary cities of the empire are indicated thereon, and behind the map stands a Gazetteer of over a hundred large pages in small print, where the evidence for each determination is presented to the reader. From the map one receives something of a surprise to find tributary cities in Crete, but they are bracketed as merely restored, and, when the reader turns to the Gazetteer and to the inscription where they are thought to have been possible restorations, he finds that the authors themselves laudably refrained from entering these perhaps unlikely complements in the text. [*Κομλοτο*]αρος, suggested as another possibility for the same passage (*A9*, II, 159), ought not to be considered, as L. Robert has just shown (*Études épigraphiques et philologiques* [Paris, 1938], pp. 245-248). The Gazetteer must represent an enormous labor, which many students of Ancient History and Geography will deeply appreciate.

Among the Testimonia the authors were able to include the new text of the Athenian monetary decree (T69). Mario Segre's article, "La legge ateniese sull'unificazione della moneta," *Clara Rhodos*, IX (1938), pp. 151-178, is a study of the first importance, not only because he contributed a new fragment and improved the text of the old pieces, but especially because he demonstrated with help from Meritt that this significant decree

was passed *circa* 449 B. C., very much earlier than any of the dates hitherto assumed. The law now takes a place among the principal developments which marked the change from a confederacy of allies to an Athenian empire. The authors have followed Segre's text. In 2 Segre wrote [μυρίασι (or χιλίασι) δραχμ]α<ι>σι ἑκάστον, because the word δραχμαί happens to follow the numeral in all those Attic inscriptions of the fifth century in which similar phrases occur. Neither later inscriptions nor literary writers maintained a fixed order of words in referring to sums of money, and the situation among the inscriptions of the fifth century is a mere accident of survival. The stone at Cos reads in this line]ασιἑκαστονενδε[, and there is no need to resort to an emendation for the sake of the order, especially as the old Attic dative plural of δραχμή is not δραχμαῖσι at all, but δραχμῆσι (Meisterhans-Schwyzler, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*³ [Berlin, 1900], p. 120, § 12). We should edit the phrase [δραχμῆσι μυρί]ασι (or χιλί]ασι) ἑκάστον. For the copy seen at Smyrna, moreover, the traditional restoration of at least the last seven lines is obviously too short.

Among the Testimonia T9, the papyrus known as the Anonymus Argentinensis, in which the authors have recognized a new excerpt from Demosthenes XXII with its commentary, exhibits the most altered appearance and provides one of the most interesting pages in the whole book.

The text of D8 (*I. G.*, I², 65) is that given in Meritt's *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (1937), pp. 55-58. In the reviewer's opinion the descriptive heading of the document might be restored [ὅφελ]εμ[τα καὶ πρᾶξι]ς ὅφ[ορ]ο. A different version of lines 20-23 has recently been suggested in a review by S. Dow, *A. J. A.*, XLII (1938), p. 603.

In summary it might be said that the authors have chosen as their subject perhaps the most important single group of documents in the field of Greek history and that they have handled the very difficult and abundant material with great success. The second volume is now eagerly awaited.

JAMES H. OLIVER.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

W. A. LAIDLAW. *The Prosody of Terence, a Relational Study.*

London, Humphrey Milford; New York, Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. 138. \$1.95.

This book, by a former pupil of Lindsay, gives a detailed account of the prosody of Terence, "in relation to that of Plautus, mainly as the latter is set forth in *Early Latin Verse*" (p. 2). It shows that Terence solved the problem imposed by

"the conflicting claims of ictus and accent . . . more or less as Plautus did" (p. 11, details on p. 12), and that the two writers agree in many other respects. For example, their iambic senarii are alike in the admission of a spondee to the second and the fourth foot, in the avoidance of the use of a tribrach word or word-ending as a foot, and in the almost invariable presence of caesura in the third or fourth foot (p. 100). Again, the trochaic septenarii of Terence "run as smoothly as those of Plautus, if foreign ears can judge of them. It is not easy to understand Quintilian's rebuke (X. I. 99) to the effect that Terence should have limited himself to senarii" (p. 109).

Of Terence's divergences from the metrical practice of Plautus, some are in the direction of greater freedom (cf. pp. 47 and 106) and some of greater strictness (cf. pp. 104 and 109). A number of Terence's innovations result, surprisingly enough, in heightened liveliness. This is true, for instance, of the greater frequency in Terence of clauses which begin with the last word in a verse (p. 48). Lively effects are produced also by the opening of a new scene within the line (p. 51), by the frequent avoidance of a "true diaeresis," coupled with the introduction of other pauses, in the iambic septenarii (pp. 105-6); and by the relatively greater number of trochaic octonarii in the plays of Terence (p. 111).

Laidlaw has performed his task judiciously. He never attempts to force the facts of Terentian usage to conform to rules. His reasonableness in the statement of his conclusions may be illustrated by the following passage (p. 55, chosen because of its importance for the history of the Latin language):

It appears from the preceding that while a long vowel (following a short syllable) is sometimes shortened before final *r* by the operation of *breves breviautes*, Terence did not otherwise shorten it; nor did he shorten a long vowel after a long syllable. And in scanning Terence we may probably retain the original (and Plautine) quantity in lines where it is not demonstrably shortened, *e. g.*:

oratōr ad vos venio ornatu prologi (Hec. 9). . . .

But Lucilius introduces the practice of shortening after a long syllable (*e. g. praetōr*); which is regular in the classical poets.

However, in spite of Laidlaw's general openness of mind, the book contains one passage which is unfair, or at least quite misleading. The statement is made (p. 24) that "among German scholars *Iambenkürzung* is held to be a *metrical law*." As a matter of fact, it was a German, Franz Skutsch, who demonstrated, in Vollmöller, *Jahresbericht*, I (1890), pp. 34-35, that the law is not metrical but phonetic (*sprachlich*). (Cf. also Skutsch, *Forschungen zur lateinischen Grammatik und Metrik*, I [1892], p. 7, n. 1). Four years later Lindsay, in *The Latin Language*, p. 201, still called the law of *breves breviautes* "a law of prosody."

Ad. 508 defunctum! verum nimia *illaec* licentia is listed (p. 6) as an example of clash of ictus and accent. But *illaec* probably had its accent regularly on the last syllable (cf. Lindsay, *Short Historical Latin Grammar*, ed. 2, p. 25). There are two minor misprints in the footnote on pp. 55-56 and one on page 59, sixth line from the foot. On page 14 read "not antecedently improbable" (for "... probable"); on page 66 "Perfect Indicative" for "Present Indicative."

The Table of Contents is as follows: Chap. I. Accent and Ictus; II. "Brevis-Brevians" and Other Conversational Pronunciations; III. Division of Resolved Feet Between Words; IV. Undivided Feet, Diaeresis, Caesura (in which are included devices to avoid monotony at line-endings); V. Final Vowels and Consonants; VI. Noun, Pronoun and Verb; VII. Hiatus; VIII. Variation of Quantity; IX. Metres of Terence; Appendices: (1) Diaeresis, (2) Hiatus, (3) Final Monosyllable, (4) Word List (giving the Terentian pronunciation of some 125 words and also listing 39 diminutives); Index (fourfold).

ALICE F. BRAUNLICH.

GOUCHER COLLEGE.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Belkin (Samuel). *Philo and the Oral Law. The Philonic Interpretation of Biblical Law in Relation to the Palestinian Halakah.* Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1940. Pp. xiv + 292. \$3.50. (*Harvard Semitic Series*, XI.)

Bolkestein (Hendrik). *Wohltätigkeit und Armenpflege im vorchristlichen Altertum.* Utrecht, *A. Oosthoek*, 1939. Pp. xvi + 492.

Brazzel (Sister Kathleen). *The Clausulae in the Works of St. Gregory the Great.* Washington, D. C., *Catholic Univ. of America*, 1939. Pp. xiv + 82. (*Stud. in Med. and Ren. Latin Lang. and Lit.*, XI.)

Brink (A.). *De Democratie bij Demosthenes.* Groningen, *J. B. Wolters*, 1939. Pp. 116. H. fl. 2.40.

Brunel (J.). *L'aspect verbal et l'emploi des préverbes en grec, particulièrement en Attique.* Paris, *C. Klincksieck*, 1939. Pp. 296. 90 fr. (*Coll. linguistique publiée par La Société de Linguistique de Paris*, XLV.)

Cary (E.). *Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities*, II (Books III and IV). Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. 532. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Charanis (Peter). *Church and State in the Later Roman Empire. The Religious Policy of Anastasius the First, 491-518.* Madison, *Univ. of Wisconsin Press*, 1939. Pp. 102. \$1.50. (*Univ. of Wisconsin Stud. in the Social Sciences and History*, 28.)

Charlesworth (M. P.). Documents Illustrating the Reigns of Claudius and Nero. Cambridge, *University Press*; New York, *Macmillan*, 1939. Pp. viii + 42. \$0.90.

Cordier (A.). Études sur le vocabulaire épique dans l'"Énéide." Paris, "*Les Belles Lettres*," 1939. Pp. xxxi + 354. (*Coll. d'études latines publ. par la Société des études latines sous la direction de J. Marouzeau*, Sér. scientifique, XVI.)

De Grassi (Atilius). Inscriptiones Italiae, Vol. XIII: Fasti et Elogia; Fasc. III: Elogia. Rome, *La libreria dello stato*, 1937. Pp. xxiv + 86.

Dornseiff (Franz). Echtheitsfragen antik-griechischer Literatur. Rettungen des Theognis, Phokylides, Hekataios, Choirilos. Berlin, *de Gruyter & Co.*, 1939. Pp. 88.

Fitzhugh (Thomas). The Aryan Voice "Εραφρος Φωρή vel Articulata Vox. *Univ. of Virginia Bulletin of the School of Latin*, 2nd ser., no. 8. Pp. 7. \$0.50.

Genovesus (Victor) and Morabito (Joseph). Animi Certamen; Mysteria Rerum. Carmina certaminis poetici Hoeufftiani. Amsterdam, *Acad. R. Disciplinarum Nederlandica*, 1939. Pp. 23.

Hendrickson (G. L.) and Hubbell (H. M.). Cicero, *Brutus* and *Orator*. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. 529. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Jolliffe (Harold Richard). The Critical Methods and Influence of Bentley's *Horace*. Private ed., distributed by Univ. of Chicago Libraries, 1939. Pp. iii + 152. (Diss.)

Kitto (H. D. F.). Greek Tragedy. A Literary Study. London, *Methuen*, 1939. Pp. x + 410.

Klingner (F.). Horatius, *Carmina*. Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1939. Pp. xx + 4 + 379.

van Langenhove (George). Linguistische Studiën, II: Essais de linguistique indo-européenne. Antwerp, *De Sikkel*; 's Gravenhage, *Nijhoff*, 1939. Pp. xvii + 151.

Lemaître (Georges). André Maurois. *Stanford Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xi + 128. \$2.

Marót (Károly). Amicitia. Pp. 71; 2 plates. (*Acta Univ. Szegediensis*, Tom. XIII [1939], Fasc. 1.)

Murray (A. T.). Demosthenes, *Private Orations*, III. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. viii + 451. (*Loeb Classical Library*.)

Norden (Eduard). Aus altrömischen Priesterbüchern. Lund, *Gleerup*; London, *Oxford Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xiv + 300. 18 s. (*Acta R. Soc. Humaniorum Litterarum Lundensis*, XXIX.)

Petersen (Lelva). Zur Geschichte der Personifikation in griechischer Dichtung und bildender Kunst. Würzburg-Aumühle, *Konrad Triltsch*, 1939. Pp. 95. RM. 3.

von Premerstein (Anton). Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der Giessener Universitätsbibliothek, V: Alexandrinische Geronten vor Kaiser Gaius, Ein neues Bruchstück der sogenannten Alexandrinischen Märtyrer-Akten. Giessen, *Münchowsche Universitäts-Druckerei*, 1939. Pp. iii + 71; 3 plates. (*P. Bibl. Univ. Giss.*, XLVI.)

Robinson (Rodney Potter). Manuscripts 27 (S. 29) and 107 (S. 129) of the Municipal Library of Autun. A Study of Spanish Half-Uncial and Early Visigothic Minuscule and Cursive Scripts. *American Acad. in Rome*, 1939. Pp. 87; 72 plates. (*Memoirs of the American Acad. in Rome*, XVI.)

Teggart (Frederick J.). Rome and China. A Study of Correlations in Historical Events. Berkeley, *Univ. of California Press*, 1939. Pp. xvii + 283; 14 maps. \$3.

Warren (Austin). Richard Crashaw. A Study in Baroque Sensibility. *Louisiana State Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. xv + 260. \$3.

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PHILOLOGY

VOL. LXI, 4

WHOLE No. 244

SOPHOCLES ON HIS OWN DEVELOPMENT.

The passage of Plutarch's tract *De Profectibus in Virtute* ⁷ which reports Sophocles' account of his own development is in its way a unique record. No other Attic writer of the fifth century B. C., except Aristophanes, has left his opinion on his own work, and Aristophanes does not give his in the language of sober prose. It is therefore surprising that, though many editors and critics mention this passage, it has not been fully discussed, and what agreement exists about its meaning is open to grave doubts. It is surely worth our while to see what the words really mean and to ask whether, as has been commonly assumed, they refer merely to Sophocles' diction ¹ and not to more general aspects of his art. If we can decide what their precise meaning is, we are in a better position to apply them to the extant plays and fragments of Sophocles and to illustrate his conception of his own progress by his actual achievement.

We may first ask where Plutarch found the passage. He does not say what his source is, and his only hint is the word *ἐλεγε*. T. B. L. Webster suggests that the quotation comes from Sophocles' book *On the Chorus*, which is mentioned by Suidas, s. v. *Σοφοκλῆς*. But we may doubt this for several reasons. First, a purely personal statement of this character would probably be out of place in a Greek treatise on the composition of drama. If

¹ This view is held by A. E. Haigh, *The Tragic Drama of the Greeks*, pp. 161-2; R. C. Jebb, *Trachiniae*, p. xlii; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Hermes*, XL (1905), pp. 150-1; M. Pohlenz, *Die griechische Tragödie*, I, p. 231; T. B. L. Webster, *Sophocles*, p. 143; G. Perrotta, *Sofocle*, p. 8. It does not seem to be shared by K. Reinhardt, *Sophokles*, p. 17, but he does not argue for his view.

Aristotle's *Poetics* had forerunners in the same genre, it indicates that in its first stages literary criticism was technical and practical, not reminiscent and autobiographical. Secondly, the word ἔλεγε implies that Sophocles' statement was made in conversation; it means "said" or "used to say." If the words came from a book, we should expect ἔγραψε. Thirdly, the word ἤδη in the statement shows that when he made it Sophocles referred to what was then present time, and this points to conversation,—“I am now . . .” A more likely source than the treatise *On the Chorus* is some book which recorded the conversation of Sophocles in which the words occurred, and such a book existed in the *Epidemiae* of Ion of Chios, which told anecdotes about Sophocles and reported a conversation between him and an Eretrian on questions of poetry, such as the use of certain epithets (*apud* Athenaeus, XIII, 604 a-d). This work was known to Plutarch who uses it for his lives of *Cimon* (9) and *Pericles* (28), and it seems to be a likely source for Sophocles' account of himself. For it contained literary and other anecdotes about him and reported his words as he said them. If this is right, we may assume that the substance of Plutarch's quotation is reasonably accurate. For Ion was a friend of Sophocles and is as good a witness as we can ask for. But of course there is a possibility that Plutarch has transposed the original words into the literary language of his own time. We might well be surprised at his doing this; for though his memory was sometimes at fault, we do not know of his rewriting his original. But such a view is not *primâ facie* impossible. If, however, we find that the words are not appropriate to the language of later literary criticism, we may assume that Plutarch has quoted accurately and that the words are as near to what Sophocles actually said as any reported talk can be to its original.

So far as the MSS are concerned, the quotation presents no difficulties. It is grammatical as it stands, and there are no serious variants. Since the context is relevant, the whole sentence of Plutarch may be quoted: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἔλεγε τὸν Αἰσχύλου διαπεπαιχὸς ὄγκον, εἶτα τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τεχνὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς, τρίτον ἤδη τὸ τῆς λέξεως μεταβάλλειν εἶδος, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἠθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον, οὕτως οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν πανηγυρικῶν καὶ κατὰ τέχνην εἰς τὸν ἀπτόμενον ἥθους καὶ πάθους λόγον καταβῶσιν, ἀρχονται τὴν ἀληθῆ προκοπὴν καὶ αὐτοφον προκόπτειν. *As*

the words of Sophocles stand, they have an intelligible and obvious structure. It is clear that the participle *διαπειπαχώς* governs not only *τὸν Αἰσχύλου ὄγκον* but also what follows, *τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατὰτεχνον τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς*, and those are wrong who, like Haigh, Wilamowitz, and Perrotta, supply some word to mean "adopted" with the second group. Any interpretation must take account of the two objects governed by *διαπειπαχώς*, and we must reject the translation "imitate playfully" which is suggested by the eighth edition of Liddell and Scott. For though this may apply to the first part on the assumption that Sophocles began by imitating the *ὄγκος* of Aeschylus, it can hardly apply to the second; for few will agree that Sophocles passed through two Aeschylean periods, and the change of *αὐτοῦ* to *αὐτοῦ* is quite unwarranted so far as the MSS are concerned. Another evasion of the text is to change *διαπειπαχώς* to *διαπεπαλαιχώς* as Webster does. His ingenious translation "fought his way through" makes the change look attractive, but the word means "having gone on wrestling," and the accusatives would have to be internal. In fact, if they were to have the sense which Webster gives them, they should be in the dative, as we see from such examples as Galen, XVII (1), 569, where *διαπαλαίω* is used with *νοσήματι* in the sense of "wrestle against." What sense can be made with such a word and such internal accusatives is not clear, and in any case we have no right to alter *διαπειπαχώς* until it has been proved untenable. But though it cannot mean "imitate playfully" or even "handling with a light touch," as F. C. Babbitt nicely turns it,² in this context, that does not mean that it is corrupt. We must see what other meaning can be found for it.

Those who believe that Plutarch has rewritten the passage in the language of Hellenistic or Greco-Roman criticism might point to *διαπειπαχώς* and say that the word is used by Demetrius, *De Eloc.* 147, where, in discussing a passage of Sophron which compares boys pelting men to the Trojans pelting Ajax with darts, he says that there is a charm in the comparison, *τοὺς Τρῶας διαπαλζονσα ὥσπερ παῖδας*. Rhys Roberts rightly translates "which makes game of the Trojans as though they were boys."³ But

² *Plutarch's Moralia*, I, p. 421.

³ In *Class. Rev.*, XL (1926) Rhys Roberts suggests that Sophocles did actually make fun of Aeschylus in such a line as frag. 611, but since he attributes this to the second stage and accepts the correction of *αὐτοῦ*, he fails to establish his point.

this sense does not help with Sophocles. For we can hardly believe that Sophocles regarded his own first works as making fun of Aeschylus. If there was a joke, it was surely against himself for imitating the master with too great devotion. So the parallel is irrelevant, and, if this was the normal use of the word in the first century, we have a small indication that Plutarch did not rewrite his original or use someone else's rewriting of it. In any case a more satisfactory parallel to Sophocles' διαπεπαιχώς may be found in an author nearer to him in time than Demetrius. Plato at *Laws* VI, 769a uses the words παιδὰ καλῶς διαπεπαισμένη for a "game well played out." The combination with δια- gives the meaning of continuance to a finish, and the uncompounded use of παίζω may well explain what Sophocles means. For in archaic and classical Greek it is used for the conduct of different arts. Used first of dancing by Homer at θ 251 and ψ 147 and by Hesiod at *Scut.* 277, it is later used by Anacreon of singing and dancing (frags. 2, 4 and 5, 4), by *Homeric Hymn* III, 206 of Apollo playing the lyre, by Pindar of poets performing their songs (*Ol.* I, 16) and by Aristophanes of Pan piping (*Frogs* 230). This use naturally led to the later use of παίγιον in the sense of "poem" by Leonidas (*Anth. Pal.*, VI, 322), Polybius (XVI, 21, 12), and Philetas (Stobaeus, II, 4, 5). Plato even uses it of a comic dramatic performance (*Laws* VII, 816e). It is therefore quite possible that Sophocles, speaking with the ease of conversation, used παίζω of his own art and prefixed δια- to it to show that at the time of speaking he had finished with two stages in the practice of his poetry. If so, the word means simply "having played out," in the sense of "having practised to the limit."

In the first stage Sophocles practised the ὄγκος of Aeschylus. The later critics often use the word, but ambiguously, sometimes in a good sense, sometimes in a bad. Thus "Longinus" uses it both of the dignity of oratorical eulogies (*De Subl.* 8, 3) and of inflated pomposity (*ibid.* 3, 4); Demetrius both combines it with μέγθος (*De Eloc.* 36 and 54) and applies it to the inappropriate pomp with which trifles may be invested (*ibid.* 83). It would therefore be a little strange if Plutarch, transposing Sophocles' words into the language of his own time, used a word which was ambiguous and did not help to clarify what the quotation meant; it is easier to believe that he kept ὄγκον because it

was in his text. Nor is the word confined to the later critics. In his *Rhetoric* III, 6 Aristotle speaks of *δγκον τῆς λέξεως* and means something like "grandeur of language," and this shows that in the fourth century *δγκος* had passed into literary criticism. In the *Poetics* 1459 b 28 he speaks of *ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος δγκος* and means "the grandeur of the poem," while his description of the hexameter as *δγκωδέστατον* (*ibid.* 1459 b 35) means that it is the weightiest of metres. Aristotle shows that in his time *δγκος* was used in literary criticism and in a favourable sense. But since he makes his meaning clear by adding qualifying phrases like *τῆς λέξεως* and *τοῦ ποιήματος* and does not use the word in isolation as Sophocles does, we cannot claim that Sophocles used the word just as he did. He may well be using it in a vaguer sense than Aristotle does, and he may also have had a clearer perception of the metaphor which is involved in its application to matters of poetry.

We should be able to get some light from Sophocles' use of *δγκος* in his plays. He uses it metaphorically in four places. One of these (*O. C.* 1341) does not really concern the present problem, but the three others are more relevant. At *Trach.* 817, when Hyllus says

*δγκον γὰρ ἄλλως ὀνόματος τί δαί τρέφειν
μητρῶν . . . ;*

he means, as Jebb says, the dignity which belongs to the name of mother, and the use here, like Aristotle's, is favourable. On the other hand at *Ajax* 129 when Athene says to Odysseus

μηδ' δγκον ἄρη μηδέν'.

she means that he is not to show pride and when at *O. C.* 1162 the speech which Polynices requests is said to be *οὐκ δγκον πλέων*, the word again means pride in an unfavorable sense. The existence of the two meanings is easily understood. What may look like proper dignity in one place may look like empty presumption or pomposity in another. Now in his attribution of *δγκος* to Aeschylus Sophocles does not hint which meaning he intends and the natural solution is that his *δγκος* covers both. What this is can be seen from the simplest use of the word to mean "size." We know that Sophocles did not admire Aeschylus without reservations, since he said of him *εἰ καὶ τὰ δέοντα ποιῇ, ἀλλ'*

οὐκ εἰδώς γε (Athenaeus, I, 22b), but he admired him enough to practise his methods for a time, and we might expect him in retrospect to use some word which was reasonably impartial. And if *ἄγκος* means "size" or "bulk" or "bigness," this is what he does.

The application of such a metaphor to poetry need not cause surprise, nor need we look to later critics for parallels. Such bigness belonged to bodies. Plato speaks of τὸν τῶν σαρκῶν ἄγκον (*Laws* III, 959c), and Xenophon applies the adjective *ἀγκώδης* to the bellies of horses (*Equ.* 1, 12). To speak of the *ἄγκος* of poetry meant simply that somehow it had size or bigness. Now this is very similar to what Aristophanes does when he makes Euripides contrast himself with Aeschylus

ἀλλ' ὡς παρέλαβον τὴν τέχνην παρὰ σοῦ τὸ πρῶτον εὐθὺς
οἰδοῦσαν ὑπὸ κομπασμάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐπαχθῶν,
ἴσχυα μὲν πρῶτιστον αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ βάρος ἀφείλον

(*Frogs* 939-41).

And later in the play the same notion of *βάρος* appears when Aeschylus decides to weigh his verses against Euripides:

τὸ γὰρ βάρος νῦν βασανεῖ τῶν ῥημάτων (*ibid.* 1367).

The notion that poetry can have a *βάρος* or weight is not far removed from the notion that it can have *ἄγκος* or size. Both are metaphors from physical bodies, and both are ambiguous in the sense that weight and bulk can be used either for praise or blame. Or rather, though both may be thoroughly admirable, each has a weak side which appears if it is wrongly used. Just as the real fullness of Aeschylus might degenerate into turgidity, so his majesty might sometimes appear to be merely pompous. In any case the lines from Aristophanes show that this kind of physical metaphor was quite appropriate to the criticism of poetry in the fifth century.

Aristophanes may perhaps throw some more light on what Sophocles meant by the *ἄγκος* of Aeschylus. In its metaphorical use the word could be applied to any kind of majesty or pride; it referred to the element of greatness or size which may be seen in thoughts and words. So the Aristophanic Aeschylus says of his own work

ἀνάγκη

μεγάλων γνωμῶν καὶ διανοιῶν ἴσα καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τέκτειν.
κἀλλως εἰκὸς τοὺς ἡμθέους τοῖς ῥήμασι μέλῃσι χρῆσθαι

(*Frogs* 1058-60)

when Euripides taxes him with speaking with "Lycabettuses and great pieces of Parnassuses,"—also examples of size. The same notion underlies the Chorus' address to Aeschylus:

ἀλλ' ὃ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων πυργώσας ῥήματα σεμνά

(*ibid.* 1004)

no less than Euripides' taunts that his rival's poetry was full of "Scamanders, moats, men at arms, brazen griffens" καὶ ῥήμαθ' ἐπτόκρημα (*ibid.* 928-929), where the last words again suggest the size and height of Aeschylean poetry. So when Sophocles spoke of the *δγκος* of Aeschylus he meant something which would be quite in the spirit of contemporary language about poetry and would convey an impression of the size of Aeschylus' creation.

Plutarch's quotation merely says τὸν Αἰσχύλου *δγκον*, but most scholars have assumed that Sophocles was speaking only about his language. That *δγκος* could be applied to diction is shown by Aristotle's *δγκος τῆς λέξεως* (*Rhet.* 1407 b 26), but there he explains what he means by adding τῆς λέξεως, and that *δγκος* could be used in literary criticism for other matters than diction is shown not merely by Aristotle's statement that ὁ τοῦ ποιήματος *δγκος* is increased in the epic by events taking place simultaneously (*Poet.* 1459 b 28) but by Aristophanes' account of his own activities at *Wasps* 1024:

οὐκ ἐκτελέσαι φησὶν ἐπαρθεῖς οὐδ' ὀγκῶσαι τὸ φρόνημα

where the metaphor in *ὀγκῶσαι* is applied to the spirit which informed his poetry. Sophocles might use *δγκος* for almost any aspect of his art; and, if he used it in a restricted sense for the diction alone, we should expect him to anticipate Aristotle and make his meaning clear. This conclusion is countered by Wilamowitz who presses the nature of the context in Plutarch and says that this shows Sophocles' concern to be only with diction. But when we look at the context, we find that his concern is not between one kind of diction and another in orators but between artificiality and truth in their work, between what is ostentatious and elaborated and what expresses character and feeling. In

fact Plutarch suggests that the progress of Sophocles was not simply in his language but in his poetic art generally which passed from an Aeschylean *ῥυθμός* to something quite different. And when we look at the Aristophanic notion of *βάρος* in poetry, we find that this too is not limited to diction. For Euripides begins at *Frogs* 937-938 by saying that he has no cock-horses in his plays,—a question of subject matter,—goes on to say that he took themes from books (943), and adds that he included monodies,—a question of musical and dramatic technique. Sophocles may well have meant no more than that in his first stage he practised the full majesty and pomp of Aeschylus; and, though this would include a high, tragic diction, it certainly might also include other elements in the Aeschylean drama. A better argument that Sophocles refers only to his diction might be extracted from the superlatives at the end of his statement, *ῥηϊκώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον*. We might claim that these refer to the best of three stages, and since the last is specifically concerned with diction, the other two must be. But the superlatives do not necessarily mean this, and make perfectly good sense if they are taken simply to refer to different kinds of diction in general. Moreover, that Sophocles does not refer merely to diction follows from the description of the second stage where, as we shall see, the word *κατασκευῆς* must describe something more general in the way of composition.

Something of what Sophocles meant in practice by this *ῥυθμός* may be seen in the fragments of his *Triptolemus*, which was produced in 468 B. C. (Pliny, *N. H.* XVIII, 65) and may well have been one of the plays with which he won his first victory over Aeschylus which is assigned to this year (Plutarch, *Cimon*, 8; *Marmor Parium* 56). In this there are certainly traces of Aeschylean pomp in the language. The remarkable line, of which Demetrius so disapproved (*De Eloc.* 114)

ἀπυνδάκωτος οὐ τραπέζουται κύλιξ (frag. 611)

may well have been an unsuccessful attempt to rival Aeschylean grandeur. Another line

σὲ δ' ἐν φρενὸς δέλτοις τοὺς ἐμὸς λόγους (frag. 597)

has been thought to have some connection with *P. V.* 789⁴

⁴ So Pearson *ad loc.*

ἦν ἐγγράφου σὺ μνήμοσιν δέλοις φρενῶν

but the figure in it is probably traditional since Pindar uses a variation on it at *Ol.* X, 2, Aeschylus uses it in different forms at *Suppl.* 185, *Cho.* 448, *Eum.* 275, and Sophocles reverts to it in old age at *Phil.* 1325. No doubt the language of the *Triptolemus* had Aeschylean echoes and mannerisms, but the play seems to have owed more to Aeschylus than them. Thé speech in which Demeter gave Triptolemus a geographical account of the West where his journey lay (frag. 598, Dionysius Hal., *Ant. Rom.* I, 12) recalls similar descriptions given by Prometheus to Io in the *Prometheus Bound* and to Heracles in the *Prometheus Delivered* and has no parallel in the extant plays and fragments of Sophocles. Moreover, the appearance of Demeter on the stage as an active promoter of the dramatic development recalls Athene in the *Eumenides* and Aphrodite in the *Danaides* and has little in common either with the rôle of Athene in the *Ajax* or the use of Heracles as a "deus ex machinâ" in the *Philoctetes*. The notion of building a play round the foundation of an Attic festival, as the *Triptolemus* is round the Eleusinia, seems too to have parallels in Aeschylus. For it has been thought that his *Danaides* ended with the foundation of the Thesmophoria,⁵ his *Salaminiæ* with the Aiantea,⁶ and the last play of the Prometheus trilogy with the Promethea.⁷ Finally, the splendour of the serpent-drawn car in which Triptolemus makes his journey and which seems to have been actually presented on the stage⁸ recalls Aeschylus' love of pageants and such remarkable means of locomotion as the sea-horse of Oceanus in *Prometheus Bound*. In another play, the *Lemniæ*, we can also discern an undoubted Aeschylean influence. Of this play Sophocles wrote two versions, and in the first of these he gave a list of the Argonauts as Aeschylus had done in his *Cabiri* (frags. 385-386). The significant point here is that in the second version Sophocles omitted this list (Steph. Byz., s. v. Δώτιον), as if he felt that it was inappropriate to his riper manner. In his early period, too, it seems next to certain that Sophocles composed trilogies.⁹ One on the

⁵ D. S. Robertson, *Class. Rev.*, XXXVIII (1924), pp. 5-23.

⁶ R. C. Jebb, *Ajax*, p. xxiii.

⁷ G. Thomson, *Prometheus Bound*, p. 35.

⁸ Webster, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁹ For Sophocles' trilogies cf. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge in *New Chap-*

saga of Telephus is well authenticated, and others have been claimed with reason on Medea and Danae. Composition on this scale, so unlike Sophocles' later method with single plays, may have tended to produce a grandiose, Aeschylean effect. There is little doubt that in his Aeschylean days Sophocles followed his master in other respects than diction, and the effect at which he he aimed might well be called *δῆκος*.

The second stage belonged to Sophocles himself. He had found something of his own, and this he practised till he exhausted it. But the phrase *τὸ πικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τεχνὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς* is by no means easy to translate. Almost every word in it calls for comment. First, *κατασκευῆς*. Webster suspects that it is of the Roman period, and it was certainly used by later critics. For Dionysius uses it to mean "ornament" (*Ad Pomp.* 2) and Diogenes Laertius quotes Diogenes of Babylon as having defined it as *λέξις ἐκπεφευγυῖα τὸν ἰδιωτισμὸν* (VII, 59), that is the avoidance of colloquialism. Neither of these helps much with Sophocles. For he would hardly call ornament "bitter," and the avoidance of colloquialism seems too special a meaning for the fifth century. On the other hand *κατασκευή* had also the much less technical meaning of "arrangement" (Dionysius, *Ad Ann.* ii, 16). Sophocles may well be using the word like this. For Plato applies *κατασκευή* to quite abstract things, as at *Laws* VIII, 842c *ἡ τοῦ βίου κατασκευή* and V, 789b *τῆς τῶν νόμων κατασκευῆς*. Its fundamental meaning is "construction," and that is applicable to the composition of poetry. Moreover, the verb *κατασκευάζω* is used for imaginative fabrications, as when Plato says *εἰ μὴ Γοργίαν ἢ Νέστορά τινα κατασκευάζεις* (*Phaedrus* 261c) or Demosthenes *παροίοντες μὲν τινὰς καὶ ὑβριστὰς κατασκευάσει* (LIV, 14), and it could be used with such words as *πρόφασιν* (Xenophon, *Cyr.* II, 4, 7) or *τὸ ἀπόρητον* (Demosthenes, II, 6) in the sense of "invent." The natural meaning, then, for Sophocles' *κατασκευή* is "fabrication" or "invention." He contrasts his second stage, which was at least of his own fabrication, with his first when he practised an art which belonged to Aeschylus, and that is why *Διοχόλου* is so soon followed by *αὐτοῦ*.

The character of this *κατασκευή* is explained by *τὸ πικρὸν καὶ*

κατάτεχνον, and about these words too there is strong disagreement. On the one side Pearson takes them to refer to an "occasional harshness and want of polish,"¹⁰ and Webster translates by "unpleasant and artificial." On the other side Jebb takes τὸ πικρόν to mean "pungency" and κατάτεχνον "subtle elaboration." The Hellenistic critics do not really help to a solution. For while πικρός is used in the bad sense of "harsh" by Dionysius (*Ad Pomp.* 3; *Ad Amm.* ii, 2; *De Comp.* 22), it is used in the good sense of "pungent" by Demetrius with reference to the Attic dialect (*De Eloc.* 177). This disagreement leaves us where we were, and we must see if the fifth century can do any better. This too provides no decisive parallel in literary criticism, but Jebb ingeniously tried to explain the word by quoting Eupolis on the oratory of Pericles

οὕτως ἐκίλει καὶ μόνος τῶν ῥητόρων
τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκρωμένοις (frag. 94, 6-7)

and suggested that Sophocles left a sting in his hearers as Pericles did. But it is not certain that Eupolis meant this; it is at least possible that his figure is not from a bee leaving its sting but of a charioteer driving his team to such a frenzy that it passes all others. In any case, even if Eupolis meant that Pericles' oratory left a sting, this does not throw any light on Sophocles' use of πικρός.

A much sounder method is to look at the normal use of πικρός in the fifth century, and this is simply that it is the opposite of ἡδύς. The two words are contrasted as opposites by Alcmaeon of Croton (frag. 4, Diels⁴), Empedocles (frag. 90, 1), and Democritus (frags. 9 and 125) while Sophocles himself contrasts τερπνά and πικρά at *O. C.* 615. There can surely be little doubt that when he discerned a bitter element in his own composition, he meant that there was something in it which gave not pleasure but pain. What he meant by this we shall see when we consider the whole phrase to which τὸ πικρόν belongs.

The element of τὸ πικρόν is qualified by the word κατάτεχνον and since the article is used only once, the whole phrase is a unity and must be treated as a complex whole. We should not, like Jebb, dissolve it into two quite separate components, for which

¹⁰ *Fragments of Sophocles*, I, p. 230.

the correct Greek would be τὸ πικρὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ τεχνον. On the meaning of κατὰ τεχνος the later critics throw no light, since they do not use the word, and Webster's suspicion that it is of the Roman period cannot be substantiated. The only passage which throws any light is an erotic epigram of Philodemus (*Anth. Pal.*, V, 132, 5), in which he addresses his love and exclaims:

ὦ κατατεχνοτάτου κινήματος.

Liddell and Scott take this to mean "artificial," but it is hard to see what that can mean in the context, and surely Waltz is on the right road when he translates "cette démarche savamment ondulée."¹¹ In fact the word means something like "ingenious." Nor is it surprising that it is combined with κατασκευής if the latter means "invention." The two words are well assorted, and their association recalls Aeschines' complaint of τὰς τέχνας καὶ τὰς κατασκευάς of Demosthenes (II, 1). The prefix κατα- simply intensifies and draws attention to the large amount of τέχνη in Sophocles' invention. The word is used because it is more expressive than a simple word like τεχνικός. When we combine this with the other words in the phrase, we find that Sophocles claimed for his second period a painful ingenuity in his own invention.

What he meant by this may be easily illustrated, notably by the *Ajax*. In no other extant play does Sophocles show such ingenuity in providing painful effects. We have only to remember the scene in which the mad Ajax is mocked by Athene,—a scene to which there is no parallel in Greek tragedy except perhaps in the *Bacchae*,—the device by which the stage is emptied and the scene changed that Ajax may kill himself in solitude, the prolonged pathos of the silent figures of Tecmessa and Eurysaces watching over the dead body while Teucer quarrels with the Atridae about burial. A similar painful originality may be deduced from the fragments of lost plays. It is clear from Plutarch (*Amat.* 17) that in the *Niobe* some at least of the children were actually killed on the stage. In the *Polyxene* the ghost of Achilles appeared above his tomb and spoke to the departing Greeks with mysterious majesty of the groaning realms of Acheron which it had left (frag. 523), a scene which

¹¹ *Anthologie Grecque*, II, p. 67.

showed surely a greater boldness than even the appearance of Darius' ghost in the *Persae* or Polydorus' in the *Hecuba*. In the *Odysseus Acanthoplex* Sophocles secured a specially painful effect when he brought his dying hero onto the stage and made him recognize his slayer in his own son (Cicero, *Tusc.*, II, 48). Stranger than any of these, if the evidence of the scholiast on Aristophanes' *Birds* 99 is to be trusted,¹² was the *Tereus*, where a particularly bloody catastrophe ended in the chief characters being turned into birds and appearing in their new forms. In these cases Sophocles secured effects more painful than anything known in Aeschylus, and used a high degree of inventive ingenuity.

The third stage was different from the other two. On that all agree, but the words *τρίτον ἤδη τὸ τῆς λέξεως μεταβάλλειν εἶδος ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἠθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον* have been subjected to alteration and misinterpretation. The text must be tried out as it stands, and we cannot accept alterations which are made simply to suit a preconceived theory about what Sophocles ought to have meant. First, Bernhardt, approved by Wilamowitz, wished to alter *μεταβάλλειν* to *μεταλαβείν*. For this there is no need, since *μεταβάλλειν* can mean "change to," as it does at Euripides, *I. A.* 343, 363, Plato, *Rep.* IV, 424c, *Crat.* 405d, and is impeccable in form and sense. Secondly, the omission of the article before *τῆς λέξεως*, suggested by Schoene, is thoroughly insidious. For it makes it easier to take the whole passage as referring simply to *λέξις* by making *τρίτον* agree with *εἶδος* and the words mean "a third kind of diction." That would be all very well if Sophocles were referring simply to diction, but we have seen that this is open to doubt, and the case for such a view is not strengthened by playing with the text. In fact *τρίτον* is beyond reproach; it should be taken adverbially in the sense of "thirdly." As such Sophocles uses it at *Ant.* 55 and possibly at frag. 380. If we keep the MSS reading, we get excellent sense: "thirdly, he was now changing to the kind of diction which, etc."

The third stage differs from the first two in its attention to *λέξις*, diction. The word means this at Plato, *Apol.* 17d, where

¹² *ἐν γὰρ τῷ Τηρεῖ Σοφοκλῆς ἐποίησεν αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν Τηρέα) ἀπαρ-
νθισμένον καὶ τὴν Πρόκνην.* If the transformed Tereus did not appear on
the stage, there seems little point in the Hoopoe's remarks at *Birds*
100-1. On the other hand Horace, *A. P.* 187 is against the scholiast.

Socrates says of his strangeness to forensic language *ξένος ἔχω τῆς ἐνθάδε λέξεως*, and at *Laws* VII, 795e *Μούσης λέξις* means "poetical diction." So too Aristotle uses the word at *Poetics* 19-20 and *Rhetoric* III, 7. There is, then, no difficulty about Sophocles having used it before them in the same sense. But his precise meaning depends on how we take his words. The clause which begins with *ὅπερ* can, grammatically speaking, be taken either as explanatory of the whole preceding clause or as explanatory simply of *εἶδος*. The objection to the first view, which Festa supports,¹³ is that the change undergone by Sophocles is called *ἠθικώτατον καὶ βέλτιστον*, and it is hard to see how it could be either of these. *ἠθικώτατον* might be defended as meaning "expressive of his own character," but the actual change would not be so described. Still less would the change itself be called "best"; for there is no question of comparing one change with another, but of comparing one state with another. This view seems to involve insuperable obstacles, and it is quite easy to take *ὅπερ* as referring to *τὸ τῆς λέξεως εἶδος*. Sophocles after mentioning his third stage says what it is and praises it.

It should be possible to state more precisely what Sophocles meant by saying that his kind of diction was *ἠθικώτατον*. *ἠθικός* is applied in various ways to literature by Aristotle, who uses it of tragedy (*Poet.* 1456 a 1), the *Odyssey* (*ibid.* 1459 b 15), songs (*Pol.* 1341 b 34), and the diction of oratory (*Rhet.* 1408 a 10 ff.). In all of these cases its meaning is much the same. That kind of tragedy is *ἠθική* which deals mainly with character; the *Odyssey* has more interest in character than the *Iliad*; since "ethical" melodies are distinguished from those of action or passion, we may assume that they are concerned mainly with character; in rhetoric a speech is *ἠθική* if it expresses the character of the person who makes it. So *ἠθικός* means "concerned with character," and so, more precisely, "expressive of character." So when Sophocles said that his diction was *ἠθικώτατον*, he meant no more than that his characters spoke in a way that was characteristic of them. His position is well illustrated by that of Aristotle who in discussing *ἠθική λέξις* says *ἐὰν οὖν καὶ τὰ δρόματα οἰκεία λέγῃ τῇ ἔξει, ποιήσει τὸ ἥθος· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτ' αὖτ' ὥσαύτως ἂν ἀγροῖκος ἂν καὶ πεπαιδευμένος εἴπειεν* (*Rhet.* 1408 a 30). In his third stage this was true of Sophocles.

¹³ *Riv. indo-greco-ital.*, III (1919), pp. 9 ff.

In making the persons of his plays talk in character Sophocles was not really a pioneer. Aeschylus had certainly done the same thing with the Watchman in the *Agamemnon* and the Nurse in the *Choephoroi*; in the language of Clytaemnestra it is hard not to detect a peculiar directness which accords with her ruthless personality. Moreover, this claim of Sophocles seems all the more remarkable if we accept, as some still do, the view that he created ideal types; for we should hardly expect them to talk in character, and a common assumption is that they just speak in poetical language which belongs more to Sophocles than to them individually. The advocates of this view base their opinion on what Sophocles himself said, αὐτὸς μὲν οἷός τις εἶναι, Εὐριπίδην δὲ οἷος εἶναι (Aristotle, *Poet.* 1460 b 34) and agree with Bywater who assumes that with δαί we must supply εἶναι and translate "he drew men as they ought to be, but Euripides as they were." The natural deduction from this translation is that Sophocles disliked realistic characters and preferred ideal types. Moreover, this interpretation is not modern. Bywater quotes a remark attributed to the poet Philoxenus (S. Maximus Conf., 2, p. 632, Combef.) who, in answer to a complaint that while Sophocles produced good women he produced bad, said: Σοφοκλῆς μὲν οἷος δαί εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας λέγει, ἐγὼ δὲ οἷος εἶναι. Philoxenus, then, assumed that Sophocles' women were morally good and that Sophocles himself had said so. This assumption attributes a curious blindness to Sophocles where his own work was concerned. His Clytaemnestra in the *Electra* hardly qualifies to be called χρηστή, and when we turn to his male characters, who must be included in his own statement, what are we to say of the Atridae in the *Ajax*, Aegisthus in the *Electra*, or Creon in the *Oedipus at Colonus*? Their conduct may perhaps be explained, but it cannot be held up as a model for imitation. If Philoxenus and Bywater are right, Sophocles did not know what he was saying when he compared his own characters to those of Euripides, and, as a critic of his own work, his opinion is of little value.

There is, however, a way out of this difficulty. We need not put too much trust in Philoxenus. He was, after all, merely answering in his own way someone who praised the goodness of Sophoclean heroines; he may well have accepted for purposes of argument what was a complete misinterpretation of Sophocles' real meaning. There are other, and more satisfactory, ways of interpreting his words than Bywater's. First, we might supply

not *εἶναι* but *ποιεῖν*; for it is as easy to supply an infinitive out of *ποιεῖν* as out of *εἶναι*, and then Sophocles would say that while Euripides created characters as they were, he himself created them as they should be created. Or, alternatively, we can make a concession to the followers of Bywater by supplying *εἶναι* but take the words not of moral or ideal excellence but simply of dramatic propriety; the characters are what they ought to be in a play. Whichever alternative we prefer, the result is the same. Sophocles maintained that characters must be created with dramatic propriety. And this is what Aristotle seems to have understood him to mean. For in the same section where the remark is quoted, he both uses it as an argument that what is not true may none the less be what it ought to be in a play and postpones till later his discussion whether actions in a play are morally good and bad, as if this were a different consideration. If we so interpret Sophocles' words and combine them with his other words about diction which displays character, we may deduce that by *ῥηκώτατον* he did not mean greater realism or colloquialism but simply something more suited to his characters than what he had hitherto used.

The change of which Sophocles spoke may of course be illustrated by comparing early work like the *Ajax* with late work like the *Philoctetes*. But this is to assume that the remark was made by him at the end of his life, and that is a doubtful assumption. In fact we may mark a perfectly real difference in the question of diction between the *Ajax* and the *Antigone*. In the *Ajax* the language is not really *ῥηκή*. So far as the manner of speaking is concerned there is little difference between Ajax and Tecmessa, between Odysseus and the Atridae. A small point will make the similarity of diction clear. In the quarrel between Teucer and Menelaus Menelaus uses an *αἶψα* about the uselessness of a man of bold words in a stormy sea (1142-1149) and Teucer answers him with another *αἶψα* of the same length and the same kind about a man who triumphed over his neighbour's woes. Now in action the two characters are quite different, and for the audience they stand for strongly contrasted points of view, but in their language they are at this point indistinguishable. Sophocles uses an old technique which survived in comedy at least until Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*, but it is not well suited to the portrayal of character. But in the *Antigone* the characters are certainly to some extent differentiated by their manner of speech. The

Guard has his curious mixture of colloquialisms and pomposity which well suits a man of his condition. Creon's measured utterance and abundant maxims show him as the true type of platitudinous entêtement and make a strong contrast with the simple and direct utterance of Antigone. Of course there are many who still believe that the *Ajax* is later than the *Antigone*, but even they must admit that the language of the *Ajax* is far less adapted to the characters than that of the *Antigone*. Nor need they be treated too seriously, since the whole dramatic technique of the *Ajax* shows the marks of an early date. On a balance of evidence we may conclude that while the *Ajax* represents the second stage of Sophocles' development, the *Antigone* represents the third. A comparison of the two plays will show what he meant by the change of his own painful ingenuity to that kind of diction which most displays character.

In conclusion, then, Sophocles' remark, put into *oratio recta*, means this: "After practising to the full the bigness of Aeschylus, then the painful ingenuity of my own invention, now in the third stage I am changing to the kind of diction which is most expressive of character and best." The three stages have been illustrated by the *Triptolemus*, *Ajax*, and *Antigone*, and the remark agrees with what we know of the facts. No doubt the process was gradual, and there is no need to assume decisive and deliberate breaks between the different stages. In fact both ἦδη and μεταβάλλειν indicate that when Sophocles made the remark he was still in the process of moving over from the second to the third stage. Nor need we assume that he spoke the words at the end of a long life. In fact, if they come from Ion of Chios, they must have been spoken before 421 B. C., when Ion, as we know from Aristophanes' *Peace* 835 ff., was already dead. In that case they cannot take account of the *Electra*, *Philoctetes*, or *Oedipus at Colonus*. And indeed the remark may come from a considerably earlier date. For Ion's account of Sophocles belongs to the Samian war of 441-440 B. C., and this is at least a likely source for anything that Sophocles said about his own art. If this is right, the third period may be said to have begun with the *Antigone*. For it was his success with this play that brought him as a general to Samos, and it is likely that he would have it in mind when he spoke of the latest development of his art.

ALEXANDER'S PLANS.

If it is true, as some believe, that Alexander planned a western expedition, then our picture of the great Macedonian will have to be altered in some essentials. The whole question depends (so far as published research goes and, be it added, quite unnecessarily) on the authenticity of Diodorus XVIII, 4, 1-6. Alexander's *ὑπομνήματα* (including plans for a western expedition) are imbedded in this passage, and many writers—Kaerst, E. Meyer, Jacoby, Schubert, Endres, Kornemann, Kolbe, and recently Wilcken¹—assume that the *ὑπομνήματα* descend from Hieronymus and treat them as history. In 1921 Tarn rejected² them as unhistorical and now in 1939 is publishing a learned paper, "Alexander's Plans," in *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, which fortifies his previous arguments and adduces a good deal that is new.³ Tarn and Wilcken ably present the opposing points of view and between them cover the literature on the subject. Briefly put, I believe that Tarn has shown conclusively that Wilcken's position is untenable, but I do not believe that it necessarily follows from Tarn's discussion that Alexander did not plan a western expedition: consequently, I may limit myself pretty much to Tarn's papers. Finally, I shall call attention to two passages in Arrian in the hope that we may advance the argument further; if our interpretation is correct, it will of course place Alexander in a new light.

Though I shall rest my case on Arrian, it is best to begin with Diodorus. I shall not argue that the *ὑπομνήματα*, at least as we now have them, are genuine. What I shall do, in the first place,

¹ U. Wilcken, *Die letzten Pläne Alexanders des Grossen* (Berlin, 1937).

² W. W. Tarn, "Alexander's *ὑπομνήματα* and the 'world-kingdom,'" *J. H. S.*, XLII (1921), pp. 1 ff. Niese, Beloch, and Wilamowitz had also rejected them. M. Cary, *The Legacy of Alexander* (New York, 1932), p. 3, is convinced by Tarn's "damaging criticism." A. D. Nock also rejects, in his review (*O. P.*, XXXIII [1938], p. 126) of W. Kolbe, *Die Weltreichsidee Alexanders des Grossen* (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1936).

³ I am very grateful to Dr. Tarn for his kindness in sending me advance proofs of his article. (This is now published in *J. H. S.*, LIX [1939], pp. 124-135.)

is to examine their authenticity, and this means beginning with Tarn's paper of 1921. Speaking generally, those who favor the *ὑπομνήματα* believe that they fit, somehow, Alexander's character, whereas the first step necessarily must be to determine their genuineness. Because he has subjected the *ὑπομνήματα* to a searching analysis, Tarn's papers are, I believe it is fair to say, the only really vital ones on the subject. Tarn's method, again speaking generally, is to point out the absurdity of this or that item in the *ὑπομνήματα* and to proceed to show how the idea grew until, in some instances, it actually became part of the Romance. This is a proper and valuable way of approaching the problem; but, when concluded, it is still fair to ask, I think, whether the story had as its beginning any solid substratum of fact. If other evidence is found, we may then say that the *ὑπομνήματα* of Diodorus preserve in curious fashion an echo of history and perhaps throw some additional light on Alexander's secretariat—but that is all. Without other evidence, however, we must insist that the demonstrably false statements among the *ὑπομνήματα* not only make the entire list suspect but practically worthless, even though a true statement here and there may have survived the vicissitudes of time and may make us wish to guess at the background.

Before we consider the plans themselves, we must examine briefly the contention that our passage in Diodorus is not from Hieronymus. Schubert⁴ has proved that books XVIII-XX are a composite work, containing much that is not from Hieronymus; and Tarn in 1921 showed that this is especially true of XVIII, 2-4, though he accepted one item as definitely from Hieronymus. Therefore, says Tarn, we cannot assume that the story of the *ὑπομνήματα* is from Hieronymus, and the whole story must be examined on its merits. That is true, but, since Tarn reaches the conclusion that the passage is not Hieronymus, I must suggest a danger in his method. He is quite correct, I believe, in making substance, rather than style, the criterion by which to judge a writer's source. But I do not think it is correct to favor the "long quotation"; that is to say, if a doubtful passage or phrase is preceded or followed by one of reasonably certain

⁴ R. Schubert, *Die Quellen zur Geschichte der Diadochenseit* (Leipzig, 1914).

authorship, the two probably go together. The Alexander historians could (and did) draw from different sources in the same sentence; and yet I see that Tarn still favors the long quotation, for in a recent book ⁵ he remarks that Kornemann ⁶ has "justly emphasised the fact that the named fragments of a lost historian are no more than a starting point for reconstruction." In a review of Kornemann, however, I have shown the pitfalls of this method.⁷ Since, therefore, we simply do not know who was the ultimate source of our Diodorus passage, we must, as Tarn says, examine the story on its merits.

After Alexander's death Perdikkas found in the king's *ὑπομνήματα* ⁸ certain plans, which he referred to the army. Tarn shows (p. 16) that the army had no competence in such matters, and says that Hieronymus therefore cannot be the source here. Granted that the army would not be consulted concerning plans, it is still an open question whether the source of Diodorus knew of any plans at all. As Tarn remarks (p. 10), "There is no inherent improbability in the supposition of a collection of royal plans." Our task of discovering the echo in Diodorus, if there be an echo, is simplified if we resolutely seek the kernels of historical fact, recognizing that the *ὑπομνήματα* of Diodorus are necessarily a far cry from those of Alexander (whether from Hieronymus or another good, early source is immaterial here). Diodorus gives the following plans: ⁹

(1) The completion of Hephaestion's pyre (*πυρά*). "The pyre," says Tarn (p. 11), "was already finished. . . . The first plan, then, is a historical absurdity." In his *Life of Alexander* (72, 3), however, Plutarch states that Alexander planned to spend ten thousand talents upon a tomb (*τύμβος*) and obsequies (*ταφή*) for Hephaestion, and upon their embellishments. I submit that it matters little whether Diodorus (or his source) confused pyre and tomb; it was the costly memorial which

⁵ *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (Cambridge, 1938), p. 44.

⁶ E. Kornemann, *Die Alexandergeschichte des Königs Ptolemaios I von Aegypten* (Leipzig, 1935).

⁷ *A. J. P.*, LVIII (1937), pp. 108 ff.

⁸ I do not know what *ὑπομνήματα* means. "Memoranda" is the usual translation.

⁹ I am following C. T. Fischer's text of Diodorus in the Teubner edition (Leipzig, 1908).

Alexander had on his mind and this could hardly have been finished by the time of his own death. Incidentally, if Alexander kept *ὑπομνήματα*, are we to suppose that he struck off the plans as they were fulfilled?

(2) The construction of six temples in Europe at a cost of 1500 talents each. "This might be true," says Tarn.

(3) A synoecism of cities. Tarn says that "no synoecism of cities by Alexander, done, begun, or planned, is known." If the proletariat of new foundations came from native villages, would that constitute a synoecism?

(4) Interchange of peoples between Europe and Asia. Tarn says that it is "probably safe to believe that this plan, at any rate in part, had genuine tradition behind it."

(5) A magnificent temple at Ilion. "Strabo XIII, 393 may be evidence that Alexander had thought of this years before," says Tarn.

(6) A tomb for Philip like the Great Pyramid in Egypt. With Tarn, we may quickly dismiss this.

"So far, then," says Tarn, "the plans given in the *ὑπομνήματα* are a mixture of things very possibly true and things certainly false. Of the latter, one is obviously of Egyptian manufacture; while the former relate to *building* and *colonisation*." I believe my comments show, however, that all the plans may be substantially true, except the sixth.

(7) This, as Tarn states, is the plan that matters: The construction of 1000 warships, larger than triremes, in Phoenicia, Syria, Cilicia, and Cyprus for the expedition against the Carthaginians and the maritime peoples of Libya and Spain and the coterminous coast as far as Sicily; the construction of a road along the coast of Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles; and the construction of harbors and dockyards at convenient places for the great fleet.

Tarn says (p. 17) that the principal item in the *ὑπομνήματα*, "the plan to conquer Carthage and the Mediterranean basin, is part of a legend which developed by regular stages from the Cleistarchean embassies to the Romance, whose basis is admittedly the last echo of the Cleistarchean vulgate. This item was not formulated *earlier* than c. 200 B. C." Two points here. Referring to a story given by Curtius, to be noted again below, Tarn says (p. 14) that "Alexander's plan to march from Spain to Italy over

the Alps is obviously taken from Hannibal's march, and this story therefore is later than 219." The mention of the Alps certainly is late,¹⁰ but we still do not come to grips with the main point, whether Alexander did or did not have designs of any sort upon the West. Similarly with the embassies. Some of them—those from the Libyans, Bruttians, Lucanians, Etruscans—are certain. "As all embassies appeared in the *Journal*," says Tarn (p. 12), "it is difficult to credit any not in Arrian." We do not need to; those from Rome, for example, are a late addition; but the fact remains that before his death Alexander had contacts of an official nature with western peoples, and the story would grow with time. Finally, we may mention Tarn's observation (p. 13) that "it is hardly necessary to remark that if you are going to the Pillars you do not begin by sending your fleet to Babylon" (from Phoenicia, in sections, overland). I think you do, if you are already at Babylon and are planning first of all a colonization of the Persian Gulf and, especially, if you are as ignorant of Arabia and Africa as Alexander was.

Let us examine more closely the possibility that Alexander envisaged an expedition against the West. Tarn states (p. 14) that "it is likely enough that Alexander may have meditated sending out expeditions of *exploration and discovery*, whether round Africa, or in the Atlantic like Pytheas; precisely as he did send an expedition to explore the Caspian." It seems to me just as reasonable to admit the likelihood of an expedition of conquest, but there is no proof yet for either. Turning to Wilcken, we see (p. 5) that he looks upon the *ὑπομνήματα* as a collection of official documents, kept perhaps by Eumenes, who had the *Ephemerides* in charge.¹¹ The purpose of Wilcken's paper, as I have already intimated, is not to discuss the authenticity of the *ὑπομνήματα*, but, by searching for their traces, to reach a deeper understanding of Alexander. Wilcken finds in Curtius X, 1, 17-18 confirmation of Alexander's plan for an expedition against Carthage and Europe and is surprised (p. 14) that students have not turned it to account, even though Tarn has

¹⁰ Curtius really speaks of sailing past the Alps; a small slip, corrected by Tarn in 1939.

¹¹ In *The Ephemerides of Alexander's Expedition* (Providence, 1932), p. 73, I pointed out that Eumenes probably was not the secretary of the expedition for the last years.

summarized and commented upon it. Since the Curtius passage is not the only one that can be summoned to the support of Diodorus, it will be well to examine all the evidence.

After Nearchus joined him in Carmania, Alexander planned, according to Curtius, to go from Syria to Africa, conquer (be hostile to) Carthage, continue through Numidia to Gades and Spain by way of the Pillars of Hercules, and sail past the Alps to Italy and Epirus—an expedition for which he would need 700 heptereis. If one will examine the Itinerary in my *Ephemerides* (p. 58), it will be seen that at precisely this same point Plutarch remarks (68, 1) that, when Nearchus joined him, Alexander formed the desire of sailing down the Euphrates, circumnavigating Arabia and Libya, and then of entering the Mediterranean by way of the Pillars of Heracles; hence ships of every kind were built for him at Thapsacus. Only slightly later in the Itinerary, and with the same source before him, Arrian (VII, 1, 1-4) has this to say: "When he arrived at Pasargadae and Persepolis, Alexander was seized with a desire to sail down the Euphrates and Tigris to the Persian Sea. . . . Some authors also say that he was planning to sail round the greater part of Arabia, the country of the Ethiopians, Libya, and the land of the Nomads beyond Mt. Atlas, as far as Gades in our sea, believing that, after he had conquered both Libya and Carthage, he might justly be called king of all Asia. . . . Some say that he planned a voyage thence into the Euxine Sea, to Scythia and Lake Maeotis, while others state that he planned to go to Sicily and the Iapygian promontory. . . . For my part I do not know what were his plans." These detailed plans at (let me emphasize) this point in the narrative are untrustworthy, for they rest on neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus, and may therefore be dismissed with Curtius and Plutarch.¹²

Thus far, then, and in spite of Wilcken, there has not been a scintilla of evidence for a western expedition, even though Tarn's arguments against it may not in every case have been conclusive. We may now note that in his 1939 article Tarn examines once more the Diodorus and Curtius passages: the pyramid-tomb (an

¹² I am not noticing Arrian, IV, 7, 5 and other passages in the ancient authors which give vague (or untrustworthy) references to Alexander's desire to conquer the world.

impossibility); the 1000 warships (developed from Curtius' impossible statement); the use of the name "Alps" (which, like the pyramid-tomb, cannot be earlier than 196-5); the construction of the military road along the coast of North Africa (Alexander is not known to have built any roads)—all these are unquestionably far later than Alexander, and certainly no careful historian can use Diodorus' *ὑπομνήματα* as history. Perhaps, as Tarn says, "anyone putting forward, as a plan of Alexander's, anything so extraordinary as the conquest of the Mediterranean basin would naturally insert some true items in the supposed *ὑπομνήματα* if he could, to give verisimilitude to his story." The plan, as we have it, was probably concocted in the late Hellenistic period to show that Alexander "was to have what Rome in fact did have," and we can almost hear a Greek "speaking: 'So you Romans have now got the Mediterranean and its coasts, the sceptres of land and sea—*γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης σκῆπτρα*. Well and good. But if Alexander had lived, those sceptres would have been his—here's his plan—and where would you have been then?'"

At all events we may agree that the Diodorus passage, even if it does go back to a historical kernel,¹⁸ cannot be very helpful (as I explained earlier); but the truth is we do not need Diodorus for Alexander's western plans, and students of the problem must address themselves to Arrian. Tarn, in 1939, has touched on part of this, but for other purposes, and I give his point in some detail. Toward the end of his paper Tarn devotes two paragraphs as to "how the plan for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin grew up." The embassies at Babylon played a part, but "I now think that Alexander's schemes, real and alleged, of *exploration* were a far more important factor, and I must look at these. When he turned back at the Beas he *abandoned* a hard-won

¹⁸ I mean just this by "kernel" or "echo": I hope to show that Arrian (without fully realizing it, a fact which lends strength to his credibility) reveals that Alexander had an idea of western conquest. This idea was embroidered with time; witness Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, and even Arrian VII, 1, 1-4. The details, then, are all worthless; the most we can ever hope to do is to recover the *idea*. Tarn says this: "But as Alexander certainly thought of the circumnavigation of Arabia for himself, he *could* equally well have thought of that of Africa; he had no idea of its size"—I hope to show that he *did* think of it.

conquest. . . . The abandonment of the eastern Punjab was a turning-point in Alexander's career, for once he had quitted India, he made no more conquests, but turned his thoughts to exploration instead. He tried to explore the coast of his own province of Gedrosia, to help maritime trade; and when he died he had two explorations in hand, the Caspian and the coast of Arabia. . . . A story was told that, after Arabia, he meant to circumnavigate Africa and enter the Mediterranean through the Pillars; ¹⁴ as he knew nothing of the size of Africa or of Herodotus' story of a Phoenician circumnavigation which took three years, the story has some chance of being true, though he could hardly have gone in person. But projects of exploration by a naval and military force will, in literature, pass with the greatest ease into projects of conquest. The (supposed) projected circumnavigation of Africa became a plan for conquering North Africa from the Pillars eastward.¹⁵ The real plan of exploring the Arabian coast, known from the *Journal*,¹⁶ became, in the Curtius passage already discussed, the conquest of that coast; and that passage exhibits a (supposed) projected circumnavigation of the Mediterranean in actual process of passing into the conquest of the Mediterranean basin."¹⁷

Tarn says again, at the end of his paper, that after quitting India Alexander "turned to exploration instead of further conquests." I cannot find the evidence for this: Alexander fought,

¹⁴ Tarn refers to the Plutarch passage (68, 1) and adds, "no mention of conquest." Plutarch, however, says that ships of every kind were built for Alexander at Thapsacus; but I have already said that Plutarch is not evidence here.

¹⁵ Tarn's references are to Arrian, V, 26, 2; VII, 21, 1.

¹⁶ See my note 22.

¹⁷ Curtius in effect, continues Tarn, ascribes to Alexander a rather vague and not very belligerent expedition, which "presently develops into the full-blown plan for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin given by Diodorus. That the Diodorus passage is later, perhaps much later, than the already late Curtius passage, and has merely grown out of it, is surely now self-evident." *Mutatis mutandis*, this can be said of much of the material in the Alexander historians. Yet the question remains, what, if anything, lay back of it all? Generally we do not know, and without an impeccable source it is not worth while guessing. On the other hand, where an impeccable source *does* exist, we must give it full weight, for everyone will agree that much vital information concerning Alexander is missing; see my note 22.

wherever it was necessary to fight; he colonized Rhambacia, and, for him at least, this was outside India, for he had crossed the Arabius river and a large stretch of desert; in short, the departure from India shows no radical break with his past. But this is really part of another problem. We must turn to the passages in Arrian, not, however, with an idea of determining "*how* the plan for the conquest of the Mediterranean basin grew up"; above all, it does not concern us to discover how "the (supposed) projected circumnavigation of Africa became a plan for conquering North Africa from the Pillars eastward." If we can establish that Alexander hoped to *circumnavigate Africa*, it obviously follows that we have proved the existence in his mind of an idea for a western expedition. Call it conquest or exploration, Alexander voluntarily surrendered nothing; and certainly we do not need the fertile imagination of a Curtius or Diodorus to embroider the picture for us. The trouble has been that the *προμήματα* are just specific enough to make us concentrate on the Mediterranean, and, the details being chiefly absurd, we have lost ourselves in proving the impossibility of it all. Let us now forget Diodorus, Curtius, and Plutarch:

The passage of fundamental importance is in Arrian.¹⁸ In addressing the mutinous troops at the Hyphasis (Beas) Alexander says that "the distance before we reach the Ganges and the Eastern Sea is not great; I tell you that the Hyrcanian (Caspian) Sea will be seen to be united with this, because the Great Sea encircles the whole earth. I will also show to the Macedonians and to the allies that the Indian Gulf flows into the Persian, and the Hyrcanian Sea into the Indian Gulf. From the Persian Gulf our expedition will sail round to Libya as far as the Pillars of Heracles. From the Pillars all the interior of Libya will be ours, and so the whole of Asia." The extraordinary ignorance of geography, which would have been impossible at a later date, points to a good source; and in fact there is nothing that is suspect about this passage; but, above all, it must be noted how very modest are Alexander's plans¹⁹ as compared with those in the other Arrian passage (VII, 1, 1-4) quoted above, where

¹⁸ V, 26, 1-2. Tarn has alluded to it (see my note 15).

¹⁹ Alexander's ambitions are restricted to Asia (with which Africa was often grouped), though his empire will extend up to the Pillars.

Arrian, characteristically, has forgotten the (less dramatic) plans of the speech. To take our second important passage in Arrian. In Bactria Alexander told Pharasmanes²⁰ that he now had a "desire of conquering the Indians; after he subdued them, he would possess the whole of Asia. He said that after he had conquered Asia he would return to Greece and make an expedition through the Hellespont and Propontis with all his forces to the Pontus." It is universally agreed, I think, that Alexander's ideas enlarged as his expedition progressed. In Bactria-Sogdiana he had one set of plans, India (and thus all of Asia) and then the Black Sea (which, he thought, was not far from where he then was²¹); but in India success and a larger world brought other ideas, still Asia to be sure, but an Asia that extended to the very frontiers of western Europe. This would entail a western expedition, round Africa. For my purposes it is not at all necessary to speculate on what Alexander may have planned after his return to Babylon, for the kernel of it was there three years earlier.

In 1921 Tarn said (p. 11) that "it is, of course, a strong argument against the genuineness of the *ὑπομνήματα* that they do not give a single one of the plans known from Arrian, though certainly the rebuilding of E-sagila and the Arabian expedition were *μνήμης ἀξία*." But the *ὑπομνήματα*, as we have them in Diodorus (if we may return to them), are dramatic. On the other hand, our brief quotations from the Ephemerides, which concern Alexander's last days, mention the (dry) immediate plans of an expedition.²²

²⁰ Arrian, IV, 15, 5-6.

²¹ Alexander mistook the Jaxartes for the Don.

²² Strictly speaking, the Ephemerides do not specify the (Arabian) expedition, though we have probably been right in thinking so. Of the five extant Alexander historians, only Arrian (VII, 24, 4-26, 3) and Plutarch (75, 3-76, 4) give extracts from the Ephemerides for Alexander's last days, and Plutarch does not mention a proposed expedition. I wish to emphasize how odd it is that, with the reference to the expedition before him, Arrian does not elaborate at all in his regular narrative; I do not count VII, 20, for, as Tarn shows in his 1939 article, this was "only Hiero's report and throws no light on Alexander's intentions." This can only mean that much information about Alexander was lost, since an expedition of any importance would have caused a great stir. For us it is an added warning not to expect too much of our sources here.

If I have shown (as I have tried to do) that Tarn's objections to the *ὑπομερίσματα* are not always conclusive, it certainly does not follow that I would take the next step and, with Wilcken, argue that Diodorus' plans fit Alexander's character—it would be as profitable to say that an expedition to China fitted him.²³ But I believe that I have shown that Alexander did have plans of a farseeing kind, preserved, perhaps, by an echo in Diodorus, but certainly to be discovered in trustworthy passages in Arrian. That is probably all that can be done with Alexander's plans. If we are to understand Alexander's character better—particularly if we are to examine the idea of his so-called world-kingdom—we must study him during his lifetime, and, it may be added, certain lines of inquiry may confirm some of the implications of this paper. For example, did Alexander envisage the brotherhood of man, or, lacking real vision, did he limit himself to a union of the new masters of Asia with the old, Macedonians with Persians? Did he envisage at the outset of his expedition the possibility of world conquest, or, like Philip, something definitely less? It is hard to believe that the experience of Xenophon and the ambition of Agesilaus were lost upon him. The world meant to him, as to everyone else, the Persian empire; the patches round about, inhabited by savages, could be ignored or attended to later. The West was another matter, but Alexander can hardly have been unaware of the near-successes of his neighbors in that quarter.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

²³ The only thing which would "fit" Alexander would be a trip to the Pillars, so as not to be outdone by Heracles.

CORINTH AND THE ARGIVE COALITION.

Thucydides' account of the period which followed the Peace of Nicias is felt generally to be among the least satisfying portions of his work. It is disputable whether or not these chapters were finally revised,¹ but the intricacy of the diplomatic moves which have to be described and the absence of a central theme are obstacles which not even the most careful revision could remove. The narrative is moderately detailed, and in many cases the aims of states or parties are clearly defined, but to a greater extent than in other parts of his work the author leaves his readers to guess the motives underlying the negotiations which he records. These omissions spring from a variety of causes. First, the number of the states involved is large, and to define the object of each at every turn of the situation would overload his narrative. Secondly, his caution led him to venture upon motivation only where his sources were unquestionably trustworthy, and in this case the difficulty of obtaining information on intrigues whose aims were deliberately concealed must have been considerable. Thirdly, it is his practice to condense his accounts of schemes which were abortive or without much influence upon subsequent events.² A problem upon which he throws little light is raised by the mixture of forcefulness and hesitancy displayed by the Corinthians,³ and it is the purpose of this article

¹ If the bulk of Book V is a late addition composed only when the author recognised the unity of the Peloponnesian War, he cannot here have followed his normal practice of collecting information about events at the time of their occurrence and must have begun this process when much was already forgotten. But discussion on the composition of his work continues without any very conclusive result.

² It is significant that the aims of Argos, Mantinea, and Elis, whose armies operated against Sparta in the campaign of 418, are more clearly outlined than those of Corinth, Boeotia, and Megara, whose estrangement from Sparta was only temporary.

³ There is nowhere any indication that the fluctuations of Corinthian policy were caused by differences of opinion between political parties, as was the case at Athens and Sparta. In the Corinthian War the democrats and oligarchs at Corinth were sharply divided on foreign policy, but this was because the estates of the latter suffered from the protracted operations at the Isthmus.

to suggest what factors may have determined the course of Corinthian diplomacy.

It was the Corinthians who after the conclusion of the alliance between Athens and Sparta sent envoys to Argos to urge the formation of a defensive coalition under Argive leadership (V, 27, 2-3).⁴ The ambitions of Argos are well known to Thucydides,⁵ and he records them fully, since they led to the campaign of 418. The Argives were disinclined to renew their treaty with Sparta, because they hoped to reap the fruits of their neutrality in the Archidamian War and become the leaders of the Peloponnese (28, 2; 40, 3; 69, 1, cf. Aristoph., *Peace*, 475-7). This object was to be attained at the expense of Sparta, and the most promising feature of the situation was the resentment felt against Sparta by those allies which, believing their interests betrayed by the Peace of Nicias, refused to accept its terms. Among these was Corinth, whose envoys declared to the Argives that the newly-formed alliance between Athens and Sparta was designed to threaten Peloponnesian autonomy (27, 2). But this fear, which soon spread to other Peloponnesian cities (29, 3-4), was surely the creation of Corinthian propaganda. Thucydides nowhere suggests that it had any foundation,⁶ and to him the Spartan purpose in concluding the alliance was a purely defensive one (22, 2); both Athens and Sparta were too exhausted by war and too embarrassed by difficulties arising from the Peace to embark upon a joint policy of far-reaching imperialism.⁷ Under the leadership of Nicias Athens would scarcely entertain ambitions of this kind, and if he were ousted by the Radicals, the result would doubtless be a breach with Sparta. Considerations other than anxiety for their independence must have influenced the determination of the Corinthians to play the leading

⁴ All references are to Thuc. V, unless otherwise defined.

⁵ Considerable portions of Book V may well derive from Argive sources.

⁶ Diodorus (XII, 75, 4) characteristically accepts this threat as a fact. Meyer, *G. d. A.*, IV, p. 467, and Ferguson, *C. A. H.*, V, p. 257, are inclined to believe that it had some foundation.

⁷ The Spartans gave vague assurances that they would join the Athenians in compelling the Chalcidians, Boeotians, and Corinthians to accept the Peace (35, 3-5); but they evidently did not contemplate any offensive action.

part in initiating and organizing the Argive coalition; indeed, the promptitude with which they embarked upon their plan of action suggests that it was formed before the alliance between Athens and Sparta had been signed.

The two states which immediately declared their readiness to join the coalition were Mantinea and Elis, each actuated by a local grievance against Sparta. The outcome of an alliance between Argos, Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis, if it assumed an offensive as well as a defensive character, as the Argives at least intended, might well be a campaign against Sparta. Success in this venture would materially benefit the three partners of Corinth, especially Argos whose ambition to dominate the Peloponnese would be assured, but to the Corinthians themselves, though it might bring satisfaction, it could provide nothing more concrete. They had, it is true, every reason for animosity against the Spartans: the Peace of Nicias left Sollium and Anactorium in Acarnanian hands (30, 2),⁸ failed to repair other losses sustained by them,⁹ and secured none of the objects for which they had precipitated the Archidamian War. These feelings, however, occasioned only by disappointment, were easily forgotten at two subsequent moments when the situation suggested a rapprochement with Sparta (36-8; 48). A desire to avenge the betrayal of their interests by Sparta was neither the only nor the principal motive of the Corinthians in their energetic promotion of an Argive coalition.

The bitter hostility of Corinth towards Athens at this time is recognised by modern scholars,¹⁰ but the extent of its influence in determining Corinthian policy has perhaps received insufficient attention. Now an attack by the coalition upon Sparta would involve the Athenians, who were committed to full support of the Spartans under the terms of their recent alliance (23, 1). But, as Thucydides points out (40, 2), the Argives were aware of the friction existing between the two powers, which might soon become intensified. They even entertained

⁸ This appears to be the only passage (with the possible exception of 32, 4) in which Thucydides claims knowledge of unexpressed Corinthian sentiments during this period.

⁹ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 468; Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 255; De Sanctis, *Storia dei Greci*, II, p. 296.

¹⁰ Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

hopes of an alliance with Athens (*ibid.*), and at least had reason to expect that Athenian assistance to Sparta would be unsubstantial. Moreover, the Athenians could have little influence upon operations conducted in the interior of the Peloponnese, however scrupulously they might honour their obligations. The developments of 420-18 show how accurately the Argives gauged the situation in 421, and their hopes were doubtless shared by Mantinea and Elis (cf. 44, 2). But the Corinthians had very different intentions. They aimed, it seems, at nothing less than a renewal of the Peloponnesian War with the substitution of Argos for Sparta as the formal leader of the adversaries of Athens. The Spartans would probably be ranged on the Athenian side, but if all the principal states of the Peloponnese were brought into the Argive coalition, Sparta would be hemmed in by a cordon of enemies and would be unable, as well as perhaps unwilling, to prevent invasions of Attica and attempts to break up the Athenian empire.¹¹ Whereas the Argives at present regarded war with Sparta as the chief object of the coalition, the Corinthians probably hoped to reduce this to a purely defensive character. Owing to the danger of alienating the many Argives who had sympathy for Athens (44, 1) these Corinthian aims could not yet be divulged, and it would be only when other enemies of Athens—Boeotians, Megarians, Chalcidians—had been drawn in and had made their influence felt that Argive scruples could be overcome and the whole force of the coalition directed against Athens. The familiar war-cry of a crusade to liberate Greeks enslaved by the Athenians could then be renewed,¹² and if success were achieved, the Corinthians would be among the chief beneficiaries. This interpretation of their intentions is consistent with the invariable trend of their policy since the middle of the fifth century, when their commerce and their colonial empire were eclipsed by the advance of

¹¹ The inability of the Athenians to restore their authority in the Thraceward district suggested that such attempts might be more successful than those undertaken in the early years of the Archidamian War.

¹² The arguments of the Corinthian delegates at the congress of the Peloponnesian League in 432 (Thuc., I, 120-4) could be reaffirmed, with emphasis upon the economic menace of Athenian power even to Peloponnesian states which had no maritime interests (*ibid.*, 120, 2).

Athens; it may be confirmed by a brief examination of the part which they played in the diplomatic exchanges of 421-0.

The proclamation inviting states to join the Argive coalition was issued by Argos but drafted by Corinth. Whereas other cities might secure membership by communicating with a board of twelve Argive commissioners, Athens and Sparta might join only with the consent of the Argive demos (28, 1). This formula is astutely worded. That Sparta was not excluded from membership must have appeared to the Argives a mere formality designed to maintain the ostensibly defensive nature of the coalition and necessitated by the Spartan alliance with Athens. But the Corinthians may well have deliberately drawn up the proclamation in such a way as to facilitate the entry of Sparta into the coalition, if the alliance with Athens broke down and sentiment hostile to Athens became predominant at Sparta. The Corinthian attitude to the Thraceward district is also significant. When Corinth formally entered the Argive coalition, the Chalcidians, bitter enemies of Athens, joined at the same moment (31, 6), and whenever the Chalcidians are mentioned by Thucydides in this period, they appear in close association with the Corinthians (30, 2; 35, 3; 38, 1, 4), who evidently represented themselves as champions of a people betrayed by Sparta and likely soon to be subjected to Athenian attacks. Boeotia and Megara, also enemies of Athens but not actively threatened, proved less tractable, and their decision to hold aloof from the coalition for the present reflects a desire to avoid an open breach with Sparta. The next move was an attempt by Corinth and Argos to win the support of Tegea. Its failure damped the enthusiasm of the Corinthians (32, 3-4), and the reason for their disappointment is clear: Tegea was of strategic importance and an essential link in the chain of states with whose aid they hoped to isolate Sparta. As was later proved by the operations of 418, Tegeate fidelity would enable the Spartans to take the offensive against Mantinea and Argos. A Corinthian embassy was then sent to Boeotia and, after failing to win Boeotian support by direct persuasion, carried out a manoeuvre whose purpose Thucydides does not fully explain (32, 5-7). The Boeotians consented to send envoys with the Corinthians to Athens and seek to obtain for them the same system of ten-day truces which was in operation between themselves and the Athenians; if this attempt

failed, they would repudiate their own truce with Athens. The Athenians refused to accept a proposal which would amount to recognition of the Corinthian secession from Sparta and would thereby anger their ally. This result must have been anticipated by the Corinthians from the outset, and their diplomacy was evidently designed to embroil the Boeotians with Athens and thus overcome Boeotian hesitation in joining the Argive coalition. But the Boeotians, who had now perhaps realised the intentions of the Corinthians, failed to keep their promise.

The inclusion of both Boeotia and Megara in the Argive coalition was indispensable to the success of the Corinthian plan, since otherwise invasions of Attica could not be resumed, and the continued indecision of these states doubtless disappointed the Corinthians even more than the blank refusal of Tegea. It may therefore be to this moment of discouragement that an event belongs to which Thucydides refers considerably later (48). Argos, Mantinea, and Elis agreed that their alliance should be made offensive as well as defensive, but the Corinthians refused to participate in this alteration. They evidently recognised that any military operations which might ensue would be directed against Sparta and that their own ambitions had no prospect of fulfilment unless this offensive alliance included Boeotia and Megara. They were perhaps on the point of withdrawal from active participation in the coalition when at the end of 421 two newly-elected Spartan ephors, who disapproved of the Peace of Nicias, put forward secret proposals which, if carried into effect, would have caused a fresh alignment of the Greek powers (36). By a complicated method which need not be described here all the allies of Sparta in the Archidamian War were to be reunited under Spartan leadership with the valuable addition of Argos, and the outcome would certainly be a resumption of hostilities against Athens (36, 1). The Corinthians gladly associated themselves with the Boeotians, Megarians, and Chalcidians in the prosecution of this design (38, 1), and their action shows, as has already been suggested, that their feelings of resentment against Sparta were not very deep. That Sparta should become their ally instead of being their enemy was a most welcome prospect; the objects for which they had been working since the spring were likely to be attained in

a more attractive form than had hitherto seemed possible.¹³ But owing to difficulties arising from the Boeotian constitution the scheme proved abortive (38, 2-3), and its failure left the situation unchanged.

The subsequent conclusion of an alliance between Sparta and Boeotia alarmed the Argives: they feared that they would have to face Sparta, Athens, Boeotia, and Tegea, a combination far stronger than their own coalition (40, 3). The suspicious tergiversations of Corinth, whose motives cannot have been intelligible to them, probably afforded a further cause of uneasiness. Hence early in 420 they began to negotiate with Sparta (40-1), regretting their refusal to renew the truce which had expired in the previous year. Soon, however, the growth of anti-Laconian sentiment at Athens and the forceful diplomacy of Alcibiades offered hopes that the Athenians might join the Argive coalition, and this prospect caused the Argives to discontinue their negotiations with Sparta. The long-standing sympathy of the Argives for Athens (44, 1) and their hope of profiting from tension between Athens and Sparta (40, 2) had always been a menace to the Corinthian plan.¹⁴ When the Quadruple Alliance was formed, the Corinthians naturally refused an invitation to join it and began to seek a reconciliation with Sparta (48). A later attempt to win their support, which shows that Argos did not appreciate the bitterness of their antagonism towards Athens, was also unsuccessful (50, 5).

Corinthian diplomacy thus failed utterly. The only compensation of the new alignment was that the entry of Athens into the Argive alliance would increase friction with the Spartans, but the latter could not be expected to embark upon open war with the Athenians so long as Argos, Mantinea, and Elis challenged their authority in the Peloponnese and received intermittent support from Athens. The Corinthians could only wait for more promising times and meanwhile resist Athenian at-

¹³ It is conceivable that the plan of the ephors may have been suggested to them by Corinthian envoys who were then at Sparta (36, 1) and must have been aware of the strained relations between Sparta and Athens. But no evidence can be adduced in support of this conjecture.

¹⁴ Nevertheless, the Corinthian view that these Argive sentiments might be overcome was shared by the anti-Athenian party at Sparta, as is seen from the scheme promoted by the two ephors (36).

tempts to humiliate them further (52, 2; 53; 55, 1). The battle of Mantinea substantially improved their position, and in 416, when Athenian relations with Sparta were exceptionally strained, they declared war on Athens (115, 2-3), hoping soon to draw the entire Peloponnesian League into the conflict.

The foregoing interpretation of Corinthian diplomacy receives some support from the policy of Nicias in 421. The suggestion that the Peace should be reinforced by a defensive alliance was put forward by the Spartans, and the advantages which they hoped to derive from it are unequivocally explained by Thucydides (22, 2).¹⁵ On the other hand, the factors which led Nicias and his Conservative followers to welcome the Spartan proposal are somewhat obscure,¹⁶ for the view that he was a philo-Laconian, whose policy resembled that of Cimon, can no longer be maintained.¹⁷ The Athenians sorely needed a breathing-space during which they might build up their damaged resources and fully restore their authority in the empire, especially in Thrace.¹⁸ Quarrels which seemed likely to inflame the Peloponnesians would surely facilitate the attainment of these aims by distracting their former enemies. Why then did they consent to an agreement which rendered them liable to send aid if Laconia were invaded or the Helots revolted (23, 1-3)? Their conduct can be considered reasonable only if their own territory was in danger of invasion and a reciprocal guarantee from Sparta urgently needed. According to Plutarch (*Nic.* 10, 2) Nicias concluded the alliance because Corinth and Boeotia seemed likely to cause a renewal of the war, and modern scholars touch upon the prospect of invasion.¹⁹ But Nicias in a speech delivered some years later implies that these two powers would

¹⁵ The last words of this section are, however, barely intelligible, for the Spartans cannot have feared that the rest of the Peloponnesians would go over to Athens. If this had been likely, the readiness of the Athenians to accept the Spartan alliance would be even more remarkable. Editors have sought to remove the difficulty by emendation or transposition.

¹⁶ Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 467, surely exaggerates the extent to which the alliance would enable Athens to influence Spartan policy.

¹⁷ West, *C. P.*, XIX (1924), p. 228; Neumann, *Klio*, XXIX (1936), p. 38, n. 3.

¹⁸ Glotz, *Histoire grecque*, II, pp. 659-60.

¹⁹ Ferguson, *op. cit.*, p. 256; De Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

hardly venture to attack Attica without support from others (Thuc., VI, 10, 3). It is arguable that but for the alliance Sparta might eventually have been persuaded to renounce the Peace; but if Corinth was organising a powerful coalition, including Argos, with the intention of directing it against Athens, the danger was far more pressing. Sparta could not with certainty secure Attica from invasion, as has been pointed out above, but the alliance might serve as a deterrent, and the readiness of the Athenians to assume commitments in return for somewhat problematical advantages shows how seriously the threat was regarded. Among the virtues of Nicias was a capacity for gathering information about the intentions of other states. The Corinthian plan may well have reached his ears and led him to seize the opportunity afforded by the Spartan proposal while his own party remained in power and relations with Sparta were moderately cordial.

H. D. WESTLAKE.

KING'S COLLEGE,
UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM,
NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE.

EURIPIDES AND EUSTATHIUS.

The *παρεκβολαὶ εἰς τὴν Ὅμηρον Ἰλιάδα—Ὀδύσσειαν* of Eustathius contain approximately 325 citations of Euripides. The greater part of these citations are quotations of the text of Euripides and are, further, mainly from five tragedies. The tragedies are cited in the following proportion: *Phoenissae*, 39; *Hecuba*, 60; *Orestes*, 39; *Medea*, 28; *Hippolytus*, 48; *Bacchae*, *Heracleidae*, *Alcestis*, once each; *Iphigeneia Taurica*, *Hercules*, *Helen*, twice each; *Iphigeneia Aulidensis*, *Troïades*, *Cyclops*, *Ion*, three times each. The citations include 52 of fragments and 26 references to Euripides in general.

The citation of Euripides by Eustathius, as well as of the multitude of other classical writers, was of course incidental to the main purposes of Eustathius. In the course of the *Commentaries* Euripides is cited for a variety of reasons, but usually primarily for the sake of illustration—of the use or distinction of meaning of a word or phrase, to substantiate a Homeric usage, to distinguish a Homeric and Euripidean usage, for the etymology, accent, or exegesis of a word, to illustrate Euripidean paraphrase or imitation of Homer, to illustrate the use of proverbs by Euripides, for glosses. Judging from the incidental nature of Euripidean citation, one might expect naturally that quotation of Euripides would be highly inaccurate. The degree of accuracy of Eustathius in quoting is an interesting question and a difficult one. For just as there is considerable difference in Eustathius' purpose in citation, so there is considerable difference in his method of citation, a difference doubtless increased by the nature of his book, its extent, and the length of time required for composition. To make clear the manner in which Eustathius cites Euripides and to determine the degree of accuracy attained in the quoting of Euripides, I have attempted to discover in the case of each citation the particular line and play which Eustathius was citing, and then have gathered together citations of a similar nature into several classes.

In the first class are formal, *verbatim* quotations of the text of Euripides which agree in every detail with the best MS tradition of the passage in question. That Eustathius intended

these quotations to be formal and accurate is made clear by the manner of introduction of the quotations—by the use of *εἰπών*, *φησὶ*, *οὖν*, *ἐν τῇ*, etc. The following are the references to formal quotations of Euripides in Eustathius:¹ *Phoenissae* 28 (Eustathius 1205, 52); 45 (381, 20); 45 (909, 28); 108 (239, 24); 283* (236, 25); 383 (575, 6); 489 (811, 25); 1377-8* (669, 48); 1406 (647, 9); 1462 (236, 35); 1587 (743, 5). *Hecuba* 21-2 (Eustathius 545, 29; 853, 50; 958, 60; 1271, 64); 64* (249, 39); 131 (1381, 40); 260* (1647, 37); 288-9 (1422, 12); 320 (690, 58); 345 (950, 64); 442-3* (1401, 28); 553 (28, 20); 559 (930, 40); 603 (930, 42); 640* (55, 15); 736 (1128, 7); 911* (189, 12); 920 (540, 21); *Orestes* 72 (Eustathius 742, 55); 81 (653, 29); 162 (437, 37); 228 (791, 3); 234* (1799, 31); 720 (1288, 15); 878 (1264, 19); 919 (1335, 61); 1137 (245, 7); 1205 (687, 53); 1384* (1276, 15); *Medea* 1 (Eustathius 452, 33; 1248, 56); 1 (1419, 45); 8 (374, 12); 34 (1203, 30); 245* (739, 34); 262* (694, 25); 426* (10, 29); 476 (896, 56; 1379, 59); 613* (633, 39); 1033 (600, 13); 1164 (146, 29); 1198 (456, 46; 501, 12). *Hippolytus* 88 (21, 20); 201* (701, 1); 274 (189, 24); 375 (168, 4); 436 (164, 31); 459* (233, 35); 525-6* (432, 6); 612 (1175, 29); 632 (170, 6); 948 (484, 15); 1172 (501, 20). *Bacchae* 124 (771, 56); *Hercules* 929 (1401, 12); *Iph. Aul.* 1149-50 (1693, 11); *Iph. Tau.* 1193 (108, 30); *Troïades* 1176-7 (757, 46); *Cyclops* 136 (1485, 31).

A second group of citations are formal, *verbatim* quotations, accurate in every detail. The quotations of this group, however, contain a variant reading which is either possible or probable, or suggests or supports a probable reading. These are as follows: *Phoenissae* 370* (Eustathius 432, 12); *Hecuba* 260 (1117, 38);

¹ Passages marked with an asterisk furnish additional MS support to suspected or questioned readings. For example, in Eustathius 739, 34 on *Medea* 245, the reading of Eustathius supports *ἄσπς* of ABL¹ against *ἄσπς* V, *ἄσπς* P, *ἄσπς* L. In Eustathius 633, 39 on *Medea* 613, Eustathius reads *ἄσπσοι σ'* with several MSS against *ἄσπσοι* of AV. In Eustathius 432, 6 on *Hippolytus* 525, Eustathius reads *σ'* with AVL¹ sup¹ against *σ'* of MBN. If the citation of Eustathius is primary, as some of them are, the citation has the value of a twelfth-century MS, provided there is an apparent accuracy in the quotation; if the citation is secondary, as some of them are, the citation has an even greater value, depending upon the quality of the source and accuracy of citation.

337 (1875, 48); 996 (52, 23; 792, 19; 1312, 20); 1090 (358, 31). *Orestes* 87 (146, 12; 809, 36; 1856, 15); 396 (22, 5); *Medea* 120-1 (55, 27); 219-21 (415, 11); 422 (634, 13); 426 (634, 13); 632-3 (568, 24). *Hippolytus* 104 (245, 15); 387 (723, 16); 1189 (599, 24); 1207 (495, 27); 1321-2 (488, 15); *Helen* 59 (30, 34).

A third group of citations are those formal quotations which show an error or inaccuracy when compared with the accepted text of Euripides. In this group the variation is often minor and the quotations otherwise precise even to small details. In the following list, the discrepancy in the quotation of Euripides by Eustathius has been noted in each case for the purpose of permitting a true idea of the manner of quotation: *Phoenissae* 184 (Eustathius 462, 4) *μεγαλάνορα ὑπερηγορίαν* for *μεγαλαγορίαν* (-*ανορίαν* codd.) *ὑπεράνορα*; 501 (569, 14) *ἴσον* for *ἴσον*; 889 (55, 17; 154 34) *ἐστί* (but correctly in 55, 17) for *ἐστί*; *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* for *τῶ ἀγαθοῦ*; 944-5 (500, 34) word order interchanged; 1105 (473, 4) *πυκναῖς* for *πυκναῖσιν*; *ἀσπίσι* for *ἀσπίσιν*; 1128 (473, 4) two words omitted; 1141-2 (344, 14) one word omitted; 1159 (786, 23) *δέ* omitted; 1300 (1021, 42) *φρένα* for *φρέν*; 1748 (554, 34) *ὀδυρμῶν* for *ὀδυρμάτων*. *Hecuba* 14 (48, 8) two words omitted; 342-4 (129, 13) syncopated; 359-60 (415, 11) syncopated; 607 (55, 18) *τ'* omitted; *Orestes* 42 (519, 43) *δ'* omitted; 55-6 (250, 39) one word omitted; 193 (1428, 22) article added, substitutes Attic for Doric form; 265 (904, 6) *εἰς* for *ἐς*; 981 (1266, 42) *δέ* omitted; 1005 (1713, 7) *τε* omitted; 1205 (727, 34) *δ'* omitted; 1189 (4, 33) *συλλάβετε* for *ξυλλάβεθ'*. *Medea* 13-4 (734, 15) *συμ-* for *ξυμ-*; 618 (682, 47) *γάρ* omitted; *Hippolytus* 374 (82, 35) *γῆς* for *χῶρας*; 914 (156, 15) *γε* omitted; 1126 (468, 42) *ἀκτῆς* for *ἀκτᾶς*; 1329 (1743, 24) *ἀφιστάμεθ'* for *-μεσθ'*; 1340 (737, 5) *γάρ* omitted. *Ion* 59-60 (281, 45).

The next group is a group of adapted quotations, in which Eustathius did not intend to quote accurately. This is clearly proved by the loose manner of citation, and by the way parts of the quotation (in noun and verb construction) are adapted or accommodated to the syntactical requirements of the sentence of Eustathius into which it has been incorporated. These quotations are usually exact in every detail, otherwise, and sometimes appear *verbatim*: *Phoenissae* 1 (Eustathius 447, 1); 210 (1003, 60); 636-7 (776, 53); 805 (650, 49); 1116-7 (182, 27); 1185*

(683, 60) 1514 (125, 30); 1572* (612, 20). *Hecuba* 8 (649, 55); 65* (1815, 11); 71 (173, 16); 294-5 (723, 57); 458 (1556, 29); 570* (216, 6); 641 (42, 3); 924-5 (454, 15); 926 (690, 42). *Orestes* 12 (1200, 14); 40 (53, 6); 115 (492, 8); 211-2 (982, 44); 234 (1404, 56); 393 (1294, 50); 396 (383, 15); 426 (1051, 53); 554 (1498, 57); 933* (319, 46). *Medea* 187 (160, 13); 679 (1303, 34); 1123 (1515, 21); 1176 (643, 39). *Hippolytus* 69 (436, 34); 121 (353, 16); 136 (438, 25); 214 (210, 44); 646 (427, 27); 762 (427, 27); 843 (640, 6); 1135 (599, 22); 1168 (500, 8); 1229 (427, 27); 1234 (598, 27); 1237 (384, 4); 1254 (633, 34); 1254 (832, 31); 1302 (502, 32). *Alceste* 607-8 (707, 38).

There is a further group of citations which may be termed "allusions," in which Eustathius refers to the use of a word or to a situation, but does not quote the passage at all. These are: *Phoenissae* 28 (Eustathius 160, 5); 160 (1367, 25); 574 (666, 36); 838 (419, 5); 1124-5 (269, 35); 1407 (331, 34); general references, Eustathius 381, 20; 394, 11. *Hecuba* 3 (840, 33); 3 (643, 29); 101 (918, 50); 288 (152, 45); 320 (462, 16); 421 (1361, 18); 451-2 (1695, 40); 458 (1557, 54); 525 (1956, 34); 525 (1653, 27); 555 (25, 42); 600 (519, 41); 699 (384, 23); 699 (1405, 49); 922 (904, 59); 945 (379, 35); general references, Eustathius 242, 22; 694, 14; 953, 3; 1214, 64; 1288, 33; 1361, 18; 1519, 40; 1805, 36. *Orestes* 5 (1700, 22); 213 (22, 34); 265 (1528, 28); 275 (1636, 49); 1287 (1374, 65); 1639-41 (20, 14). *Medea* 352 (170, 45); 906* (217, 3); *Hippolytus* 231 (361, 22 and 26); 452 (262, 23); 643 (646, 2); 736 (405, 34); 763 (690, 41); 1168 (401, 10); 1254 (633, 22); general references, Eustathius 161, 45; 170, 9; 1081, 19; 1565, 8; 1688, 20; 1932, 14. *Cyclops* 104 (1455, 34). *Ion* 171 (131, 22); 453 (1861, 43); *Iph. Aul.* 216 (342, 36). *Iph. Tau.* 439 (918, 50). *Troïades* 1257 (1242, 45). General references, to the *Cyclops*, Eustathius 1850, 38; to *Iph. Aul.*, 57, 31 and 185, 5; to *Helen*, 401, 10; to *Heracles*, 284, 34; to *Hercules*, 815, 11; to *Troïades*, 975, 31.

The citations of the fragments reveal much the same methods of citation as those of the extant plays. The references are as follows:

Fragments whose sources are found in Eustathius alone: Fr. 106 Nauck (Eustathius 656, 58; 1234, 42; 1640, 60; 1681, 42);

107 (1607, 4; 1902, 1); 366 (1720, 26); 628 (1564, 35); 693 (107, 31); 762 (959, 43); 775 (1731, 55); 927 (566, 15).

Formal quotations: Fr. 15, 2 (Eustathius 173, 1); 146 (1632, 9); 189 (1192, 48); 200, 3 (240, 42); 207 (1799, 54); 282, 1-2 (1299, 20); 327, 6 (892, 39); 379 (1775, 19); 467 (1532, 16); 579 (236, 30); 631 (1170, 59); 639 (789, 16); 830 (1090, 51); 888 (1084, 2; 1397, 19); 892 (868, 34); 895 (1596, 43); 896 (883, 62); 898, 9-13 (978, 23); 899 (1801, 33); 1014 (641, 59); 1015 (1412, 16); 1086 (887, 5); 1111 (695, 44; 903, 51; 1003, 24).

Adapted quotations: Fr. 15, 2 (Eustathius 399, 11); 73 (1430, 63); 367 (1058, 5); 473 (1356, 63); 495 (1837, 1); 516 (770, 22); 631 (1170, 53); 907 (867, 64); 968 (1467, 31).

Allusions: p. 621 Nauck (763, 12); Fr. 369, 1 (1793, 40); 633 (1761, 40); 680 (592, 21); 1098 (1910, 48).

There are then a large group of citations to Euripides which cannot be identified with a specific passage or play, but refer generally to Euripides. I have included here with the references the subject of each citation, which will illustrate pretty well the scope of the subjects of the whole group of citations from Euripides. These are: on his beginning his dramas *in medias res*, as Homer begins his epics, Eustathius 7, 37; on the distinction of *δέμας* and *σῶμα*, Eustathius 61, 40; on the use of *τρίβος*, 74, 3; on the use of *μέτα*, 74, 45; on the manner of supplication in Euripides, 129, 3; on the use of *λελησμένος*, 264, 26; of *ὄχημα*, 375, 6; on the repetition of *πολλὰ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων* (in *Al.* 1162, *An.* 1285, *Bac.* 1386, *Hel.* 1704), 476, 31; on the use of *πέπλος*, 599, 45; on Sthenoboea, 632, 6; on the use of *νάπη* and *νάπος*, 668, 34; on Agamemnon, 674, 55; on the Euripidean use of *φῶς ἡλίου*, 729, 55; on the use of beaks of ships as trophies, 750, 35; on the use of *χρῆν*, 751, 53 and 1179, 39; on Euripides' blame of the Trojans, 822, 3; on the similarity of a passage in Homer to an Euripidean prologue, 1006, 5; on Euripides' loquaciousness, 1128, 21; on the use of *λίνος* and *αἰλινος*, 1164, 9; on Euripides' life, 1205, 20; on *ἀσπράγαλοι*, 1289, 61 and 1379, 39; on the two aspects of *αἰδώς*, 1338, 28; on the use of *ἡνεγκα*, 1435, 66; a comparison of Homeric and Euripidean *anagnorisis*, 1495, 7; also, 1593, 45; 1834, 22.

Finally, there is a citation from the Euripidean recension of Homer—the addition of a line after *Il.*, 2, 866, Eustathius 366,

13; three citations of passages in comedy mentioning Euripides: Plato Com., Fr. 30 (Eustathius 813, 47); Diphilus, Fr. 60 (Eustathius 1205, 20); Aristophanes' *Frogs* 91 (Eustathius 1226, 16); and a line assigned to Euripides by Eustathius which is to be identified with Aeschylus' *Choephoros* 773 (Eustathius 1013, 12).²

The quotations of the text of Euripides, as I mentioned above, furnish a number of variant readings. In the list of these variants below, I have included only those displaying some degree of possibility or probability, or supporting a probable reading, and, with a few exceptions, those which are unique to Eustathius:

- Hecuba* 260 (1179, 38) ἀνθρωποκτονεῖν (with P) for ἀνθρωποσφαγεῖν (codd. and Eustathius 1647, 37)
- “ 337 (1875, 48) ὧς τ' for ὥστ'
- “ 360 (415, 11) τύχοιμι for τύχοιμ' ἄν
- “ 996 (52, 23; 792, 19; 1312, 30) τοῦ (with P) for τῶν
- “ 1090 (358, 31) εὖσπλον for ἐνοσπλον
- Phoen.* 370 (432, 12) ἔχω for ἔχων
- “ 805 (650, 49) ἐπίσημον (with P) for ἐπίσημον
- “ 1116 (182, 27) ξύν (with P) for σύν
- Orestes* 87 (146, 12; 809, 36; 1856, 14) ἦκει for ἦκετον
- “ 234 (1404, 56) ἡδύ (with P) for γλυκύ
- “ 396 (22, 5) ξύνεσις for σύνεσις
- “ 933 (319, 46) Δαναοὶ δέ (δαναοὶ δέ P) for Δαναῖδαι
- “ 1005 (1713, 7) πελειάδος for πλειάδος
- Medea* 120 (55, 27) ὀργήν for ὀργάς
- “ 219 (415, 11) ἔστιν ἐν for ἐνεστιν
- “ 220 (415, 11) ἐκμάθη (ἐκμάθοι L) for ἐκμαθεῖν
- “ 422 (634, 13) ὑμνοῦσαι (ὑμνέουσαι v) for ὑμνεῦσαι
- “ 426 (634, 13) ὕμνοι (with B² suprascr.) for ὕμνον
(ὕμνοις V, corr. v)
- “ 632 (568, 24) ἐφίης (ἐφίης VL) for ἐφείης
- “ 633 (568, 24) οἰστόν for οἰστόν

² I have ventured to describe in some detail the manner in which Eustathius cites Euripides on account of the uncertainty which surrounds Eustathius' method generally. It is reasonable to suppose that Eustathius cited other authors in general in the same fashion as has been illustrated in the case of Euripides.

- Hipp.* 104 (245, 15) μέλοι for μέλα
 " 387 (723, 16) ταῦτά (ταῦτ' L) for ταῦτ'
 " 1189 (599, 24) ἀφβύλησιν (with B. N. Haun.) for ἀφβύ
 λαισιν
 " 1207 (495, 27) οὐρανόν for οὐρανῷ
 " 1321 (488, 15) μάντεως for μάντων
 " 1322 (488, 15) ἔνεμας (with P H) for παρέσχος (γ
 ἔνεμας L P²)
Alcest. 608 (707, 38) ἐς (εἰς V B) for πρὸς
Helen 59 (30, 34) λέχος for λέκτρ'
Ion 59 (281, 45) Χαλκωδογτιάδαις (χαλκωδογτιάδαις L corr.
 for χαλκωδογτιάδαις P et prim. L.
Fr. 693 (107, 31) φίλον Eust., om. rell.
Fr. 693 (107, 31) ἔκτεινε (with *Etym. Flor.*) for ἐγείραι
Fr. 146 (1632, 9) ἔρροι for ἔρρει
Fr. 892 (868, 34) καίτοι for ἐπεὶ
Fr. 1014 (641, 59) οὐκ ἔτη for οὐκέτι

An examination of the citations of Euripides by Eustathius will convince one of the extent and depth of Eustathius' familiarity with Euripides, and, on the whole, of a rather remarkable accuracy in his quotation of the text of Euripides. The distribution of the citations of Euripides, as stated above, point very clearly, in my judgment, to the fact that Eustathius used a MS of Euripides containing the five plays from which the bulk of the citations are made.

HAROLD W. MILLER.

FURMAN UNIVERSITY.

APOLLO AND THE SUN-GOD IN OVID.

A century ago Karl Otfried Müller perceived that Apollo was not the Greek sun-god and that the two deities were not commonly identified until Hellenistic or Roman times.¹ His discovery was so contrary to the prevailing view of his times that it gained acceptance but slowly through the course of the nineteenth century, in the latter part of which it had to make its way against the solar-myth theories of Max Müller and his school, who gave a new lease of life to the concept of Apollo as primarily a sun-god.² But Otfried Müller's theory has the evidence on its side, and today no one can seriously dispute that Apollo was not originally a sun-god.³ Those who like a solar Apollo can do no more than follow Gruppe in giving as early a date as possible to the identification of Apollo with the sun. Even so, they must admit that the identification was not common until Hellenistic times at the earliest.

But everyone has thought that by the first century B. C. the literary identification of the two gods was complete. To Gruppe, for instance, the identification of Apollo with the sun is so frequent in Latin poets that he considers it unnecessary to cite

¹ *Die Dorier*, I, pp. 286-291. I am indebted to Professors I. M. Linforth and G. M. Calhoun for valuable criticisms and suggestions made during the preparation of this article, which is a revision of a paper that I read before the annual meeting of the Philological Association of the Pacific Coast on November 25, 1938, at Palo Alto. A résumé of the paper appears in *P. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), pp. xxxvif.

² F. Max Müller, *Contributions to the science of mythology* (London, New York; Longmans, Green; 1897), I, pp. 91, 123, 404. On Apollo interpreted as a sun-god or light-god see also W. H. Roscher, *Apollon und Mars* (Leipzig, Engelmann, 1873), pp. 16-18, and "Apollon," *Myth. Lex.*, I, pp. 422 f.; P. Decharme, *Mythologie de la Grèce antique* (Paris, Garnier, 1884), pp. 99 f.; F. Froehde, "Ἀπόλλων," *Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen*, XIX (1893), pp. 231 f.; F. Preller, *Griechische Mythologie* (Berlin, Weidmann, 1894), I, pp. 230 f.; Rapp, "Helios," *Myth. Lex.*, I, p. 1996.

³ See K. Wernicke, "Apollon," *P.-W.*, II, 19-21; Jessen, "Helios," *ibid.*, VIII, 75 f.; L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1896-1909), IV, pp. 136-144; O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (Munich, C. H. Beck, 1906), pp. 1240-1244; H. J. Rose, *Handbook of Greek Mythology* (New York, Dutton; London, Methuen; 1928), pp. 33 f., 134.

passages in evidence.⁴ Of the Latin poets, Ovid in particular, who has so much to say about Apollo, is all but universally supposed to have treated Apollo and the sun as one and the same god.⁵ A few commentators neither affirm nor deny this, but speak of Apollo in their remarks on Ovid's Apolline stories and of Sol in their notes on solar stories.⁶ But the great majority of commentators do not hesitate to affirm that Ovid identifies the two gods; and this view runs through all schooltexts and handbooks.

At first sight it would seem impossible to deny that in Ovid's eyes Apollo is the god who every day drives the sun-chariot across the sky, preceded by Aurora and attended by the Hours. For Ovid is largely responsible for the prevalence in modern times of the idea that Apollo was a sun-god. His influence upon Renaissance and later poets, who abound in allusions to Apollo as the sun, is well known.⁷ Bulfinch and Gayley based their handbooks of mythology chiefly upon Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, and they have given several generations of schoolchildren an almost ineradicable conviction that Apollo is the sun-god. If the question should be asked whether Ovid calls the sun-god Apollo or gives Apollo the name Sol and solar attributes, the immediate response of almost any classical scholar, I think, would be that he does. Let us not answer so hastily, but rather look to see

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 1240, note 3; see also Farnell, *op. cit.*, p. 137; Wernicke, *loc. cit.*, 19.

⁵ See the following editions of Ovid's works: *Metamorphoses*: M. Haupt (Berlin, Weidmann, 1903), p. 64; F. J. Miller (London, New York; *L. C. L.*; 1916), II, pp. 438, 484, 492. *Fasti*: R. Cornali (Turin, Loescher, 1897-1902), II, p. 24; J. G. Frazer (London, Macmillan, 1929), III, pp. 91 f.; V, p. 2. *Tristia, Ex Ponto*: A. L. Wheeler (London, New York; *L. C. L.*; 1924), p. 493. Among the numerous school editions that identify Apollo and the sun-god may be mentioned the following: *Selections*: J. N. Anderson, C. W. Bain, Golling-Fritsch, Charles Knapp (*Virgil and Ovid*), Greenough-Kittredge-Jenkins (*Virgil and other Latin poets*). *Metamorphoses*: Siebelis-Polle-Stange, Meuser-Egen, J. Lejard, F. Harder, R. S. Lang (Book XII). *Fasti*: G. H. Hallam.

⁶ See V. Fabricius, *De diis fatis Joveque in P. Ovidii Nasonis operibus quae supersunt* (Leipzig, G. Fock, 1898), pp. 4, 7, 19-22; F. W. Kelsey, *Selections from Ovid* (Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1897), pp. 30 f.; A. Lange, *Methodischer Lehrer-Kommentar zu Ovids Metamorphosen* (Gotha, Friedrich Andreas Perthes, 1892), I, pp. 93-119.

⁷ See E. K. Rand, *Ovid and his influence* (New York, Longmans, Green, 1928), pp. 150-167.

whether Apollo was unmistakably recognised as a sun-god by Ovid, whether he clearly links Apollo with the myths, epithets, functions, and attributes of the sun-god, or the sun-god with those of Apollo.

At the outset the distinction between Apolline and solar stories in Ovid's works must be made clear. The Apolline stories involve the god whom the Greeks called Phoebus Apollo and whom they did not regard as a sun-god; either these stories are found in extant Greek writings of the centuries before Ovid's time or the god that appears in them is clearly identified by Ovid with the Apollo of Greek Apolline stories.⁸ The solar stories are those that involve the god whom the Greeks called Helios Hyperion. In each group we must notice what epithets are given to the god, what his provinces and attributes are, with whom he is associated, and where he is chiefly worshipped.

The Apolline stories that Ovid treats at some length are:⁹ the slaying of Python (*M.*, 1, 438-451); Daphne (*M.*, 1, 452-567; see *S.*, 25; *P.*, 2, 2, 80); Coronis and the birth of Aesculapius (*M.*, 2, 542-632; see *F.*, 1, 291); Mercury's theft of Apollo's kine (*M.*, 2, 676-686; *F.*, 5, 692); Cadmus' consultation at Delphi (*M.*, 3, 8-18, 130); Niobe (*M.*, 6, 146-312; see *T.*, 5, 1, 57 f.); Marsyas (*M.*, 6, 383-400; *F.*, 6, 703-708); Cyparissus (*M.*, 10, 106-142); Hyacinth (*M.*, 10, 162-219); contest with Pan (*M.*, 11, 153-179); building of the walls of Troy (*M.*, 11, 194-210; see *H.*, 1, 67; 15, 180); Chione and Daedalion (*M.*, 11, 301-345); death of Achilles (*M.*, 12, 580-611; see *M.*, 13, 501; *H.*, 8, 83); Aeneas' consultation of the Delian Apollo (*M.*, 13, 630-679); the Cumaean Sibyl (*M.*, 14, 129-153); the oracle to the Romans on Aesculapius (*M.*, 15, 626-643); Apollo and the raven (*F.*, 2, 247-266). Several other stories are briefly summarised or alluded to: Apollo's metamorphosis into a crow in Egypt (*M.*, 5, 329 f.); the seduction of Isse and other maids (*M.*, 6, 122-

⁸ Such stories as those of Cyparissus, Aeneas' consultation of the Delian oracle, Apollo and the Cumaean Sibyl are not found in earlier Greek writers. No doubt the Latin poets took some of them from Alexandrian writers whose works no longer exist.

⁹ For citations of Ovid's works I shall make use of the following abbreviations: *A.*, *Amores*. *A.A.*, *Ars Amatoria*. *F.*, *Fasti*. *H.*, *Heroides*. *I.*, *Ibis*. *M.*, *Metamorphoses*. *P.*, *Epistulae ex Ponto*. *R.*, *Remedia Amoris*. *S.*, *Epistula Sapphus*.

124); metamorphoses of Cephisus' grandson and of Eumelus' son (*M.*, 7, 388-390); the tuneful walls of Megara (*M.*, 8, 14-16); Orpheus' head and the Lesbian serpent (*M.*, 11, 56-60); the oracle to the Romans on the Idaean mother (*F.*, 4, 263 f.); Ius' consultation on the Palladium (*F.*, 6, 425-428); the death of Aesculapius (*F.*, 6, 759-762); the tending of Admetus' flocks (*A. A.*, 2, 239-241); Apollo as defender of Troy (*T.*, 1, 2, 5); Psamathe and Crotopus (*I.*, 571 f.).

Ovid calls the god of these stories Phoebus forty-six times, Apollo eleven times, Delius six times, Latona's son five times; arquiteus, Delphicus, Paeon, Smintheus, twice each; Cynthus, intonsus, and fatidicus deus, once each.¹⁰

Apollo appears as the god of the bow (*M.*, 1, 441, 457-460, 519, 559; 2, 603, 615 f.; 6, 227-266; 10, 108, 170; 12, 596, 606; 13, 501; 15, 634. *H.*, 8, 83), as the god of prophecy (*M.*, 1, 491, 517 f.; 3, 8-18, 130; 10, 209; 13, 650, 677-679; 15, 630-641. *F.*, 2, 262; 4, 263 f.; 6, 425-428), as the god of music and poetry (*M.*, 1, 518, 559; 2, 601, 682 f.; 6, 384; 8, 15 f.; 10, 108, 170, 205; 11, 155, 165-171, 317. *F.*, 6, 707. *H.*, 15, 180), as god of medicine (*M.*, 1, 521-524; 2, 617 f.; 10, 187-189; 15, 626-643), and as a herdsman-god (*M.*, 2, 679-685; 6, 122-124. *F.*, 5, 692. *A. A.*, 2, 239-241).

His attributes are the bow as archer-god, the lyre as god of music, the tripod as god of prophecy, and the laurel (*M.*, 1, 450, 558 f.; 2, 600; 11, 165; 15, 634. *P.*, 2, 2, 80). He has long, flowing locks (*M.*, 1, 450, 564; 12, 585). His birds are the raven or crow (*M.*, 2, 544 f., 596, 632; 5, 329. *F.*, 2, 249-266) and the hawk (*M.*, 6, 123; 11, 344). He wears a purple mantle while playing the lyre, which is inlaid with gems and Indian ivory (*M.*, 11, 166 f.). He once wore a lion's skin (*M.*, 6, 123).

He is the son of Jupiter (*M.*, 1, 517; 12, 586. *F.*, 6, 761) and of Latona (see Appendix), the brother of Diana (*M.*, 5, 330; 6, 160, 215 f.), the father of Aesculapius (*M.*, 2, 629 f.; 15, 639-643. *F.*, 1, 291; 6, 761), Orpheus (*M.*, 10, 167), and Philammon (*M.*, 11, 316 f.). His loves among women are Daphne, Coronis, Isse, Chione, the Cumaean Sibyl, and Psamathe; among men, Cyparissus and Hyacinth. He is associated with Neptune in the building of the walls of Troy (*M.*, 11, 202; 12, 587), and he

¹⁰ For all citations on names and epithets see Appendix, *infra* pp. 443 f.

entrusts the child Aesculapius to Chiron (*M.*, 2, 630). Favored mortals are Cadmus (*M.*, 3, 8-18), Daedalion (*M.*, 11, 339-343); and Admetus (*A. A.*, 2, 239).

Delos is his birthplace (*M.*, 6, 191 f. *F.*, 5, 692), and is especially favored by him (see Appendix on epithet *Delius*). He also loves Delphi, seat of his great oracle (*M.*, 1, 515; 10, 167 f.; 11, 165, 304; 15, 631), and he is the lord of Claros, Tenedos, and Pataros (*M.*, 1, 516). He also favors Troy (*M.*, 11, 194-205; 12, 587. *H.*, 1, 67; 15, 180. *T.*, 1, 2, 5) and Megara (*M.*, 8, 14-16).

Apollo is often busy on earth in the daytime; this would be difficult if he had to spend the whole day driving the sun-chariot. When Apollo and Hyacinth begin their game, Titan is midway in his course (*M.*, 10, 174). Here is a clear distinction between Titan in the sky and Apollo in Laconia.

We see, in short, that in Ovid's narration of the Apolline stories the god differs in no way from the conception of him that is current in the Greek literature of earlier centuries.

Ovid tells the following major stories that involve the sun-god: Phaethon (*M.*, 1, 750-2, 400); the love of Mars and Venus (*M.*, 4, 169-189. *A. A.*, 2, 561-588); Leucothoe and Clytie (two stories woven together, *M.*, 4, 190-270). To these may be added the brief participation of the sun-god in three other stories: Medea's flight from Corinth on the dragon-chariot given her by the sun (*M.*, 7, 398); Ceres' consultation of the sun in her search for Proserpine (*F.*, 4, 581-584); the sun's turning back in his course at the sight of Thyestes' crime (*A. A.*, 1, 327-330. *T.*, 2, 391 f. *P.*, 4, 6, 47 f. *I.*, 427 f.). These are few in comparison with the Apolline stories; but the Phaethon story is very long, the three told in the fourth book of the *Metamorphoses* cover a considerable section of the book, and one of them is also told at moderate length in the *Ars Amatoria*; so that it is possible to learn a good deal about the sun-god from them.

He is called Sol twenty-two times, Phoebus six times; Hyperione natus and Titan, twice each; auctor lucis, lux mundi, volucrum moderator equorum, once each. He is never called Apollo, and the only name that is common to the gods of the two groups of stories is Phoebus.

The god of the solar stories is above all the driver of the sun-chariot (see the Phaethon story *passim*; also *A. A.*, 1, 330. *T.*, 2, 392. *P.*, 4, 6, 48. *I.*, 428); only he of all beings can guide

the horses of the sun (*M.*, 2, 57-62). He everything:

oculis quibus adspicit omnia (*M.*, 2, 32)
omnia qui video, per quem videt omnia te

But he never looks upon the realm of the dead. He has a palace in the far east where the Ethiopians and the Indians (*M.*, 1, 773-777).

His chief attribute is the crown of rays (he wears purple raiment and sits upon an emerald throne in his eastern palace (*M.*, 2, 23 f.). Such is he, garbed as the sun-god that Phaethon cannot reach. His palace is fashioned of gold, bronze, and ivory. The twelve signs of the Zodiac are represented, and the whole universe (*M.*, 2, 1-18). His chariot, that draws his chariot, the serpent (*M.*, 7, 3) is seen in the Cygnus story (*M.*, 2, 367-380). He is identified with the Heliades, is associated with the Heliades, is associated with the Heliades; see 10, 91, 263).

This god is the son of Hyperion (*M.*, 4, 208), he is called Titan. He is the brother of the Titanes (2, 208), the father of Phaethon, Circe (the Heliades (*M.*, 2, 340). His loves are Clymene (2, 43; 4, 204), Leucothoe (*M.*, 4, 196-255), Rhode (208, 234 f., 256-270), Rhode (*M.*, 4, 204-205). His attendants are the Day, Months, Hours, and Seasons (*M.*, 2, 25-30, 118 f.). He is associated with Aurora (*M.*, 2, 113, 144), Lucifer, the minor deities of the sea, into which Tethys looses his horses in the morning and receives him at night in the west (*M.*, 2, 6) of Triton, Proteus, Aegaeon, Doris, and the Heliades upon his palace doors (*M.*, 2, 8-14).

In all this the Sol or Phoebus that rule the world as the Helios of Greek myth. There is no indication between this god and the Apollo of the first

¹¹ See also *M.*, 4, 172, 195. *F.*, 4, 581-584. *A.* as god of oracles; Sol sees everything from his chariot. There is no indication, either in language or co-identification of function in this respect.

side of the fact that both are called Phoebus. We must now study the many passing references and allusions that Ovid makes to Apollo and to the sun when he is not telling a story about them. These brief passages can be divided into those that obviously refer to a solar deity or to the Greek Helios and those that do not.

The non-solar god is called Phoebus forty-eight times, Apollo twenty-one times, Paean four times, Leucadius three times, Actiacus and Clarius, twice each; Delphicus, laurigerus, intonsus deus, saluber, stirps Letoia, canorus, flavus, domesticus, once each. Again he appears often as the god of the bow (*M.*, 8, 31. *A.*, 3, 3, 29. *R.*, 705. *P.*, 4, 8, 75 f. *S.*, 23), of oracles (*M.*, 13, 410; 15, 143-145. *F.*, 1, 20; 2, 713; 3, 855 f. *A.*, 3, 2, 51. *A.*, 2, 496; 3, 789. *T.*, 4, 8, 43; 5, 12, 15. *I.*, 125 f., 262), of music and poetry (*A.*, 1, 1, 11 f. and 16; 1, 3, 11; 1, 15, 35 f.; 2, 18, 34; 3, 8, 23; 3, 12, 18. *A. A.*, 1, 25; 2, 493 f.; 3, 142, 347. *R.*, 76, 251 f., 489 f., 705, 767. *T.*, 3, 2, 3 f.; 5, 3, 57. *P.*, 4, 8, 75 f. *S.*, 23), and of medicine (*M.*, 15, 533-535, 742. *F.*, 3, 827. *R.*, 76, 704. *T.*, 3, 3, 10; 4, 3, 78). His attributes are the bow, lyre, tripod (*A. A.*, 3, 789), and laurel (*F.*, 3, 139; 6, 91. *A. A.*, 2, 495 f. *R.*, 75. *T.*, 3, 1, 39; 4, 2, 51). He has beautiful and unshorn locks as the god of manly beauty (*M.*, 3, 421. *F.*, 2, 106. *A.*, 1, 1, 11; 1, 14, 31. *T.*, 3, 1, 60). There are references to his mother Letoia (*T.*, 3, 2, 3), his sister Diana (*M.*, 15, 550. *F.*, 6, 111. *A.*, 2, 5, 27. *R.*, 200. *P.*, 3, 2, 48), his sister Minerva (*A. A.*, 1, 745), his sons Aesculapius (*M.*, 15, 533, 742), Orpheus (*M.*, 11, 8), and Miletus (*M.*, 9, 444, 455, 663). He loved the maidens Deione (*M.*, 9, 443 f.) and Cassandra (*M.*, 13, 410. *T.*, 2, 400). He is associated with the Muses and Bacchus (*A.*, 1, 3, 11; 3, 8, 23; 3, 12, 17 f. *A. A.*, 3, 347 f. *T.*, 3, 2, 3 f.). Mopsus is a favored mortal (*M.*, 8, 350-354). Favored cities and localities are Delphi (*M.*, 15, 144. *F.*, 3, 856. *A.*, 1, 15, 35 f. *T.*, 4, 8, 43), Delos (*A. A.*, 2, 80), Claros (*A. A.*, 2, 80. *F.*, 1, 20), Tenedos, Chryse, Cilla (these three in *M.*, 13, 174), Miletus (*M.*, 9, 443-449), Actium (*M.*, 13, 715. *S.*, 165 f. *T.*, 3, 1, 42; 5, 2, 76), Apollonia-on-Pontus (*T.*, 1, 10, 35), and Rome, where he is worshipped on the Palatine (*M.*, 15, 865. *F.*, 4, 951. *A. A.*, 3, 119, 389. *T.*, 2, 25; 3, 1, 60).

The scattered passages that refer to the sun-god are very

numerous and mostly of one type: poetic references to the course of the sun across the sky or to the passage of days, as often in the *Fasti* in passages like the following couplet that describes the transition from April 2 to April 4:

Ter sine perpetuo caelum versetur in axe,
ter jungat Titan terque resolvat equos (*F.*, 4, 179 f.).

A few passages are references to Circe or Pasiphae as daughters of the sun, and the like.

In these passages the sun-god is called Phoebus twenty-nine times, Sol twenty-one times, Titan fifteen times, Hyperion four times, nitidus (deus) three times; Cynthus and magnus, twice each; candidus, celer deus, pater Heliadum, once each. As in the myths he is the driver of the sun-chariot (e. g. *F.*, 1, 652; 2, 73 f.; 3, 109, 415 f., 518; 4, 180, 688) and the god that sees everything (*M.*, 13, 852 f.; 14, 375). He cannot abide the approach of an underworld goddess, Tisiphone (*M.*, 4, 488), and he never penetrates the caverns of Sleep (*M.*, 11, 594 f.). He has two homes, one in the east and one in the west (*H.*, 9, 16), and he starts his course from Ocean's stream (*F.*, 3, 415). He wears a crown of rays (*F.*, 1, 385). The day that he bears in his car is purple (*F.*, 3, 518; see also *M.*, 15, 193), whence the color of his raiment. He is the brother of the moon-goddess, called Luna, Phoebe, or Titania (*M.*, 1, 11. *F.*, 3, 110. *H.*, 11, 45. *I.*, 107, 210), and of Diana, who is identified with the moon (*M.*, 2, 454; 15, 196). He is the father of Circe (*M.*, 13, 968; 14, 10, 33, 346, 376, 382, 438. *R.*, 276), Pasiphae (*M.*, 9, 736. *H.*, 10, 91), and the Heliades (*F.*, 6, 717), and the grandfather of Medea (*M.*, 7, 209). He is associated with the Year (*F.*, 1, 164), Aurora (*M.*, 15, 191), and Lucifer (*M.*, 15, 189. *T.*, 3, 5, 55 f.). He is worshipped at Rhodes (*M.*, 7, 365) and at Heliopolis in Egypt (*M.*, 15, 406 f.).

From the entire analysis of both myths and allusions we see that there are few points of resemblance between the two gods. Both are called Phoebus and Cynthus; Diana is called sister of both; both wear purple raiment; the gems and Indian ivory of Apollo's lyre suggest the riches of the sun's palace in the orient; and the serpent is linked with both. Only the mutual epithets and the link with Diana are significant; for a few resemblances in attributes can be found between any two gods.

It was also the practice of Virgil and other Latin poets to apply the name Phœbus to the sun-god.¹² This epithet, we know from Greek literature, properly belongs to Apollo; it means "bright," "pure," "radiant." As Otfried Müller and Farnell have shown, it has nothing to do with the sun.¹³ Yet its meaning makes it a fit epithet for the sun-god too. Perhaps the practice of calling the sun Phœbus had already arisen among Alexandrian poets, though I know of no instance; whereas the Latin poets do so very often. Perhaps such expressions as Aeschylus' ἥλιον φοῖβη φλογί (Pr. 22) had an influence upon the poets who started this practice.

When Ovid calls the sun *nitidus* or *candidus* he is simply translating *Phœbus* into Latin. But he no more thought Apollo and the sun the same because he called both Phœbus than he thought Pyrrha, Diana, Latona, and Circe, the same because he called each Titania.¹⁴

More serious is the fact that Ovid calls the sun-god Cynthus in identical lines in the *Fasti* (3, 346, 353). The text appears sound; there are only variations of spelling in late and inferior manuscripts.¹⁵ Now to call the god Cynthus appears to be equivalent to calling him Delius, and this would seem to be an identification of Apollo with the sun. Yet it is difficult to suppose that Ovid means to identify the two gods in this one passage, when he treats them so differently elsewhere. It is important to observe that the name used here is Cynthus, not Apollo or Delphicus or Latona's son. Elsewhere Ovid uses this name but once for Apollo (A. A., 2, 239), and it is occasionally given to Apollo by other Latin poets.¹⁶ We must inquire whether it is not possible that Ovid thought Cynthus a suitable epithet for a sun-god not identified with Apollo.

We have noticed that he calls Apollo *Cynthus* only once; but he calls Diana *Cynthia* six times.¹⁷ If one makes an analysis of Ovid's treatment of Diana and of the moon-goddess, one sees

¹² See e. g. *Æn.*, 4, 6.

¹³ See the citations in notes 1 and 3 *supra*.

¹⁴ See *M.*, 1, 395; 3, 173; 6, 346; 14, 382, 438.

¹⁵ See Merkel's critical apparatus in his edition of the *Fasti* (Berlin, G. Reimer, 1841).

¹⁶ See Virgil, *Ecl.*, 6, 3; *Georg.*, 3, 36.

¹⁷ *M.*, 2, 465; 7, 765; 15, 537. *F.*, 2, 91, 159. *H.*, 17, 74.

that though Ovid usually treated the two goddesses as though they were distinct, he does nevertheless positively identify them. In *M.*, 15, 196 he calls the moon *nocturna Diana*. In *M.*, 3, 173 Diana, in the course of the Actaeon story, is called Titania. It is more likely that she is called this because the moon-goddess was one of the Titan race than because her mother Latona was a Titaness and is called Titania (*M.*, 6, 346). The moon is called Titania for the same reason that the sun is called Titan. In *H.*, 17, 74 the moon is called Cynthia. But most important of all is *M.*, 2, 454, in the course of the Callisto story, where Diana is treated in her usual character of virgin huntress. The goddess, fatigued with the chase and the heat, comes to a cool grove and pleasant stream:

cum dea venatu fraternis languida flammis
nacta nemus gelidum. . . .

There can be no doubt that the brother referred to is the sun. But it is probable that Ovid uses *fraternis flammis* with reference to Diana's lunar character only, since the moon has been mentioned in the preceding verse: *orbe resurgebant lunaria cornua nono*; and a little earlier (*M.*, 2, 208) he has used a like phrase of the sun's relation to the moon:

inferiusque suis fraternos currere Luna
admiratur equos, . . .

Ovid's identification of Diana with Luna does not imply that he identified Apollo with Sol. For Diana had become closely associated with the moon and Hecate in the *triformis dea*. In *F.*, 1, 387 she is called *triplex Diana*; see *H.*, 12, 79: *per triplicis vultus arcanaque sacra Dianae*. Virgil speaks of *tergeminaeque Hecaten, tria virginis ora Dianae*.¹⁸ Ovid and Virgil both call Diana *Trivia*.¹⁹ Hecate seems to be the connecting link between Artemis and Selene; both became identified with her. She is the original *triformis dea*, called so as the goddess of cross-roads, though later this name was taken to mean a triune goddess who was Selene in the heavens, Artemis on earth, and Hecate

¹⁸ *Aen.*, 4, 511.

¹⁹ *M.*, 2, 416. *P.*, 3, 2, 71. *Aen.*, 7, 516, 774; 10, 537; 11, 566, 836. See Catullus 34.

beneath the earth.²⁰ In Ovid a fourth goddess, Phoebe, is fused with these three.²¹

So Ovid apparently looks upon Diana as the sister of both Apollo and Sol. There is some inconsistency in this, since the parents of Apollo and Sol are quite different and belong to different generations. But the inconsistency is not conspicuous and it is not Ovid's; he has merely accepted what tradition brought him.

Now the sun and Diana-Luna are paired as Phoebus and Phoebe and as Titan and Titania. So, since Ovid and other Latin poets use Cynthia frequently as a name for Diana, and in *H.*, 17, 74 Ovid gives the name directly to the moon-goddess, while they use Cynthus much more rarely for Apollo, it seems probable that Ovid calls the sun Cynthus because his sister is called Cynthia. He sets the pair Cynthus and Cynthia beside the two just mentioned.

Now if it should seem that Cynthus must refer to Apollo and could not be understood of any other god, I must point out that Apollo by no means has a monopoly upon this epithet. In fact, it is his in poetry only. In actual worship upon the island of Delos only Zeus was worshipped as Cynthus, and, I might add, only Athena as Cynthia, both upon the summit of Mount Cynthus.²² Delian inscriptions show no epithet for the great Apollo of Delos; elsewhere he was called Delius.²³ Now it is interesting that among the dedications to Zeus Cynthus found among the ruins upon the summit of Cynthus was one inscribed to Zeus Helius by a certain Isidorus in the second century B. C.²⁴ Here

²⁰ See Heckenbach, "Hekate," P.-W., VII, 2782; Farnell, *op. cit.*, II, 509-512; see the oracle quoted in Euseb., *Praep. evang.*, 4, 23, 7.

²¹ See Hesiod, *Th.*, 136, 404.

²² See the inscriptions in André Plassart, *Les sanctuaires et les cultes du mont Cynthe* (Paris, Boccard, 1928), pp. 95-140; also many inscriptions in *I. G.*, XI, 2, among the accounts of the Delian *hieropoiei*.

²³ For Delian practice see numerous inscriptions in *I. G.*, XI; on the epithet Delius see Wernicke, *loc. cit.*, 48 f.

²⁴ Plassart, *op. cit.*, p. 119: an altar with the inscription: Δὲ Ἑλλῶν ἐν[χῆρ] | Ἰσίδωρος Ἀρριμάχου — — | ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς [γυναίκος] | καὶ τῶν τέκνων | (κτλ.). See *ibid.*, p. 68 for discussion. On p. 119, note 1, and p. 123, note 2, Plassart calls attention to two inscriptions that bear witness to the worship of Helius by orientals resident upon Delos in

we find that Helius is a substitute for Cynthus. It is not impossible that Helius had a place among the cults of Delos important enough to be known to Ovid or to his source. Or, even if his Delian cult was unimportant, Ovid's source may have been some Lycophron making a deliberately obscure reference to the sun.

It may be objected that it is simpler to suppose that Ovid is influenced by syncretism when he calls the sun Cynthus. There can be no doubt that Ovid was aware of the syncretism that identified Apollo and Helius; he would have known it from Callimachus if from no one else. And like all Roman poets he was strongly influenced by the Alexandrians, whose love of erudite and recondite allusion is notorious. But the religion of the philosophers, in which syncretism plays an important role, has no place in Ovid's poems. He presents either the religion of the Roman people, as in much of the *Fasti*, or the popular mythology of the Greeks, as in most of the *Metamorphoses*. This mythology he presents in its usual form, uncolored by any philosophical doctrine. In his presentation of Greek myth we need expect no more syncretism than is to be found in pseudo-Apollodorus.

In any case, the evidence comes to this: only *F.*, 3, 346, 353, and *M.*, 2, 454 can be used as evidence that Ovid ever identified Apollo with the sun-god, and they are not conclusive. Everywhere else Ovid clearly distinguishes the two gods.

We can see how Ovid brings Apollo's character as archer, musician, physician, or prophet into his Apolline stories, even where it has nothing to do with the story that is being told. Surely he would have often alluded to Apollo's solar character in the same way, if he had considered Apollo a sun-god. Surely he would have referred to Apollo's crown of rays as he so often refers to his bow or lyre or laurel. Again, if he thought the sun-god to be the same as Apollo, he would have felt free to call the sun Apollo or Paeon or Delius. He would have referred in passing to the laurel or bow or lyre when talking about the sun-god. In the many places in the *Fasti* where Ovid refers to the sun-god and his steeds he always calls him Sol or Phoebus or Titan. No recourse can be had to metrical considerations; it is unthinkable that in all his treatment of the sun-god Ovid was never able to

usual attributes, or that in all his treatment of the god of oracles, medicine, and music, he never found it possible to call him Sol or Titan or to refer to his crown of rays or to his chariot and steeds. For the English poets who have thought that Apollo and the sun were the same have done just this sort of thing. See e. g. Shakespeare, *Winter's tale*, 4, 3, 29 f.:

... and the fire-rob'd god
Golden Apollo, (became) a poor humble swain.

Tennyson, *Lucretius*, 124-127:

Look where another of our Gods, the Sun,
Apollo, Delius, or of older use
All-seeing Hyperion—what you will—
Has mounted yonder; . . .

Browning, *Apollo and the fates*, 1 f.:

Flame at my footfall, Parnassus, Apollo
Breaking ablaze on thy topmost peak.²⁵

It seems likely that in Ovid's time the identification of Apollo with the sun had not yet gone beyond the adherents of certain philosophical sects, such as the Stoics, who favored syncretism and symbolical interpretations.²⁶ The first literary evidence of this identification is Euripides' *Phaethon*, fragment 781 (Nauck), 11-13:²⁷

ὃ καλλιφεγγὲς Ἥλι', ὥς μ' ἀπώλεσας
καὶ τόνδ'· Ἀπόλλων δ' ἐν βροτοῖς ὁρθῶς καλεῖ,
ὅστις τὰ σιγῶντ' ὀνόματ' οἶδε δαιμόνων.

These lines, far from proving that Apollo was generally identified with Helios in the fifth century B. C., prove the opposite. And Euripides, fond of syncretism, never recurs to this particular syncretism in his extant plays. It is much the same with Callimachus, fragment 48 (*Hecale* 8 Mair):

²⁵ See also Browning, *Aeschylus' soliloquy*, 146; very interesting is Spenser, *Faerie queene*, 3, 11, 36-39.

²⁶ See Plutarch, *De Pythias oraculis*, 400 CD, and the citations in Gruppe, *loc. cit.*

²⁷ I. M. Linforth, in his "Two notes on the legend of Orpheus," *T. A. P. A.*, LXII (1931), pp. 11-17, makes it clear that there is no evidence for an identification of Apollo and the sun in the lost *Bassarides* of Aeschylus.

οἱ νῦν καὶ Ἀπόλλωνα παναρκέος Ἑλλίοιο
 χάρι διατμήγουσι καὶ εὐποδα Δήωλιν
 Ἀρτέμιδος.

The poet seems to be criticising those who make these distinctions. Yet we must admit that the identification of Persephone (Δηώλη) with Artemis was never popular. Here again we have the influence of erudite syncretism. And in spite of Callimachus' remarks here, he does not give Apollo a solar character in his hymn to Apollo, where he speaks of Apollo as archer, prophet, musician, physician, and shepherd.²⁸

The question arises whether the identification of Apollo with the sun ever became widespread, either in cult or in popular mythology, down to the end of paganism. A hundred years after Ovid's time, in Plutarch's *De Pythiae oraculis* (400 C D), the question is raised whether or not Apollo is the sun; even among the learned adherents of the schools of philosophy there was some uncertainty about this. And in the whole *Bibliotheca* of the pseudo-Apollodorus, which perhaps appeared around Plutarch's time,²⁹ there is no indication that Apollo is a solar deity. Whether he was ever popular as a solar deity is a question that I hope to discuss at another time.

²⁸ Very interesting evidence on Apollo's original character has come to light. B. Hrozný, in his article "Les quatre autels 'Hittites' hiéroglyphiques d'Emir Ghazi et d'Eski Kışla, et les divinités Apulunas (?) et Rutas," *Archiv Orientální*, VIII (1936), pp. 171-199, maintains that a god's name on several Hittite hieroglyphic inscriptions is to be read *Apulunas*. The second syllable only is uncertain, but he has arguments to support his conjecture. This god is the protector of altars and sacred places, the guardian of doors and gates. This is very interesting in view of Apollo's epithets *θυραῖος*, *προπύλαιος*, *προστατήριος*; see Wernicke, *loc. cit.*, 53, 64. Hrozný also identifies Rutas, companion of Apulunas, with Artemis, through the conjectural intermediate form *Ruta-mis*, "my Rutas." I am indebted for my knowledge of this evidence to Professor Henri Grégoire of the University of Brussels.

²⁹ See J. G. Frazer, *Apollodorus* (London, New York; L. C. L.; 1921), I, Introduction, p. xvi.

APPENDIX.

The names and epithets of Apollo and Sol and the citations of the lines of Ovid's poems in which they occur are listed here. Citations in italics indicate the occurrence of the name or epithet in a brief reference or allusion to the god; other citations indicate its occurrence in a story about the god.

1. Apollo

Actiacus: *M.*, 13, 715. *S.*, 166.

Apollo: *A.*, 1, 14, 31; 1, 15, 35; 3, 3, 29. *A. A.*, 2, 493. *F.*, 6, 91. *H.*, 8, 83. *I.*, 262. *M.*, 1, 473; 3, 421; 7, 389; 9, 455; 10, 209; 11, 8, 155, 306, 339; 13, 174, 631, 715; 15, 533, 638, 639. *P.*, 4, 8, 75. *R.*, 251, 489, 767. *S.*, 23. *T.*, 1, 2, 5; 1, 10, 35; 3, 3, 10; 5, 3, 57; 5, 12, 15.

arquitenens: *M.*, 1, 441; 6, 265.

canorus: *A. A.*, 3, 142.

Clarius: *A. A.*, 2, 80. *F.*, 1, 20.

Cynthius: *A. A.*, 2, 239.

Delius: *M.*, 1, 454; 5, 329; 6, 250; 11, 174; 12, 598; 13, 650.

Delphicus: *F.*, 3, 856. *M.*, 2, 543, 677.

domesticus: *M.*, 15, 865.

fatidicus deus: *F.*, 2, 262.

flavus: *A.*, 1, 15, 35.

intonsus (deus): *M.*, 12, 585. *T.*, 3, 1, 60.

Latoius: *M.*, 11, 196. Latonia proles: *T.*, 5, 1, 57. Latonigena: *M.*, 6, 160. Latous: *M.*, 6, 384. proles Latoia: *M.*, 8, 15. stirps Letoia: *T.*, 3, 2, 3.

laurigerus: *A. A.*, 3, 389.

Leucadius: *S.*, 166. *T.*, 3, 1, 42; 5, 2, 76.

Paeon: *A. A.*, 2, 1 bis. *F.*, 4, 263. *M.*, 1, 566; 14, 720; 15, 535.

Phoebus: *A.*, 1, 1, 11 and 16; 1, 3, 11; 2, 5, 27; 2, 18, 34; 3, 2, 51; 3, 8, 23; 3, 12, 18. *A. A.*, 1, 25, 745; 2, 241, 509 bis; 3, 119, 142, 347, 389, 789. *F.*, 1, 291; 2, 106, 247, 261, 713; 3, 139, 827; 4, 951; 6, 111, 112, 707 bis, 701. *H.*, 1, 67; 15, 180. *I.*, 126, 465, 571. *M.*, 1, 451, 452, 463, 490, 553; 2, 545, 608, 628; 3, 8, 10, 18, 130; 5, 330; 6, 122, 215; 8, 31, 350; 9, 444, 663; 10, 132, 162, 178, 197, 214; 11, 58, 164, 303, 310, 316; 13, 410, 501, 632, 640, 677; 14, 133, 141, 150; 15, 550, 631, 642, 742, 865. *P.*, 2, 2, 80; 3, 2, 48. *R.*, 76, 200, 704, 705, 706. *S.*, 25, 165, 181, 183, 188. *T.*, 2, 25 and 400; 4, 2, 51; 4, 3, 78.

saluber: *R.*, 704.

Smintheus: *F.*, 6, 425. *M.*, 12, 585.

2. Sol

auctor lucis: *M.*, 4, 257 f.

candidus: *M.*, 15, 30.

celer deus: *F.*, 1, 386.

Cynthus: *F.*, 3, 346, 353.

Hyperion: *F.*, 1, 385. *M.*, 8, 565; 15, 406, 407.

Hyperione natus: *M.*, 4, 192, 241.

lux mundi: *M.*, 2, 35.

magnus: *M.*, 13, 852. *R.*, 276.

nitidus (deus): *F.*, 3, 44. *M.*, 14, 33. *T.*, 3, 5, 55.

pater Heliadum: *F.*, 6, 717.

Phoebus: *A.*, 1, 5, 5. *A.A.*, 1, 330; 2, 697. *F.*, 1, 164, 651; 3, 361, 416; 4, 390, 688; 5, 17, 420, 694; 6, 199. *H.*, 10, 91; 11, 45; 13, 103. *M.*, 1, 338, 752; 2, 24, 36, 110, 399; 3, 151; 4, 349, 715; 5, 389; 6, 486; 7, 324, 365; 11, 595; 14, 416; 15, 191, 418. *R.*, 256, 585.

Sol: *A.*, 2, 1, 24. *A.A.*, 2, 573 bis, 575. *F.*, 1, 163; 4, 581, 583. *H.*, 6, 86; 9, 16; 20, 86. *I.*, 107, 210, 428. *M.*, 1, 751, 767, 771; 2, 1, 32, 154, 162, 394; 4, 170 bis, 214, 235, 238, 270, 488, 633; 9, 736; 11, 353; 13, 853 bis; 14, 10, 33, 346, 375; 15, 30. *P.*, 4, 6, 48. *R.*, 276. *T.*, 1, 8, 2; 2, 392; 3, 5, 55.

Titan: *F.*, 1, 617; 2, 73; 4, 180, 919. *H.*, 8, 105. *M.*, 1, 10; 2, 118; 6, 438; 7, 398; 10, 79, 174; 11, 257; 13, 968; 14, 376, 382, 438. *S.*, 135.

volucrum moderator equorum: *M.*, 4, 245.

JOSEPH E. FONTENROSE.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY.

LIVY AS SCRIPTURE.

For the Gallic invasion of Rome, Florus, the title of whose book sets forth that it is an epitome of Livy,¹ gives the following extraordinary explanation (I, 13, 3): *ea certe fuit vis calamitatis ut in experimentum inlatam putem, scire volentibus dis an Romana virtus imperium orbis mereretur*. Though Livy nowhere expressly explains the invasion in these terms the thought is not an unfair representation of Livy's ideas. Camillus who is the voice incarnate of Roman idealism is made to say (V, 51, 8): *igitur victi captique ac redempti tantum poenarum dis hominibusque dedimus ut terrarum orbi documento essemus*. How different is this from the Old Testament concept of Assyria as the rod of Jehovah's anger and the staff in their hand as His indignation against the backsliding children of Israel (Isaiah X, 5), or of the Canaanites being left in Palestine after the conquest to prove Israel by them (Judges III, 1)? Godless foreigners from a remote country are brought to invade Rome to *prove* the people and to serve as a rod of chastisement; Roman history is divinely directed to provide instruction to all mankind. The cosmic importance of Roman history, its use to illustrate the workings of heaven, the legitimate pride which that history confers upon those that share in it, and the consequent obligation to prove worthy of it are ideas implied in almost every page of Livy. The primarily patriotic intent of Livy's history is, indeed, quite universally recognized, but the quality of Livy's patriotism and the means which he employs to convey it can better be appreciated by noticing its kinship with the only other ancient history which employs analogous means for an analogous end.

For it is well to realize that of the patriotic historiography which he typifies Livy provides the first example in classical antiquity. Both Herodotus and Thucydides show Athenian sympathy, but neither regards Athenian superiority as something to be naturally assumed by author or reader. Herodotus' most explicit statement on the subject, that the Athenians were the saviors of Hellas,² is put down only as a probability after

¹ Florus used other sources besides Livy; cf. Otto Rossbach's Introduction to his Teubner text, p. lviii (Leipzig, 1896).

² VII, 139, 5.

close reasoning; and if Thucydides had not told us so we should never have suspected that he was himself a general (and therefore presumably strongly biased) in the war of which he writes.

Polybius and Dionysius of Halicarnassus provide instructive comparisons with Livy because for considerable stretches they offer parallel accounts for his third and first decades respectively. Polybius is a great admirer of Roman achievement, to be sure, and he tells us much of fate and fortune and the natural gifts of individuals and peoples; but his purpose is to fit Rome into the scheme of general history, and he is addressing Greeks primarily. It is significant that Livy, when he is apparently following Polybius, leaves out the numerous political and military observations and reflections. Significant also in this connexion is a principle of Polybius:³ "We must therefore disregard the actors in our narratives and apply to the actions such terms and such criticisms as they deserve." Dionysius of Halicarnassus had a fuller prospect of Roman achievement, and yet the point of his whole work seems to be that such achievement redounds to the credit of Greece, for, as he tells us (I, 89) with the air of bestowing the supreme compliment, Rome is a Greek city.

Of course Livy learned from the Greek historians, as he learned from Greek tragedy and epic. His pathetic scenes are ascribed, with much probability, to the influence of the Peripatetic school. But Livy is Roman in a sense that even his fellow-Augustans are not. In their productions the Roman stream is fused with the Greek; in Livy the specifically Roman remains untouched, the Greek element is added without impinging on the integrity of what is Roman. There can be no doubt that Livy's Roman predecessors were thoroughly patriotic; national modesty would surely be alien to Cato or Ennius. But in none of Livy's predecessors, if only because none wrote a work of such scope, did patriotism of such a degree and such an extent inform the whole of Roman history. For another history written out of a comparable conviction of the central importance of its subject, covering a comparable sweep of time, similarly based on a grand tradition and calculated to arouse the bearers of that tradition to the sense of obligation which it implies, we have nowhere else to turn than to the narrative portion of the Old Testament. The

³ I, 14, 8, translation of W. R. Paton, *L. C. L.*

analogy to Scripture seems to me to provide a suggestive approach to criticism of Livy as well as to one aspect of Roman mind and temper. The analogy may become convincing if we see how closely the means which Livy employed to attain his end can be paralleled in the Bible. It may be instructive to list, with the minimum of illustration, some of the techniques in which Livy differs from the Greek historians and is rather like the writers of the Old Testament narrative.

1. Livy suppresses his own personality almost to the Homeric minimum of *οἷα νῦν βροτοί*. When he does appear it is in connexion with some critical remark on his sources, or, very rarely, some moral reflection. These remarks are never intruded into a narrative but are put at the beginning or end of some unit, as is the case with the Praefatio or the lesser prefaces. One instance will illustrate Livy's practise.⁴ After the account of the Battle of Zama, Polybius praises, in his own person of course, Hannibal's skilful generalship in the battle (XV, 15, 3). In his parallel account Livy does not himself express this opinion but ascribes it to Scipio and other experts (XXX, 35, 5). At the very opening of Greek history writing we have the opposite practise stated as a program by Hecataeus of Miletus:⁵ "I write these things as they seem true to me, for the accounts of the Greeks are many, and as I think, ridiculous."

The Biblical author intrudes upon his account only to notice a situation that prevails "unto this day" (especially frequent in Joshua and Judges; cf. also Genesis XXVIII, 19: "but the name of that city was called Luz at the first"), or for a reference to the book of the wars of the Lord (Numbers XXI, 14) or to the book of Jasher (Joshua X, 13) or to the chronicles of the kings of Judah (I Kings XV, 7) or of Israel (I Kings XVI, 27).

2. The gauge of truth which determines what stories should be told or what version of a given story should be preferred is frankly the extent to which the story or version documents the Augustan ideal of what a *vir vere Romanus* should be. In VIII, 38-39, for example, Livy gives a circumstantial account of a

⁴ This and other examples of the same thing are given in Ivo Bruns, *Die Persönlichkeit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Alten* (Berlin, 1898), pp. 17 ff.

⁵ 1a in F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Berlin, 1923), p. 7.

great victory over the Samnites. In VIII, 40 he admits in so many words the difficulty in choosing among authorities and the probability that the records have been vitiated by fictitious family traditions; but this critical scepticism had not deterred him from giving the favorable account in the preceding chapters.

In the Bible stories are also chosen or emphasized according as they document the narrator's purpose. Omri, for example, was probably the most capable king of Israel, for the Assyrian inscriptions still call Israel "the house of Omri" a century after its fall. But one would never guess it from the few verses devoted to him in I Kings XVI; the narrator is not interested in a man who wrought evil in the eyes of the Lord and made Israel to sin.

3. A kindred principle is involved in the aetiologial stories so frequent in the early books of Livy. Places holy and accursed, institutions religious and secular, formulaic expressions are given authority by reference to a story in antiquity. The story of the combat of the Horatii and the Curiatii and of the trial of the surviving Horatius for slaying his sister (I, 24-26) not only provides an archetypal case for a complicated legal procedure, but also explains the sanctity of certain spots. Indeed, sometimes two several stories (both, therefore, probably wrong) account for the sanctity of the same spot; that is the case with the Lacus Curtius (I, 13, 5 and VII, 6, 3).

Similarly, stories are told of the patriarchal period to justify current usages. Jacob's vision at Bethel (Genesis XXVIII) gives patriarchal authority to the sanctuary at that place. Abraham's purchase of the Machpelah (Genesis XXIII) defends Israel's proprietary right against the encroachments of Edom.

4. Here might be mentioned the highly suspect artificial chronology which accounts for the period between the arrival of Aeneas in Italy and the traditional date of the founding of the city, and for the period between that date and the expulsion of the Tarquins. This chronology was of course not invented by Livy, but he reproduces it without question.

The fact that Solomon, David, and Saul are each credited with a rule of forty years, and that the period of the Judges is so frequently divided into multiples of forty years, suggests a conjectural systematization to fill the period between the traditional date of the Exodus and the reign of Solomon.

5. Livy's patriotic intent may be clearly apprehended in his treatment of the national heroes, who receive a kind of reverence which the Greek historians do not give even a Solon or a Lycurgus, a Themistocles or a Pericles. The Roman analogues of these Greeks are represented as not merely lawgivers, statesmen, generals; their lives constitute a kind of hagiographa. Numa, Camillus, even Scipio Africanus are hedged about with a kind of sanctity. Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, Cloelia, to take characters from a single episode (II, 10, 13), are impossible as human beings; each is a rather lifeless embodiment of a properly lofty republican patriotism. Polybius (VI, 55) has Horatius die in the Tiber, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (V, 33) has Cloelia and her companions effect their escape by prevailing upon the Etruscans to turn their backs while the girls bathe. Such human possibilities as baths and drowning are somehow not to be thought of in connexion with Livy's beatification of these heroes. How Roman and how Augustan was Livy's emphasis on the hagiologic character of the gallery of ancient worthies is to be seen from the precisely parallel action of Augustus himself in putting before the eyes of Livy's readers an actual gallery of all the Roman triumphators from Aeneas down, done in bronze, placed in a double row of niches in the walls of his magnificent Forum dominated by the Temple of Mars Ultor, "with the name and *cursus honorum* of each general engraved in the plinth and his *res gestae* on a marble slab fixed to the wall below." *

Almost any approved figure in the Bible will illustrate the tendency to exalt the national heroes; perhaps the Judges, especially the five "major" ones, will serve best for Livian analogies.

6. For those that are accepted as national heroes there is a tendency to exaggerate the merits and gloss over the failings in order to produce a uniformly favorable picture. This tendency may be seen, for example, in the characterizations of the three heroes of the Second Punic War, Fabius Cunctator, Marcellus, and Scipio Africanus, for each of whom, however, Livy incidentally provides enough unfavorable information to render suspect the wholly favorable picture it is his manifest intention

* See Platner-Ashby, *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome* (Oxford, 1929), p. 221, where full references to literature and inscriptions are given.

to give. The wisdom of Fabius' persistence in his good plan has been questioned,⁷ and Plutarch, though he follows the same laudatory tradition of all the Fabii as does Livy, does report some sharp dissent.⁸ Marcellus was undoubtedly a competent general, but Livy minimizes his excessive cruelty (at Leontini, Enna, Syracuse) and his rashness (which caused his untimely death), and exaggerates his prowess; at Capua, for example, a great victory is reported with very little basis in fact.⁹ It is not to be expected that Livy should be critical of the Scipionic legend,¹⁰ but he is ready to go beyond it. At Ticinus Publius Scipio's life, he tells us, was saved by the Africanus to be. Livy knows that Coelius ascribes the rescue to a Ligurian slave, but says he would prefer to have the other version true (XXI, 46, 10). In XXXV, 15 Livy reports the patently apocryphal colloquy between Scipio and Hannibal at Ephesus, where Hannibal politely insists that he would have claimed precedence over even Alexander and Pyrrhus if he had beaten Scipio. This is of a piece with Livy's claim (IX, 17) that any number of republican heroes were as competent generals and better men than Alexander.

Perhaps the Patriarchs can best illustrate the tendency to spare the saints (compare the "sparing of the Twelve" in Matthew and Luke as against Mark). Genesis XX (Abraham, Sarah, Abimelech) is a doublet, with a purposely higher moral tone, of Genesis XII, 10-20 (Abram, Sarai, Pharaoh).

7. Conversely, and perhaps to underline the merits of the saints, unsuccessful generals are exaggerated into villains. In the same war Flaminius and Varro are the scape-goats. Flaminius was certainly not the rash incompetent Livy makes him out to be.¹¹ The principal charge against him (and the exculpation for the defeat at Trasimene) was his mad godlessness, illustrated by his taking up the consulship at Ariminum instead of at Rome

⁷ See B. L. Hallward, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, VIII (1930), p. 49.

⁸ *Fabius*, I.

⁹ Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 75: "... a slight skirmish which appears as a serious battle in the Livian *aristeta* of Marcellus."

¹⁰ Discussed fully in R. M. Haywood, *Studies on Scipio Africanus* (Baltimore, 1933; *The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science*, Series LI, No. 1).

¹¹ Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

(XXI, 63); but this is plainly disproved by Polybius III, 77, 1. Varro was certainly not alone to blame for Cannae.¹² If he had been the thanks he received (XXII, 61, 14) would have been unthinkably ironic, and he would surely not have been continued in important commands year after year (XXV, 6, 7; XXVII, 35, 2). Even traditional villains are given a more heroic stature in Livy. Tullia who incites Tarquin to murder her father Servius is merely petulant in Dionysius (IV, 28-40); Livy (I, 46-48) raises her imperial ambition to become a model for Lady Macbeth.¹³

The case of Omri, cited above, and of the others who walked in the ways of Jeroboam the son of Nebat illustrate the vilification, unfair by absolute standards, which unsympathetic characters suffer.

8. For how late in the Republic Livy found it feasible to aggrandize his heroes it is hard to say. Certainly for Augustus, at least in the first Decade,¹⁴ his attitude is nothing less than reverent.¹⁵ This attitude is to be noticed not only in the direct references to Augustus, not only in the scope and purpose of the whole work which supports and justifies the Augustan program of reform, but also in numerous subtler touches, calculated to conform to Augustus' predilections. From the Monumentum Ancyranum as well as from Horace and Vergil we know that Augustus liked to think of himself as a soldier; we also know that in actual warfare he was something less than a model general.¹⁶ Perhaps that is why Livy writes *tum* in II, 6, 8: *decorum erat tum ipsis capessere pugnam ducibus*. Of such immoral generals as Sextus Tarquin (I, 54, 4) and Hannibal (XXI, 4) it is told that they shared in the toils of the common soldiery; such conduct, it is implied, must not be expected of an

¹² Hallward, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹³ See my note "Clytemnestra in Elizabethan Dress," *Glass. Weekly*, XXXII (1939), pp. 255 f.

¹⁴ The three references to Augustus are I, 19, 3; IV, 20; and XXVIII, 12, 9, of which the last shows no particular enthusiasm.

¹⁵ See Gertrude M. Hirst, "The Significance of *Augustior* as applied to Hercules and to Romulus: a Note on Livy I, 7, 9 and I, 8, 9," *A. J. P.*, XLVII (1926), pp. 347-357; reprinted in her *Collected Classical Papers* (Oxford, 1938), pp. 1-11.

¹⁶ References for Augustus' fecklessness in battle are collected in my *Scutus Pompey* (New York, 1930), p. 147.

Augustus. After the death of Romulus, of whom Augustus considered himself a sort of avatar, the people complain (I, 17, 7): *multiplicatam servitutem, centum pro uno dominos factos*. The benefits conferred by the "good" kings are emphasized; the institution of monarchy is criticized only in its abuse.¹⁷

Special consideration is given David, who is regarded as the real founder of the Hebrew kingdom. We are not allowed to forget that besides being a successful warrior and a great monarch he was "the anointed of the God of Jacob and the sweet psalmist of Israel" (II Samuel XXIII, 1).

9. Not only significant persons but significant events also are made more impressive by the infusion of supernatural elements. Before the Battle of Allia, Livy tells us (V, 37) that (a) the Romans were so blinded as to make no special preparations, and (b) the Gauls moved down from Clusium at prodigious speed. Now as to (a), from Dionysius of Halicarnassus, XIII, 19 and Plutarch, *Camillus*, XVIII we learn that the Romans mobilized all their resources and that they had 40,000 men at Allia; that accounts for their despair after their defeat. As to (b) the Gauls did not, as a matter of fact, move particularly quickly. The military tribunes whose election caused the Gauls to fly to arms (V, 36, 11-12) entered office July 1 (V, 32, 1); Clusium was three days from Rome (Polybius II, 25, 2); the Battle of Allia was fought July 18 (VI, 1, 11). The miraculous element introduced here makes Rome's failure less shocking, as it frequently makes Rome's success more significant. This is particularly the case when without such an element the incident might be passed over as trivial or ordinary. So, for example, the raven that helped Valerius against his Gallic adversary (VII, 26) both raises the achievement to a higher significance and warns the Romans against saying in their heart, *My power and the might of mine hand hath gotten me this wealth*.

In the Bible all events are significant, in that all illustrate the workings of God in history. Direct intervention may be illustrated from Joshua's battle at Gilboa, where "the sun stood still and the moon stayed until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies" (Joshua X, 13). A good parallel for Valerius and the Gaul is David and Goliath.

¹⁷ See especially II, 1.

10. Livy's treatment of Roman defeats makes very clear his unquestioning conviction of Rome's superiority and Rome's destiny. With such a conviction the defeats, as being contrary to nature, must be explained; and the explanations are almost in the nature of theodicy. It is true that Herodotus sees the finger of God in the Greek victory over the Persians; but in that case it is not a question of implementing the destiny of Athens but rather of chastising the overweening frowardness of the Persians. The Roman defeats have been studied in a recent dissertation,¹⁸ where they have been classified according as they resemble Allia, Caudium, or Cannae. The explanations also fall into types; they emphasize not such external factors as geography and strategy but rather the qualities of heart and spirit, the moral force, in which, as in discipline and courage, Romans are axiomatically superior. Where the fight is *puro ac patenti campo ubi sine ullo insidiarum metu vera virtute geri res posset* (XXIV, 14, 6) there can be no question of Roman victory. The significant point, which the dissertation should have made, is that when the Romans do submit to fight in an unfavorable field with the possibility of ambush and are in consequence defeated they are driven to do so by an outside power: before the Gallic invasion, *iam urgentibus Romanam urbem fatis* (V, 36, 6); and before Cannae, *Cannas urgente fato profecti sunt* (XXII, 43, 9).

The hand of God does not fall short, and therefore defeats of the Hebrews must also be explained. That at Ai, for example, took place because Achan had stolen of the accursed thing (Joshua VII). The nations whom Joshua does not conquer are left that by them Israel may be proved (Judges II, 22). In Livy XXXIX, 1 the Ligurians serve an analogous purpose: *is hostis velut natus ad continendam inter magnorum intervalla bellorum Romanis militarem disciplinam erat*.

But these parallels and the numerous others that can be cited¹⁹ may be superficial, and might be overbalanced by a larger number of significant dissimilarities. It is out of the startling conformity of my next three rubrics to the spirit which pervades all

¹⁸ Heinz Bruckmann, *Die Römische Niederlagen im Geschichtswerk des T. Livius* (diss. Münster, 1936).

¹⁹ E. g., the exposed twins and Moses, the laws of Numa and of Moses, the rape of the Sabines and the marriages of the Benjamites (Judges XXI).

the historical portions of the Old Testament that a conviction of the essential similarity of the two works may arise.

11. The Romans have as it were a monopoly on moral traits besides courage, discipline, and ability to rule; such, among others, are (a) *fides* and *pietas* and (b) *clementia*, which the Augustan propaganda put forth as peculiarly Roman virtues.²⁰ (a) Every war, especially where there might be reason to suppose otherwise, is painstakingly shown to be a *bellum iustum*. Whenever Roman dealing in standing by a treaty might be brought into question, a vigorous effort is made to justify Roman conduct on legal grounds. A good example is IX, 5, 2, in reference to the nullification of the *pax Caudina*: *itaque non, ut vulgo credunt Claudiusque etiam scribit, foedere pax Caudina, sed per sponsionem facta est*. When the Campanians at their request and to the great benefit of Rome are received into alliance despite the existing treaty with the Samnites, careful negotiations must be undertaken to justify such a course; *tamen tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit* (VII, 31, 1). Gabii is, indeed, taken by a ruse, but that was done by an irresponsible Tarquin, *minime arte Romana, fraude ac dolo* (I, 53, 4). When Camillus returned to the Faliscans their children whom the schoolmaster would have betrayed, they yielded voluntarily, not merely out of gratitude but because they recognized the worth of Roman *fides*: *vos fidem in bello quam praesentem victoriam maluistis, nos fide provocati victoriam ultro detulimus* (V, 27, 13). The outside world generally recognizes *fides* as a Roman quality; so the Spartan Nabis says (XXXIV, 31, 4): *cum vos intueor, Romanos esse video, qui rerum divinarum foedera, humanarum fidem socialem sanctissimam habeatis*. (b) When the Alban traitor Mettius is cruelly, albeit justly, punished by being torn apart between two chariots, Livy hastens to add that this was the only example of such punishment in Roman history; *in aliis gloriari licet, nulli gentium miliores placuisse poenas* (I, 28, 11). During the darkest weeks of the Hannibalic war their Latin allies remained loyal to the Romans because Roman government had been just and merciful, and the Latins did not object to rendering obedience to a people whom they recognized as their betters: *haud abnucebant . . . melioribus parere* (XXII, 13, 11). The scope

²⁰ Cf. Erich Burck, "Livius als Augusteischer Historiker," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, I (1935), pp. 446 ff.

of Roman justice is so generous as to include lands across the sea; that, it is sometimes implied, is the basis of Roman foreign policy. So the Greek audience understood it when Flaminius proclaimed the freedom of Greece (XXXIII, 33, 5).

12. By corollary, the lesser breeds without the law are assumed to be not only deficient in these traits but generally inferior. It is not so remarkable that Syrians are *vilissima genera hominum et servituti nata* (XXXVI, 17, 5), for even Aristotle²¹ speaks of "slaves by nature." Roman conviction of grace is more striking when it expresses contempt for Athenians, as in XXXI, 44, 9: *Athenienses quidem litteris verbisque quibus solis valent bellum adversus Philippum gerebant*. It may well be that the account of the development of Roman theatrical performances (VII, 2-3) is especially calculated to eliminate any sense of indebtedness to Greece.²² An account like that of the duel between Titus Manlius and the Gaul (VII, 10) is clearly intended to point the contrast between the sober, restrained Roman, with confidence resting on assured competence, and the gaudy, undisciplined Gaul, who emphasizes his childishness by putting his tongue out at his opponent. So the Fabii who go on an embassy to the Gauls are, because of their impulsiveness, spoken of as *Gallis magis quam Romanis similes* (V, 36, 1); similarly Timasitheus, who belonged to the piratical Liparensians, is spoken of as *Romanis vir similior quam suis* (V, 28, 3). *Fides* is not to be expected from non-Romans; *Punica religio* is a proverbial oxymoron, which ingenuous Romans sometimes, but always to their subsequent regret, accept at face value. A case in point is that of the 6,000 who escaped from Trasimene (XXII, 6, 12), though it is difficult to see why Maharbal need have given his word in the first place to men who were completely in his power.

13. The Romans are, in a word, in the natural order of things, children of destiny, lords of creation, fated to prevail over all other peoples. Livy cannot marvel at Roman expansion as Polybius does any more than he could marvel at water running down hill. From the beginning heaven guided Rome to its destiny (I, 4, 1): *debeatur, ut opinor, fati tantae origo urbis maximique secundum deorum opes imperii principium*. Rome's

²¹ *Politics*, I, 1254 B.

²² Cf. Henri Bornecque, *Tite Live* (Paris, 1933), p. 119.

first king, immediately upon his translation to heaven, sends word (I, 16, 7): *abi, nuntia, inquit, Romanis caelestes ita velle ut mea Roma caput orbis terrarum sit; proinde rem militarem colant, sciantque et ita posteris tradant nullas opes humanas armis Romanis resistere posse*. From the circumstances of its occurrence I think it is no exaggeration to say that this quotation is intended to serve as a sort of text for Livy's whole enterprise. It is made to apply to Roman expansion, as at XXVI, 37, 5: *iam velut despondente fortuna Romanis imperium orientis*. It is made to apply to the Roman habit of rising to victory after defeat, as XXVI, 41, 9: *et fato quodam data nobis sors est, ut magnis omnibus bellis victi vicerimus*.

The temper of Livy's history as shown particularly by these last three rubrics may be illuminated by the suggestive analogy of Scripture. Jehovah's exclusive choice of Israel, the moral superiority of Israel, the unworthiness of the heathen, the destiny of Israel to inherit the promised land and there to dwell secure, the obligation that rests upon Israel to continue worthy of its special favor—these ideas are explicitly and repeatedly enforced, in Deuteronomy in particular; quotations are too numerous to choose from and too familiar to require citation. Now it is under the direct influence of the Deuteronomist that the entire history of Israel was written.²³ Each of the kings, for example, is appraised only on the basis of his adherence to the Deuteronomic requirement of worshipping at the sole legitimate sanctuary at Jerusalem. The Deuteronomic ideas are the controlling factors in Hebrew history as told in the Old Testament; to the extent to which similar ideas exercise a similar control upon his history Livy may be looked upon as the Old Testament of the Romans. To Livy as to the Old Testament the paradox propounded by a distinguished Biblical scholar applies:²⁴ *Die alttestamentliche Geschichte ist ein Problem des Glaubens, und umgekehrt, der alttestamentliche Glaube ist ein Problem der Geschichte*.

MOSES HADAS.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

²³ Cf. e. g. J. Bewer, *The Literature of the Old Testament in its Historical Development* (New York, 1922), p. 215.

²⁴ A. Weiser, "Glaube und Geschichte im Alten Testament," *Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten und Neuen Testament*, N. F. IV, 4 (1931), p. 19.

DRUSUS CAESAR'S TRIBUNICIAN POWER.

Everyone is familiar from Tacitus' *Annals* with the facts that Drusus Caesar received the tribunician power at Tiberius' request of the Senate in A. D. 22, and that he died in A. D. 23.¹ Many coins and inscriptions show that when he died he bore the title *tribunicia potestate iterum*. So much has always been abundantly clear. But *when* in 22 the power was conferred, and *when* in 23 he died, were questions not satisfactorily answered. And those questions were linked by the iteration in coins and inscriptions of the tribunician title.

The date of Drusus' death became precisely known many years ago by the discovery of the *Fasti Oppii Maiores* (cf. *infra*), but that new evidence has escaped the notice of some, and no one, seemingly, has observed its bearing on the related problem of the date of the tribunician power. And some available evidence on the latter question has apparently been overlooked. There has been assumption which was not justified; there has been argument which was sometimes unfounded; and there has been conjecture which is no longer necessary; still other writers have ignored the problem of dates altogether.

Dessau assumed that the conferring of the authority upon Drusus coincided with its renewal to Tiberius, and dated Drusus' death "post k. Iulias (sc. tribunicia potestate iterum)." ² That assumption, in which he was followed by Gardthausen,³ was not justified and can now be proved erroneous.

Mattingly wrote: "Drusus received the tribunician power in A. D. 22—the exact date is not known; as his coins with TR. P. II run parallel to Tiberius' with TR. P. XXIIII, it is tempting to suppose that he started his second term of power on his father's day, June 27. He died early in 23." ⁴ But there seems

¹ Tac., *Ann.*, III, 56; IV, 8.

² *Prosop.*, II, p. 177; cf. *Gesch. d. röm. Kaiserzeit* (1926), II, i, p. 32, "Da starb Drusus . . . in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 23 n. Chr., zu Beginn des zweiten Jahres seiner nominellen Mitregentschaft."

³ P. W., X, 433.

⁴ *B. M. O.* (1923), I, cxxxvii; cf. Sutherland in *J. R. S.*, XXVIII (1938), p. 131, n. 12, "Mr. Mattingly . . . has conjectured that Drusus was TR P early in 22, becoming TR P II on his father's day 27th June, A. D. 22, and thus continuing until his death early in 23."

to be no such parallel; for the coins of Tiberius showing TR. P. XXIII⁵ bear none of Drusus' titles, and coins of Drusus showing TR. P. II either have none of Tiberius' titles,⁶ or carry TR. P. XXXIII and belong a decade later.⁷

Marsh⁸ has only the year date for Drusus' death, and none for the tribunician power. Ciaceri⁹ has even less. Hammond writes: "Drusus was consul with his father in 21 A. D. and at his father's request obtained the *tribunicia potestas* from the Senate. He was poisoned by Sejanus in 22 A. D." [sic].¹⁰ Kornemann¹¹ has the precise date of Drusus' death as the new *fasti* record it, but for the tribunician power only the year date.

It is possible, however, by Tacitean evidence to date the tribunician power of Drusus more narrowly than within the year 22 merely.¹

Early in A. D. 21 Tiberius left the capital to sojourn in Campania.¹² During his absence he communicated with the Senate by letter; and we know of numerous such communications. Those which fall in the year 21¹³ we may pass over, to mention specifically those of the following year. The Emperor wrote regarding the aediles' statement of the need for sumptuary legislation,¹⁴ again to ask the tribunician power for Drusus,¹⁵ and a third time to modify the adulatory decrees of the Senate passed together with the conferring of the authority on Drusus, and answer a question from the House about the rights and responsibilities of the *Flamen Dialis*. Together with this last letter the Senate had a letter from Drusus, who also was in Campania, acknowledging the grant of the *tribunicia potestas*.¹⁶ Finally, Tacitus records

⁵ *B. M. C.*, Tiberius Nos. 70-84, 91-94.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Nos. 95-101.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, Nos. 171-173 and p. 144 n.

⁸ *The Reign of Tiberius* (1931), pp. 165, 161.

⁹ *Tiberio Successore di Augusto* (1934).

¹⁰ *The Augustan Principate* (1933), p. 74. The same author's recent article, "The Tribunician Day during the Early Empire" in *Mem. Amer. Acad.*, XV (1938), pp. 23-61, deals with reigning Emperors and so does not include Drusus.

¹¹ *Doppelprincipat und Reichsteilung* (1930), pp. 42 f.

¹² Tac., *Ann.*, III, 31, 2.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, III, 32, 1; 35, 1; 38, 2; 47, 1; 51, 2.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, III, 52, 4-54.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, III, 56, 1.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, III, 59, 2 f.

that the serious illness of Livia prompted Tiberius' hurried return to Rome, and remarks upon the relations between mother and son; "neque enim multo ante [he adds] cum haud procul theatro Marcelli effigiem divo Augusto Iulia dicaret, Tiberi nomen suo postscripserat."¹⁷ And this dedication is dated for us by the *Fasti Praenestini* as having occurred on 23 April.¹⁸

It is, then, clear that Tiberius returned to Rome not long after 23 April, in May perhaps, hardly, one would suppose from the wording of Tacitus, later than June; that Drusus had received the tribunician power some little time at least before that return; and that the investiture can be confidently dated within the first four or five months of A. D. 22, with probability March or April. We cannot, in the state of our evidence, do better; yet this is some gain.

As has been mentioned above, we now know that Drusus died on 14 September, 23;¹⁹ the day was formerly supposed to have been the date of the elder Drusus' death in 9 B. C.²⁰ Drusus became *tribunicia potestate iterum* in the spring of 23, continuing so until his death in September, as coins and inscriptions show. It thus becomes clear that there was no coincidence or connection of the original grant of the power to Drusus, or its renewal, with the annual renewal of the same power to Tiberius, whether Tiberius' day was 26 June (Hirschfeld) or 1 July (Mommsen).²¹

ROBERT SAMUEL ROGERS.

DUKE UNIVERSITY.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, III, 64, 1 f.

¹⁸ *C. I. L.*, I², p. 236.

¹⁹ *C. I. L.*, VI, 32493; cf. Leuze in *Jahresber. für Altertumswiss.*, CCXXVII (1930, III), pp. 102, 139.

²⁰ *C. I. L.*, I², p. 329.

²¹ Cf. Hammond in *Mem. Amer. Acad.*, XV (1938), pp. 24 f. and references there.

PTOLEMAIS AND THE ARCHON SORTITION CYCLES.

The welcome discovery by Meritt that Phyle was a divided deme between 307 and 201 B. C., associated with the two tribes Demetrias and Oineis,¹ and also Pritchett's new reading of the demotic of Phyle in *I. G.*, II², 1706 (line 143),² have greatly assisted in the interpretation of this archon list which was so ably edited by Dow.³ In other words, the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. may have come from either Demetrias or Oineis, and so, too, might the polemarch of 215/4 B. C. were he not restricted to Demetrias by the fact that the fourth thesmothetes came from Oineis, double representation of tribes in the board of nine archons not being permitted. Under these circumstances, a new tabulation of the tribal affiliations of the boards of archons listed in *I. G.*, II², 1706, seems desirable for the purpose of clarifying the system of rotation. For convenience, and in order to avoid confusion in this period of transition when the new tribe Ptolemais came into being and so disturbed the tribal sequence, I follow Ferguson's example in retaining the sequence numbers of the twelve tribes which had officiated since 307 B. C., designating Ptolemais as P.⁴ Retaining all permissible alternatives, and without any prejudice as to the date of the creation of Ptolemais, these tribal affiliations would be as follows:⁵

¹ Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 72-77, no. 10.

² Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 192-193.

³ Dow, *Hesperia*, II (1933), pp. 418-446, pls. XII-XIV.

⁴ Ferguson, *Athenian Tribal Cycles*, pp. 50-51. Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], pp. 176-177) followed a more complicated scheme, though likewise avoiding confusion, by listing only the ten original tribes with sequence numbers and designating the two Macedonian tribes as A[ntigonis] and D[emetrias]. It will be recalled that the official position of Ptolemais was at the exact middle of the list, between 6 and 7 by my numbering.

⁵ The list of archons is repeated from my *Athenian Archon List* (1939), except that . . . bios is omitted from 217/6 B. C., since the *stoichedon* arrangement would demand an earlier date if possible (*Archon List*, p. 163), and Pritchett now points out to me that this is in fact possible since the treasurer of military affairs is known to have

	Archon	Epony- mos	Basi- leus	Pole- march	Six Thesmothetai					
229/8	Heliodoros	2	8	7	4	1/5	6	10	11	12
228/7	Leochares	12	1/5	2/8	1	4	7	9	2/10	11
227/6	Theophilos	2/10	11	8	2	1/8	1/5	6	9	1/2/12
226/5	Ergochares	7		6	1/3	2	3	P/9	10	11
225/4	Niketes	6	10	1/3	2	4	7	8	P/9	12
224/3	Antiphilos	P/11	2	1/12	1	1/3	9	6		
223/2	?? Kalli - - -									
222/1	Archelaos									
221/0	Thrasyphon	[2 ?]					4/9	8	10	P/10/11
220/19	Menekrates	8	9	2/12	1	2/10	4	6	P/12	11
219/8	Chairephon	12	4	11	1/2					
218/7	[K]all[i].....]									
217/6									11	12
216/5	Hagnias	4	7	6	2/12	8	5	P/11	9	11
215/4	Diokles	1	5	2/8	4	P	7	8	9	12
214/3	Euphiletos	5	10	8	1	1/8	P	9	11	12
213/2	Herakleitos	9						7		

Scrutiny of this list, even before the readings were as complete as they are now, had revealed that the arrangement is based on simultaneous observance of three different laws.

(A) The law discovered by Sauppe in 1864, to the effect that no single tribe should have double representation in any given

acted as disbursing officer as early as 239/8 B.C. (Crosby, *Hesperia*, VI [1937], p. 445); thus 233/2 or 231/0 would be preferable for . . . bios. As for the tribes, I include as a possible restoration Dow's attractive suggestion that Thrasyphon (221/0) belonged to Demetrias (*Hesperia*, II [1933], p. 444; *A. J. A.*, XL [1936], pp. 59-62, 70). For the subdivision of Oion (eponyms of 227/6) and Phyle (polemarchs of 228/7 and 215/4) see Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 75-76, 78; cf. Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 187, 190. For the possible subdivision of Anakaia (second thesmothetes of 220/19, fifth of 228/7), of Atene (polemarch of 220/19, first thesmothetes of 216/5), and of Phlya (fourth thesmothetes of 226/5, fifth of 225/4), see below. I admit for the present that half of Amphitrope (sixth thesmothetes of 227/6) might have belonged to either of the Macedonian tribes, as suggested by Pritchett (*A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], p. 191). On the other hand, Dow's similar suggestion in the case of Heliodoros of Diomeia (*Hesperia*, III [1934], pp. 180-181) may now be rejected; I had definitely proposed Demetrias (*Archons*, pp. 37, 447, 448, 450 n. 3; accepted by Ferguson, *Cycles*, p. 64 n. 1, p. 143 n. 1), and this is now confirmed by two new inscriptions, Agora I 3311 and 4221 (Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX [1940], pp. 75, 78). Furthermore, we may reject as purely academic the appearance of Ptolemais in 229/8 (polemarch), 228/7 (fourth thesmothetes), or 227/6 B.C. (basileus, fifth thesmothetes), since it can be demonstrated by means of the secretary cycles that Ptolemais did not exist in any case before the year of Ergochares (*Archons*, p. 194; *Archon List*, p. 83 n. 97).

year.⁶ A few assumed exceptions have been gradually eliminated, the latest to survive being the assumed duplication of the polemarch from Atene (2) and the second thesmothetes from Anakaia (assumed to be 2 by the Beloch law B) in 220/19 B. C.⁷ This I overcame by the argument that Atene was a subdivided deme (2/12), half retaining the original affiliation, an argument which has been accepted by Ferguson, Meritt, and Pritchett.⁸ On the other hand, Dow argues that Atene was not subdivided but was transferred wholly to Demetrias (2), pointing out that the half which might be supposed to have remained in Antiochis (12) is not mentioned in a complete roster of the latter tribe (*I. G.*, II², 910 + Agora I 600).⁹ It must be recalled, however, that this roster is of the year 169/8 B. C. when half, at least, of Atene belonged to Attalis; and it is reasonable to suppose that after both halves of this deme were reunited in Antiochis in 201 B. C. it was transferred in its entirety to Attalis the next year. We may, nevertheless, retain for the present both possibilities for Atene (on the understanding that the Beloch law may have been violated in the case of the second thesmothetes), but all other alternatives which would cause unavoidable duplication of tribes may be eliminated (e.g., eponymos of 227/6; basileus of 228/7; polemarchs of 224/3, 215/4; first thesmothetes of 226/5; second of 224/3, 214/3; fourth of 216/5; sixth of 227/6, 221/0).

(B) The law discovered by Beloch in 1884—rather a scribal procedure than an actual institution of government—in accordance with which the six thesmothetai were listed in any given year in a sequence according to the official tribal order. It was immediately apparent, however, that some exceptions must exist, as in 224/3 B. C. under any circumstances, and also in 225/4 B. C. if Ptolemais already existed, and in 220/19 B. C. if Ptole-

⁶ Cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.*, 22, 5; 55, 1; 59, 7; 63, 1.

⁷ For the history of these exceptions, see Dinsmoor, *Archons of Athens* (1931), pp. 447-450, 462.

⁸ *Archons*, pp. 448, 462; Ferguson, *Cycles*, p. 51 n. 2; Meritt, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 75-76 nn. 11, 14; Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), pp. 189-190, 192-193.

⁹ Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 180; *Prytaneis*, pp. 129-133, no. 71.

mais did not yet exist. The latter possibility may be rejected, however, for it is hardly conceivable that a deme would have been named in honor of Berenike after the death of Ptolemy III and her own murder by her son Ptolemy IV; and it is evident from the calendar equation in a decree of Thrasyphon (*I. G.*, II², 839) that the thirteen tribes were all in existence from the beginning of his year.¹⁰ On the other hand, even with Ptolemais functioning in 220/19 B. C., there must be a disturbance of the sequence unless we admit that Anakaia was a divided deme, the second thesmothetes coming from Demetrias (2). I had followed Kirchner in adopting this subdivision of Anakaia, and Ferguson and Pritchett have agreed with me;¹¹ as in the case of Atene, however, Dow has objected, assuming that Anakaia remained entirely in Hippothontis (10) and that the disturbance in sequence was a scribal error.¹² For the present, therefore, we may retain both possibilities for Anakaia (2/10). Likewise in 225/4 B. C., where the sequence might be perfect if we assumed that Ptolemais did not yet exist, or even if we regarded Phlya as a deme subdivided between Ptolemais and Kekropis (9) as Johnson suggested,¹³ it seems desirable to admit both possibilities. We may, however, eliminate all alternatives which cause disturbances in sequence other than the definite instance in 224/3 B. C. and the two possibilities in 225/4 and 220/19 B. C. (marked by asterisks in the following table), as follows: first thesmothetes in 216/5, second in 229/8 and 227/6, third in 227/6 and 221/0, fifth in 228/7, and sixth in 227/6 and 221/0 B. C.

A combination of the evidence from laws A and B clarifies our table and yields the following result:

¹⁰ *Archons*, p. 190.

¹¹ *Archons*, pp. 447-448; Ferguson, *Cycles*, p. 50; Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), p. 193.

¹² Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 180.

¹³ Johnson, *A. J. P.*, XXXIV (1913), p. 383; retained as a possibility by Dow, *Hesperia*, III (1934), p. 176 n. 1, p. 182 n. 1. I had argued against this (*Archons*, pp. 449-450, 463 nn. 1, 5; *Archon List*, p. 161 n. 181), however, and I still feel that the analogy of the following year is sufficient basis for regarding it as a scribal error, possibly incurred through such reasoning as I formerly suggested (*Archons*, p. 463).

	Archon	Epony- mos	Basileus	Polemarch	Six Thesmothetai						
229/8	Heliodoros	2	8	7	4	5	6	10	11	12	
228/7	Leochares	12	5	2/8	1	4	7	9	10	11	
227/6	Theophilos	10	11	8	2	8	5	6	9	12	
226/5	Ergochares	7		6	1	2	8	P/9	10	11	
225/4	Niketes	6	10	1/8	2	4	7	8	*P/9	12	
224/3	Antiphilos	P/11	2	12	1	3	*9	6			
223/2	?? Kalli - - -										
222/1	Archelaos										
221/0	Thrasyphon	[2 ?]					4	8	10	11	
220/19	Menekrates	8	9	2/12	1	2/*10	4	6	P	11	
219/8	Chairephon	12	4	11	1/2						
218/7	[K]all[i]]										
217/6									11	12	
216/5	Hagnias	4	7	6	2	3	5	P	9	11	
215/4	Diokles	1	5	2	4	P	7	8	9	12	
214/3	Euphiletos	5	10	8	1	3	P	9	11	12	
213/2	Herakleitos	9						7			

(C) The law discovered by Ferguson in 1932, showing that the three chief archons were arranged according to sortition cycles of twelve or thirteen years. This was ascertained by means of the observation that duplications of tribes among the three chief archons occur at such lengthy intervals that they must have resulted, not from pure chance, but from a definite law of distribution.¹⁴ For instance, in the list of eponymoi it is evident that there would have been a terminus between 228 and 221 B. C. if we accept Dow's attractive theory that Thrasyphon belonged to Demetrias (2), the tribe duplicated by Heliodoros;¹⁵ but in any case the terminus would lie between 227 and 219 B. C. to avoid duplication of Antiochis (12). Again, in the list of basileis, the terminus would lie between 227 and 215 B. C. in order to avoid duplication of Pandionis (5), and also between 224 and 214 B. C. to avoid duplication of Hippothontis (10). Since it is evident that inextricable confusion would have resulted unless both cycles were rotating with identical terminal dates, we ascertain that in order to fit both the eponymoi and the basileis the terminus must have been between 224 and 219 B. C., or perhaps even between 224 and 221 B. C. if we accept the attribution of Thrasyphon to Demetrias (2).

¹⁴ Ferguson, *Cycles*, pp. 50-54; accepted exactly by Dow (*Hesperia*, III [1934], p. 177), and in principle by myself—in fact I had already formed a similar conclusion—but with some doubt as to the exact location of the breaks (*Archon List*, pp. 4-5 with n. 7, p. 74 n., p. 160). Now Meritt has shown that Phyle was subdivided and that a break in 227 B. C. is unnecessary, though he retains Ferguson's second break in 223 B. C. (*Hesperia*, IX [1940], p. 76; cf. Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], pp. 192-193).

¹⁵ For Thrasyphon and Heliodoros of Diomeia, see n. 5 above.

But we have also to fit in the cycle of the polemarchs, also rotating on the same basis. Considered alone, the list of polemarchs yields a choice between four solutions: (a) with the polemarchs of 228/7 and 220/19 B. C. both coming from Demetrias (2), like that of 215/4 B. C., we have two breaks between 227 and 220 and between 219 and 215 B. C.; (b) with the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. coming from Oineis (8) and that of 220/19 B. C. from Demetrias (2), we obtain two breaks, one exactly in 227 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Oineis) and the other between 219 and 215 B. C.; (c) with the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. coming from Oineis (8) and that of 220/19 B. C. from Antiochis (12), we again obtain two breaks, one exactly in 227 B. C. and the other between 223 and 220 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Antiochis); (d) with the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. coming from Demetrias (2) and that of 220/19 B. C. from Antiochis (12), we require only one terminus, between 227 and 215 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Demetrias) and more closely between 223 and 220 B. C. (to avoid duplication of Antiochis). Since two of these solutions (a and b) are in any case improbable because they require a polemarch from Demetrias (2) in 220/19 B. C. and so confuse the official sequence of the thesmothetai, and since three of these solutions (a, b, and c) are improbable also because they require two breaks so close together as to constitute an interruption of the cycles, we may adopt the solution (d) which is in full agreement with the cycles of the eponymoi and basileis. We have seen that the latter require a terminus between 224 and 219 B. C.; the polemarchs (solution d) require a terminus between 223 and 220 B. C.; all three cycles are in absolute accord. And, if we accept the probability that Thrasyphon belonged to Demetrias (2), the terminus is even more closely defined as between 223 and 221 B. C.

In first discussing these sortition cycles, Ferguson had suggested a terminus in 227 B. C. (regarding this as the end of an ordinary cycle of twelve years) and an actual break or interruption in 223 B. C., explained as the result of the creation of Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C. Meritt was able to dispense with two breaks in such close proximity by assigning the polemarch of 228/7 B. C. to Demetrias (2), and, regarding the polemarch of 220/19 B. C. as belonging to Antiochis (12), located a single break between 223 and 220 B. C. So far, Meritt's modification

is identical with mine. But for the location of the break he prefers the very year 223 B. C. suggested by Ferguson on the ground that it could then be explained by the creation of Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C. Pritchett adopts the initial year as a fundamental point in his discussion, and as the chief reason for arguing that the polemarch of 220/19 B. C. came from Antiochis (12).

I have always argued, however, in favor of placing the creation of Ptolemais, not in the archonship of Antiphilos (224/3) where the sole evidence consists in the confused order of the thesmothetai and in the fact that the Ptolemaia seem to have been celebrated in his year, but rather two years earlier in the archonship of Ergochares (226/5), where we have actual evidence in the calendar itself.¹⁶ Pritchett now suggests that my date of the creation of Ptolemais "would leave unexplained the break in the archontes' cycle."¹⁷ This criticism might be valid if it were an actual break; but I regard it merely as a natural terminus between the cycles, which need not have been actually interrupted in the case of the archons since, as we know, the rotation of the secretaries of the Council was unaffected by the new creation. Let us examine the situation more closely.

Assuming that Ptolemais was created shortly after the beginning of 226/5 B. C., it would seem that, if the cycle had previously been intended to terminate in 224 B. C., the normal procedure would have been to give Ptolemais immediately one of the three chief offices—though this would have been a measure of last resort, since Ptolemais would have occupied only a portion rather than the whole of this year,¹⁸—a second in 225/4 B. C., and, prolonging the cycle by one year because of the increased number of tribes, to take the third chief archon from Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C., thus terminating the cycle at what is now known to be actually the earliest possible terminus. But it is clear that in 225/4 B. C. the three chief archons all came from other tribes; evidently there was no immediate hurry. Presumably, therefore, the single unknown demotic of 226/5 B. C., that of the basileus,

¹⁶ Dinsmoor, *Archons*, pp. 193-195, 460-463 (with my earlier date 229/8); *Archon List*, pp. 160-161, 231-232 (returning to the orthodox date 226/5).

¹⁷ Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI (1940), p. 193 n. 23.

¹⁸ For similar arguments against awarding fractions of years to "privileged" tribes on other occasions, Aiantis in 263/2 and Ptolemais in 201/0 B. C., see *Archon List*, pp. 73, 173.

was not from Ptolemais, because there would have been no urgent need for this makeshift alteration in the course of the year; and another argument against a basileus from Ptolemais is the fact that the fourth thesmothetes belonged to a deme (Phlya) which evidently passed entirely from Kekropis (9) to Ptolemais,¹⁹ so that, without duplication of tribes, disturbance of official sequence, or unfair discrimination, the thesmothetes might have regarded himself as representing both tribes at different portions of the year. The basileus of 226/5 B. C., therefore, would have represented (by elimination) either Aigeis (4) or Antiochis (12)²⁰—for Pandionis (5) and Oineis (8) are to be excluded since they held the same office only two and three years earlier, in the same cycle. Thus the cycle evidently continued for at least three years after 224 B. C., with Antiphilos representing Ptolemais in 224/3 B. C., and presumably the basileus and polemarch coming from this tribe in 223/2 and 222/1 B. C., or vice versa. Thus the terminus would have been no earlier than 221 B. C. And since, in order to fit the cycles of the three offices, it could have been no later than 220 B. C., or preferably 221 B. C. in order to agree with the probable tribe of Thrasymphon, we may now regard 221 B. C. as the actual line of demarcation, restoring the list as follows:²¹

Archon	Epony- mos	Basi- leus	Pole- march	Six Thesmothetai						
				4	5	6	10	11	12	
229/8	Heliodoros	2	8	7	4	5	6	10	11	12
228/7	Leochares	12	5	2	1	4	7	9	10	11
227/6	Theophilos	10	11	8	2	3	5	6	9	12
226/5	Ergochares	7	[4/12]	6	1	2	3	P/9	10	11
225/4	Niketas	6	10	1/8	2	4	7	8	*P	12
224/3	Antiphilos	P	2	12	1	8	*9	6		
223/2	?? Kalli - - -		[P ?]							
222/1	Archeleas			[P ?]						
221/0	Thrasymphon	[2]		[1]	[8]	4	8	10		11
220/19	Menekrates	8	9	12	1	2	4	6	P	11
219/8	Chairephon	12	4	11	1/2					
218/7	[K]all[i]									
217/6								11		12
216/5	Hagnias	4	7	6	2	3	5	P	9	11
215/4	Diokles	1	5	2	4	P	7	8	9	12
214/3	Euphiletos	5	10	8	1	3	P	9	11	12
213/2	Herakleitos	9						7		

¹⁹ For the improbability that Phlya was a divided deme see n. 13 above.

²⁰ The few letters of the demotic read by Dow in line 32 seem to be A A or A A, which would equally well fit Ankyle (4) or Anaphlystos (12), but hardly Algilia (12).

²¹ It will be noted that the two demes of which the subdivision has hitherto been left in question, Anakaia (nn. 5, 11, 12) and Atene (nn. 5, 8, 9), may now be definitely regarded as subdivided.

Counting back thirteen years from 221 B. C. we come to 234 B. C. as the beginning of an archon cycle, and twelve years earlier still we obtain an initial year in 246 B. C. This is the very year in which, according to my new arrangement of the archons, we find an unexplained break in the secretary cycles, which at that point begin a new system of rotation with Aigeis (4).²² Thus the interpretation of *I. G.*, II², 1706, seems to offer additional confirmation for the break of the secretary cycles in 246 B. C. and so for my present dating of the archon Diomedon in 246/5 B. C. and, indirectly, for my present arrangement (system B) of the secretary cycles before the end of the Chremonidean War, with a secretary from Potamos (1) in the archonship of Demokles in 278/7 B. C.²³

WILLIAM BELL DINSMOOR.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

²² Twenty-four years earlier still, in 270 B. C., the initial year of an archon cycle would coincide with that of the priestly cycle of Asklepios, but whether this rotation should be carried back without a break, to a beginning in 307 or 306 B. C., is questionable.

²³ Pritchett's new attribution of Potamos to Demetrias (2) as well as to Antigonis (1) and Leontis (6) weakens the force of one of the eliminations which led me to adopt system B (Pritchett, *A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], pp. 187, 193 n. 23), and would in itself permit a return to system A. I still feel, however, that the other factors involved necessitate the retention of system B.

THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ATTIC STRATEGOI.

Mr. H. B. Mayor, in a recent paper,¹ has argued that the Athenian Strategoi, whose election by the Assembly is placed early in the seventh prytany,² entered office shortly thereafter as soon as they had passed the dokimasia. This theory, for which no absolutely decisive evidence is claimed,³ dates the replacement of the old Board of Ten by the new generals some time before the start of the campaigning season instead of at the beginning of the civil year, as has been generally supposed, or of the councillor year, as Wade-Gery has recently postulated.⁴ Mayor's arguments seem very plausible, but it may be well to consider literary and epigraphical evidence, neglected by him, which bears upon the case.

A difficulty with Mayor's theory can be clearly seen from a study of the Samian revolt of 440 B. C. Thucydides (I, 115) says that Byzantium revolted simultaneously with Samos. Byzantium paid tribute for the last time in the spring of 440 B. C.,⁵ so the Samian war began after the collection of tribute in that year and continued through the greater part of 440/39 B. C.⁶ This agrees with the statement in the scholia to Aristophanes, *Vespae*, 283: τὰ περὶ Σάμον ὅ' ἔτει πρότερον ἐπὶ Τιμοκλέους (441/0 B. C.) γέγονε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑξῆς Μορυχίδου (440/39 B. C.).⁷ Thucydides (I, 117) gives the names of five Athenian leaders who arrived at Samos with the final reinforcements to Pericles from Athens.⁸ These men, including Phormio, Hagnon, and Thucydides, were notable commanders, and, although they are not

¹ *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), pp. 45-64.

² Aristotle, *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 44, 4, and Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 581 ff. Cf. W. Schwahn, *R. E.*, Supplement VI, col. 1074.

³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 45 and 64.

⁴ *Class. Quart.*, XXVII (1933), p. 28.

⁵ Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *Athenian Tribute Lists*, I, p. 250.

⁶ Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II², 2, p. 215, and Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 45. Meritt has determined from the evidence of *I. G.*, I², 293, that the war against Byzantium and Samos lasted through only a small part of 441/0 B. C. and through the greater part of 440/39 B. C.

⁷ Cf. Diod., XII, 27 f., and Plutarch, *Pericles*, 24-28.

⁸ A sixth general for this year, Ἐπιτελής, is supplied from *I. G.*, I², 943; cf. Accame, *Rivista di Filologia*, LXIII (1935), p. 343.

designated as strategoi, it is held, apparently without exception, that they partly represent the board of generals for the second and final year of the war.⁹ The names of all ten members of another strategic board associated with Pericles against Samos are also known,¹⁰ and since this list cannot be reconciled with the names given by Thucydides, it must be assigned to the year when the war began. In addition, there is still a third college of generals, differing from the other two, which Wade-Gery has successfully identified as a list of the men who swore to the terms of peace when the treaty was ratified at the close of the war.¹¹ Meritt has pointed out that the probable date for its ratification would be the Panathenaic festival in the summer of 439 B. C.¹² At any rate, this alliance must have been consummated shortly after the conclusion of the war, for the Samian capitulation was complete and there was no need for a lengthy discussion of terms (Thuc., I, 117). Thus, there are three different boards of strategoi within a period extending from the spring of 440 B. C. to the summer of 439 B. C. Only the orthodox theory that the term of office for the strategoi started in the middle of the present Gregorian year seems to fit the recorded facts.

Another objection to Mayor's theory results from a study of the language employed in Attic inscriptions of the fourth and later centuries in connection with the various military officials. Aristotle states ('*Αθ. Πολ.*, 44, 4) that generals, hipparchs, and all other military ἀρχαί were elected simultaneously; so any theory which concerns the generals must with reason be extended to the other elected military magistrates. Whenever a temporal expression is required to designate the term of office of strategoi, hipparchs, and taxiarchs, the phrase ἐν τῷ δαίμα ἀρχοντος is invariably employed. The abundant examples of such phraseology in carefully worded official documents imply simultaneity of office.¹³ In *I. G.*, II², 1155 (339/8 B. C.), there is inscribed

⁹ See Kirchner, *P. A.*, s. vv.; Krause, *Attische Strategenlisten*; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.*, II², 2, pp. 215 and 261; and, in particular, Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 50-52.

¹⁰ Aristides, II, p. 183, and III, p. 485 [ed. Dindorf]. Cf. Beloch, *op. cit.*, p. 261, and Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹¹ *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 309-313.

¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 53. Cf. Wade-Gery, *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), p. 312, note 3.

¹³ Some exceptions to this rule are cited by Ferguson, *A. J. P.*, LIX

the phrase οἱ στρατευσάμενοι ἐπὶ Λυσιστρατίδου ἀρχοντος καὶ ὁ ταξίαρχος ---; in *I. G.*, II², 500 (302/1 B. C.) the phrase οἱ ταξίαρχοι οἱ ἐπὶ Εὐξενίππου ἀρχοντος; in *I. G.*, II², 1485 and 1486 (307/6 B. C.), τοὺς ἱππάρχους τοὺς ἐπὶ Ἀναξικράτους ἀρχοντος. The title to a third century catalogue reads as follows: οἱ στρατιῶται οἱ ἐπὶ --- ἀρχοντος ἀνέθηκαν στεφανώσαντες τὸν στρατηγὸν ---.¹⁴ In *I. G.*, II², 3201 (346/5 B. C.), a taxiarch is crowned as ταξι-αρχήσας ἐπὶ Ἀρχίῳ ἀρχοντος. Strategoi are frequently honored as στρατηγήσας ἐπὶ τοῦ δαίνα ἀρχοντος (*I. G.*, II², 2854, 2856, 2857, etc.). Of an earlier date is the statue-base for Thrasyboulos of Kollytos: ἐπὶ Ἀστέῳ ἀρχοντος Θρασύβουλος Θράσωιος Κολλυτεύς στρατηγῶν ---.¹⁵ The list might be considerably expanded.¹⁶

In naming the generals for the year 425 B. C. in accord with the theory of a separate strategic year, Mayor (pp. 61-62) culls names from two Boards, as listed under the orthodox theory,—those of the years 426/5 and 425/4 B. C. For the year 424 B. C., no list is offered by Mayor, although he does, in the course of his discussion, name four generals for this year: Nicias, Lamachus, Hippocrates, and Thucydides. However, there remain eight other strategoi, seven explicitly named as such by Thucydides and an eighth added by Aristophanes, who must be assigned to the campaigning season of 424 B. C. In Thucydides, IV, 53, Nicostratus and Autocles are joined with Nicias in the description of the occupation of Cythera (June, 424).¹⁷ In IV, 65, Eurymedon, Pythodorus, and Sophocles are named as the strategoi who ratified the terms of the Conference of Gela, held during the summer of 424 B. C. In IV, 75, Demodocus and Aristides are listed along with Lamachus as generals in command of the collecting of the tribute. Finally, Aristophanes (*Nubes*, 581 ff.) tells of Cleon's election after his military success at Sphacteria.^{17a} This total of twelve military generals for Mayor's strategic year offers a real difficulty: it does not

(1938), pp. 235-236. These exceptions apply to examples which approximate, but do not precisely span, the archon's year.

¹⁴ *I. G.*, II², 1958; cf. *I. G.*, II², 682, lines 31 and 45.

¹⁵ *Hesperia*, VIII. (1939), no. 2 (373/2 B. C.).

¹⁶ See Kahrstedt, *Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen*, p. 72.

¹⁷ Cf. *I. G.*, I², 324, line 21 (Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 138).

^{17a} Cf. Wade-Gery, *Class. Quart.*, XXIV (1930), p. 33, note 3.

seem to be fair to assume that in two particular cases Thucydides uses the term *strategos* in the sense of a minor independent commander; nor will the suggestion that one of the twelve was chosen to fill the place of Hippocrates after the latter's death at Delium satisfy,¹⁸ for this occurred in November, 424 B. C., much later than the known activities of any of the other eleven generals. In connection with this same year, another obstacle to Mayor's theory arises, for he must assign Eurymedon and Cleon to the same Board of Ten. Wade-Gery has argued that both were from the same tribe, Pandionis,¹⁹ and has expostulated against any exception to the "one per Tribe" rule during the Archidamian War after Pericles' death.²⁰ These difficulties do not exist under the orthodox theory.

Mayor's plea for a new strategic year is based in large part on his interpretation of the events of the year 425 B. C. (pp. 50-63). A reëxamination of his position seems hardly necessary, for a very satisfactory analysis of the chronology of this year has been given by Wade-Gery and Meritt (*A. J. P.*, LVII [1936], pp. 377-394). Without special pleading, they assign the beginning of Demosthenes' generalship to the last of June. The word *ιδιώτης* (Thuc., IV, 2, 4) and the phrase *τῶν τε ἐν Πύλῳ στρατηγῶν ἓνα* (IV, 29, 1) are given their natural meaning. Demosthenes' generalship of 427/6 B. C. expired after his failure in Aetolia.²¹

¹⁸ Cf. Adcock, *C. A. H.*, V, note on Table facing p. 252. Adcock, of course, has in mind for Hippocrates' successor a general active in the first half of 423 B. C.

¹⁹ *Class. Quart.*, XXIV (1930), pp. 33-39. Cf. Meritt, *A. F. D.*, p. 129; West, *A. J. P.*, XLV (1924), p. 145, note 18; and Adcock, *C. A. H.*, V, *ad* Table facing p. 252.

²⁰ Aristotle, *Ἀθ. Πολ.*, 61, 1. Cf., however, Accame, *Rivista di Filologia*, LXIII (1935), pp. 341-355; Ferguson, *A. J. P.*, LIX (1938) pp. 232-233; and Busolt-Swoboda, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II, p. 891. Accame has objected that both Phormio and Hagnon were from Pandionis in the year 430/29 B. C. and Hipponicus and Nicias from Aigeis in 427/6 B. C. The latter has been conclusively demonstrated as incorrect by Meritt (*Hesperia*, V [1936], p. 410) and the former has been questioned by Wade-Gery (*Class. Quart.*, XXIV [1930], p. 33, note 2). In spite of Wade-Gery's more recent assignment of Phormio (*P. A.*, 14958) to Pandionis in *Class. Phil.*, XXVI (1931), pp. 312-313, the identification is not adopted by Beloch or Adcock.

²¹ Cf. *C. A. H.*, V, p. 228. The clause *τὸν ἐς τὴν Αἰτωλίαν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγήσαντα, ὅπως σφίσις ἡγεμὼν γίγνηται* (III, 105, 3) may not fairly

Concerning the passage quoted by Mayor from Aristophanes' *Acharnenses*, many interpretations have been offered which are in accord with the orthodox theory. Adcock (*C. A. H.*, V, Table facing p. 252) assumes that Lamachus was general for the entire Attic year 426/5 B. C.; West (*A. J. P.*, XLV [1924], p. 147) suggested that Lamachus was chosen at a bye election; more probable is van Leeuwen's and Starkie's interpretation that Lamachus was a taxiarch (lines 566 ff.) and that the reference to the strategos in line 593 is a parody of the *Telephus*.²² This latter is apparently the interpretation of Croiset (*Aristophanes and the Political Parties at Athens*, translated by J. Loeb, p. 54) and of G. Murray (*Aristophanes*, p. 34). Mayor's effort, following Müller-Strübing, to identify the persons alluded to in *Acharnenses*, lines 603-606, with the strategoi of 425 B. C. does not appear successful. It is difficult to connect Διομεαλαζόν with Eurymedon or Sophocles, for the word should be understood as referring to a person from the deme Diomeia, of the tribe Aigeis (II); but the general from Aigeis is already known for this year, and he is not either of these two. Moreover, there is a reference in line 602 to the salary drawn by these men, whom Dicaeopolis in line 610 calls ambassadors. Since the generals received no salary,²³ it is preferable to adopt the conventional interpretation that the allusion is to remunerative posts in foreign countries, to which no active service was attached.

As for Mayor's rejection (pp. 48-50) of a generalship for Alcibiades in 420/19 B. C., the best evidence still seems to be that of Plutarch (*Alcibiades*, 15, and *Nicias*, 10), who expressly states that Alcibiades was appointed general before the quadruple alliance of July, 420 B. C. Finally, Mayor's assertion (pp. 47-48) that according to the orthodox theory Laches, predecessor

be evoked by the advocates of either theory. It merely refers to Demosthenes' generalship in the early summer of 426 B. C.

²² At any rate, when Dicaeopolis, in line 595, calls Lamachus a σπουδαρχὸς, office-seeker, it suggests that Lamachus was canvassing for the generalship at the approaching election, which regularly occurred shortly after the Lenaea. With comic anticipation, Lamachus had boasted (line 593) that he was a general.

²³ Busolt-Swoboda, *Gr. Staatskunde*, II, p. 1075; cf. [Xenophon], *Ath.*, I, 3.

of Pythodorus, was commanding the Sicilian fleet as "pro-Strategus" from July, 426 B. C. till February, 425 B. C. overlooks the conclusion of West (*A. J. P.*, XLV [1924], p. 155) and Adcock (*loc. cit.*) that Laches, of Kekropis (VII), was in fact a general in the Attic year 426/5 B. C.²⁴ Formerly, it was supposed by Beloch that Laches and Pythodorus were both of Tribe VII, and so could not be generals in the same year. But West has shown that Pythodorus was of Tribe VIII, and he and Adcock agree in assigning generalships to both men for 426/5 B. C.

W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

²⁴ In this connection Mayor might have used the evidence offered by McGregor (*A. J. P.*, LIX [1938], pp. 154-155) that in 422 B. C. Cleon sailed for his post in the Thraceward region before the official beginning of his term of office. This affords no difficulty to the acceptance of the orthodox theory.

A NEW FRAGMENT OF A. T. L., D 8.

One of the results of the study which Meritt has devoted to the restoration and interpretation of the Athenian decree concerning the collection of tribute¹ is the right understanding of the *φόρο ἐγλογῆς* as local boards appointed in the various allied cities. If there were any need for further proof of the new interpretation,² this would have to come from the postscript of that decree, lines 59 and 60.³ The addition of a still unpublished fragment, though revising Meritt's tentative restoration, does not seem to give the desired further proof. The fragment E. M. 5533 joins fragments 9 and 10 of D 8 along their lower edge in such a way that the lines of fracture on their left and right sides appear as continued on the new fragment (cf. Fig. 1).




Fig. 1.

[Φ]όρο ἐγλο[γῆς τῶ]
 [πα]ρὰ τῶν πό[λεων].

¹ B. D. Meritt, *Documents on Athenian Tribute* (abbreviated to *D. A. T.*), pp. 3-42; Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* (abbreviated to *A. T. L.*), I, pp. 122 ff., D 8, 166 f., and pl. XXV.

² Approval has been expressed in the following reviews of Meritt's book: S. Accame, *Riv. di Fil.*, XVI (1938), p. 409; G. Daux, *Rev. Arch.*, XII (1938), p. 291; S. Dow, *A. J. A.*, XLII (1938), p. 601; R. Flacelière, *R. E. G.*, LI (1938), p. 290; H. Nesselhauf, *D. L. Z.*, LIX (1938), col. 1033; J. H. Oliver, *Ol. W.*, XXXII (1938), p. 87; M. N. Tod, *Ol. Rev.*, LII (1938), p. 138; A. M. Woodward, *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology*, XXV (1938), p. 64 and *J. H. S.*, LVIII (1938), p. 108; U. Kahrstedt, *G. G. A.*, CC (1938), pp. 159 ff.; G. Corradi, *Boll. di Fil. Class.*, X (1939), pp. 264 ff.; compare M. N. Tod, *J. H. S.*, LIX (1939), p. 249, note 159.

³ See Meritt, *D. A. T.*, p. 23.

In restoring [φ]όρο ἐγλο[γῆς, Meritt retains the old restoration; the rest can now be restored with certainty, based upon a comparison with line 28 of *I. G.*, I², 76: τὸ παρὰ τὸν πόλεον. Below the two lines of the postscript there is preserved an uninscribed space of 0.10 m., and it seems safe to assume that the new fragment belongs to the lower end of the stele, and that its letters are part of the last lines of the whole inscription. The width of the stele at the lower end of the new fragment can be restored to 0.62 m., and the seventh letter of each of the two lines of the postscript falls exactly in the middle of the stelē, below the space between the eighteenth and nineteenth stoichoi of the decree. Thus both lines of the postscript are evenly spaced over the width of the stele.⁴

The postscript may be understood as meaning "Collectors of tribute from the cities," if we assume that ἐγλογῆς is nominative plural of ἐκλογεύς. Whatever may be the significance of the postscript, it is not a part of the decree itself, though it was presumably engraved at the same time and by the same hand as the preceding decree.⁵ Lines 25 and 26 of the decree provide that the stele be erected by the same prytany under which the decree was passed.⁶ This, as well as the uninscribed space below the postscript, may exclude the possibility that the names of the collectors (if they were to be elected in the allied cities) were intended to be inscribed below the postscript. The postscript itself does not indicate clearly whether the collectors were to be Athenians or citizens of the various cities, but it does not contradict Meritt's interpretation that the collectors were appointed by the Allies. Their official title may now be attested by the postscript as well as by the literary tradition and by the appointment of similar boards in the decree regulating the Offering of First-fruits at Eleusis.⁷ It seems unlikely that

⁴ Compare Meritt, *D. A. T.*, pp. 25 f.

⁵ Similar postscripts accompany the decrees published as *I. G.*, I², 39, 87 (see Meritt and Davidson, *A. J. P.*, LVI [1935], p. 70, line 36), 94 (see *I. G.*, I, suppl., pp. 66 f., no. 53 a), 106, 135 (see W. Bannier, *Berl. Ph. Woch.*, XLVII [1927], col. 668), 170, and 171; compare Thucydides, V, 56, 3. For the interpretation of the postscript of *I. G.*, I², 39, see M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, p. 85.

⁶ See Meritt, *D. A. T.*, p. 24. For a similar provision, see *I. G.*, I², 139, 16 ff.; compare Schulthess, *R. M.*, VII, col. 1734, 3 ff.

⁷ See Meritt, *D. A. T.*, pp. 14 ff.; *A. T. L.*, T 18, 44, 62, 66, and 100.

boards of collectors were first established for the collection of the First-fruits, and afterwards similar boards for the collection of the tribute. Thus, D 8 may have been passed several years before *I. G.*, I², 76,⁸ an assumption which confirms the date that Meritt now proposes (*A. T. L.*, p. 213, D 8; compare E. Weston, *A. J. P.*, LXI [1940], p. 349).

A few remarks may be added on the date of D 7; Meritt assumed that this document has to be dated prior to D 8.⁹ This is not the place to discuss the content of this decree; yet I believe that the letter forms of the inscription indicate a date near the middle of the fifth century. To determine an upper limit, we may point out that only few public inscriptions (engraved in Attic script) of the period before 449 B. C. contain examples of four-bar sigma, and in these it appears almost exclusively in the headings.¹⁰ We may conclude, therefore, that D 7 is definitely later than 449 B. C. In the seventh Tribute List, from the year 448/7 B. C., four-bar sigma is employed for the first time throughout the whole text of an Athenian public inscription; the eighth List, from the following year, brings, I think for the last time, a revival of the three-bar sigma. The first building accounts of the Parthenon (*I. G.*, I², 339; B. D. Meritt, *A. J. A.*, XXXVI [1932], pp. 472 f.) and of the statue

The Eleusinian decree provides that the First-fruits should be collected within Attika by the demarchs, thus possibly replacing the older board of *παρόδοι* who had to collect the *τεπὸς σίτρος*; see Athenaeus, VI, p. 235 and Pollux, VI, 35.

⁸ For the date of *I. G.*, I², 76, see W. B. Dinsmoor, *Arochons of Athens*, pp. 338 f. and M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 74.

⁹ See *D. A. T.*, pp. 59 f. and *A. T. L.*, pp. 122, D 7, 164 f., 212 f., and pl. XXIV; approval has been expressed in the reviews listed in note 1. Only Neesselhauf wishes to date D 7 after D 8; yet his argument is, as I understand, based on a restoration which has now been abandoned by Meritt with regard to a recently found fragment (see *A. T. L.*, p. XI, Addendum and P. G. Stevens, *Hesperia*, Supplement III, p. 78, fig. 59).

¹⁰ Tribute List of 453/2 B. C.; *I. G.*, I², 19 and 929, 67 (see *I. G.*, I, 433, 67); decree concerning Sigeion, published by Meritt, *Hesperia*, V (1936), pp. 360 f., no. 3. The building accounts, published as *I. G.*, I², 335, are not well enough dated to be used as evidence for the occurrence of four-bar sigma before 449 B. C.; compare H. T. Wade-Gery, *J. H. S.*, LIII (1933), p. 79, note 28. The same applies to the inscription published as *I. G.*, I², 37; compare A. Binneboessel, *Att. Urkundenreliefs*, pp. 40 f.

of Athena Parthenos (*I. G.*, I², 354), both dated in 447/6 B. C., have four-bar sigma; there is, however, no evidence to show that the texts of these two inscriptions were not cut on the stone some years after 447/6 B. C. No Tribute List from the year 449/8 B. C. is preserved, but *I. G.*, I², 24 may belong to this year, and this inscription is similar to D 7, except for the three-bar sigma.¹¹ Furthermore, there may be mentioned *I. G.*, I², 20, an inscription which cannot be dated with accuracy, but which contains in its heading a three-bar sigma, while four-bar sigma is consistently employed in the text of the decree.¹² As to other examples of the early use of four-bar sigma, I should like to refer to *I. G.*, I², 940 and to the epigram on the public grave monument of the Athenians who fell in 447 B. C. at Koroneia.¹³ *I. G.*, I², 396 is

¹¹ For the restoration and date of *I. G.*, I², 24, see M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 40 and G. Welter, *Arch. Anz.* (1939), col. 14. Here should also be mentioned *I. G.*, I², 44, where, besides early letter forms, four-bar sigma is employed. The inscription from Eleusis published by K. Kourouniotis, 'Ελευσινιακά, I, pp. 173 ff. and dated (in spite of the occurrence of three-bar sigma) after 446 B. C. may well be earlier; see G. M. Richter, 'Αρχ. Ἐφ. (1937), p. 25, n. 6; M. Segre, *Clara Rhodos*, IX (1938), p. 167, note 3. R. Vallois, *R. E. A.*, XXXV (1933), pp. 195 ff., brings the Eleusinian inscription into relation with the Eleusinian building accounts, *I. G.*, I², 336, which (with its three-bar sigma) is most similar to *I. G.*, I², 24; for Vallois' interpretation of ἀγάλμα, compare *Syll.*³, no. 142, note 4. All these inscriptions, including D 7 and the Attic monetary decree, should be understood as evidence for Perikles' foreign, finance, and building policy at the beginning of the 'forties; doubts as to the early date of the copy of the monetary decree found in Aphytis have been expressed by D. M. Robinson, *T. A. P. A.*, LXIX (1938), p. 43, note 1 (compare C. H. V. Sutherland, *Greece and Rome*, IX [1940], p. 68).

¹² An early date for *I. G.*, I², 20 was suggested by M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, p. 57; compare H. T. Wade-Gery, *B. S. A.*, XXXIII (1935), p. 112, note 2. Compare also the public funeral list published as *I. G.*, I², 937.

¹³ See Kyparissis and Peek, *Ath. Mitt.*, LVII (1932), pp. 142 ff.; compare *Hesperia*, VIII (1939), p. 159, note 2. I wish to add that further study convinced me that *I. G.*, I², 394 I, and possibly also *I. G.*, I², 400 Ia, belong to the monument erected after the Athenian victory over the Boeotians at Oinophyta in 457 B. C.; compare, however, R. Vallois, *R. E. A.*, XXXV (1933), p. 196, note 1. In this case, there does not seem to remain a single public Attic inscription with three-bar sigma that can be dated with certainty after 447/6 B. C.; compare, however, the various ostraka illustrated by J. Carcopino, *L'ostracisme Athénien*, pls. 2 and 3, and J. Kirchner, *Imagines*, nos. 29 and 30.

another public inscription with four-bar sigma that may be dated in the year 447 B. C., if we should restore in it the name of Eretria (see U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet*, pp. 35 and 38; Graf Stauffenberg, *R. E.*, VI A, col. 1682, 39 ff.); compare, however, H. Nesselhauf, *Klio*, Beiheft XXX, pp. 136 f.; F. Hampl, *Klio*, XIV (1939), p. 39.

The preceding observations may be sufficient to show that a public decree in the writing of which four-bar sigma is employed can be dated as early as 448/7 B. C., provided, of course, that the forms of the other letters support such a date. That is the case with D 7. Some of its letter forms seem late, but are well attested for the early 'forties: alpha with its horizontal stroke near the bottom occurs on *I. G.*, I², 34; lambda with its shorter stroke almost horizontally engraved occurs on *I. G.*, I², 19, 20, 529, and on the Koroneia epigram (see note 13). Early features are: rho, which closes against the upright at an acute angle about two-thirds of the way down toward the bottom; upsilon, which is in many instances still made of two curving branches. For the shapes of alpha, rho, and upsilon compare the inscription published by W. K. Pritchett, *Hesperia*, IX (1940), pp. 97 ff., no. 18. The lower limit for the date of D 7 may be determined by its comparison with *I. G.*, I², 39 and 50, decrees from the years 446 and 439 B. C.;¹⁴ both inscriptions appear to be definitely later than D 7. We draw the conclusion that D 7 may be dated on the basis of its letter forms in one of the years following the middle of the fifth century, and not later than 445 B. C. A date more accurate than that will be suggested by Hill and Meritt in their forthcoming publication of the new fragment of D 7.¹⁵

ANTON E. RAUBITSCHKE.

INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY.

¹⁴ For *I. G.*, I², 39, see M. N. Tod, *Greek Hist. Inscr.*, no. 42; for *I. G.*, I², 50, see Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 48 ff.

¹⁵ In publishing these observations I have enjoyed the encouragement of Professor Meritt who kindly allowed me to use his notes and photographs and discussed with me most of the questions involved.

P. ABERDEEN 18.

Among a large group of papyri and ostraca of varied contents,¹ Mr. E. G. Turner has published as number 18 a two-line document which has a certain value for the history of the Nile at the close of the third century of our era.² It reveals how closely the progress of the river was scrutinized during the period of inundation.³ With the guidance of daily records such as the Aberdeen papyrus precautions might be taken to avoid the grave consequences to the country's agriculture incident on a flood of too great or too meager proportions, and no time need be lost when the proper moment came to open the dikes for the reception of the flood waters.⁴ A number of inscriptions and papyri give the maximal rise of the Nile in specific years,⁵ but only P. Aberdeen 18 and P. Oxyrhynchus 1830 (6th century) record the observation of its rise from day to day. Mr. Turner was unable to establish conclusively that his text relates to the annual inundation, and the purpose of this note is to confirm his conjecture.

The text in question exists in two copies, and from the published plate I derive the following diplomatic transcript, which will serve as a control of discussion.

¹ *Catalogue of Greek and Latin Papyri and Ostraca in the Possession of the University of Aberdeen. Aberdeen University Studies*, No. 116 (Aberdeen, University Press), 1939.

² The date of the text is given explicitly as "9th year (of Diocletian) and 8th year (of Maximian)," i. e. 292 A. D.

³ The administrative apparatus for the measurement of the flood in antiquity may be studied in Ludwig Borchardt, *Nilmesser und Nilstandemarken*, *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1906, Phil.-hist. Abh. nicht zur Akad. gehör. Gelehrter, Abh. I.; the similar arrangements of modern Egypt, in J. Barois, *Irrigation in Egypt* (translated from the French by Major A. M. Miller), Miscellaneous Documents of the House of Representatives for the second session of the fiftieth Congress, Vol. 9 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890).

⁴ Some idea of the economic significance of the Nile in Egyptian life may be gained from Allan C. Johnson, *Roman Egypt to the Reign of Diocletian (Economic Survey of Ancient Rome)*, edited by Tenney Frank, Vol. II), pp. 7-19.

⁵ See Turner's introduction to P. Aberdeen 18.

ΟΘΕΚΑΙΚΥΝΙΡ̄Θ̄ϚΚΑΙΗϚΘΩΘΙΖΕΙCΙΗ
 ΔΑΚΒΓ̄ΤΤΗΧΙΓΔΑΚΔΗΤΤΗΧΙΔΔΑΚΗ

The text is replete with unmarked abbreviations, and to these Mr. Turner's transcript is for the most part an excellent guide.

ὁ θε(ὸς) καὶ κύ(ριος) Νῖρ̄ θ̄ (ἔτους) καὶ η̄ (ἔτους) Θὼθ̄ ιζ̄ εἰς η̄
 δακ(τύλους) β, γί(νονται) πῆχ(εις) ιγ δάκ(τυλοι) δ, ἡπ(είρου) (?)
 πῆχ(εις) ιδ δάκ(τυλοι) η

Mr. Turner has equated Νῖρ̄ with Νῖλος — Νεῖλος, but he is perturbed by the substitution of ρ for λ before a vowel and by the form of the mark of abbreviation.⁶ I suggest that the first words of the text be read ὁ θε(ὸς) καὶ κύ(ριος) Νῖ(λος) πρ̄(οσβέβηκεν), "The God and Lord Nilus has risen." The abbreviation of the verb follows a known type in which the first letter of the word is placed above the second.⁷ ἀναβαίνειν and ἀνάβασις are more usual for the rising of the Nile, but P. Oxyrhynchus 1830 employs both ἀναβαίνειν and προσβαίνειν⁸ in this sense, and P. Maspero 2, II, 22 has the phrase ἡ τῶν νελῶν ὑδάτων πρόσβασις. In this way, all doubt is removed that the Aberdeen papyrus is a report on the rise of the Nile from September 14 to 15 of the year 292 A. D.

The text raises no further difficulty until we strike ἡπ(είρου) in line 2. From Thoth 17 to 18 the Nile rose 2 digits, making a total rise from the beginning of the flood season up to Thoth 18 of 13 cubits 4 digits. Then come the disturbing letters ΗΤ followed by a higher total. Mr. Turner is properly cautious in suggesting the resolution ἡπ(είρου); it is not easy to see what force the word could have here.⁹ The difficulty is removed by

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 19, n. 1.

⁷ L. Mitteis and U. Wilcken, *Grundzüge und Chrestomathie der Papyrskunde*, I, i, p. xli. π above ρ occurs in P. London I for πράγματος and πρὸς; see Index 6 (b) in that edition. The cursive form of π is illustrated in Viktor Gardthausen, *Griechische Palaeographie*, II (Leipzig, 1913), p. 329.

⁸ Cf. P. Petrie, II, p. 22, No. IX, 1, 7.

⁹ P. Aberdeen, p. 20: "... the second total, introduced by the letters π, creates difficulties. In expanding the letters to read ἡπ(είρου) I have supposed that it refers to the height of flood water either covering the valley, or perhaps accumulated in an artificial reservoir. The peculiar fact that this second total is higher than the first is to be

comparison of the Aberdeen papyrus with P. Oxyrhynchus 1830. Although the texts are separated by an interval of two or three hundred years, the Aberdeen papyrus is just such a skeleton report as might be expanded into a letter like that from Oxyrhynchus. The pertinent words of the latter ¹⁰ are εὐαγγελίζομαι . . . τὸν . . . τῆς Αἰγύπτου ποταμὸν προσβεβηκέναι . . . ἀπὸ ε τοῦ Μεσορῆ μηνὸς ἕως ζ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνέβη δακτύλους ιβ, ὡς εἶναι νέου ὕδατος πήχεις β δακτύλους κ . . . πέρνσι δὲ ταῖς αὐταῖς ἡμέραις ἀνέβη δακτύλους λζ, ὡς εἶναι νέου ὕδατος πήχεις ε δακτύλους ζ . . . The rise of the Nile in the last three days and its total rise from the beginning of the inundation are followed by the same data for last year. Similarly, in the Aberdeen papyrus, the total rise to date is followed by the total rise at the same time last year, and the mysterious letters should be resolved ἡ π(ερυσινή), *sc.* πρόσβασις.

With these corrections the text now has the following appearance:

ὁ θε(ὸς) καὶ κύ(ριος) Νι(λος) προ(σβεβηκεν) θ (ἔτους) καὶ η (ἔτους)
 Θωθ ιζ εἰς ιη
 δακ(τύλους) β, γί(νονται) πήχ(εις) ιγ δάκ(τυλοι) δ. ἡ π(ερυσινή)
 πρόσβασις) πηχ(ῶν) ιδ δακ(τύλων) η.

H. C. YOUTIE.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

explained on the hypothesis that artificial means, perhaps something like the *ἐνθεμα* of P. Oxy. 1830, have been used." The character of the *ἐνθεμα* itself is obscure. The Oxyrhynchus text suggests a reservoir, and this brings to mind a Nilometer of the kind found at Edfu and pictured by Borchardt, *op. cit.*, p. 26. For other guesses, see the editors' note. The problem is complicated by the very uncertain reading of line 9, which I cannot believe is correct.

¹⁰ For the sake of convenience, editorial punctuation—square and curved brackets—has been omitted.

REVIEWS.

W. JAEGER. Diokles von Karystos. Die griechische Medizin und die Schule des Aristoteles. Berlin, 1938. Pp. 244.

Jaeger's book is the first modern monograph on Diocles, whose fame in antiquity almost equalled that of Hippocrates. That recent scholars have neglected him may partly be due to the fact that only fragments of his writings are preserved.¹

Against the common belief Jaeger tries to demonstrate that Diocles did not live before Aristotle. Rose's opinion to the same effect did not carry any conviction, for it was made as an aperçue rather than elaborated as a doctrine. Maass' splendid observation that Diocles avoids hiatus elucidated a detail of his style, but did not prove that he lived in the last third of the 4th century B. C., as Maass suggested (cf. Jaeger, pp. 13 ff.). By placing the scattered references to Diocles into the framework of Greek philosophy Jaeger puts on a new basis the discussion of the problems involved, for he shows for the first time to what extent Diocles' language and thought coincide with Aristotelian formulations and ideas. Jaeger then concludes that Diocles must have been dependent on Aristotle and that he must have been at least his contemporary, for otherwise Aristotle would be dependent on Diocles, and that too in regard to important metaphysical and ethical concepts as well as characteristic scientific terms and stylistic devices.

Such a line of reasoning, no doubt, contains an *a priori* assumption which is not incontestable. Aristotle in many respects is dependent on his predecessors, and if it were certain that Diocles lived earlier, one would have to resign oneself to the fact that it is Diocles who taught Aristotle. Yet, whereas scholars so far had concluded from ancient testimony that Diocles died around 350 B. C., certainly before Aristotle formulated his own philosophical system, Jaeger infers from the fragments that he died after 300 B. C. and before 288/7 B. C. (p. 119). In an article, published shortly after his book had appeared, Jaeger goes even farther and tries to prove that Diocles lived from 340-260 B. C.² In both cases Jaeger's thesis is based on the interpretation of the same two statements which alone, it seems,

¹ M. Wellmann, *Die Fragmente der Sikelischen Ärzte Akron, Philistion und des Diokles von Karystos* (Berlin, 1901).

² *Vergessene Fragmente des Peripatetikers Diokles von Karystos, Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1938, Phil.-hist. Klasse, No. 3, p. 17. (This paper I shall quote as II, whereas the book will be quoted as I).

provide direct information about Diocles' lifetime, the one coming from Theophrastus (*Περὶ λίθων*, chap. 5 = frag. 166 Wellmann), the other from Athenaeus (II 59a = frag. 125 Wellmann).

Frag. 166, although of secondary importance for Jaeger, must be considered first, because of certain difficulties which it involves. It reads thus: ἔλκει γὰρ (*scil.* τὸ λυγγούριον) ὥσπερ τὸ ἤλεκτρον, οἱ δὲ φασιν οὐ μόνον κάρφη καὶ ξύλον, ἀλλὰ καὶ χαλκὸν καὶ σίδηρον, ἐὰν ᾗ λεπτός, ὥσπερ καὶ Διοκλῆς ἔλεγεν. Originally Jaeger claimed that Diocles, who was still alive around 300 B. C., must have been dead at the time when these words were written (before 288/7 [I, p. 119]), since Theophrastus speaks of him in the imperfect. Later he maintains only, again on account of the use of the imperfect, that Diocles was not in Athens when Theophrastus wrote (II, p. 13), another possible explanation of the tense discussed by Jaeger in his book, but there rejected as unlikely (*loc. cit.*).

The possibility of such a flexible interpretation of the imperfect (*cf.* also I, p. 14), in my opinion, does not enhance confidence in the certainty of either the one or the other conclusion. Moreover, Pliny, in paraphrasing the passage, says (XXXVII, 53): *quod Diocli cuidam Theophrastus quoque credit*. Jaeger, referring to the somewhat deprecatory expression *Diocli cuidam*, says: "Dieser Unterschied in der Bewertung des Diokles bei Theophrast und Plinius würde allein schon fast genügen, um zu beweisen, dass es sich um den grossen peripatetischen Arzt handeln muss . . ." (I, p. 117); and he claims that Diocles "für ihn (*scil.* Pliny) keine greifbare Grösse mehr ist" (*loc. cit.*). Yet, since Theophrastus does not pass any judgment on Diocles' achievements, it is impossible to speak of differences in the evaluations pronounced by Theophrastus and by Pliny. Besides, it is hardly justifiable to cavil at Pliny's appreciation of Diocles' importance, for Pliny, who in other places mentions Diocles either simply by name or as the physician Diocles, calls him "the second in glory to Hippocrates" (XXVI, 10 = frag. 5 Wellmann). Since Pliny understood Theophrastus' statement to refer to a certain Diocles, this Diocles for Pliny could not be identical with the famous Diocles. Therefore it is dangerous, I believe, to use the fragment at all for determining the lifetime of Diocles of Carystus.*

* There is at least one other fragment the genuineness of which is doubtful (frag. 99 Wellmann), *cf.* J. Heeg, *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, 1911, pp. 991 ff. Wellmann's revindication of the fragment (*Hermes*, XLVIII [1913], pp. 484 ff.) is not convincing. Another physician Diocles is known from Galen (XIII, p. 87 Kühn, and Wellmann, p. 65, n. 1), not to speak of all the others by that name referred to in ancient literature. *Cf.* also D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson, *The Philosophical Review*, XLVIII (1939), pp. 212-213.

The chronological evidence thus seems restricted to frag. 125: Διοκλῆς δὲ κολοκύντας μὲν καλλίστας γίνεσθαι περὶ Μαγνησίαν, προσέτι τε γογγύλην ὑπερμεγέθη γλυκεῖαν καὶ εὐστόμαχον, ἐν Ἀντιοχείᾳ δὲ σικκόν, ἐν δὲ Σμύρῃ καὶ Γαλατίᾳ θρίδακα, πήγανον δ' ἐν Μύροις. The mention of Antioch, Jaeger says—taking up an argument of Rose entirely overlooked and forgotten later on—proves that Diocles was still alive when that city was founded or even for some time thereafter; Diocles must have lived, therefore, until 300 B. C. (I, pp. 67 ff.). Yet, as Theiler pointed out to Jaeger, Galatia is mentioned in the same fragment, and the name Galatia cannot have been used earlier than 270 B. C. (cf. II, p. 16). Jaeger, therefore, finally assumes as Diocles' term of life the years 340 to 260 B. C. (II, pp. 17; 36), and he claims that Diocles must have lived long enough to polemize against Herophilus whose *floruit* lies between 270 and 260 B. C. (cf. II, pp. 15; 36 ff.).

How does such a hypothesis fit in with the indirect evidence? When in his book Jaeger discusses Vindicianus' (4/5th century A. D.) doxographical survey of medical problems in which certain theories of Diocles are formulated as answers to the doctrines of Herophilus, he writes: "Wir müssen also entweder Wellmanns Voraussetzung preisgeben, dass in dem Exzerpt wörtliche Zitate aus Diokles vorliegen, oder folgern, dass Diokles im 3. Jahrh. lange genug gelebt habe, um eine Schrift gegen Herophilus verfassen zu können, der von Galen und anderen antiken Zeugen ausdrücklich als jünger als Diokles bezeichnet wird und nach herrschender Annahme erst vom zweiten und dritten Jahrzehnt an 'geblüht' hat. Dieser Synchronismus hat natürlich etwas Verlockendes, wenn man schon einmal dabei ist, die ganze Chronologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte der griechischen Medizin von Hippokrates bis zum Beginn des hellenistischen Zeitalters umzustossen. Aber hier stehen wir im Begriff, den Boden sicherer Tatsachen zu verlassen und statt der überwundenen Schwierigkeiten neue zu schaffen" (I, p. 200). Indeed, the assumption that Diocles could have opposed views held by Herophilus is inconsistent with the testimonies of Celsus and Galen (frags. 4; 16 Wellmann) who agree that Diocles wrote before Herophilus.

Why does Jaeger now (II, p. 15) consider as genuine the so-called answers of Diocles to Herophilus which he himself had shown to be arranged by Vindicianus, as is typical of this late compilatory literature (I, pp. 200 ff.)? His main reason for changing his mind is the reference to Galatia (II, p. 16); and yet, Kaibel, in his edition of Athenaeus, had already remarked: γαλατεία C E, videtur corruptum; Kaibel's statement is probably due to stylistic considerations, as Jaeger explains (*loc. cit.*). Jacoby, too, regards καὶ Γαλατία as an obvious insertion which destroys the careful antithesis otherwise to be observed in these words (Jacoby *apud* Jaeger, *loc. cit.*, p. 16, n. 2). Moreover,

since the statement apparently means to tell where the best kind of lettuce is grown, it would be hardly appropriate to name two places of production (Smyrna and Galatia); also in the words immediately preceding and following only one place is mentioned for the best kind of vegetables referred to there (cf. E. Kind, *Philologische Wochenschrift*, LIX [1939], p. 528). Finally, Diocles, in giving the places of origin, usually speaks of cities, not of countries (Jaeger, II, p. 16). One must conclude, I think, that καὶ Γαλατία is a later insertion; additions in statements of this kind are certainly nothing extraordinary.

At any rate, the contention that Diocles lived long enough to write against Herophilus—a claim which is refuted by all indirect testimony—cannot be established by the evidence adduced by Jaeger.⁴ Besides, the content of Diocles' teaching is in no way linked to the work done by Herophilus and his associates; on the contrary, Diocles' doctrine and method are characteristic of the bent of the older generation. To give one striking example: Diocles' anatomy is animal anatomy, not human anatomy (cf. I, p. 165), which is a distinctive feature of Hellenistic medicine. It is safe to say that none of the new medical concepts, as conceived by the physicians of the first half of the third century B. C., is echoed in the fragments preserved from Diocles' writings. Had he really lived and worked from 340-260 B. C. his system would be an outright anachronism. That it was is, of course, not impossible; yet this could be concluded only on the basis of irrefutable evidence.

If the chronological argument from the fragments allows of any conclusion at all, it proves that Diocles lived until 300 B. C., the time in which Antioch was founded, or shortly after, in other words perhaps from 375-295 B. C. Such a result is not incompatible with Pliny's and Galen's opinion that Diocles lived shortly after Hippocrates (frag. 5 Wellmann, *secundus aetate* (scil. Hippocratis); frag. 26 Wellmann, μικρόν ὕστερον Ἱπποκράτους),⁵ for Hippocrates probably died around 380 B. C. The new date for Diocles' lifetime can also be reconciled with Celsus'

⁴ Consequently it seems impossible to accept either Jaeger's identification of Diocles of Carystus with the Diocles mentioned in the will of Strato (II, pp. 10 ff.), or his new dates for the physicians of the 4th century B. C., which he bases on his chronology of Diocles (II, pp. 36 ff.). Furthermore, if Jaeger's thesis as formulated in his article is adopted, it becomes even more doubtful that the so-called letter of Diocles to Antigonos is genuine (I, pp. 70 ff.), for Diocles could hardly write to the king on an equal footing around 305/4 (I, p. 79) if he was at that time 35 years old and at the beginning of his career.

⁵ I fail to understand Jaeger's statement that a *floruit* of Diocles shortly before or around 300 B. C. is in agreement with Pliny's expression: *Diocles secundus aetate famaque Hippocratis* (II, p. 12), nor can I see that Galen's μικρόν ὕστερον Ἱπποκράτους is already a misrepresentation of the tradition, because it puts Diocles immediately after Hippocrates (II, p. 37).

reckoning of generations (frag. 4, *post quem* (scil. Hippocratem) *Diocles Carystius, deinde Praxagoras et Chrysippus, tum Herophilus et Erasistratus*). Yet, I think one must admit that Diocles' lifetime then extends over a longer period or begins at a later date than one would have guessed from the indirect information.

Nevertheless, even if one is inclined to disregard the one direct testimony (frag. 125) entirely, since it certainly has been altered by addition, and since the foundation of Antioch seems a rather late *terminus post quem* for Diocles' death—even then it would be in accord with all the other ancient witnesses to assume that Diocles was a contemporary of Aristotle. Before Jaeger nobody ever seriously considered this possibility, for the close ideological and stylistic resemblance between the work of the two men had not been observed and the question of their mutual dependence consequently was no issue. Now that this observation has been made, one becomes aware that nothing prevents assuming Diocles to have been of the same age as Aristotle or somewhat younger.⁶ On the contrary, the evidence points in this direction, for according to all sources Diocles was later than Hippocrates; there is no indication that the two were contemporaries, they are always distinguished as belonging to different generations. The chronological argument then, rightly considered, is in favor of Jaeger's first thesis of a close proximity of Diocles and Aristotle. This again makes it unnecessary to explain their agreement by presuming that Aristotle borrows from Diocles.

All these considerations do not, of course, indicate the extent of the reciprocal influence of the two men, or whose influence was the stronger and more important. It stands to reason that Diocles, in the methodological discussions in which he shares the views of Aristotle,⁷ is dependent on him. Tradition does not suggest any philosophical originality of Diocles, and the fragments show a combination of different trends rather than a strongly personal point of view. Diocles may also have taken over the terminology, which in many respects closely resembles that of Aristotle (I, pp. 16 ff.).⁸ Allowance must be made, however, for some exception to the contrary even in regard to this relation. Too little is known about Diocles to exclude the possibility of his having some philosophical ideas of his own or devising some stylistic novelty.⁹ The statement of Diocles (II,

⁶ Cf. Jaeger, I, p. 12: "Einen durchschlagenden Grund für . . . frühe Datierung des Diokles gibt es in der Tat nicht."

⁷ *κρίσις* (I), *δυοιον*, *ἀρχαὶ ἀναπόδεικτοι*, *ἀρμότιον* (I, pp. 25 ff.; 37 ff.); the concept of teleology (pp. 51 ff.).

⁸ *ἐπιδέχασθαι* (I, p. 23); *ποσαχῶς λέγεται* (p. 24); *συμβαλεῖν εἰωθε* (p. 31).

⁹ Especially if he had been a *ρήτωρ* (frag. 89 Wellmann, and Jaeger I, p. 2). But Wellmann's emendation was rejected and the genuineness of the fragment disputed by Heeg (cf. *supra* n. 3).

pp. 5 ff.) in which he disagrees with Aristotle in the explanation of winds shows that, in spite of all his dependence on Aristotelian philosophy, Diocles was able to judge for himself even in questions of natural philosophy. Nor is there any reason why it should have been necessary for him to learn what he learned by a careful study of the published *Ethics* as well as from the oral lectures which he had heard.¹⁰

Yet, if it is reasonable to assume Diocles' dependence on Aristotle in these matters, a similar subordination of Diocles the zoologist and physician is not probable. It is hardly a "Skandalon der historischen Vernunft" (I, p. 177) that Diocles' work is represented as one of the sources of Aristotle's zoological writings. In the first place, Diocles discussed questions of zoology not only in his meager dietetical books, as Jaeger at one place says (I, p. 176), but also in his treatise on anatomy, the first ever written (Galen, II, p. 282 Kühn = frag. 23 Wellmann). This book, then, could have been a source of information for Aristotle, as Jaeger elsewhere admits (I, pp. 183-4), and a source of special importance if Aristotle himself did not write on anatomy (I, p. 165, n. 1). Such a work presupposes systematic knowledge and most probably contained a description of animal parts (contrary to Jaeger, *loc. cit.*); there is certainly no proof that it was unsystematic or lacking in description. Moreover, even disregarding the problem of the Coan zoological system (I, pp. 167 ff.), Aristotle himself testifies to his knowledge of forerunners in the field; he cannot have been the first to establish a system of zoology.¹¹ This fact in no way detracts from the remarkable qualities of his work or from the incomparable greatness of his achievement. Even where he takes over his knowledge, he maintains his independent attitude. Jaeger was doubtless correct when in his book he interpreted *De Generatione Animalium* II 7, 745 b 33-746 a 28 as a polemic against Diocles' divergent opinions (I, p. 166) and suggested that there may be many other such polemics in the Aristotelian writings (I, p. 167).¹² Still, even controversy does not exclude dependence, in the case of Aristotle any more than in the case of Diocles, the natural scientist.

¹⁰ I, p. 59: "Nun scheint mir aber aus unserer Untersuchung zugleich unwiderleglich hervorzugehen, dass Diokles die ethische Lehre des späten Aristoteles nicht *nur* aus mündlichem Vortrag, sondern in ihrer genauen schriftlichen Formulierung gekannt hat, wie sie in der Nikomachischen Ethik uns vorliegt."

¹¹ Cf. I. V. Carus, *Geschichte der Zoologie* (1872), pp. 57 ff.; 77. If Buffon, Cuvier, and Alexander v. Humboldt are inclined to see in Aristotle the first whom tradition mentions, the originator of zoology and its system (I, pp. 167-8), Aristotle himself answers (*Poetics*, 1448 b 27-30): τῶν μὲν οὖν πρὸ Ὀμήρου οὐδενὸς ἔχομεν αἰτεῖν τοιοῦτον πόλημα, εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλοῦς.

¹² Attention must be called, however, to the fact that this interpretation of these passages cannot be reconciled with the chronology set up in Jaeger's later article.

As for Diocles the physician—no general considerations make it probable or acceptable that he, the son of a physician, wherever his opinions coincide with those of Aristotle, even in medicine, must be borrowing from him, or that in these instances both go back to the same source (I, pp. 218-19). To be sure, it would be hopeless to collect all the cases of their agreement and to divine which one is following the other (Jaeger, *loc. cit.*). Yet there are also cases in which Diocles deviates from Aristotle (e. g. I, p. 166); and certainly, if Diocles even as a physician had nothing to offer Aristotle he could not have been "the second in glory to Hippocrates" and one of the doctors whom Aristotle praises by saying: "those physicians who have subtle and inquiring minds have something to say about natural science and claim to derive their principles therefrom."¹³ Finally, Aristotle asserts that philosophers should discuss the causes of death and disease only up to a certain point (*μέχρι του*); he does not say that they have to become physicians themselves (*ibid.*). Why, then, should he not have learned from Diocles?

To sum up: Jaeger has shown, I believe, that Diocles was a contemporary of Aristotle and deeply influenced by Aristotelian philosophy, the first physician of the "synthetic type" (I, pp. 5; 220), integrating, as a true Aristotelian, the achievements of the whole past (I, p. 224). These results of Jaeger's interpretation, results of the greatest importance, must be protected and upheld against certain exaggerations to which he himself is liable in determining the rôle of Aristotle as compared with that of Diocles; they must be kept safe against the new position which Jaeger has later taken in regard to the chronological questions. Only then will a more appropriate appreciation of Diocles' achievements be reached.¹⁴

LUDWIG EDELSTEIN.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.

ETTORE BIGNONE. *Studi sul Pensiero Antico*. Naples, Luigi Loffredo, 1938. Pp. viii + 355. L. 15.

This interesting volume represents a collection of articles dealing with Antiphon the sophist, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and Ennius. All of these articles had already appeared in Italian periodicals. In fact, one of them, "Il pensiero platonico ed il Timeo," was published as far back as 1910; and I feel some doubt as to whether it was really wise to include it, almost

¹³ *De Respiratione* 480 b 22 ff., Hett's translation (Loeb Classical Library [1935], p. 479).

¹⁴ When this was already in page-proof there appeared (*Philos. Rev.*, XLIX [July, 1940], pp. 393 ff.) an article of Jaeger's summarizing the views expressed in his book and paper here reviewed.

unaltered, in a book issued in 1938. It is certainly impressive to see that Professor Bignone in 1910 concentrated on the connection between the ideas and the visible world, the transition from the realm of Being to that of Becoming, the function of the Demiurge, the problem of the mythical form, in other words on those questions which have ever since dominated the discussion. And yet, one inevitably feels that the investigations of scholars like Whitehead, Demos, A. E. Taylor, Cornford, Eva Sachs, and Stenzel have in the meantime shed so much new light on these questions that Bignone's discussion can claim interest only as a stage in the history of these studies but not as a contribution pointing beyond the conclusions of these scholars and emphasizing aspects hitherto neglected.

The articles on the sophist Antiphon which form the bulk of the work include more references to books and papers published after their first appearance (in 1917 and 1919 respectively), but even they can hardly be said to be "up to date." In fact, Professor Bignone who complains again and again that his contributions have been overlooked by scholars outside Italy (which is certainly a pity) repays in kind, so to speak, by failing to take into account not only Aly's elaborate plea for an identification of the two Antiphons (*Formprobleme der griech. Prosa*, Leipzig, 1929) but also such important discussions of sophistic thought as that in Jaeger's *Paideia*. It would be unfair, however, to dwell on these omissions since they hardly impair the essential value of Bignone's own work. I will not go into the details of his treatment of the papyri of Antiphon's *Ἀλήθεια*, partly because he does not actually "edit" them in such a way that other scholars could form their own independent judgments (and, needless to say, for that purpose one would have to reexamine the papyri themselves) and partly because the main importance of Bignone's papers does not seem to lie in their contributions to textual criticism. There is a great deal of force, however, in his arguments that the extant sections of the *Ἀλήθεια* are *deductiones ad absurdum* of propositions (concerning Justice) with which Antiphon himself did not agree and that while refuting some narrow legalistic conceptions of Justice he provides a better foundation for that concept in his idea of *concordia* (*ὁμόνοια*). This *concordia* he finds realized in the cosmos and would like to see pervading the political community as well.

As a background to Antiphon's theories, Professor Bignone writes the history of the conflict between *νόμος* and *φύσις* in Greek thought, beginning with Heraclitus, who makes a good starting point, and taking us down to the Hellenistic schools. This is a fine piece of work, and I am inclined to agree with him that the most daring and shocking theories (i.e. those extolling might against right and celebrating the "superman") were put forward not by the sophists proper but by men like Callicles and Thrasymachus who actually advocate them in

Plato's dialogues. Professor Bignone well shows the demoralizing atmosphere of the Peloponnesian War as a factor favoring the growth of this mentality. I regret only that he fails to make full use of the important testimony of Attic tragedy. Both Euripides and Sophocles offer ample material for the conflict between Law and Nature, Might and Right, State and Individual (even Euripides' attacks on the traditional gods are closely connected with his attitude toward νόμος). Yet Professor Bignone has only a short reference to the famous passage, *Soph., Ant.* 450 ff. (p. 16), which has figured in this context ever since Hegel. There is further evidence for "nature" and the right of the stronger in Plato, *Laws* IV, 714 f., X, 889 f., where Plato gives accounts as well as criticisms of these theories; and it is unfortunate that Professor Bignone has paid no attention to them. It might be maintained that the Stoic identification of Law, Reason, and Nature has its historical basis in Plato and should not be treated without reference to him.

At times Professor Bignone strikes the reader as too subtle in his argumentation and overconfident in his suggestions. I cannot, for instance, follow him in his theory that Antiphon's work and views were the source of certain passages in Sophocles' *Ajax* (notably the famous monologue, 646 ff.); and in his attempt to reconstruct the "systems" of Protagoras, Hippias, and other sophists he seems to me to go further than our material warrants. I doubt whether we can really know as much as Professor Bignone thinks he knows about the difference between Antiphon's and, say, Protagoras' views, and we should not regard it as an axiom that a sophist must always be consistent with himself. Generally speaking, in a field where our knowledge depends so largely on chance and accidents of transmission it would be wise to be less dogmatic than Professor Bignone is. He rightly points out what a great difference even such small pieces as the fragments of the *Ἀλκιβια* make to our knowledge of the thought of that period; but I am not sure that the lesson to be drawn from this has always been present to his mind.

Thus, there is room for scepticism in evaluating Professor Bignone's results; but scepticism too may be overdone, and we should be carrying the principles of caution too far if on the basis of general considerations (about the fragmentary character of our evidence, etc.) we rejected Professor Bignone's arguments against the identification of Antiphon the sophist and Antiphon the orator. For the gulf between the orator's conservative and reactionary outlook and the sophist's "progressive" belief in the equality of all human beings cannot be argued away. This is as sound an argument as has ever been put forward by a classicist, and I agree with Professor Bignone that it is stronger than the stylistic differences between the *Ἀλκιβια* and the orations which, as he rightly remarks, may be explained in several different ways.

Chapter V contains new material for Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; and chapter VI is one of those "*conferme*" to his "*Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*" of which Bignone has published a considerable number since the appearance of that important book (1936). As the readers of this review will know, Professor Bignone has in that book, on the basis of Jaeger's reconstruction of Aristotle's early dialogues, undertaken to show how important these works were both for the growth and for the manner of presentation of Epicurus' philosophy. To all intents and purposes chapter V also is a "*conferma*," and it would be more pleasant for the reviewer (as well as fairer to the author) if we could discuss both chapters in connection with the book. This, however, would lead us too far afield. Therefore, I must content myself with stating my general impression that while the chapters are full of stimulating suggestions Professor Bignone frequently appears to carry speculation too far. In particular, it seems hazardous to hunt for new fragments or echoes of the *Protrepticus*. Anyone aware of the extent of protreptic literature will realize that the writers of *προτρεπτικοί* were almost forced to keep their discussions within the range of the same basic ideas, and to repeat certain commonplaces over and over with but slight variations. Therefore, unless we are shown very close and characteristic agreements between Aristotle on the one hand and Cicero, Boethius, and Gregory Nazianzen on the other, we shall be reluctant to believe in a direct indebtedness. Nor does Professor Bignone always give sufficient attention to the purpose and context of the passages in these writers. Take the following instance: Aristotle said in the *Protrepticus* that the young ought to philosophize; Epicurus (let us grant for the purpose of argument) replied: Not only the young but also the old ought to philosophize. Gregory, in his famous oration on baptism (XL) argues that not only the young but also the old ought to be baptized. Obviously, this was his honest conviction as a Christian and responsible leader of the Church, and there is no justification for inferring from a very superficial similarity that Gregory "*ha presente il Protreptico di Aristotele e la sua fortuna*" (the last words, by the way, show that Professor Bignone credits Gregory with interests more typical of a modern philologist than of an ancient theologian, however learned). Some other arguments in these chapters are no better than this; but a few of Professor Bignone's suggestions are worth considering, and I think that he is definitely right in regarding Sen., *De brev. vit.*, I, 2 as a reference to the *Protrepticus*. Yet, this is a passage in which Aristotle is actually quoted by name.

The last chapter of the book deals with "Ennio ed Empedocle." Eduard Norden had (*Ennius und Vergil*, pp. 10 ff.) used the lines: *Corpore Tartarino prognata paluda virago cui par imber*

et ignis, spiritus et gravis terra (521 ff., Vahlen) in conjunction with others to prove that Ennius was the source of the Allecto episode in the *Aeneid*. Professor Bignone does not dispute this but suggests a new interpretation of *cui par*, etc. The idea is not that the four elements have in equal amounts participated in the makeup of the *virago Discordia* but rather that *Discordia* has a standing "on a par" with the four elements. This seems to do justice to the wording of these lines and also to agree more definitely with Empedocles on whom Ennius is generally recognized to depend in this passage. The same interpretation was put forward, between the first and the second publication of Bignone's paper, by Hermann Fränkel (*Hermes*, LXX [1935], pp. 62-64) but neither of the two scholars seems to have been aware of the other's work.

FRIEDRICH SOLMSSEN.

OLIVET COLLEGE,
MICHIGAN.

-
- A. SEVERYNS. *Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus*. Première Partie: Le Codex 239 de Photius: Tome I: Étude paléographique et critique; Tome II: Texte, traduction, commentaire. Paris, E. Droz, 1938. Pp. xvi + 404; 3 plates; pp. 298. 200 fr. (Fac. de Phil. et Let. de l'Univ. de Liège, LXXVIII and LXXIX.).

In these two volumes M. Severyns presents the first part of the results of a study of Proclus which has occupied him for more than fifteen years. As the subtitle indicates, this portion of M. Severyns' work is almost entirely devoted to Photius and his *Bibliotheca*, particularly to Codex 239, i. e. the portion of the *Bibliotheca* in which Photius reports the reading of two books of Proclus' *Chrestomathy*. M. Severyns begins with a short account of the creation of the *Bibliotheca*. This work of Photius might almost be considered as a part of the "minutes" of a kind of reading club which had existed for some time at Byzantium under the leadership of Photius. In 855 Photius and some other members of the club were included in an embassy sent to the Caliph of Bagdad. They continued their readings on the journey and the *Bibliotheca* represents the reports of these readings prepared by Photius to be sent to his brother Tarasius at Byzantium. M. Severyns holds that the entire text was dictated by Photius to a secretary. He bases this conclusion on the interesting observation that although Photius often modifies the passages from Greek authors which he includes in his work, "toutes ces modifications sont opérées avec tant d'adresse que le texte de la *Bibliothèque* garde toujours fidèlement l'allure et le style de l'original." This, argues M. Severyns,

reveals the work of a man of learning and taste, and is due to Photius and not to a scribe working for hire. If Photius was willing to take all this trouble when dealing with extracts, which he might simply have marked in his books for the secretary to copy, he would have certainly made personally the résumés and commentaries. This hypothesis also explains why the early entries are short compared with the later (the first sixty entries occupy nineteen pages, the second sixty 368). The first ones were partly made by Photius before he got his secretary and were later dictated with a few additions from memory; the later ones are more expansive because the secretary was at hand. The dictations were not revised because they were destined only for Photius' brother, who was in a great hurry to get them. Frequently in the course of his work M. Severyns returns to these peculiar circumstances under which the *Bibliotheca* was created and emphasizes the importance of the influence which they had upon the subject matter and style and upon the condition of the MSS.

Severyns believes that Orth is wrong in explaining the preface of the *Bibliotheca* as an addition made when it was published by Photius. Severyns maintains that it is a "lettre d'envoi" which Photius sent to his brother along with the manuscript of the *Bibliotheca*. Later other members of the reading club, having heard of the work, asked to have copies, and the letter was put at the head of these copies.

After this introduction Severyns proceeds to the main section of his work, which is divided into three parts: I. Étude Paléographique, II. Étude Critique, III. La Tradition Indirecte. These three divisions occupy more than 300 pages and it is, of course, impossible even to list here the multitude of details in which Severyns has corrected his predecessors, discovered new facts, and presented new interpretations and ideas. There is a vast amount of detailed information about the MSS of Photius and the manuscript tradition. So far as one can say who does not himself have a first-hand knowledge of these MSS, this information seems to be presented with good sense and extreme care. It is almost impossible to avoid wondering at times, however, whether all this material needed to be presented, or, at any rate, presented at such great length. M. Severyns himself is conscious of this possible objection, but assures us that the minuteness with which he has treated some of his material is justified by the importance of the conclusions to which it leads. The main conclusions at which M. Severyns arrives are these: Of the two MSS, A and M, shown by Martini to be the sources of all other extant MSS of Photius, A was made by an ignorant but extremely conscientious scribe, and a number of his mistakes doubtless go back to his model. In spite of its many errors A is far the best guide we have for reconstructing the original text

of Photius. The beginning of A is defective and the end is lacking; in these portions A must be replaced by B, a copy of A made in the thirteenth century by the most learned of all the scribes or correctors who worked on Photius' *Bibliotheca*. Except for these portions, however, B, though deserving of more consideration than it has sometimes received, is inferior to A, because the learned "corrections" of its scribe really obscure the early MSS tradition. M was itself copied by a scribe only a little less ignorant than the scribe of A. But at some earlier period an ancestor of M was "corrected" rather extensively by some learned reader, who is mainly responsible for the considerable divergences between the two families as we have them. M. Severyns has succeeded in identifying this learned corrector as the Byzantine scholar and book-lover Arethas, pupil of Photius. The numerous mistakes in A and the numerous "corrections" in M are the more readily understandable if we bear in mind that the original manuscript of the *Bibliotheca* was probably a very mediocre one, in view of the peculiar circumstances under which the work was composed. It is obvious that the next editor of Photius will find the discoveries of Severyns indispensable and, in fact, revolutionary.

The first volume closes with a brief summary of the history of the MS tradition as M. Severyns has reconstructed it. The three plates give reproductions of: 1. A page of MS A; 2. A page of MS M; 3. A page of Cod. Paris. gr. 451 to illustrate a scholium by Arethas on Clement of Alexandria.

In the second volume, after brief prolegomena containing a history of the printed text of Photius and a description of the arrangement of the present edition of Codex 239, M. Severyns presents a new critical text of Codex 239 with *marginalia* from A and M and *testimonia* in addition to the critical apparatus. Below this is a French translation of the text. Far the greater part of the volume (some 200 pages) is given over to a lengthy commentary. The general purpose of the commentary is to reveal, as far as is possible, the thought of Proclus as it is presented in Photius' summary and then, with this as a basis, to arrive at a fair estimate of the capacities and achievements of Proclus. In general M. Severyns seems to have been reasonably successful in his effort to follow a middle course between those who treat Proclus "comme un parent pauvre" and those specialists who would try to make him seem more important than he really was. Many of the subjects treated in the commentary will, of course, be greatly expanded in later parts of this work when M. Severyns will have presented a complete study of the *Chrestomathy*. This is notably true of what many might consider the most important subject of all, the Epic Cycle. Another important matter which is postponed is the consideration of the date of Proclus. There are indications in these volumes, however,

that M. Severyns does not believe that the author of the *Chrestomathy* was the neo-Platonic philosopher (e. g. I, pp. 263, 324; II, p. 80; cf. also the double entries in the indices). It might be mentioned in passing that M. Severyns attacks with particular enthusiasm scholars who in attempting to reconstruct the *Chrestomathy* put great faith in the scholia to Dionysius Thrax.

The usefulness of these volumes has been enhanced by a series of indices. Each volume contains a very detailed general index, an index of Greek words which are discussed, and an index of references to MSS, Greek authors, and passages therefrom. The second volume contains in addition an *index verborum* of Codex 239 of Photius.

Perhaps the highest praise which can be given to this excellent work is to say that it whets the appetite for more, and makes us await with impatience the second part of the study, in which M. Severyns will treat other sources of information about Proclus and his *Chrestomathy*. One may echo with especial fervor in these days M. Severyns' prayer that "difficultés nouvelles" will not delay too long the completion of his task.

FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK.

UNIVERSITY OF OREGON.

ETTORE PARATORE. Introduzione alle Georgiche. Palermo, F. Ciuni, 1938. Pp. 145.

The author explains that the title of his book does not signify that he means to furnish a key to the full understanding of Virgil's poem. His purpose is to set the *Georgics* in their place within the poet's development, and specifically to show that this poem, while in important respects an advance on the *Eclogues*, is in the main a work of the same literary and political background as the earlier poems, and still a long way from the *Aeneid*.

His method is to assume that the "lyrical" passages—the Praise of Italy, and the rest—placed so regularly in the centre and at the end of each book, are a safe guide to the poet's frame of mind, since they are the most personal utterances in the poem. Within these passages he analyses the individual motives, comparing them with motives in the *Epodes* of Horace. He seldom refers to the *Eclogues*, apart from the fourth, and indeed his work virtually resolves itself into a demonstration that one epode, the sixteenth, shines through Virgil's fabric in a number of places. Presumably we have here the origin of Paratore's study, since he has already in an earlier publication sought traces of *Epode* XVI in Propertius. The relation of this epode to the fourth Eclogue has long had the attention of Latin scholars, but Paratore is the first to bring it into contact with the *Georgics*.

The topics most closely studied are the idyllic motives of *Georg.*, II, 136-76 and III, 294-338, the "political" motives of *Georg.*, II, 167-70 and 495-540, and the Myth of the Ages in *Georg.*, I, 121-46, to each of which is devoted a chapter. Most convincing is the confrontation of the Praise of Italy with Horace's description of his earthly paradise. The relationship is complicated by Virgil's having employed similar motives in the fourth Eclogue; but Paratore rightly assumes the influence of the epode on the eclogue, and further tries to show that when Virgil returns to the idyllic motives in the third Georgic these betray traits found in Horace but not in the fourth Eclogue. For this last point (p. 65) his evidence is not wholly convincing, especially since he hardly gives full weight to the fact that in *Georg.*, III, 294-338 Virgil is manifestly versifying Varro. We must grant that there is a very telling parallel between *Georg.*, III, 316-7 (*atque ipsae memores redeunt in tecta suosque / ducunt, et gravis superant vix ubere limen*) and *Epode XVI*, 49-50 (*Illic iniussae veniunt ad mulctra capellae, / refertque tenta grex amicus ubera*); but here again *Ecl.* IV, 21 stands between: *ipsae lacte domum referent distenta capellae / ubera*.

It is easier to show that in general Virgil is moving within the circle of motives familiar to his youth than it is to prove the immediate influence of *Epode XVI*. Paratore goes on to the political motives of *Georgic II* and *Epode XVI*. Horace mentions the Marsi, the Etruscans, Capua, Spartacus, the Allobroges, Germany, and Hannibal as foreign foes of Rome. In *Georg.*, II, 167-70 Virgil names among the races of Italy the Marsi, Sabellae, Ligures, and Volsci, and cites as heroes the Decii, Marius, Camillus, the Scipios, and Octavian. The Marsi are in both lists, Virgil later (II, 533) mentions Etruria, and Paratore equates Marius with Germany and Scipio with Hannibal; but fundamental differences make this comparison no strong basis on which to establish even that the poems originated in the same moment of political feeling, to say nothing of their interdependence. There is more to be said for the suggestion that the final passage of Book II, with its allusions to the civil wars, reflects the epode, and that line 512 (*atque alio patriam quaerunt sub sole iacentem*) is a direct reference to Horace's invitation to escape.

Least convincing is the attempt to prove that the Myth of the Ages in *Georg.*, I, 121 ff. is dependent on the last four lines of the epode where the same myth is employed. In order to prove derivation it is necessary to show the existence of a peculiarity common to the two passages. This Paratore exerts himself to find. He says that only in Aratus, in *Epode XVI*, and in this passage of the *Georgics* is the number of ages given as three. Tibullus, who imitates the Virgilian passage, misunderstood it, as do Kiessling and Heinze, in finding there only two ages, whereas *tum* in line 143 marks a new age, and we have an age of

Saturn, an age of wood [!], and an age of iron. This is merely fantastic, and *tum* in line 143 to a candid reader is surely no different from *tum* in lines 137, 139, and 145 with which it forms a rhetorical repetition. Paratore strangely fails to mention in this connection the recurrence of the Ages at the end of Book II, where again there is a simple contrast between the age of Saturn and the age of Jove. Indeed he could have used this second occurrence since it ends a passage that he has otherwise plausibly connected with *Epode XVI*.

Despite the overstraining of his parallels, Paratore's discovery that there are echoes of *Epode XVI* in the *Georgics* will probably stand, and he has made plain in detail that Virgil in this poem is still working within the circle of motives inherited by him, by Horace, and by the elegists from the *νέωτεροι*. The book is valuable, and readers, if they can put up with its excessively parenthetical style, will find in it an abundance of good observations to which it is impossible to do justice in a review.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

JAMES HUTTON.

VICTOR EHRENBERG. *Alexander and the Greeks*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1938. Pp. 110. 7s. 6d.

This attractively printed book consists of four thoughtful essays. It abounds in correct and stimulating suggestions, and in guesses which may be right; but one is occasionally left with the feeling that Ehrenberg has set out to prove more than the present state of our evidence warrants; and, indeed, he appears so anxious to make his point that he often refers to a needlessly large number of supporting "facts," many of which are themselves wrong.

The burden of the first essay, "Alexander and the liberated Greek cities," is that the Asiatic cities and the Island Greeks did not belong to the Corinthian League. Perhaps Ehrenberg's third footnote on p. 15 will bring us to the heart of the matter: "Tarn (*Cambr. Anc. Hist.*, VI, p. 363) states that a purely Panhellenic policy could not have been carried through, but he believes (pp. 371 f.) in the cities joining the Corinthian League and enjoying very definite liberty: Alexander 'neither claimed nor exercised any further authority beyond what the League gave him.'" What Tarn really says, however, is this: "But once the preliminary settlement of the disturbed affairs of the cities was over—and this was a war measure—he neither claimed nor exercised any further authority, beyond what the League gave him, and sent no more orders or rescripts, save the formal documents. . . ." Considering the world as it then was, I do not see how Alexander could have done otherwise—his autocratic actions

during the immediate crisis do not exclude the probability that the cities became his allies and members of the League as well.

The second paper is entitled "Pothos"—this is Alexander's famous "longing"—and concludes "that Alexander himself picked out this word to convey a meaning peculiar to him alone, and alien to the mainly rational mind of the Greeks." I am not certain what Pothos means, if indeed it has any special meaning at all, but I doubt if it means this; in any event, Kornemann's *Alexandergeschichte des Ptolemaios* must be used with care (cf. my review, *A. J. P.*, LVIII, pp. 108 f.). The third essay, "Aristotle and Alexander's Empire," is a careful study of an intensely interesting subject. Ehrenberg shows, quite correctly I believe, that the great creations of Alexander and Aristotle "were conceived and grew and took effect without any mutual impressions worth mentioning." Ehrenberg argues, however, that Alexander aimed at oecumenic unity and not a unity of mankind. Since it is now much debated whether, with Alexander, the opposite to "national" is "cosmopolitan" or "oecumenic," I may add that the crux of the matter is Alexander's prayer at Opis: Homonoia can point only to cosmopolitanism. The final essay gives the title to the book and examines the emotional and intellectual process of Alexander's mind.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

GUSTAVE GLOTZ, PIERRE ROUSSEL, ROBERT COHEN. *Histoire Grecque*. Vol. IV, Alexandre et l'Hellénisation du Monde Antique. Part I, Alexandre et le Démembrement de son Empire. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1938. Pp. 434.

The book under review corresponds to sections of the sixth and seventh volumes of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, and it is rather instructive to place the two works side by side. Your preference will depend pretty much on what you are after. The French work is straight history, magnificently done; it starts with Persia and follows at once to Alexander and his successors, but nevertheless one is left with a feeling of incompleteness. There was more to the ancient world than just this; but another trouble, if it is a trouble, is probably inherent in the plan of the work itself. Tarn's chapters on Alexander, for example, come to less than 90 pages; obviously, this is not nearly enough space in which to tell everything that Alexander did, but it does give ample room for interpretation. Glotz and Cohen, on the other hand, devote 150 pages to Alexander's expedition; they are pages packed with Alexander's doings, culled from the ancient sources, but the story is so full that there is room for only the

briefest interpretation. It is a well-written and vividly interesting account, as one would expect of Glotz and Cohen, and it is also sound and well-documented; cautious might almost be the word at times.

There is interpretation, of course, with considerable leaning in spots toward Radet, but on the whole our four chapters on Alexander's expedition take us relentlessly from place to place with only the briefest halts to catch our breath. To take a fair sample, is it enough to say, as has been said so often, that Philip and Olympias met for the first time at the mysteries of Samothrace, and that Alexander inherited from his father intelligence and courage, and from his mother passion and mysticism? Thalestris, queen of the Amazons, is not mentioned at all, and yet someone must tell us sometime what significance this episode has for our Alexander-sources; at any rate, one might expect a recognition of some of these important problems: it is not enough, by way of introduction, to summarize the ancient writers. The Cleitus and Callisthenes episodes are treated in the usual way (though see *A. J. P.*, LIII, pp. 353 ff.), but today it is a serious mistake, I think, to give the orthodox account of Parmenio's death, for we now know that his death must be classed as a judicial murder and not as downright murder (*A. J. P.*, LVIII, pp. 108 ff.). The account of Alexander's future plans is correct, if one feels that Alexander envisaged nothing more than an exploration of Arabia and the Caspian, but one would like to have at least a statement of the problem. The discussion of Alexander's ideas of world-empire is vague (as such discussions generally are), while the discussion of his ideas on the unity of mankind does not advance the argument beyond Tarn. The only serious chronological difficulty in Alexander's entire expedition (his arrival at the Hindu Kush in mid-December, 330 B. C.) is successfully met; and in many another way the authors give proof of wide reading and sound judgment, but it is at least an open question whether in a book of this kind our chief final impression should be that Alexander did a good deal of marching. The account of the expedition is followed by a description of Greece under Alexander and by a general chapter on his government. Again it seems to me, to take an example, that either here or previously we should be given something more than a summary of Alexander's arrangements for Asia Minor. Does not Alexander's appointment of barbarians to important posts at the very beginning of his expedition reveal significantly the dawn of a startling policy (*Classical Studies presented to Edward Capps*, pp. 298 ff.)?

The second part of our volume, by Roussel, gives a meticulous picture of the Greek world after Alexander: Antigonos, Demetrius Poliorcetes, Lysimachus, Agathocles, they and all they did are here. It is good historical writing, and we may rejoice that

the great *Histoire Générale*, of which our volume in the *Histoire Ancienne* is a part, will very soon follow its Cambridge counterparts to a successful conclusion.

The two maps are commonplace, if not poor, and in several instances are wrong.

C. A. ROBINSON, JR.

BROWN UNIVERSITY.

ALBRECHT BECKER-FREYSENG. *Die Vorgeschichte des philosophischen Terminus 'contingens.'* Heidelberg, F. Bilabel, 1938. Pp. 79. (*Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Mittelalters*, Heft 7.)

In all European languages the word "contingent" is used as a philosophical *terminus technicus* in order to characterize an event as possible but not necessary, that is, as something that may happen or fail to happen. The use of the word in this sense can be easily traced back as far as the 14th century, when Nicolaus of Oresme used it in his translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. It began to be used more frequently in the late 17th and in the 18th century when it played a great part in the discussion of the so-called cosmological proof of the existence of God, which at that time is also called the proof "a contingentia mundi." Finally, in the 19th century there developed what may be called a philosophy of contingency (*Kontingenzphilosophie*), which was inaugurated by E. Boutroux's famous work *De la contingence des lois de la nature*.

The ultimate origin of the term, however, presents a rather puzzling problem, and it is this problem which the author of the work here reviewed has proposed to solve.

"Contingere, contingit" in classical Latin always refers to an event that actually happens. Such an event, of course, can also be considered as accidental or fortuitous. But, in order to express this, a "casu" or "forte" has always to be added to the verb. How, then, did the participle "contingens" and the adjective "contingent" come to be used in that sense without any such addition?

The earliest instance of this use of the word in extant literature is found in Boethius' commentary on Aristotle's work *περὶ ἐρμηνείας*. But here we encounter another rather puzzling problem.

Of Boethius' commentary two versions have come down to us, one of them obviously a revised and enlarged edition of the other. In both these versions the word "contingere" is used as a translation of two different Greek terms: *συμβαίνειν* and *ἐνδέχασθαι*. Of this fact there can be no doubt whatever, since each section of the commentary is preceded by a translation of the passage

commented upon so that one can easily see to what Greek terms the Latin words correspond. In spite of this there is an important difference between the two versions.

In the earlier edition we find the curious sentence (Aristotle, 22 a 15 ff.; Boethius, I, 180, 15-17): quod possibile est esse contingit *aliquando* ut sit et hoc est contingit esse. Since this sentence is meant to explain Aristotle's statement that the *δυνατόν* (possible) and the *ἐνδεχόμενον* (contingens) are *logically* equivalent, there can be no doubt that the "contingit esse" at the end of the sentence means *ἐνδέχεται εἶναι*. The first "contingit," however, can *not* mean *ἐνδέχεται*, since in this case the "aliquando" would be meaningless. If, on the other hand, one takes it in the sense of the earlier Latin "contingere" = "to happen" or of the Greek *συμβαίνει*, as is indicated by the construction with "ut," the explanation is not quite correct. For in the passage in question Aristotle is not at all concerned with the question whether an event of this kind will happen to occur sometime actually (*συμβήσεται ποτε γενέσθαι*), but is very careful to confine himself to the explanation that an *ἐνδεχόμενον* is something which *may* happen (*γένοιτο ἄν*), though actually it may never happen at all. But "contingit ut aliquando sit" in the sense of *γένοιτο ἄν* would be still another use of the word "contingere," to which there is no analogy elsewhere. The author is therefore probably right in his contention that Boethius, when writing this sentence, was not aware of the fact that his "contingere" corresponded to two different Greek terms and that he therefore tried—unsuccessfully—to derive one of its meanings from the other.

This view is further confirmed by the observation that in the second edition of the commentary the incriminated sentence is omitted and replaced by a rather lengthy explanation in which Boethius tries to make it clear that he is now using the term "contingens" in the sense of *ἐνδέχεται*.

The author tries to explain this difference between the two editions of Boethius' commentary on the assumption that Boethius, when writing the first version, did not consult the Greek original but an earlier Latin translation made by Marius Victorinus in which "contingere" was already used in the sense of both *συμβαίνειν* and *ἐνδέχεται*. But how Victorinus himself was induced to do so it is impossible to discover since his translation has not come down to us.

The further investigation deals with the meaning of *ἐνδέχεται* in Aristotle's works. As Aristotle himself states, the word *ἐνδέχεται* can be used in a wider and in a narrower sense. In the wider sense it includes the *ἀναγκαῖον*, because what is necessary must a fortiori be possible; in the narrower sense it excludes the *ἀναγκαῖον*, that is, it means what is possible but *not* necessary (cf. *Anal. Pr. I*, 13, 32 a 18 ff.: λέγω δ' ἐνδέχεται καὶ τὸ

ἐνδεχόμενον, οὐ μὴ ὄντος ἀναγκαῖον τεθέντος δ' ὑπάρχειν, οὐδὲν ἔσται διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον. τὸ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ὁμωνύμως ἐνδέχεσθαι λέγομεν. The author calls ἐνδέχεσθαι in the wider sense "ἐνδ I" and in the narrower sense "ἐνδ II." He contends that Aristotle, apart from *Anal. Pr.* I, 13-22, uses the word always in the sense of ἐνδ I. This is scarcely correct. In one of the cases quoted by the author as examples of ἐνδ I (p. 51 Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.* 1139 b 7 ff.: οὐδὲ γὰρ βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου) one has only to read the rest of the sentence τὸ δὲ γεγονός οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μὴ γενέσθαι in order to see that the ἐνδεχομένου here excludes the ἀναγκαῖον, for οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι μὴ γενέσθαι is equivalent to ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι (cf. περὶ ἔρμ. 13, 22 a 29-31). In reference to περὶ ἑρμηνείας itself one may reduce the statement of the author to the observation that in those passages Aristotle, on account of the ambiguity of the term ἐνδέχεσθαι, always adds a καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι or a καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, in order to make it quite clear that he speaks of an οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. Apart from that, he almost never makes any positive use of ἐνδέχεσθαι in the sense of ἐνδ I. It was therefore no great innovation when Porph. and Alex. Aphrod. used plain ἐνδέχεσθαι in the sense of ἐνδ II in their commentaries on περὶ ἑρμηνείας, as the author contends (p. 71).

Yet, in addition to many very valuable contributions to the interpretation of single passages in Boethius (cf. especially pp. 58 ff.) the author has given us the important result that Boethius used the term "contingere" in three different meanings: συμβαίνειν, ἐνδ I, and ἐνδ II, and that his commentary has had a decisive influence on the use of the word in the Middle Ages, and indirectly on its use in modern times.

The author does not follow the use of the word in detail because many of the relevant medieval works exist only in manuscripts which are not easily accessible. But he shows that John of Salisbury tries to distinguish between different meanings that had been confused by some of his predecessors.

The author seems to think that Boutroux's "contingent" corresponds exactly to Aristotle's ἐνδ II. Yet this too is somewhat doubtful. For whenever Aristotle uses the term ἐνδέχεσθαι a reference to the future is always implied. He therefore never calls an event that has actually happened an ἐνδεχόμενον though he may speak of it as of an ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. But in this case one thinks of it, so to speak, from a standpoint in the past, from which it appears as something that might have happened to be different or might not have occurred at all. Boutroux, on the other hand, very frequently calls actual events "contingent." This use of the word corresponds exactly to one of the many uses made of the word συμβεβηκός by Aristotle (cf., for instance, *Phys.* VIII, 5, 256 b 7 ff.: πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός [sc. κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον] οὐκ ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο

δηλον ὡς ἐνδέχεται ποτε μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων. οὐ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ' ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι. In this case even the problem discussed by Aristotle has some similarity to one of Boutroux's problems, though the solution is different). It might therefore be worth while considering whether "contingere" in the sense of συμβαίνειν has not also had some influence on the modern notion of "contingent."

K. V. FRITZ.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

J. M. LE BLOND. *Eulogos et l'argument de convenance chez Aristote*. Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1938. Pp. vii + 133.

French scholars have in recent years made a number of useful lexicographical studies that throw light on the philosophical significance of terms; the present work takes its place among them. Recognizing the slight use made by Greek writers earlier than Aristotle of the term εἰλογος (or εὐλόγως) and Aristotle's fondness for the expression, M. le Blond skilfully distinguishes its many *nuances* of meaning and shows the part that it plays in Aristotle's thought.

Part I first surveys the use of εἰλογος before and after Aristotle, and then deals in a general way with Aristotle's use of it. Noting that the term is not found in the *Organon*, the rigorous reasoning of which leads to conclusions commonly described as ἀναγκαῖος, the author finds that in the treatises on astronomy, natural history, and morals Aristotle often adopts the expression εἰλογος to describe speculative judgments with regard to the relation between a fact and a body of knowledge already either possessed or assumed, or to indicate as natural (whether finally justified or not) a dialectical process leading to a new judgment. This last "speculative" use of the term is hardly to be distinguished from its "practical" use. In all these uses εἰλογος seems to be indicative less of objective, scientific certainty than of a subjective sense of satisfaction at the perception of a probable connection between facts or principles, such as numerical order, logical relationship, adaptation to a context.

Part II begins with an index of all passages in the Aristotelian *corpus* in which the term εἰλογος (or εὐλόγως) is employed. It proceeds to discuss these passages, classified according to the categories already established, quoting in every case the English phrase of the Oxford translators, as well as certain French and German translations. A few of the English versions may be worth citing, as instructive examples of the wide variety of phraseology required by the contexts.

"The reason is easily given." "This at once leads us to expect." "It is natural enough." "This fact enables us to understand." "Just what we should expect." "It is reasonable." "As was to be anticipated." "It is perfectly intelligible." "With good reason." "Rationally consistent." "So we see the reason of nature's handiwork." [Nature disposes all these things] "like an intelligent workman" (*De Gen. An.* I, 23, 731 a 24: καὶ ταῦτα πάντα εὐλόγως ἡ φύσις δημιουργεῖ). "Naturally." "As a matter of course." "This continuity has a sufficient reason in our theory." "Quite clear." "The presumption being." "It is not surprising." "Well grounded." "It is reasonable to infer." "More satisfactory to suppose." "It is highly probable." "Only a reasonable postulate." "This might plausibly seem to be the case." "Hence the propriety of the figure." And (with the negative) "it is difficult to conceive."

WILLIAM C. GREENH.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

CH. MUGLER. *L'Évolution des subordonnées relatives complexes en Grec.* Paris, "Les Belles Lettres," 1938. Pp. 132.

In this monograph the author follows closely the method of treatment which he employed in his work *L'Évolution des constructions participiales complexes en Grec et en Latin*. The material is again taken from Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, and Plato, but it is to be noticed that this time the corresponding Latin constructions are not treated, except for a few examples of a special type on pp. 21 f.

The classification is naturally based on the various types of subordinate construction that may be used to enlarge the relative clauses. These are: participles; additional subordinate clauses; infinitives in *oratio obliqua* and other uses (*la proposition infinitive*); participles after such verbs as ὁράω, αἰσθάνομαι, etc. (*la proposition participiale*); and certain examples in which the relative clauses govern dependent clauses and participles together; as well as certain more complex types. Special attention is given to subordinate clauses which are incorporated within the relative clauses on which they depend, instead of merely being placed after them. The two types are treated in separate chapters, and the discussion of the incorporated type occupies more space because of the larger number of variations which it admits. From the comparative infrequency of these constructions in Homer and from Homer's somewhat awkward manner of handling them, sometimes resulting in anacoluthon, the author infers (p. 54) that their development belongs to a later stage of the language than is the case with the construction in which one subordinate clause follows another. In Thucydides, however,

the incorporated type is used with the freedom that we should expect, and indeed some of its sub-types are first found in this author. The starting-point for the type under discussion is reasonably assumed (p. 99) to be the replacement of a participle standing in the midst of a relative clause by another clause. In the first chapter (pp. 7 ff.) the author distinguishes three varieties of the use of participles in agreement with the subject of clauses introduced by a relative which stands in an object relation to the verb: either the relative depends only on the verb, or it depends on the verb and participle, or it depends only on the participle. This treatment leads to a new classification which reappears in some of the constructions where participles are replaced by clauses and which, in a sense, cuts across the main system of classification.

The present work, together with the monograph on complex participial constructions, offers to historical syntacticians a clearer knowledge of the development of Greek sentence structure, and it is to be hoped that the author will extend his investigations to other topics of a similar nature.

On p. 4 read H 27 for II 27 and θ 87 for θ 81; on p. 49 in β 43 read *ὑμῖν* for *ἡμῖν*. On p. 40, the passages A 64, K 307, and M 238 all occur in speeches, despite the statement immediately below. On p. 68 the reference (Thuc.) VII. 68 is correct, but the passage was not quoted along with the others on pp. 68 f. On p. 101 in Γ 61 f., probably *ἀνὴρ* is the subject of *ἐκτάμνησιν* and *πέλεκυς* only of *δφέλλει*, so that the passage should be re-classified in C 2.

JAMES W. POULTNEY.

CARTHAGE COLLEGE.

MARS McCLELLAND WESTINGTON. *Atrocities in Roman Warfare to 133 B. C.* Private Edition, Distributed by the University of Chicago Libraries, 1938. Pp. 139. (Diss.)

The author has adopted as a working definition for his paper the view that an atrocity in time of war normally denotes "the infliction of injury to the person, or damage to the property of the foe in such a way as to aggravate his sufferings needlessly" but, for the purposes of his dissertation, he also takes it to mean, by a special connotation, "legal acts of extreme severity and offences which were either illegal or repugnant to the sentiments of humanity but which entailed little or no physical discomfort" (p. 1, n. 2). Within the compass of this generous definition he lists acts of every character from sacrilege to rape occurring in Roman warfare during the period extending from the foundation of the city to the fall of Numantia. The Romanophile will be pleased to learn that not only atrocious acts committed by the

Romans have been treated, but also those perpetrated by their friends, allies, and enemies. Moreover, the gentle reader at large will be considerably heartened to find that, in the dissertation, "no consideration has been taken of battlefield scenes portraying the agonies of the wounded, suffering from exposure, or death from exhaustion" (p. 3).

The objective purpose which the author has set for himself in the dissertation seems to be twofold. In the first place he hopes, in general, that his frank discussion of atrocious incidents and his inclusion of their starkly realistic details may serve as an indictment of war as waged, "not by nations in modern times, but by Rome and her enemies more than two thousand years ago" (p. 4)! In the second place he specifically endeavors to ascertain, by a topical and chronological classification of the data, "whether belligerent proceedings, from a humane standpoint, were marked by a progressive or retrogressive character" (p. 3). So far as the first is concerned, it seems fair to assume that any warfare is a subject for indictment among sober-thinking folk. As for the second purpose, the author himself seems unable to decide, for after reviewing the evidence he remarks: "If we accept the statement of Dionysius that as early as the regal period there existed a colonial system whereby the conquered instead of being killed or enslaved, were left to share their land with Roman colonists, then the warfare of the Romans was definitely retrogressive in character. If, however, this assertion is to be rejected as untrue, then the application of the principles of the *ius belli*, as reflected in milder and discriminating practices, did have an ameliorating influence in limiting the horrors of war" (p. 129).

Space does not permit a full discussion of the *minutiae* but one or two are of sufficient importance to warrant mention. For example the author accepts the old theory that what written records existed prior to 390 B. C. perished in the Gallic fire (p. 3). This seems to be one of the things that archaeology has disproved. We now know that the temples housing these records survived into the late Republic and it is probably a fair assumption that most of the records themselves also survived (cf. Frank, *Roman Buildings of the Republic*, pp. 53, 78, 83; *Life and Lit.*, pp. 179 f.).

His view, following Mommsen, that Corinth was destroyed in order to eliminate a strong commercial rival (p. 45) is probably false. This is not the place for a complete discussion of the evidence (for a fairly full treatment see *Am. Hist. Rev.*, XVIII [1913], pp. 233 ff., especially p. 243). Suffice it to say, however, that an examination of the epigraphical evidence from Delos, whose Roman merchants and capitalists, interested in the island's trade, supposedly influenced the senate in its drastic action, shows that strictly Roman commerce was of little importance in

the Aegean until the formation of the province of Asia in 132 B. C. and that prior to this the great volume of the trade there was handled by Orientals and south-Italic Greeks (cf. Tarn, *Hell. Civ.*², pp. 229 ff.; Hatzfeld, *Les trafiquants Italiens*, p. 367).

The author has made a good deal of Marcellus' spoliation of Syracuse and the precedent he established there for later Roman commanders (pp. 56-7, 62, 64-5, 93 ff.). What he has failed to stress as important, however, is the fact that the citizens were not enslaved, a punishment which would have been quite in accord with the accepted principles of warfare prevailing at the time and the absence of which in this case considerably mitigates the atrocity of the pillaging of the town. Moreover, it is scarcely correct to say that the great masses of the Campanian citizens were sold into slavery after the fall of Capua (p. 97). Although their land was confiscated by Rome the original owners were allowed to remain as renters and, later on, to regain their citizenship (cf. De Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, III, 2, pp. 342 ff.).

Vae victis can scarcely be called a representative policy of the Romans during the period covered by the work (pp. 124, 127). It is well to call to mind at least the Roman settlement in Latium (388 B. C.) after the Latin revolt, which represented one of the most humane treatments of a conquered foe the ancient world had ever seen.

On the whole this work may be serviceable in filling a small niche in the modern shelf of books on the history of ancient warfare. Its chief demerit, generally speaking, is that it fails to be sufficiently interpretative.

WILLIAM G. FLETCHER.

UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE.

Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome, Vol. XV. Rome, The American Academy, 1938. Pp. 124; Pls. 18.

The latest volume of the *Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome* opens with three catalogues of collections in the Academy Museum: "Terra-Cotta Revetments" by Isobel Simpson, "Amphora Handles" by Charlotte Ludlom, and "Ancient Coins Bequeathed by Esther Boise Van Deman," by Walter F. Snyder. All three collections are useful to students at the Academy for study, but contain nothing of any particular intrinsic interest. The catalogues have been most efficiently executed.

Mason Hammond has contributed the longest article in the volume: "The Tribunician Day during the Early Empire," which deals very thoroughly with the evidence as to the day on which the tribunician power of the Roman Emperors was renewed. He takes the subject through the reign of Alexander Severus, treating in more detail the period after Galba. The

conclusions may best be summarised in Mr. Hammond's own words. "Whether or not this discussion has added much to its predecessors, it has at least sought to present the material in its most recent and available forms. . . . The present collection may be useful as a touchstone for the new and, unless or until its conclusions are upset by that new, it may serve to reestablish Mommsen's day, December 10, throughout the second and early third centuries, against Mattingly's doubts."

Mr. Snyder presents an appendix to Mr. Hammond's article in a second contribution, a weighty "Note on the Irregular Evidence of the Date of the Beginning of the Year of the Tribunician Power during the Reigns of Septimius Severus and Caracalla." After a thorough examination of the evidence he comes to the conclusion that "the more significant portion of the irregularities (not mere errors) must be assigned to incomplete, erroneous, and tardy indication and communication of the correct official system of numeration." The reader will not be surprised to find nothing more startling, since Mr. Snyder states at the beginning of his article that "it will readily be recognized that this note does essentially no more than lend further precision and substance to the necessarily summary judgment of Mommsen in his *Staatsrecht* II, 2, 801 n. 3."

In "Pinacothecae, with Special Reference to Pompeii" the meaning of the word pinacotheca, the history of pinakes and their place in Pompeian art, and the picture galleries of Pompeii and Rome are discussed by A. W. Van Buren, who shows his well-known familiarity with the whole field of Pompeian material. He takes up the types of pinakes—votive tablets, panel picture, etc. and the relation to the Four Styles of wall painting. He identifies some rooms in Pompeii as pinacothecae and concludes that Friedländer underestimated the Roman interest in art which remained inarticulate in literature, but is shown by the presence of the paintings themselves.

Erling C. Olsen describes "Two Portrait Heads in the Museum of the American Academy in Rome." One, a relief head probably from a sepulchral monument, shows recutting which he believes proves that it was transferred to another monument. It appears to be a portrait head of the first century B. C., of the type derived from death masks. The other, the head of a child, he dates in the period of Trajan and considers that it offers evidence for a redating of the so-called "Marcellus" head in Berlin.

Claude W. Barlow closes the volume with "Codex Vaticanus 4929," a very careful and detailed description of the ninth century manuscript which is the "sole remaining authority for the text of Pomponius Mela, Vibius Sequester, and Julius Paris' Epitome of Valerius Maximus." It includes a text of the *Querolus*, and scholia which Mr. Barlow publishes here for the

first time. He discusses a variety of problems which arise from the texts in the manuscript, propounds several questions connected with them, and outlines the methods by which some of these may be answered. The article is illustrated by five excellent plates.

The volume is presented in the sumptuous style characteristic of the series. The clarity of the type and the presence and quality of the plates are things to be grateful for, but the almost pedantically elaborate system of notation sometimes becomes trying to read. One other point of criticism seems justified. In spite of the scholarly way in which the catalogues of the Academy Museum have been carried out by their authors, one is inclined to wonder why it was felt necessary to go to the expense of publishing them. As far as I can judge none of them has any really new material to contribute. Obviously a museum must be catalogued but it does not seem important to publish the contents of what is mainly a study collection.

AGNES KIRSOPP LAKE.

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE.

KARL ALBERT MÜLLER. Claudians Festgedicht auf das sechste Konsulat des Kaisers Honorius, herausgegeben und erklärt. Berlin, Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1938. Pp. 131. (*Neue deutsche Forschungen*, Band VII.)

This edition consists of four essential parts: introduction, text, notes, bibliography. Doubtless out of deference to custom the author starts his introduction with the usual trite, brief statement of Claudian's life and career as a court poet. In pages 17 through 22, however, he discusses, and, in the reviewer's opinion, ably refutes Birt's dating (403 A. D.) of the battle of Verona, concluding that it must be in 402 A. D. In reaching his conclusion Birt hypothecated an unmentioned sojourn by Alaric in Illyria for one year. Müller, rejecting this, is forced into a new hypothesis on the postponement of the emperor's triumph until 404 A. D., but his point is the less strained.

The text, published without critical apparatus, is very conservative. If the 120 lines selected at random as a check were a fair sample, it is precisely what the editor claims it to be—Birt's text with minor changes. These, by the way, are not conjectures but variant readings. To be specific, the reviewer found five different readings in the lines examined, and several changes in punctuation, of which only one is significant in that it changes the sense.

In some 85 lines examined for parallel passages which are so abundantly given in the notes the reviewer found a different

situation. Here there is almost complete independence of Birt's literary apparatus, for even where Birt and Müller each cite the same author the *locus* is often different. How much of Müller's material is borrowed from others and how much is the result of his own industry the reviewer is unable to say. The heavy debt which all editors must owe to Birt's introduction is shown by the 22 references to it in the notes, but Müller's freedom of thought is shown by the 6 places wherein he differs.

The interpretative notes are usually brief, sane, and, if controversial, documented. They range in nature from points of prosody and grammar to matters of history and literary parallels. The bibliography refers to the classic editions, the obvious historical texts, and a working selection of pertinent studies, some quite recent. The text is clear; misprints are few. The editor has done his job well.

LESTER K. BORN.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Ammianus Marcellinus, with an English Translation by JOHN C. ROLFE. Vols. II and III. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1937 and 1939. Pp. vii + 683; pp. ix + 602; frontispiece, illustrations, index, and maps in both volumes.

It is now possible to judge Rolfe's edition and translation as a whole. He expressly disclaims having produced a critical edition of the original; but as I pointed out in reviewing Vol. I (*Class. Phil.*, XXXIII [1938], pp. 124 ff.), he has given us a welcome revision of the latest text, with a few conservative emendations of his own, largely to fill lacunae. He has, however, accepted very few of the hundreds of changes suggested by various scholars during this last quarter century; those few are in general based on the sound principle of a return to the MS reading. Rolfe passes no judgment on Robinson's theory that V is a copy of M; I still believe it is simpler to postulate a joint ancestor, since the material is so scanty. In any case, Rolfe lists all the publications which must be considered by the scholar who would like to tackle the perennially fascinating task of Ammianus text correction; and the critical apparatus comprises the more important new suggestions. I note the inclusion in the text of a few conjectures which sin against the accentual cursus—a procedure of which I cannot approve. I feel it is perfectly legitimate to leave in the text a MS reading which offends the cursus, but that one should not adopt a new reading contrary to its principles, any more than a conjecture in Lucretius which contravenes the hexameter.

The translation makes available for us one of the great historical works of all time, and in an English style which closely reproduces the strange combination of the original. Ammianus was a Greek officer of the Roman General Staff under Julian the Apostate; he devoted his later years to writing a Roman history in a style partly Ciceronian and Tacitean, with reminiscences of Caesar, Livy, and many others, but at the same time permeated with Asian rhetoric and full of the words and idioms of his own day. Rolfe's translation, always intelligible, cannot help reflecting this curious mixture; Ammianus is slow reading in any language; but one finishes this English text with the same respect for a sturdy, independent character, a really great historian, that is given by acquaintance with the original. Rolfe may well be proud of the satisfactory achievement of a supremely difficult task. He has also done well to include the valuable *Excerpta Valesiana*, which supplement Ammianus, the one dealing with Constantine and the other with Theodoric, and both hitherto inaccessible in English.

CHARLES UPSON CLARK.

CITY COLLEGE, NEW YORK CITY.

ALOIS WALDE. Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch. 3., neu bearbeitete Auflage von J. B. HOFMANN. 10. Lieferung, 1937; 11. Lieferung, 1938. Heidelberg, Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung.

The ninth fascicle of this work was briefly reviewed in this Journal, LVIII (1937), pp. 372-373. The tenth fascicle covers *ischadicus* to *ligula* and in its 80 pages (721-800) corresponds to 36 pages (394-430) of the second edition. The eleventh fascicle includes pp. 801-841, to *lympa* (pp. 430-450 of the second edition), after which there are *Nachträge und Berichtigungen zum I. Band*, pp. 842-872. Inasmuch as this fascicle ends the first volume, pp. xxxiv of introductory material are prefixed to this fascicle, including the title-pages, a foreword (pp. v-ix), a table of the sources of the Latin sounds in the primitive Indo-European (pp. x-xii), bibliographical abbreviations (pp. xiii-xxxii), and other abbreviations (pp. xxxiii-xxxiv).

As in the previous fascicles, the articles on the various words show great increase in the material to which reference is made; there are a few added captions and some divisions of previous articles. I can only repeat my high estimate of the value of the work and make comment on a few words.

Lectus "bed" (p. 779) is said to be from **lek-tlom*, on the evidence of Gk. λέκτρον, with dissimilative loss of *l*, while Gk. has dissimilative change or a suffix with original *r*. But in other

Italic words *-tl-* suffered first change to *-kl-*, then dissimilative change to *-kr-*: thus *vehiculum* (with later anaptyxis), but *lucrum*. In the face of the probable etymology *baculum* < **bak-klom* < **bak-tilom*, cf. Gk. *βάκτρον* with suffix *-tro-*, Hofmann must assume for *lectus* a loss of the *-l-* before the change of *-tl-* to *-kl-*; which is contrary to the order and nature of changes found in *lucrum* and (with a consonant before the suffix) in *sepulcrum*, and quite possibly in *fulcrum*. He also fails to give a convincing reason for the change from neuter to masculine gender. Either **legh-tos* or **legh-tus* seems a more probable origin; the evidence that the *-u-*stem forms are non-original is not conclusive.

Under *lingua* (pp. 806-807) there is an interpretation of the Indic and Iranian cognates which makes clear their probable relation to the original **an̥ghuā*; but the Old Persian *harbāna-* (*ha-ra-ba-a-na-ma*) cannot be emended to *hizbāna-* (the form in which Hofmann quotes it), since there is no resemblance between the OP cuneiform *ra* and *za*. The proper reading is *hid^ubāna-*, since the omission of one small stroke changes *du* to *ra* (so Meillet-Benveniste, *Gram. du Vieux Perse*², 78). The *d* is a proper correspondent of Avestan *z* in *hizū*, and the *du* character instead of *da* antecorsonantal is to be ascribed to the fact that the following *b* came from *u*.

Littera, older *litera* (p. 814), I am glad to see, is taken (with Vaniček and many later scholars) as from **leites-ā*, cf. for formation *opera*; and not as a borrowing of Gk. *διφθέρα* ("writing-material," Ernout-Meillet s. v., after Bréal).

Among the many interesting articles, now much longer than those in the second edition, I might call attention to those on *iuxtā* (p. 737) *lacrima* (p. 746), *legūmen* (p. 781; to *legō* "gather," with *ū* after *frūmentum*), *līctor* (p. 798), *locus* (p. 817), *loquor* (p. 821), *lupa* (p. 835), *lupus* (p. 836). The fulness of the references is most gratifying. For Hofmann has come to the conclusion that all etymological comments, however erroneous in his judgment, should be recorded, that the materials may be available to scholars; and I most heartily congratulate him on this decision, for not infrequently that which has seemed unlikely or impossible has been seen later to be probable, in the face of new material or of new combinations. For example, an article by A. Kuhn in *K. Z.*, IV (1855), pp. 75-77, and its utilization in Vaniček's *Et. Wtb. d. lat. Spr.*, p. 87 (1874) and *Gr.-Lat. Et. Wtb.*, I (1877), p. 383, is not mentioned in the first and second editions of this work, but it proved most valuable in my opinion (cf. *C. P.*, VIII [1913], pp. 317-326).

It was in 1924 that Hofmann was commissioned to prepare the new third edition of Walde's *Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch*. The first fascicle was issued in 1930, the half-way mark has been reached in eight years. This work is and will

continue to be an indispensable tool. Dr. Hofmann is to be congratulated on the completion of this first volume; may he have strength and opportunity to complete the task!

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

ROLAND G. KENT.

Livy, with an English Translation by EVAN T. SAGE and ALFRED C. SCHLESINGER. Vol. XII (Books XL-XLII). The Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, The Harvard University Press, 1938. Pp. ix + 521.

The translation of these last books was interrupted by the untimely death of Professor Sage, whose memoranda became available through the assistance of Dr. Adalaide J. Wegener. One third of the volume, beginning with book XLII, 22, is the work of Professor Schlesinger. The change will not obtrude itself upon the reader. The new translator renders his author understandingly and in clear and simple English. In the transitions more nicety might perhaps be desired. Those who believe that all versions would be improved if "indeed" were cut from the vocabulary might wish something better than "then indeed" for *tum vero* (pp. 349, 493); "he himself" for *ipse* (pp. 447, 451, 495) becomes cacophonous. "By far the majority" (p. 443) is not felicitous, nor is "had brought it about" for *effecerat* (p. 451) quite elegant. In the index it is doubtful whether fifty unclassified references under *Perseus* will be useful. Since the series is still far from complete such suggestions may be useful and the mention of faults does not mean that this is not a smart and handy volume. In the maps more detail is furnished than in their predecessors. Volumes VII and VIII are still awaited.

NORMAN W. DEWITT.

VICTORIA COLLEGE, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Bieber (Margarete). The History of the Greek and Roman Theater. Princeton Univ. Press, 1939. Pp. viii + 465; 566 figures. \$7.50.

Butler (H. E.) and Scullard (H. H.), editors. Livy, Book XXX. London, Methuen & Co., 1939. Pp. ix + 176; map; 3 plans.

Combella (Frederick M.). Omitted Speech Formulas in Homer. Univ. of California Publ. in Classical Philology, vol. 12, no. 4 (1939), pp. 43-56.

Cordier (A.). L'allitération latine. Le procédé dans l'"Énéide" de Virgile. Paris, J. Vrin, 1939. Pp. xi + 112. (Publ. de la faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Lille, III.)

De Ricci (S.) and Wilson (W. J.). *Census of Medieval and Renaissance Manuscripts in the United States and Canada*. II: Michigan to Canada; III: Indices. New York, *H. W. Wilson Co.*, 1937 and 1940. Pp. xviii + 1103-2343; vi + 222.

Drerup (Engelbert). *Aus versunkenen Tagen. Jugenderinnerungen*. Paderborn, *F. Schöningh*, 1939. Pp. 299. (*Rhetorische Studien*, Ergänzungsband 2.)

Fonseca (Quirino da). *Diários da Navegação da Carreira da Índia nos anos de 1595, 1596, 1597, 1600 e 1603*. Manuscrito da Academia das Ciências de Lisboa publicado por ordem da mesma Academia. Lisboa, *Acad. das Ciências de Lisboa*, 1938. Pp. xlv + 368.

Ford (Jeremiah D. M.). *The Lusitad* by Luis de Camoens. Translated by Richard Fanshawe. Edited, with introduction. *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1940. Pp. xxix + 307. \$3.50.

Getty (R. J.). *Lucan, De Bello Civili I*. Cambridge, *University Press*; New York, *Macmillan Co.*, 1940. Pp. lxvi + 155. (*Pitt Press Series*.)

Gilbert (Katharine Everett) and Kuhn (Helmut). *A History of Esthetics*. New York, *Macmillan Co.*, 1939. Pp. xx + 582. \$4.25.

Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, vol. L. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. 130.

Hritz (John Nicholas). *The Style of the Letters of St. Jerome*. Washington, D. C., *Catholic Univ. of America*, 1939. Pp. xii + 121. (*Patristic Studies*, LX.)

Jones (Frank Pierce). *The Ab Urbe Condita Construction in Greek*. A Study in the Classification of the Participle. Baltimore, *Linguistic Soc. of America*, Supplement to *Language*, XV, no. 1, Jan.-Mar. 1939. Pp. 96. \$1.35. (*Language Diss.* no. 28.)

Laistner (M. L. W.). *Bedae Venerabilis Expositio Actuum Apostolorum et Retractatio*. Cambridge, Mass., *Mediaeval Acad. of America*, 1939. Pp. xiv + 176. \$3.50.

Lutz (Cora E.). *Iohannis Scotti Annotationes In Marcianum*. Cambridge, Mass., *Mediaeval Acad. of America*, 1939. Pp. xxx + 244. \$3.50.

Manni (Eugenio). *Lucio Sergio Catilina*. Firenze, "*La Nuova Italia*," 1939. Pp. 264. (*Biblioteca di cultura*, no. 16.)

Morrow (Glen R.). *Plato's Law of Slavery in its Relation to Greek Law*. Urbana, *Univ. of Illinois Press*, 1939. Pp. 140. \$1.50. (*Illinois Stud. in Lang. and Litt.*, XXV, no. 3.)

Nelson (Brother Joel Stanislaus). *Aeneae Silvii De Liberatorum Educatione*, A Translation, with an Introduction. Washington, D. C., *Catholic Univ. of America*, 1940. Pp. ix + 231. (*Stud. in Med. and Ren. Latin Lang. and Lit.*, XII.)

Olivero (F.). *Edgar Poe*. Translated from the Italian Text by Dante Milani. Second edition with additions. Torino, *Soc. Editrice Internazionale*, 1939. Pp. 448.

Parke (H. W.). *The Delphic Oracle*. Oxford, *Blackwell*, 1939. Pp. viii + 459; 8 plates. 21 s.

Paton (James Morton), editor. *The Venetians in Athens 1687-1688*. From the *Istoria* of Cristoforo Ivanovich. Cambridge, *Harvard Univ. Press*, 1940. Pp. xiii + 104. (*Gennadeion Monographs*, I.)

Pope (Mildred K.). *Studies in French Language and Mediaeval Literature Presented to Professor Mildred K. Pope*. *Manchester Univ. Press*, 1939. Pp. ix + 429. 25 s. (*Publ. of the Univ. of Manchester*, CCLXVIII.)

Rompelman (T. A.). *Der Wartburgkrieg*. Kritisch Herausgegeben. Amsterdam, *H. J. Paris*, 1939. Pp. vi + 355.

Stratton (Clarence). *Handbook of English*. London, *Whitlsey House*; New York, *McGraw-Hill Book Co.*, 1940. Pp. vii + 352. \$2.75.

Viereck (P.) and Roos (A. G.). *Appianus, Historia Romana*. Leipzig, *Teubner*, 1939. Pp. xxxiv + 584. RM. 18.45.

INDEX TO VOLUME LXI.

	PAGE		PAGE
Alexander's Plans,	402-412	Divine (The) Entourage in	
Another Literary Papyrus in		Homer,	257-277
the Fitzwilliam Museum,		Drusus Caesar's Tribunician	
Cambridge,	209-210	Power,	457-459
Antigonis and Demetrias, The		DUNLAP, JAMES E. Frag-	
Composition of the		ments of a Latin Gram-	
Tribes,	186-193	mar from Egypt,	330-344
Apollo and the Sun-God in		'Εκρήμορος, The Meaning of,	
Ovid,	429-444		54-61
Archon Sortition Cycles, Ptole-		Emended (An) Oracle,	78-80
mais and the,	460-468	Euripides and Eustathius,	422-428
Argive Coalition, Corinth and		<i>Ῥίμαρε</i> in Isidore,	257-258
the,	413-421	FINE, JOHN V. A. The Back-	
Aristophanes, Note on, The		ground of the Social War	
owl and the χύτρα,	77	of 220-217 B.C.,	129-165
Aristotle, 'Αθ. Πολ., 54, Note		FONTENROSE, JOSEPH E.	
on,	78	Apollo and the Sun-God	
Aristotle, The Fundamental		in Ovid,	429-444
Opposition of Plato and,		Fragments of a Latin Gram-	
34-53, 166-185		mar from Egypt,	330-344
Athenian (The) Cleruchy on		FRANK, ERICH. The Funda-	
Samos,	194-198	mental Opposition of	
Athenian (The) Secretary		Plato and Aristotle,	
Phaidros of Cholleidai,	358	34-53, 166-185	
A. T. L., D8, A New Fragment		VON FRITZ, KURT. The Mean-	
of,	475-479	ing of 'Εκρήμορος,	54-61
Attie Honorary Decrees, New		Fundamental (The) Opposi-	
Datings for some,	345-357	tion of Plato and Aris-	
Background (The) of the		totle,	34-53, 166-185
Social War of 220-217		Gens (The) Porcia and Monte	
B. C.,	129-165	Porzio Catone,	73-77
BAILEY, CYRIL. The Mind of		GIFFLER, MILTON. Note on	
Lucretius,	278-291	Aristophanes, The owl and	
BOOKS RECEIVED, 127-128, 255-256		the χύτρα,	77
383-384, 514-515		GOLDMANN, EMIL. <i>Sublimiter</i> ,	
BOWRA, C. M. Sophocles on		66-68	
his own Development,	385-401	HADAS, MOSES. Livy as	
CALHOUN, GEORGE M. The Di-		Scripture,	445-456
vine Entourage in Homer,	257-277	HEIMELHEIM, F. M. Another	
Composition (The) of the		Literary Papyrus in the	
Tribes Antigonis and De-		Fitzwilliam Museum, Cam-	
metrias,	186-193	bridge,	209-210
Corinth and the Argive Coali-		HEIDEL, W. A. The Pytha-	
tion,	413-421	goreans and Greek Mathe-	
Demetrias, The Composition		matics,	1-33
of the Tribes Antigonis		Homer, The Divine Entourage	
and,	186-193	in,	257-277
DINSMOOR, WILLIAM BELL.		Isidore, <i>Ῥίμαρε</i> in,	257-258
Ptolemais and the Archon		Isidore, A Note on,	80
Sortition Cycles,	460-468	Italic Dialects, Observations	

	PAGE
on Chronology in Sound-Changes in the,	307-329
Latin Grammar from Egypt, Fragments of a,	330-344
LEVI, ADOLFO. On "Twofold Statements,"	292-306
Livy as Scripture,	445-456
Lucretius V, 1442,	69-72
Lucretius, The Mind of,	278-291
Mathematics, Greek, The Pythagoreans and,	1-33
MCCRACKEN, GEORGE. The Gens Porcia and Monte Porzio Catone,	73-77
Meaning (The) of 'Εκρήμωρος,	54-61
MERITT, BENJAMIN D. Note on Aristotle, 'Αθ. Πολ.,	54, 78
MILLER, HAROLD W. Euripides and Eustathius,	422-428
Mind (The) of Lucretius,	278-291
MOORHOUSE, A. C. Observations on Chronology in Sound-Changes in the Italic Dialects,	307-329
New Datings for some Attic Honorary Decrees,	345-357
New (A) Fragment of A.T.L., D8,	475-479
Note on the Apocryphal Oath of the Athenians at Plataea,	62-65
Note on Aristophanes, The owl and the χύτρα,	77
Note on Aristotle, 'Αθ. Πολ.,	54, 78
Note (A) on Isidore,	80
Note (A) on the New Inscription from Samothrace,	207-208
Addendum,	208
Notice of the Department of Indic Studies at the Library of Congress,	126
Observations on Chronology in Sound-Changes in the Italic Dialects,	307-329
O. Mich. I, 24,	199-201
Oracle, An Emended,	78-80
Ovid, Apollo and the Sun-God in,	429-444
P. Aberdeen 18,	480-482
Papyrus, Literary, Another in the Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge,	209-210
PARKE, H. W. An Emended Oracle,	78-80

	PAGE
PEASE, ARTHUR STANLEY. A Note on Isidore,	80
Phaidros of Cholleidai, The Athenian Secretary,	358
Plataea, Note on the Apocryphal Oath of the Athenians at,	62-65
Plato and Aristotle, The Fundamental Opposition of,	34-53, 166-185
PRAEKEN, DONALD W. Note on the Apocryphal Oath of the Athenians at Plataea,	62-65
PRITCHETT, W. KENDRICK. The Composition of the Tribes Antigonis and Demetrias,	186-193
The Term of Office of Attic Strategoi,	469-474
Ptolemais and the Archon Sortition Cycles,	460-468
Pythagoreans (The) and Greek Mathematics,	1-33
RAUBITSCHKE, ANTON E. A New Fragment of A. T. L., D8,	475-479
REVIEWS:	
Altheim's A History of Roman Religion Translated by Harold Mattingly (ARTHUR DARBY NOCK),	90-96
Austin's The Stoichedon Style in Greek Inscriptions (STERLING DOW),	121-122
Becker-Freyseng's Die Vorgeschichte des philosophischen Terminus 'contingens' (KURT VON FRITZ),	501-504
Beede's Vergil and Aratus (EUGENE O'NEILL, JR.),	377-379
Bender's Der Begriff des Staatsmannes bei Thukydides (JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.),	249
Bignone's Studi sul Pensiero Antico (FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN),	489-493
Bonner and Smith's The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, II (HARRY M. HUBBELL),	238-243
Cambridge Ancient History,	

	PAGE		PAGE
XII; Volume of Plates, V (HUGH LAST),	81-90	Aristote (WILLIAM C. GREENE),	504-505
<i>Cameron's</i> The Pythagorean Background of the Theory of Recollection (HAROLD CHERNISS),	359-385	McGregor, <i>see</i> Meritt.	
<i>Olemen's</i> Lukians Schrift über die syrische Götter (ERWIN R. GOODENOUGH),	251	<i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i> , XV (AGNES KIRSOPP LAKE),	508-510
Clement, <i>see</i> Robinson. Cohen, <i>see</i> Glotz.		Meritt, Wade-Gery, and Mo- Gregor's The Athenian Tribute Lists, I (JAMES H. OLIVER),	379-381
<i>Cumont's</i> L'Égypte des As- tologues (HERBERT C. YOUTIE),	105-108	Molt's Ad Apulei Madau- rensis Metamorphoseon Librum Primum Commien- tarius Exegeticus (HENRY W. PRESCOTT),	115-117
<i>DeCola's</i> Callimaco e Ovidio (WM. STUART MESSER),	117-119	Mondolfo, <i>see</i> Zeller.	
<i>Delcourt's</i> Stérilité mys- térieuses et naissances maléfiques dans l'anti- quité classique (ERNST RIESS),	251-254	Müller's Claudians Festge- dicht auf das sechste Kon- sulat des Kaisers Honorius (LESTER K. BORN),	510-511
<i>Dörrie's</i> Passio SS. Macha- baeorum, Die antike lateinische Übersetzung des IV Makkabäerbuches (ARTHUR DARBY NOOK),	250	Mugler's L'Évolution des sub- ordonnées relatives com- plexes en Grec (JAMES W. POULTNEY),	505-506
<i>Ehrenberg's</i> Alexander and the Greeks (C. A. ROBIN- SON, JR.),	498-499	Nestle's Der Friedensge- danke in der antiken Welt (AUBREY DILLER),	254
Glotz, Roussel, and Cohen's Histoire Grecque, IV, Part I: Alexandre et le Dé- membrement de son Em- pire (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.),	490-501	<i>Paratore's</i> Introduzione alle Georgiche (JAMES HUR- TON),	496-498
Graham, <i>see</i> Robinson.		<i>Perry's</i> Studies in the Text History of the Life and Fables of Aesop (ELINOR M. HUSSELMAN),	243-245
<i>Harvard Studies in Classi- cal Philology</i> , XLIX (WHITNEY J. OATES),	229-234	<i>Pfeiffer's</i> Die Netzflacher des Aischylos und der Inachos des Sophokles (ALFRED CARY SCHLESINGER),	250-251
<i>Hatch's</i> The Principal Uncial Manuscripts of the New Testament (H. A. SAN- DERS),	248-249	<i>Pohlens' Hippokrates und die Begründung der wis- senschaftlichen Medizin (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN),</i>	221-229
Hofmann, <i>see</i> Walde.		<i>Raeder's</i> Platons Epinomis (BENEDIKT EINARSON),	365-369
<i>Jaeger's</i> Diokles von Kary- stos (LUDWIG EDELSTEIN),	483-489	<i>Reinhardt's</i> Das Parisurteil (HAROLD CHERNISS),	111-114
<i>Kern's</i> Die Religion der Griechen, III: Von Platon bis Kaiser Julian (IVAN M. LINFORTH),	373-375	<i>Riefstahl's</i> Der Roman des Apuleius: Beitrag zur Romantheorie (HENRY W. PRESCOTT),	115-117
<i>Laidlaw's</i> The Prosody of Terence (ALICE F. BRAUN- LICH),	381-388	<i>Roberts' Catalogue of the Greek and Latin Papyri in the John Rylands Li- brary, Manchester, III: Theological and Literary</i>	
<i>LeBlond's</i> Eulogos et l'argu- ment de convenance chez			

- | | PAGE | | PAGE |
|---|---------|--|---------|
| Texts (Nos. 457-551). (W. A. OLDFATHER), | 211-221 | <i>Visser's</i> Götter und Kulte im ptolemäischen Alexandrien (IVAN M. LINFORTH), | 119-121 |
| <i>Robinson and Clement's</i> Excavations at Olynthus, Part IX: The Chalcidic Mint (ALFRED R. BELLINGER), | 102-105 | Wade-Gery, <i>see</i> Meritt. | |
| <i>Robinson and Graham's</i> Excavations at Olynthus, Part VIII: The Hellenic House (AXEL BÖRTHIUS), | 234-238 | <i>Walde-Hofmann's</i> Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch, 3. Auflage, Lief. 10, 11 (ROLAND G. KENT), | 512-514 |
| <i>Rolfe's</i> Ammianus Marcellinus, II and III (L. C. L.) (CHARLES UPSON CLARK), | 511-512 | <i>Westington's</i> Atrocities in Roman Warfare to 133 B. C. (WILLIAM G. FLETCHER), | 506-508 |
| <i>Ros'</i> Die Μεταβολή (Variatio) als Stilprinzip des Thukydides (JOHN H. FINLEY, JR.), | 96-102 | <i>Zeller-Mondolfo's</i> La Filosofia dei Greci nel suo Sviluppo Storico, Parte I, vol. II: Ionici e Pitagorici (ALISTER CAMERON), | 369-372 |
| Roussel, <i>see</i> Glotz. | | <i>Zmigryder-Konopka's</i> Le Guerrier de Capestrano (J. WHATMOUGH), | 245-246 |
| <i>Sage and Schlesinger's</i> Livy, XII (Books XL-XLII; L. C. L.) (NORMAN W. DEWITT), | 514 | ROBINSON, C. A., JR. Alexander's Plans, | 402-412 |
| <i>Schadewaldt's</i> Homer und die homerische Frage (HAROLD CHEBNISS), | 111-114 | ROGERS, ROBERT SAMUEL. Drusus Caesar's Tribunician Power, | 457-459 |
| <i>Scharf's</i> Studien zur Bevölkerungsgeschichte der Rheinlande (NORMAN J. DEWITT), | 246-247 | ROSTOWTZEFF, M. A Note on the New Inscription from Samothrace, | 207-208 |
| Schlesinger, <i>see</i> Sage. | | Samos, The Athenian Cleruchy on, | 194-198 |
| <i>Schmekel's</i> Die Positive Philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, I (PHILLIP HOWARD DE LACY), | 376-377 | Samothrace, A Note on the New Inscription from, | 207-208 |
| <i>Severyn's</i> Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclo, Première Partie, Tomes I et II (FREDERICK M. COMBELLACK), | 493-496 | Addendum, | 208 |
| <i>Simpson's</i> M. Minucii Felici Octavius (CHARLES UPSON CLARK), | 126 | SOHULLIAN, DOROTHY M. Valerius Maximus in Certain Excerpts of the Twelfth Century, | 202-206 |
| Smith, <i>see</i> Bonner. | | SCHWEIGERT, EUGENE. The Athenian Cleruchy on Samos, | 194-198 |
| <i>Stuart's</i> The Portraiture of Claudius (PAUL A. CLEMENT), | 108-111 | The Athenian Secretary Phaidros of Cholleidai, | 358 |
| <i>Tarn's</i> The Greeks in Bactria and India (C. A. ROBINSON, JR.), | 122-124 | Scripture, Livy as, | 445-450 |
| <i>Thomas' Recherches sur le développement du préverbe latin ad-</i> (WALTER PETERSEN), | 124-125 | Social War of 220-217 B. C., The Background of the, | 129-165 |
| | | Sophocles on his own Development, | 385-401 |
| | | SPITZER, LEO. <i>Kimare</i> in Isidore, | 257-258 |
| | | Strategoi, Attic, The Term of Office of, | 469-474 |
| | | <i>sublimiter</i> , | 66-68 |
| | | Term (The) of Office of Attic Strategoi, | 469-474 |

	PAGE		PAGE
Tribunician Power, Drusus		WESTLAKE, H. D. Corinth and	
Caesar's,	457-459	the Argive Coalition, 413-421	
"Twofold Statements," On,		WESTON, ELEANOR. New Dat-	
	292-306	ings for some Attic Hono-	
Valerius Maximus in Certain		rary Decrees,	345-357
Excerpts of the Twelfth		WHITTICK, G. CLEMENT. Lu-	
Century,	202-206	cretius V, 1442,	69-72
WELLES, C. B. Addendum to		YOUTIE, HERBERT C. <i>O. Mich.</i>	
A Note on the New In-		I, 24,	199-201
scription from Samothrace,	208	<i>P. Aberdeen</i> 18,	480-482